

# SELF-LIBERATION 自我解放戰略規劃指南

A Guide to Strategic Planning for Action to End a Dictatorship or Other Oppression

終結獨裁政權或其他壓迫之行動

## EXTENDED READING 1 延伸閱讀①

### I. The Politics of Nonviolent Action

壹、非暴力行動的政治

### II. There are Realistic Alternatives

貳、確實有實際可行的替代方案

### III. The Anti-Coup

參、反政變

Gene Sharp 吉恩·夏普著

Jamila Raqib 傑米拉·拉奎伯協助編撰

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© Senior Scholar, Albert Einstein Institution. I am grateful for the advice of Dr. Mary King and Robert L. Helvey, in addition to the general support of the Board of Directors of the Albert Einstein Institution, in the preparation of this document.

亞伯特愛因斯坦研究院資深學者。在此向瑪莉金恩博士(Dr. Mary King)及羅伯 L. 赫爾維(Robert L. Helvey)的指導致謝，並向亞伯特愛因斯坦研究院董事會對準備本文件的支持表示感謝。

## 譯者序 *Translator's Preface*

After a strong joint protest against the pro-China policies of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) under Ma Ying-jeou regime at the front gate of the Legislative Yuan (the Parliament of Taiwan) organized by the Taiwan Association of University Professors and many other Taiwanese civil rights organizations held on October 25, 2008, the “Alliance of Referendum for Taiwan, ART” was formed. At that time the morale and spirit of Taiwanese people, both domestic and overseas, had hit the rock bottom due to the loss of presidential election held in March, 2008. In 2009, I was invited to give a presentation at the Summer Conference of Taiwanese American Association of East Chapter. I reported to the audience of what ART had done and was planning to do with a conclusion that “a country can only be saved by her own people”. After the conference I traveled to other cities in the USA and Canada to encourage more overseas Taiwanese to care for their homeland, particularly under such a depressing and precarious time. I was very much encouraged by their positive responses and supports and

convinced firmly that Taiwanese Self-Salvation Movement will prevail.

2008年10月25日台灣教授協會與本土社團，在立法院前門開始強烈抗議馬統幫公然傾中後而成立「公投護台灣聯盟」（以下簡稱「公投盟」）。彼時，國內外台灣人民因本土陣營大選失敗而士氣低落。2009年夏天在美東夏令營主辦單位的邀請下，我向大會報告「公投盟」奮鬥的情形，以「自己的國家自己救」作專題演講，並先後到美國與加拿大之城市拜會，鼓勵海外台灣鄉親繼續為「後頭厝」的困境提供關心與協助，得到海外鄉親的正面回應與支持，得以延續「台灣人民自救運動」。

During my speaking tour and visit to Boston, Professor Albert Lin, who has sworn that he will never shave his beard until the realization of Taiwan as an independent sovereign state, and I, joined by several other friends, paid a visit to Dr. Gene Sharp of Albert Einstein Institution, who was formerly at Harvard University, at a luncheon meeting. Albert proposed an invitation to Gene to revisit Taiwan in order to provide us with advices on the strategies of Taiwan Nation Building Movement. Dr. Sharp has been an internationally well-known theorist and consultant on “Nonviolent Struggle” for oppressed peoples. He has personally provided advices to those who eventually succeeded in restoring those well

admired self-liberation movements in three Baltic States and in Serbia. Dr. Sharp responded frankly, stating that it is not for courtesy reason, that his age will not allow him to take long international trips on one hand and emphasized the main reason behind his response is that any oppressed people have to organize their own people's power strategically to liberate themselves on the other. Unfortunately I had to leave with a disappointment, shortly after the lunch, for a speaking engagement at a Taiwanese Presbyterian Church outside the City of Boston, but was overwhelmed by joy for Dr. Sharp's verbal permission in allowing me to translate his new book: "Waging Nonviolent Struggle".

其間，利用到美國波士頓演講之便，與發誓台灣沒有獨立建國就不剃鬚鬚的林哲夫教授，一起拜會哈佛大學愛因斯坦研究院<sup>1</sup>的吉恩·夏普博士(Dr. Gene Sharp)。午餐見面時，林教授提到邀請夏普博士再度到台灣指導台灣人的獨立建國運動。夏普博士是非暴力抗爭的國際級大師，曾經實地指導波羅的海三國及巴爾幹半島塞爾維亞的獨立運動，獲得令全球追求解放人民的敬佩。夏普博士表示這不是客套，一方面他說年事已高，已經不適合長途旅行；另一方面，他說明最主要的理由是，一個受壓迫的民族要尋求解放，只能透過人民自己的力量，才能實現這個目標。我提早離開午餐出

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席演講時，確實有點失望，無法掩蓋他同意授權由我來翻譯他一本新書《啓動非暴力抗爭》(*Waging Nonviolent Struggle*)的喜悅。

However, when I finished my speech, Albert, who stayed after the lunch, visited Prof. Sharp at his office of Albert Einstein Institution and had a lengthy discussion with Gene, caught up with me and brought back two unbound copies of Gene's newest book, titled: "Self-Liberation: A Guide to Strategic Planning for Action to End a Dictatorship or Other Oppressions" as well as Dr. Sharp's verbal permission to translate and publish it in Taiwan. After spending the whole night reading it, I immediately realized that this is the very book that we have been looking for. It will remind the leaders of our civil rights movement to arm and prepare themselves with non-violent strategies to lead and empower the people under the current oppression. When I returned to Taipei, I was fully convinced that the theory and strategies in Gene's booklet with pertinent knowledge and techniques should not be limited to a small group of people. I volunteered myself for its translation into Mandarin Chinese, while Albert invited a dozen experts and scholars for a series of its in-depth study with discussions. The printing and publication of its first edition in two versions, one in

pocket-sized Mandarin Chinese only and the other in bilingual of English and Chinese, were sponsored by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, for which we are very grateful. We sincerely hope that every Taiwanese and the youth can learn the importance and usefulness of strategic planning of self-liberation.

不過，等到我演講完畢，午餐時留下來與夏普博士繼續深談的林教授，帶回來夏普博士贈送的，一份散裝剛完成的「自我解放(Self Liberation)戰略規劃手冊」一書。當晚經過研讀，發覺這個手冊整理了受壓迫民族，尋找自我解放的所有知識與進行實踐的做法，如獲至寶。深覺台灣人民追求獨立建國的運動就是台灣人民的自我解放運動，而這個運動必須從自我提升及提升人民之權能(Self Empowerment)開始。演講結束返抵台北之後，爲了按照手冊中提到的另一個重點：這種知識不要淪爲菁英分子所壟斷，即刻著手翻譯，並由林哲夫教授邀請數位具經驗且有前瞻眼光的有志之士一起研讀，漢文翻譯草稿經過林哲夫教授的審閱，台灣基督長老教會決定將這本手冊印製出版，讓更多關心台灣前途的民衆與青年學生，可以了解自我解放的戰略思考與做法。

It is particularly crucial in terms of timing to publish this translated booklet when the current colonial regime in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou wants its way of promoting pro-unification policies by ignoring the rights to referendum of Taiwanese people and by passing the

Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with the Communist China. ECFA was negotiated in a secret protocol format that even those legislators who were asked to pass it did not know either the full contents or the negotiation processes involved. Under such an oppressive situation, Taiwanese people want to stop Ma' betrayal of his presidential campaign promise to have 23 million Taiwanese in determining the future of Taiwan on one hand and block the invasion of Communist Chinese on the other, I hope that this guide will stimulate deeper strategic thinking among the Taiwanese people and will empower them in overcoming their powerlessness and helplessness. Self-Liberation is to use people's collective power strategically with cost-effectiveness to save their own country from oppression and invasion. Taiwanese people should develop the capability of nonviolent struggle and aim to achieve our national goal of becoming an independent sovereign state in the international community of nations.

值此馬統幫不顧台灣社會民意的反對，汲汲欲與中國簽訂ECFA，企圖以經濟手段達成國共兩黨併吞台灣的政治目的。台灣人民一方面要阻止馬統幫背叛選前對台灣人民所做「自由民主」的承諾，另一方面必須阻擋中國共產黨勢力的入侵。譯者期盼這本書的翻譯與出版，能夠為台灣社會普遍感到的無力感注入一支強心劑。「自我解放」就是以「人











民的力量(People's power)」來解除自己民族被滅亡的危機，進而建立自己的國家。台灣人民必須培養能力，朝這個戰略目標邁進。

As a translator, I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to Prof. Gene Sharp for his kindness and generosity in granting the permission for us to translate and publish his precious lifelong work and wisdom in facilitating the self-liberation of those peoples who are willing to help themselves with strategic mind, planning and non-violent actions.

譯者要在此誠摯感謝吉恩夏普教授，慨允授權我們翻譯及出版這本他一生長期之心血與智慧結晶的成果，以協助有志以戰略性思考、規劃及非暴力之行動而尋求自我解放的人們。

T. K. Aquia Tsay  
蔡丁貴



## 審訂者序 *Reviewer's Preface*

First of all, I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to Prof. Gene Sharp for his sustained mentorship, generous assistance and friendship over those precious years since 1990 in guiding my studies on non-violent strategies and struggle for the causes of democracy, freedoms, peace with justice and nation building of Taiwan as a sovereign and independent state.

首先，我要衷心感謝吉恩夏普教授自1990年以來，對我在研究以非暴力戰略與抗爭來追求民主、自由、公義及建立台灣主權獨立國家的努力上，提供持續不斷的教導、慷慨的協助及友誼。

Any popular movement, though may be started by a very small number of activists initially, is rooted on their collective grand vision. The subsequent public participation during the maturing stage will inevitably usher in changes to this movement on its momentum, mobility, direction, quality, as well as materialization and sublimation of their final vision. A series of inter-related and inter-locked activity plans and strategies will be

formulated based on the grand strategy for the realization of final vision.

任何大眾化的運動，雖然起初可能是極少數的人，基於某一遠大理想而發動，在其成長過程中，必經大眾的參與，導致動量、機動性、運動的方向、品質和理想的具體化及昇華，而將其運動策略化，企畫能符合藉此大策略完成最終理想，環環相扣主動性的系列活動。

As I reflect on the past five decades of my continuous involvement for Taiwan's democracy and independence movement, I have painfully felt that it has been very difficult to secure the opportunities to participate in essential decision making, exploring, formulating and strategizing pertained to the movement from far Canada. I am very grateful for the precious Providential guidance in being exposed to URM (empowerment through organizing people, Urban Rural Mission) under the leadership Rev. Prof. Ed File in Toronto 1982; conflict management and resolution program in Taiwan 1994, fortunately taken over by TPN (Third Party Neutral for conflict resolution, management, prevention and transformation) under the leadership of Dr. Steve Chen in Ottawa first and later in Taiwan in 2002; OST (Open Space Technology for re-spiriting and transformation of organization) through Rev. Dr. Larry Peterson in Taiwan 2002; and non-violent CBD

(Civilian-Based Defence) under the mentorship of Prof. Gene Sharp in Boston 1990, and in Taiwan since 1994. All these programs have been subsequently introduced to Taiwan and greatly facilitated in the growth of and impacted on the quality of the movement. However, we are still far from the ideal state of realizing our final vision of building a new and independent sovereign state of Taiwan, filled with truth, goodness, beauty, peace, justice, democracy, human rights, freedoms, rule of laws, multi-cultural civil society of vitality. This is the very opportune time for those committed and able leaders and cadres of movement to meet together in honest reflection and critical analyses of their past activities, how they were misled by the KMT resulting in losing their direction and momentum, limiting themselves to reactive programs, losing all the precious opportunities. Who can help us overcome this difficult obstacle by alternative thoughts and strategies?

回顧及探討數十年來，從事台灣的民主化及建國運動，痛切地體會到身處國外，難有連續性的參與，更難有機會擠進決策核心，影響大策略的催化、探索及擬定。能在加、美兩國接觸到數套社會運動所需的工具，謹由衷向所信仰的上帝感謝開導、指引所獲得的培能(empowerment through organizing people)的URM(城鄉宣道工作，1982年始於Toronto)；衝突處理(1994年始於Toronto)，幸在2002年再

由陳校賢教授引進中性第三者(TPN Ottawa)；開放空間技巧(OST, 2002年始於台灣)，非暴力的公民防衛(CBD, 1994年始於Boston)前後引進台灣，而或多或少地助長了咱的運動，影響其品質，卻仍與最終的理想目標，及建立新而主權獨立、充滿真善美、和平、公義、民主、人權、自由、法治，富有活力之多元公民社會的台灣國的情景仍遠。此時正是有意願、魄力，繼續參與運動的幹部雲集一堂，冷靜、坦誠地探討過去的運動，如何被KMT誤導，屢屢喪失其運動性及方向性，僅侷限於舉辦反應式的活動，而一再喪失良機，此難關由誰如何重啓另類思考之大門？

In 2009, Dr. TK Aquia Tsay was able to humble himself greatly as a professor of the National Taiwan University and devoted himself to the actual non-violent action for the democracy and independence movement of Taiwan. He extended his project of recruiting members to the “Senior Revolutionary Army” among the Taiwanese from both inside Taiwan and traveling to North American cities with greater number of Taiwanese through talks and speeches. He planned to attend the “UN for Taiwan” rally in New York City first before continuing his speaking tour to Boston, Montreal, Ottawa and Toronto in mid September. I was moved greatly by his determination and devotion and was able to convince my wife in joining me to drive to NY city for the rally first, and then to provide

the transportation for Prof. Tsay from NY city with four stops, to Boston, Montreal, Ottawa to Toronto for his speaking engagements as our first intention. Prof. Tsay offered himself to drive all the way and we ended up the passengers. My second intention for this driving trip was to take time to introduce the essentials of those four sets of tools for social transformation as well as the key personnel related to those tools.

2009年蔡丁貴教授異類地放下台灣大學教授的身段，以實際非暴力行動投入民主建國運動，在國內外招兵買馬，籌募「老人革命軍」，甚至遠飛到北美較多台灣鄉親僑居的城市演講，也趕到紐約市參加「UN for Taiwan」的遊行。並計畫之後到Boston、Montreal、Ottawa及Toronto演講。我深受感動，就與內人決定先從Toronto驅車到紐約市參加此遊行，然後接蔡教授，當他的司機，提供從紐約至Boston、Montreal、Ottawa到Toronto所需的交通。結果，反而是蔡教授全程當了我們五天的司機。我的另一用意是想藉此遠程的驅車旅行，找機會向蔡教授介紹上述四套社會改造工具的相關機構及負責主導的人士。

The first stop is Boston, where I had met Prof. Gene Sharp on February 10, 1990 at the National Conference on Non-Violent Sanction when he was in charge of the “Non-Violent Sanction Program” at Harvard University featured the keynote speaker, Dr. Johan Jurgen Holst,

the Executive Director of Institute of International Studies of Norway in Oslo, later Minister of National Defence and of Foreign Affairs. During the three day conference, I met members of the Quakers who had been providing non-violent action training and joined the Civilian Based Defence Association (CBDA), which Prof. Sharp facilitated in founding it. I had the honour of serving as one of the Board Directors of CBDA for five years as well as of hosting the Annual Meeting of CBDA in Toronto in May 1995. I was greatly moved by a telephone from Prof. Sharp in early June of 1994 that he would be ready to respond to my eager and nagging request of inviting him to Taiwan for a lecture-seminar tour on Civilian-Based Defence (CBD). He arrived in Taiwan on December 16, 1994 and provided a two week lecture-seminar series on CBD: a close lecture to the high ranking military officers at the War College, two public hearings at the Legislative Yuan (Parliament of Taiwan), and ten lecture-seminars to the public.

與第一站的Gene Sharp教授的認識，則需要追溯到1990年2月初，在Boston參加他在哈佛大學執教時所主辦的「非暴力制裁」國際會議，而接觸到非暴力行動訓練的貴格會與加入他啓蒙創設的公民防衛國際協會(CBDA)，也當了五年理事，在多倫多主辦了該會1995年的年會。而Sharp教授經四年多的拜託及邀請，終於在1994年12月答應咱的邀請，來



台灣做爲期兩個禮拜的CBD的學術性演講及研討，共有：在戰爭學院非公開的一場演講、在立法院的兩場公聽會與南北十場的公開演講及研討會。

Before the departure from Taiwan, Prof. Sharp reminded me repeatedly, a person who had been blacklisted by the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and banned from returning to Taiwan for over 30 years, to find means and ways to invite a person officially who had studied his CBD theory and to share their successful story in applying the non-violent strategies and actions to defeat the Soviet challenge posed by five reinforced divisions, including a crack paratroopers division, in restoring their national independence from USSR to the audience in Taiwan. This person was the former Minister of National Defence of Lithuania, Dr. Audrius Butkevicius. The Lithuanian victory had contributed partially to the disintegration and demise of USSR.

在他離台前，特別叮嚀挑戰一個長久被列入黑名單的人，想辦法正式由官方邀請，曾實際運用過CBD之理論的立陶宛前國防部部長Dr. Audrius Butkevicius，來分享其如何以非暴力策略及行動，擊退蘇聯五個加強師的挑戰，成功地脫離蘇聯，重獲立陶宛的獨立，並貢獻於USSR之瓦解的經過。

I believe in that God helps those who help themselves. By the grace and providence of God and help from some comrades, as an absentee candidate, I managed to secure the second position for the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) primary among six candidates for proportional representation from the overseas. When the primary was held in Taiwan in May 1995, I was hosting the Annual Meeting of CBDA in Toronto, Canada. I was included as a member of Legislative Trade Delegation to visit Lithuania in early November, 1996 and met the young psychiatrist, Dr. Butkevicius. I had requested the written record of their long struggle, rights to translate and publish it as well as extended our invitation to him for a one week visit with lecture tour to Taiwan in February 1997. During his official visit, Dr. Butkevicius shared their long detailed Baltic Way of their struggle to restore the national independence, including the 600 km human-chain extended by two million Baltic peoples from Tallinn through Riga to Vilnius to show their determination and details of the critical strategic event in the evening of January 13, 1991.

果然神不負有心人，使我選上第三屆僑選立委，1996年11月初，隨立法院經貿訪問團去立陶宛，成功地在1997年2月邀請此位年輕的精神科醫師來台訪問一個禮拜。在立法院的公聽會外，南北五場演講中，詳細闡述了其最後關鍵性奮

鬥及智取的經過，和在此之前所策劃，200萬人跨波海三國首都600多公里所組織成的人鏈(human-chain)，手牽手以展示其團結的決心，再獨立的盛舉。

Those physically very taxing visits by Prof. Sharp and Dr. Butkevicius and the sharing of their wisdom, theory and experience to the audience in Taiwan and my five year association with CBDA prompted me to organize the Research Association of National Peace-Security in Taiwan (TRANPS) in May 1999. Its main purposes are to encourage NGOs to be involved in advocating and disseminating the concepts of CBD to the public, and in promoting its educational and training programs.

Sharp教授和Butkevicius醫師不辭辛勞前後訪問台灣，他們在台灣的演講及分享，與在CBDA五年的理事經驗，間接地鼓勵了「台灣國家和平安全研究協會(TRANPS)」在1999年5月的成立。主要是企畫利用民間團體來鼓吹、推廣CBD的觀念，教育及組訓計畫。

Some of the preliminary work on CBD which I had failed to accomplish during my tenure as a legislator of the Third House, I was very fortunate to have had the support of those legislators in the Fourth and Fifth House, notably Dr. Michael M S Tsai, Mr. Cheng-yao Tai, Rev. Kok-tiong Cheng, and Mr. S K Jan. Under the leadership

spearheaded by Legislator Tsai, two inter-related bills on National Defence were enacted on January 15, 2000, nationalized the armed forces from being the KMT's Party Army, and incorporated those articles on the concepts and strategies of Total National Defence, Total Civil Defence and broad public military education. With the support and collaboration of Legislator Tai and Vice Minister of Education, Ms. Lulu Fan, TRANPS was able to convene a National Conference on Total National Defence and National Security on September 13-14, 2001 to promote a broader understanding of mutually complementary roles of armed defence and civilian based defence. Subsequently, Legislators Rev. Kok-tiong Cheng and Mr. Chi-hong Chao were able to help us in laying ground work with the Bureau of Military Education of the Ministry of Education to redesign those curricula on Military Education and Training Programs at both the secondary and tertiary levels. We were fortunate to have the participation of Prof. C H Shih, Prof. W C Chen, Prof. C. C. Lin, and Prof. Y Li as well as the support from vice Minister of National Defence, Dr. Michael M S Tsai and Vice Minister of Education, Ms. Lulu Fan. However, the civilian based defence is not a panacea. It has the potential to prevent, deter and defeat any invaders, coup de Tarts, and usurpers with advance research, education and training

programs on civilian based defence.

在我任第三屆立法院委員時未能完成的一些初步工作，非常幸運的獲得第四、五屆數位立委如蔡明憲、戴振耀、鄭國忠及簡錫堦等的有力支持。在蔡立委的主導下，2000年1月15日通過了新的國防二法，採納軍隊國家化、全民國防、全民防衛與政府應推廣全民國防教育的條文。在戴立委與范巽祿教育部政務次長的合作下，2001年9月13-14日，由TRANPS主辦「全民國防與國家安全」的學術研討會，改善了軍民雙方對公民防衛，在加強軍事國防與非武裝國防間互補性功能的瞭解，進而促成鄭國忠與曹啓鴻兩立委的協助，與教育部軍訓處合作下的軍訓課程的改編工程，也幸得施正鋒等數位教授的參與，和蔡國防部副部長與范政務次長幕後的支持。公民防衛雖非為「萬能丹」，但在有預先籌畫CBD的教育及組訓下，卻具備對防犯、嚇阻及擊敗任何外敵的入侵，與國內政變、篡權等盲舉的潛能。

The future national and human security of Taiwan depends greatly on advance thorough and holistic research, planning, and execution of the realistic CBD educational and training programs. It is also an integral element in enabling to enrich our psychological defence, to strengthen our democracy, and to consolidate Taiwan's security, peace and sustaining of growth of our nation building movement through self-liberation.

今後台灣國的國家安全與人的安全(human security)，有

賴預先透澈且整全公民防衛的務實教育及組訓策劃及推動，也是咱自我解放建國運動中，藉著具體的行動及企畫，以充實心防、深化民主、鞏固台灣國之安全、和平及持續成長的一要素。

On Sunday, September 13, 2009, Prof. Gene Sharp made an exception in receiving guests. Prof. T K Aquia Tsay left for a speaking engagement outside Boston after a simple lunch, and we moved to his Albert Einstein Institution office in East Boston. My question to Prof. Sharp was whether he would be able to make another trip to Taiwan in advising us as we tried to re-chart our future course of action. His answer was that: firstly his health condition would not allow him to travel long distance and secondly if you had seriously pursued thorough strategic research on the issue, you can do it yourselves without any external assistance. He got up and walked to his computer and had two draft copies of his new book: “A Guide to Self-Liberation” printed and gave them to us. He gave us the verbal permission to have it translated and published in Taiwan, but reminded us to ensure the quality of translation and careful in-depth study to facilitate the cost-effectiveness of Taiwan’s nation building.

2009年9月13日，Sharp教授破例在禮拜天接見訪客，在餐館見面寒暄及午餐後，蔡教授因需先離開趕路去市郊

演講，我們就到Sharp教授所創辦的愛因斯坦研究所(Albert Einstein Institution)，繼續商討能否再度請他來台灣支援，並指導咱所需的CBD工作計畫。他率直地回答說：第一、健康上不再允許他長途旅行；第二、你們只需認真研究策劃，則自力就可以做到，不需要他人的幫忙。便起身走到他的電腦，列印了兩份尚未出版的小冊——*A Guide to Self-Liberation*(《自我解放之指南》)的原稿給我們。他不計較版權，但要我們做有品質、忠實的翻譯，以供更多有台灣心的人精細地研讀，使我們能更有效益地推動建國運動。

I am very impressed by the effort and spirit of Prof. T K Aquia Tsay with price paid in encouraging many people to read both this Guide and those additional reading materials. Its Chinese versions will doubtlessly contribute to a greater number of serious readership and to realize its intended impacts. It will encourage more people to join the ranks of Taiwan Independence and Nation Building Movement with constant serious reflection, to cultivate their ability of critical thinking and analytical mind, and of engaging in strategic reflection of the relevance of activities and movement. I hope that this will prompt a group of leaders to put their collective wisdom and effort together in formulating a holistic grand strategy to plan a series of associated proactive strategies, tactics and means and accomplish the task of our nation building.

I strongly recommend all of those Taiwanese who care about our future nation of Taiwan as a sovereign and independent state, the national and human security of Taiwan, and the well being and happiness of all Taiwanese people, present and future, should read this guide and those additional reading materials seriously as well as join in all of future non-violent actions. I firmly believe that all the readers and the Taiwanese people will benefit greatly from the publication of this book toward earlier realization of building an independent state of Taiwan.

我非常敬佩蔡丁貴教授的精神、用心及所付出的犧牲，催促了不少人參加研讀此一指南小冊及所指定近一千頁的必讀文獻，此漢文翻譯本的出版及有心人士廣泛的研讀，必定會貢獻並導致Sharp教授寫此書之主旨所期待達到的效應，及促使更多有心加入台灣民主獨立建國運動之陣營的人士，經常慎重探討，致力培育思考能力，從戰略觀點反省所推動、從事的活動與運動的相關性，並催促一群領導者集思廣智，致力擬定一套整全完成建國大業所需的大策略，並策劃相關系列的主動性活動及策略、戰術與方法。確信此書所有的讀者及台灣人將因其出版而獲益良多，促成獨立建國的早日完成。

It is my great honour to be asked by Prof. Tsay to write a preface for this Chinese version. I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation



and respect for his hard work. The last, but not the least, I would also like to express my heartfelt respect and gratitude to the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT) which has made great contributions over the decades with their consistent spirit, principle, and effort toward social transformation and democracy movement based on their Christian faith and those three pertinent elements for social change, namely: love, justice and non-violent power. The PCT have issued statements and declarations at every critical juncture, joined in the non-violent action regularly, and paid dear price selflessly and worked earnestly as prophets, priests, and other roles in providing spiritual, human and material resources and support without expecting any returns. The General Assembly Office of PCT has played an important leadership role with the participation of some younger clergies, such as Rev. Hontiong Lyim, Rev. Simon Kok-tiong Cheng, Rev. Daniel Cheng, and Dr. Steve S S Chen through their active participation in those important education, training and mission programs on URM, TPN, OST, and CBD. I firmly believe that the PCT will be able to directly and/or indirectly contribute more and impact, through the professing faith with social actions, on the quality, potential and accomplishments of Taiwan's future socio-political movement as well as to the well being of the Taiwanese. I

would like express my overdue appreciation and respect to many PCT clergies and elders for those precious opportunities in allowing this first generation Christian to work with them for this precious and noble cause over the decades.

能受蔡教授之託，爲此書的漢文版爲序，是我極大的榮幸，並藉此機會向蔡丁貴教授致敬，並由衷致謝！容我套一句英文格言：「The last, but not least.」在台灣及寫此序文時，直覺的感觸應指最後才提到，貢獻最大的卻是台灣基督長老教會(The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan，簡稱PCT)！回顧數十年來，台灣的社會改造及民主運動始終一貫，秉持其信仰與基督的愛、公義及和平的三大社會改造要素，參與關鍵危機時發表聲明及宣言，經常參與非暴力的行動行列，在人力、智力及物力上，付出極高昂的代價而不求回報，全無私心，默默耕耘，扮演先知、祭司及其他多種的重要角色。PCT總會提供重要的領導者角色，其中較年輕的牧師如林芳仲、鄭國忠及鄭英兒等積極的參與URM, TPN, OST與CBD等的重要教育、組訓工作計畫。我確信PCT直接及間接地影響、貢獻於台灣的社會政治運動的品質、潛能及今後的成就，而造福於台灣的國民。亦藉此文，謹向這一大群的牧長致最大的敬意及謝意，讓我這個第一代的基督徒有機會和他們共事。

Abert Lin  
林哲夫

## 編者序 *Editor's Preface*

### Toward a New and Independent State—Taiwan 邁向新而獨立的國家——台灣

On behalf of all members of Editorial Committee, I would like to express our heartfelt appreciation to Prof. Gene Sharp for the magnanimous sharing of his life long wisdom and work through various serious publications in printed format as well as through posting on the website of Albert Einstein Institution to whoever willingly pursuing the democracy and human rights and in overcoming the injustice and oppression through strategic non-violent action. We are particularly grateful to Prof. Sharp for making a two week lecture-seminar tour to introducing the essential concepts and theory to the Taiwanese audience in December 1994, for offering us the permission to translate and publish the Guide to Self-Liberation in September 2009, and for giving us the permission to translate and publish those some 900 pages of recommended additional reading materials into Mandarin Chinese in Taiwan in September 2010.


我代表全體編輯委員向吉恩夏普教授致上十二萬分的感謝。他將他一生累積的智慧與成果透過許多連續的出版，

以及愛因斯坦研究院的網站貼文，讓所有努力超越不公不義與壓迫，而能以戰略性的非暴力行動來追求民主與人權。我們特別感謝夏普教授於1994年12月前來台灣進行兩個星期的參訪與演講，向台灣的聽眾介紹全民防衛主要的觀念與理論，也特別感謝他於2009年9月授權同意翻譯及出版這本《自我解放指南》，及2010年10月即將出版的相關大約900多頁的推薦延伸閱讀資料。

The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan issued the Human Rights Declaration in 1977 to declare to the world that the future of Taiwan should be decided and building of a new and independent state of Taiwan by the Taiwanese and through self-determination. Whenever the international community is/are discussing all issues related to the future of Taiwan should respect their rights to self-determination and their wish of the building a new and independent state through peaceful means.


自1977年台灣基督長老教會發表人權宣言，揭示台灣的未來應該經由台灣人民的決定(自決)，促使台灣成為新而獨立的國家。國際社會略可知道台灣人民的願望，在強國討論與台灣有關的議題時，至少仍會提到必須尊重台灣人民的意願，而且必須在和平的狀態下決定。

During the processes of pursuing a new and independent state of Taiwan, many elders and pioneers



have laid some foundation for the birth of this nation. They may be the well-known leaders or hard-working unknown grass root activists, but are all being respected. However, we have encountered conflicts due to disputes over the differences in strategies, as well as difficulties due to differences in value systems and identity.

在追尋新而獨立的國家的過程中，許多前輩已經為這個將要誕生的國家立下地基，無論是著名的領袖人物或是默默耕耘的基層運動者，都是令人敬佩的。但是我們也遇到過台灣人之間因為運動路線的不同而起的衝突，也曾受到因為利益或認同的問題所造成的阻礙。



In 1982, a blacklisted Taiwanese, Dr. Albert J F Lin, was able to facilitate in inviting Rev. Dr. Ed File (known as “I love Taiwan pastor”) of Urban Rural Mission of Canada in Toronto in providing the organizers training programs of empowerment through organizing people for power to those Taiwanese activists in their struggle for democracy, freedoms, human rights, and independence of Taiwan. Those activists, who had been struggling under the martial law and white terrorism were greatly helped by this training of love and non-violence.

1982年，經由加拿大的黑名單林哲夫教授(Dr. Albert Lin)，引介Rev. Dr. Ed File愛台灣牧師傳授城鄉宣教(Urban Rural Mission, URM)給追求民主、自由、獨立的台灣國家的

有志之士，這套組織人民爭取權益的愛與非暴力的訓練，曾在戒嚴、白色恐怖時期，幫助台灣人民抵抗暴政。

Later on, Dr. Albert Lin was able to introduce directly or indirectly the Third Party Neutral (TPN), Open Space Technology (OST), and Civilian-Based Defense (CBD) to Taiwan in order to strengthen the democracy and consolidate the national security.

後來，林哲夫教授陸續將中性第三者經陳校賢教授 (Third Party Neutral, TPN)、開放空間技巧經Rev. Dr. Larry Peterson (Open Space Technology, OST) 及全民國防 (Civilian-Based Defense, CBD) 引入台灣，為的是深化台灣的民主、鞏固國家安全。

When Prof. Albert Lin and Prof. TK Aquia Tsay visited Prof. Gene Sharp at the Albert Einstein Institution in Boston in September 2009, they were offered two draft copies of “A Guide to Self-Liberation” with permission to translate into Mandarin Chinese and publish. We organized a 12 member study group on this Guide in December of 2009 and met on regular basis.

2009年夏，林哲夫教授與蔡丁貴教授訪問夏普教授 (Dr. Gene Sharp) 時，得到他慨允贈送 *A Guide to Self-Liberation* (《自我解放》) 的手稿。

In the spring of 2010, Prof. Tsay finished the translation, Prof. Albert Lin reviewed, and Rev. Hontiong Lyim led the Editorial Committee members in editing. It was decided to be published by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan in two different versions: a pocket sized one in Mandarin Chinese only, and the other in bilingual version of English and Mandarin Chinese. We sincerely hope that those devoted Taiwan Independence activists may take advantages of this Guide, organize various study groups to study the contents of this Guide together in many localities and formulate their proactive strategies and non-violent actions with the help of the open space technology in accordance with our Grand Strategy of Taiwan's nation building.

2010年春，經蔡丁貴教授翻譯、林哲夫教授審訂，決定由台灣基督長老教會出版漢文版與英漢對照版，希望台灣有志於建立新而獨立的國家者，可以善用這本書，在各地組成讀書會，一起討論內容，並用OST的方式制定建國的大戰略等方案。

For conveniences of the readers, this Guide to Self-Liberation and its recommended reading materials are edited into six volumes. It is based on two considerations. At first, recommended reading pages from one book will be organized in the same volume. Secondly, each volume

may include several books so that the size of them can be almost equal. The translated version has kept the original page numbers for easy references. We have treated the Guide to Self-Liberation as an overview in a separate volume. Volume I of extended readings contains: “The Politics of Nonviolent Action,” “There Are Realistic Alternatives,” and “The Anti-Coup;” Reading materials of “Waging Nonviolent Conflict;” “On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict;” “Social Power and Political Freedom;” and “From Dictatorship to Democracy” are collected in Volume 2, 3, 4, and 5, separately and respectively. Readers are encouraged to study these translated reading materials in the sequence as Dr. Gene Sharp has strongly recommended.

爲了讀者使用方便，本書編輯的考慮是將「自我解放指南」，及文中提到之延伸閱讀資料翻譯共分別編成小冊，以延伸閱讀資料之書籍集中在一本小冊爲原則，而且以每一小冊之頁數大致相當爲考慮。但譯文中仍然保留原書之頁碼(黑反白和平鴿標示者)，方便讀者查閱引用。「自我解放指南」自成一冊，可以當作本系列的總論；延伸閱讀系列之第一冊包括「非暴力行動的政治」、「確實有實際可行的替代方案」及「反政變」；系列之二爲「啓動非暴力抗爭」；系列之三爲「戰略性的非暴力衝突」；系列之四爲「社會權力與政治自由」；系列之五爲「從獨裁走向民主」。閱讀的順序仍然按照「自我解放指南」一冊中所建議的順序。



Once again, we would like to express our sincere appreciation to Prof. Gene Sharp, Prof. TK Aquia Tsay and Prof. Albert Lin for their respective contribution to the publication of this Guide. Our gratitude also owe to Mr. Suzu Lee for his beautiful design of the cover pages, to all members of the editorial committee for their suggestions and participation in discussions. Through these publications, with further spreading of knowledge and technology in non-violent struggle, the objective of establishing a democratic system in Taiwan can be achieved.

本書的出版，再一次感謝夏普教授(Gene Sharp)、林哲夫教授(Dr. Albert Lin)及蔡丁貴教授的貢獻。感謝李夙儒完成精美的封面設計，並感謝編輯小組的討論與建議，讓「非暴力抗爭」之知識與技術的傳播，可以進一步讓台灣朝向公民社會邁進。

Hong-Tiong Lyim  
林芳仲

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美國紐約市中央公園的甘地塑像





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# 壹、非暴力行動的政治

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I

The Politics of Nonviolent Action

## The Politics of Nonviolent Action 非暴力行動的政治

 P.11

French writer Étienne de La Boétie, in speaking of the power of a tyrant:

法國作家艾蒂安德拉博耶提(Étienne de La Boétie)，這樣說到暴君的權力：

He who abuses you so has only two eyes, has but two hands, one body, and has naught but what has the least man of the great and infinite number of your cities, except for the advantage you give him to destroy you.<sup>1</sup>

那個虐待你的人，也只有兩個眼睛，有兩隻手，及

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1 Etienne de La Boetie, “Discours de la Servitude Volontaire,” in *Oeuvres Completes d’Etienne de la Boetie* (Paris: J. Rouam & Cie., 1892), p. 12. See also Boetie, *Anti-Dictator: The “Discours sur la servitude volontaire” of Etienne de La Boetie*, trans. by Harry Kurz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), pp. 11-12. That translation differs slightly from the one in the text of this volume which was made by Madeline Chevalier Emerick.

艾蒂安德拉博耶提(Étienne de La Boétie)，《揭密自願奴役》，艾蒂安德拉博耶提全集(巴黎，J. Rouam & Cie，1892年，第12頁。同時參閱博耶提，《反獨裁者：艾蒂安德拉博耶提的「揭密自願奴役」》，哈利古茲(Harry Kurz)譯，(紐約，哥倫比亞大學出版社，1942年)，第11-12頁。這個翻譯與梅德琳切瓦利爾艾美立克(Madeline Chevalier Emerick)的譯文稍有不同。


一具身軀，而其他就一無所有，但在你們城市有許多無限數量的基層民眾，除了利用你給他的優勢來摧毀你<sup>1</sup>。

Auguste Comte also argued in the early nineteenth century that the then popular theory was not correct in attributing to rulers a permanent, unchanging degree of power. On the contrary, while granting the influence of the political system on the society as a whole, Comte insisted that the power of a ruler was variable and that it depended on the degree to which the society granted him that power.<sup>2</sup> Other, more recent writers have made the same point.<sup>3</sup>

奧古斯特康德(Auguste Comte)在19世紀初也認為，當時流行的理論將統治者當作一個永久不變程度之權力是不正確的。相反的，雖然同意政治體制對整體社會會有所影響，康

2 Comte saw “every social power” as being “constituted by a corresponding assent...of various individual wills, resolved to concur in a common action, of which this power is the first organ, and then the regulator. Thus, authority is derived from concurrence, and not concurrence from authority...so that no great power can arise otherwise than from the strongly prevalent disposition of the society in which it exists...” The degree of disposition in the society toward a ruler, Comte believed, would determine the relative strength or weakness of the power-holder. (Comte, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, pp. 222-223.)

康德(Comte)認為「每個社會權力」是由：「一個對應……包括許多個人的同意、一致達成共同之行為所組成的。其中，這個權力是器官，然後是一個管制器。因此，威權是由意見一致所產生的，而不是威權造成意見的一致。可以說，如果不是社會中存在著強烈流行的社會讓渡，不可能出現強大的權力……」康德確信，這個社會對統治者讓渡的程度就會決定權力擁有者的相對優勢與弱點。康德，《奧古斯特康德之正面哲學》，第222-223頁。



德堅持認為，統治者的權力是可以改變的，而且它由社會授予他那個權力的程度而決定<sup>2</sup>。其他更近代的作家都提出同樣的觀點。<sup>3</sup>

## Sources of power 權力的來源

If political power is not intrinsic to the power-holder, it follows that it must have outside sources. In fact, political power appears to emerge from the interaction of all or several of the following sources:

如果政治權力不是權力擁有者所固有的，因此它必須有外部的來源。事實上，政治權力似乎在以下所有或幾個來源之相互作用下產生：


### 1. Authority 合法性

3 Two contemporary American writers argue similarly to Comte. Harold D. Lasswell writes: "Power is an interpersonal situation; those who hold power are empowered. They depend upon and continue only so long as there is a continuing stream of empowering responses...power is...a process that vanishes when the supporting responses cease."

"The power relationship is...giving-and-taking. It is a cue-giving and cue-taking in a continuing spiral of interaction." (Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1948], p. 10)

有兩位現代的美國作家與康德有類似的論點。哈洛德拉斯威爾(Harold D. Lasswell)寫到：「權力是一個人與人之間的情勢關係；那些擁有權力的人是因為得到授權，他們依賴著而且就能持續，只要有一個持續不斷的授權過程……當支持的回應終止的時候，權力……是一個會消失的過程。」

「權力關係是……給予與取得的關係，它在一個持續的互動中是一個暗示給予及暗示授權的關係。」(哈洛德拉斯威爾，《權力與個性》，紐約W. W. Norton & Co. 出版公司，第10頁。)



The extent and intensity of the ruler's authority among the subjects is a crucial factor affecting the ruler's power.

統治者在被統治者中之權威範圍與強度，它是影響統治者權力的一個關鍵因素。

Authority may be defined as the“... right to command and direct, to be heard or obeyed by others,”<sup>4</sup> voluntarily accepted by the people and therefore existing without the imposition of sanctions. The possessor of authority may not actually be superior; it is enough that he be perceived and accepted as superior. While not identical with power, authority is nevertheless clearly a main source of power.

合法性可以被定義為人民自願性地接受「……有權利命令與指揮，要別人聽從或服從<sup>4</sup>」，因此不需要藉著實施制裁而存在。權力的擁有者實際上可能不是優越者，他被認為及被接受為優越者，這就足夠了。雖然不等同於權力，合法性確實明顯是權力的一個主要來源。

## 2. Human resources

### 人力資源

A ruler's power is affected by the number of persons

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4 Jacques Maritain, *Man and State* (Chicago Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1954, and London: Hollis and Carter, 1954), U. S. ed., p. 126; British ed., pp. 114-115.  
捷克斯馬力潭(Jacques Maritain)，《人與國家》，(芝加哥，伊利諾州，芝加哥大學出版社，1954年，及，倫敦：Hollis and Carter書局，1954年)，美國版，第126頁；英國版，第114-115頁。

who obey him, cooperate with him, or provide him with special assistance, as well as by the proportion of such persons in the general population, and the extent and forms of their organizations.

統治者的權力是受到多少人服從他與他合作，或為他提供特別協助，以及這些人在整體人口中之比例與他們組織之範圍及形式的影響。

### 3. Skills and knowledge

#### 技能與知識

The ruler's power is also affected by the skills, knowledge and abilities of such persons, and the relation of their skills, knowledge and abilities to his needs.

統治者的權力也受到這些人之技能、知識與能力，以及他們之技能、知識與能力對統治者需要之關係的影響。

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### 4. Intangible factors

#### 無形的因素

Psychological and ideological factors, such as habits and attitudes toward obedience and submission, and the presence or absence of a common faith, ideology, or sense of mission, all affect the power of the ruler in relation to the people.

心理的與意識形態的因素，如對服從與屈服的習慣與態度，以及一個共同的信念、意識形態或使命感的有無，都

會影響統治者與人民相關的權力。

## 5. Material resources

### 物質資源

The degree to which the ruler controls property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, means of communication and transportation helps to determine the limits of his power.

統治者控制財產、天然資源、財務資源、經濟體系、通訊與運輸工具的程度，有助於確定他權力的限度。

### P.12

## 6. Sanctions

### 制裁

The final source of a ruler's power is the type and extent of sanctions at his disposal, both for use against his own subjects and in conflicts with other rulers.

統治者最後權力的來源就是他可以處置制裁的類型與程度，兩者都使用來對付他的被統治者以及在與其他統治者發生衝突的時候。

As John Austin wrote, sanctions are “an enforcement of obedience”<sup>5</sup> used by rulers against their subjects to supplement voluntary acceptance of their authority and to increase the degree of obedience to their commands.

They may be violent or not; they may be intended as punishment or as deterrence. Citizens may sometimes apply sanctions against their governments or against each other (these will be discussed below). Still other sanctions may be applied by governments against other governments and may take a variety of forms, such as the breaking of diplomatic relations, economic embargoes, military invasions and bombings. Violent domestic sanctions, such as imprisonment or execution, are commonly intended to punish disobedience, not to achieve the objective of the original command, except insofar as such sanctions may inhibit future disobedience by other persons. Other violent sanctions sometimes, and most nonviolent sanctions usually, are intended to achieve the original objective, this is often the case in conventional war, strikes, political noncooperation and boycotts. Sanctions are usually a key element in domestic and international politics.

正如約翰奧斯汀(John Austin)所說，制裁是統治者對他們被統治者使用之「對服從的強制<sup>5</sup>」，以補充自願接受他們的合法性，以及增加對他們命令服從的程度。它們可能是

5 John Austin, *Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law Fifth ed.*, rev. and ed. by Robert Campbell: 2 vols; London: John Murray, 1911[1861], vol. I, p. 89. 約翰奧斯汀(John Austin)，《法律學或制定法哲學的講義》。第五版，羅伯特康貝爾[Robert Campbell]編修，二冊，倫敦John Murray書局，1911年[1861年]，第一冊，第89頁。



暴力的或非暴力的，他們可能是打算做爲懲罰或威嚇的手段。公民可能有時候會應用制裁的方式對付他們的政府或者公民之間以制裁互相對付(這些將在下面討論)。還有其他的制裁，政府制裁其他政府可能採取的各種形式，如斷絕外交關係、經濟禁運、軍事侵略與轟炸。暴力的國內制裁，諸如監禁或處死，通常是爲了懲罰不服從，不是爲了達到原來命令之目的，除非因爲這種制裁可能會抑制未來其他人員的不服從命令。其他暴力的制裁有時候，與大多數之非暴力的制裁，通常是以實現原來之目標爲目的，這往往是傳統戰爭、罷工、政治不合作與抵制的情形。制裁通常是國內與國際政治上的一個關鍵因素。

It is always a matter of the degree to which some or all of these sources of power are present; only rarely, if ever, are all of them completely available to a ruler or completely absent. But their availability is subject to constant variation, which brings about an increase or decrease in the ruler's power. Baron de Montesquieu observed that "those who govern have a power which, in some measure, has need of fresh vigor every day ..." <sup>6</sup> To the degree that the sources of power are available without limitation, the ruler's power is unlimited. However, the opposite is also true: to the degree that the availability of these sources is limited, the ruler's political power is also limited. <sup>7</sup>

它始終是一個程度的問題，就是部分或所有這些權力

來源存在之程度的問題。只有在很罕見的情況下，如果有的話，它們全部都會完全提供給統治者，或者完全不存在。但是它們的可用性會受到不斷的變化，這就帶來統治者權力的增加或減少。孟德斯鳩男爵(Baron de Montesquieu)指出，「有權力治理的那些人，在某些程度上，每天也需要新的活力……<sup>6</sup>」在權力來源可以沒有限制使用的程度上，統治者的權力是無限的。不過，反過來也是正確的：這些來源之可用性是有限的程度下，統治者的政治權力也是有限的。<sup>7</sup>

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## Sharpening the focus for attack 聚焦攻擊的重點

Nonviolent action is a technique of struggle in which the participants are able to advance their cause in proportion to the degree that the opponent's desire and ability to maintain the objectionable policy are weakened, and that the nonviolent group is able to generate the will and power to give it the internal strength to effect the change. The skillful choice of the point of attack is important in this connection. In intellectual arguments one

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6 Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, *The spirit of the Laws* (Trans. by Thomas Nugent: Introduction by Franz Neumann: New York, Haffner, 1949), vol. I, p. 313.

查爾斯路易斯de Secondat孟德斯鳩勳爵，《法律之精神》。(湯姆斯努間特[Thomas Nugent]翻譯，佛蘭茲紐曼[Franz Neumann]引言，紐約Haffner書局，1949年)，第一冊，第313頁。

often concentrates on the weakest links in the opponent's case. In war, instead of attacking with equal force on the whole front simultaneously, one usually concentrates forces on what are believed to be the enemy's weakest points in the belief that a breakthrough there will lead to a weakening or collapse of other sections of the front. So in a nonviolent struggle the nonviolent leadership will show wisdom in concentrating action on the weakest points in the opponent's case, policy, or system. This will contribute to the maximum weakening of his relative position and the maximum strengthening of that of the nonviolent group.

非暴力行動是抗爭的一種技術，在抗爭中之參與者能夠推動他們的理念，隨著對手維持不良政策之願望與能力被削弱的程度而有所進展，而非暴力陣營能夠產生意志與力量帶來影響這項改變的內部力量。熟練地選擇攻擊點在這個關

7 Author Livingston emphasized the closeness of the relationship between possession of the sources of power and being a ruler: "A man rules or a group of men rules when the man or the group is able to control the social forces that, at the given moment in the given society, are essential to the possession and retention of power." Social forces are defined by Livingston as "any human activities or perquisite that has a social significance...money, land, military prowess, religion, education, manual labor, science...anything." (Author Livingston, Introduction to Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* Trans. by Hannah D. Kahn; ed. and rev. with an Introduction by Author Livingston; New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. xix.

亞瑟立運斯頓(Author Livingston)強調在權力來源擁有者與做為一個統治者之間關係的緊密性：「一個人或是一群人有能力控制社會力的時候，在這個社會的這一個時刻，這個人或是這一群人就會統治，這對擁有及保留權力是很重要的。」立運斯頓將社會力定義為「任何人類具有社會意義的活動或特權……，金錢、土地、軍事才能、宗教、教育、人工勞力、科學……等等任何事物」。(亞瑟立運斯頓序言，蓋耶它諾摩斯卡[Gaetano Mosca]，《統治階級》，哈娜甘[Hannah D. Kahn]翻譯，增訂立運斯頓之序言，紐約及倫敦，McGraw-Hill書局，1939年)，第十九頁。

連性上是重要的。在理智的論點上，大家往往都會集中在對手情況最薄弱的環節。在戰爭中，不會同時以平均的勢力在整條戰線上進行攻擊，人們通常會在認為敵人最薄弱的地方集中力量，人們相信如果在這裡可以突破就會導致這個陣線其他區段的削弱或崩潰。因此，在非暴力抗爭中的非暴力領導階層要表現得有智慧，將行動集中在對手之情況、政策或制度的最薄弱點。這將有助於最大限度地削弱他的相對權力位置，而且最大地強化這個非暴力陣營的相對權力位置。

In nonviolent action it is necessary to have a pivot point on which to place the lever which is to remove the evil. The selection of this pivot or issue is very important for the whole consequent campaign. One does not, in Gandhi's view, launch a nonviolent campaign for such general objectives as "peace," "independence," "freedom," or "brotherhood." "The issue must be definite and capable of being clearly understood and within the power of the opponent to yield."<sup>8</sup> In applying this technique of struggle under less than perfect conditions, success may depend, Miller writes, on "phasing strategy in such a way as to score a series of minor gains or to secure a single major victory in the most accessible sector, rather than trying for a cluster of major objectives at the same time."<sup>9</sup> Whether the specific objective(s) chosen is (are) highly limited or very ambitious will hinge in part on the nonviolent group's

assessment of its relative strength and capacity for action.

在非暴力的行動中，它必須有一個支點可以放置槓桿，以消除邪惡。這個支點或議題的選擇對隨後整個運動是非常重要的。甘地認為，不要爲了如此一般性的目標如「和平」、「獨立」、「自由」或「同胞」而展開一場非暴力的運動。「這個議題必須是明確的，而且能夠被清楚地理解，以及是在對手權力可以屈服的範圍之內。<sup>8</sup>」在不是理想的條件下應用這種抗爭技術，米勒(Miller)這樣寫到，成功可能依賴於：「階段性戰略的方式，以逐步獲取一系列次要的進展，或者在最容易到達的部門取得一場主要的勝利，而不是在同一時間嘗試許多主要的目標。<sup>9</sup>」這個(些)選擇的具體目標到底是非常有限的或者是非常有野心的，有一部分將取決於非暴力陣營對他們要採取行動之相對力量與能力的評估。

In a study of the defeated campaign in Albany, Georgia, in 1962, Professor Howard Zinn wrote:

在一項研究1962年喬治亞州奧爾巴尼市失敗的運動中，霍華德津恩(Howard Zinn)教授說：

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8 Gandhi, quoted in Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 134. See also Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 30 and p. 174; Ind. Ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 30 and p. 174.

甘地，引用於波西(Bose)，《甘地主義的研究》，第134頁。亦參閱，甘地，《非暴力抵抗》，第30及174頁；印度版本《堅持真理運動(Satyagraha)》，第30及174頁。

9 Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 30 and p. 174, pp. 168-169.

米勒(Miller)，《非暴力》，第30、174及168-169頁。

There has been a failure to create and handle skillfully a set of differentiated tactics for different situations. The problem of desegregating Albany facilities involves various parties: some situations call for action by the city commission; some for decision by the Federal Courts; some for agreement with private businessmen. Moreover, there are advantages to singling out a particular goal and concentrating on it. This is an approach not only tactically sound for Negro protest but also creates a climate favorable to a negotiated solution. The community is presented with a specific concrete demand rather than a quilt of grievances and demands which smothers the always limited ability of societies to think rationally about their faults.<sup>10</sup>

過去曾經失敗於沒有爲了不同情況的需要而熟練地創立或處理一組有差別的戰術。奧爾巴尼市公共設施之種族隔離的這個問題涉及許多不同的部門：某些情況需要呼籲市委員會採取行動，某些則需要聯邦法院的決定；某些需要與私人企業家達成協議。除此之

10 Howard Zinn, *Albany* (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1962), p. 19, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 328. Miller also cites on this Wyatt Tee Walker, "Achievement in Albany," in *New South* (Atlanta), June, 1963.

霍華德津恩(Howard Zinn)，《奧爾巴尼(Albany)》(亞特蘭大，南部區域議會，1962年)，第19頁，引用該書第328頁。米勒亦引用於懷特惕瓦爾克(Wyatt Tee Walker)，《奧爾巴尼的成就》，新南方(亞特蘭大)，1963年6月。

外，挑選出一個特定的目標而且將力量集中在這個目標上，會有一些優點。這個做法不僅在黑人抗議上是健全的戰術，而且會創造透過談判解決問題的有利氣氛。這個社區就面對一個特定具體的要求，而不只是不滿與要求的糾葛，這些不滿與要求迫使總是有限能力的社會去理性地思考它們的缺陷。<sup>10</sup>

Martin Luther King, Jr., reached a similar conclusion in the same case:


馬丁路德金恩二世(Martin Luther King, Jr.)，在同一個案中達成類似的結論：

...we decided that one of the principal mistakes we had made there was to scatter our efforts too widely. We had been so involved in attacking segregation in general that we had failed to direct our protest effectively to any one major facet. We concluded that in hard-core communities a more effective battle could be waged if it was concentrated against one aspect of the evil and intricate system of segregation.<sup>11</sup>

……我們如此決定，我們在那裡犯了一個主要的錯

11 Martin Luther King, Jr., *Why We Can't Wait* (New York: The New American Library, Signet Books, 1964), p. 54.

馬丁路德金恩二世，《我們為什麼不能再等待》，(紐約：新美國圖書館，西格內特書局，1964年)，第54頁。




誤就是將我們的努力分散得太大了。我們一直如此投入攻擊一般性的隔離，以至於我們沒有能夠有效地將我們的抗議導向任何一個主要面向。我們的結論是在核心社區要啓動更有效的戰鬥，就好像只對邪惡與複雜之隔離體制的單一面向發動戰鬥一樣。<sup>11</sup>

Without question there were other serious causes of the Albany defeat, but those do not invalidate these observations.

毫無疑問地，奧爾巴尼市的失敗還有其他嚴重的原因，但是這些並不能否定這些觀察意見。

Instead, then, of a campaign for some very general objective, Ebert writes: “In working out the staged plan, it is essential for the success of the campaign to find the correct point of attack or one flash-point among many in social relationships which symbolizes all the other conflicts.”<sup>12</sup> In the Vykom campaign, sketched in Chapter Two, the issue was the right of people to use a road that led to their homes. In the 1930-31 independence movement the specific issue which initiated the campaign was that of the Salt Laws, which touched the lives of most of the people in India; other wider political aims were condensed into eleven demands.<sup>13</sup>

那麼相反地，不要進行某些非常廣泛目標的運動，埃





伯特(Ebert)寫道：「在制定要上場的計畫時，運動成功的關鍵在象徵著所有其他衝突的許多社會關係中找到正確的攻擊點或者一個點燃點。<sup>12</sup>」在威克姆(Vykom)的運動中，如第二章所述，這個議題是人民使用通往他們家園之道路的权利。在1930年至1931年獨立運動中，開啓運動的具體議題是「食鹽法」的議題，它觸及了印度大部分人的生活；其他更廣泛的政治目的則被濃縮成11項的要求。<sup>13</sup>

This is not a matter of being moderate in one's aims, but of concentrating one's strength in ways which will make victory more likely. The planners choose the point of attack, the specific aspect of the general problem which symbolizes the "evil" which is least defensible by the opponent and which is capable of arousing the greatest strength against it. Success in such limited campaigns will in turn increase the self-confidence of the actionists<sup>14</sup> and their ability to move effectively toward the fuller achievement of their larger objectives as they gain experience in the use of effective means of action to realize their aims.

這不是一個提出溫和之目標的問題，而是以集中自己力量的方式，而可以讓勝利變得更有可能的問題。規劃者選

12 Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS, p. 171.

埃伯特(Ebert)，《非暴力抵抗的理論與實務》，碩士論文，第171頁。

13 See Sharp, *Gandhi Wields...*, pp. 56-57 and pp. 59-60.

參閱夏普，《甘地行使...》，第56-57及59-60頁。

擇這個攻擊點，是一般性問題的一個具體面向，象徵著「邪惡」，這是對手最不容易防衛的地方，是能夠激發出最大反對它的力量。在這種小型有限之運動的成功，反過來就會增加行動者的自信<sup>14</sup>與他們的能力，在他們獲得使用有效之行動手段以實現目標的經驗後，就可以有效地邁向更完全實現更大的目標。

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The choice of the point of attack requires considerable understanding and a keen perception of the total situation. Amiya Chakravarty has described very well Gandhi's ability to combine short-run and long-run plans in the selection of a focal point for action. It sometimes happens, Chakravarty writes, that "in following one obvious remedial line we have hit upon a symptom which symbolizes, demonstrates and challenges a root situation." A series of attacks on these points makes it possible to move "from one total situation to another." The issue should be kept clear and clean, he continues, pointing out that, for example, segregation in opium parlors would be an erroneous choice as a

14 Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa* (rev. sec. ed.; trans. from the Gujarati by Valji Govindji Desai; Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan, 1950), p. 46.

甘地，《南非的堅持真理運動》（修訂二版，由Valji Govindji Desai 翻譯自Gujarati 原文，印度，Ahmedabad市，Navajivan書局，1950年），第46頁。

point for attack on racial segregation, while the right to pray in unsegregated churches “would be an issue of overwhelming convergence.” Repression against nonviolent actionists concentrating on such a point of attack could but strengthen their cause. “Again and again, Gandhiji showed an instinct, a spiritual instinct, for the right issue, for the converging issues which supported each other at a point.”<sup>15</sup>

這個攻擊點的選擇需要對整體情勢有相當的了解與敏銳的感覺。阿米亞恰克拉發迪(Amiya Chakravarty)已經對甘地結合短期與長期計劃，以選擇一個行動焦點的能力有很好的描述。恰克拉發迪寫道，有時候會這樣發生，「在一個明顯的治療方向上，我們偶然會擊中一個症狀，象徵、表明與挑戰一個情勢的根源。」一連串對這些點的攻擊就有可能「從一個整體情勢移動到另一個整體情勢」。這個議題應保持清晰而且明確。他繼續說，並指出，例如，攻擊鴉片館的隔離，將是對種族隔離政策攻擊點的一個錯誤選擇；而要求在沒有種族隔離之教堂的祈禱權利就會是：「一個壓倒性收斂的議題。」對集中在這些攻擊點之非暴力行動者的鎮壓，只會加強他們的信念。「一次又一次，甘地本能地、以一種

15 Amiya Chakravarty, *A Saint at Work: A View of Gandhi's Work and Message* (William Penn Lecture 1950; Philadelphia: Young Friends Movement of the Philadelphia Yearly Meetings, 1950), pp. 29-31.

阿米亞恰克拉發迪(Amiya Chakravarty)，《聖者之運行：甘地之行事與訊息的觀點》(威廉潘恩講座，1950年，費城：費城年度會議之青年朋友運動，1950年)，第29-31頁。

精神上的本能，表現出選擇正確的議題，選擇出收斂性的議題讓彼此在這個攻擊點互相支持<sup>15</sup>。」


This approach to political action has strong support from a quite different source, namely, Lenin, who wrote: “The whole art of politics lies in finding and gripping as strong as we can the link that is least likely to be torn out of our hands, the one that is most important at the given moment, the one that guarantees the possessor of a link the possession of the whole chain.”<sup>16</sup>

這種政治行動的方法會有從相當不同來源的強力支持，這就是列寧(Lenin)所寫的：「政治的整體藝術在於，盡我們所能地尋找與抓住這個最不可能從我們手中被強奪的聯結，它在一個特定的時刻是最重要的，是一個可以保證這個聯結的擁有者就會佔有這整個鏈條。」<sup>16</sup>

16 V. I. Lenin, “What is to be Done? Burning Questions of our Movement.” in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works in Three Volumes* (New York: International Publishers, and Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), vol. I, pp. 232-233. Also, in Lenin, *Selected Works in Two Volumes* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950) vol. I, p. 379.

V. I. 列寧(Lenin)，「還可以完成甚麼？我們運動的燙手問題」，於V. I. 列寧《精選三冊》(紐約，國際出版社，及，莫斯科，進步出版社，1967年)，第一冊，第232-233頁。同時於，列寧，《精選二冊》(莫斯科，外國語出版書屋，1950年)，第一冊，第379頁。


## Basic Elements in Nonviolent Strategy 非暴力戰略的基本要素

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The strategy and tactics of war have been carefully developed and studied, and major attempts have been made to develop underlying theory. Maxims, rules and systems for conducting war have been formulated in response to “urgent want.”<sup>1</sup> In the field of nonviolent action there has been to date no comparable development. Gandhi made the most important conscious efforts to develop strategy and tactics in this technique of struggle. He was, however, neither an analyst nor a theorist; hence, despite his contribution in practice and his passing observations, the analysis and formulation of strategy and tactics have been left to others.

戰爭的戰略與戰術已經受到仔細的發展及研究，而且主要的努力是用在發展形成戰略與戰術之基礎的理論。爲了指揮戰爭中反應之「緊急需要」<sup>1</sup>，建立了格言、規則及系統。在非暴力行動的領域，到目前爲止並沒有相對應的類似

<sup>1</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 96.  
克勞塞維茲(Claweswitz)，《戰爭論》，第一冊，第96頁。



發展。甘地對這個抗爭技術的戰略與戰術之發展做了最重要而有意識的努力。不過，他既不是一個分析者也不是一個理論家；因此，儘管他對實務有所貢獻及他所傳承的觀察，戰略與戰術之分析與形成，都是留到其他人時才完成。

Only comparatively recently has attention been turned to the examination of the problems and possibilities of strategy and tactics in nonviolent struggle against would-be internal dictators or invaders.<sup>2</sup> Attention is needed both to the broad field of strategy and tactics and to the specific problems which are likely to arise in facing particular opponents and in achieving particular objectives.


只有到了相當最近的時候，注意的焦點才轉向探討以非暴力抗爭面對可能出現之內部獨裁者或者入侵者時，所需

2 This has been especially stimulated by examinations of how prepared nonviolent struggle might be used in national defence-- i.e., "civilian defence". See, for example Sir Stephen King-Hall, *Defense in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 196-205 (Nyack, N.Y.; Fellowship, 1959; Br. ed.: London: Gollancz, 1958), and Adam Roberts, "Civilian Defence Strategy," in Roberts, editor, *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense*, Br. ed.; *The Strategy of Civilian Defence*, pp. 215-254.

This chapter, however, is restricted to examination of basic principles of strategy and tactics in nonviolent action generally, and will not therefore examine how these principles might be applied in specific conflicts or for particular purposes.

這個觀點可以透過仔細檢視而受到特別的激發，做好準備的非暴力抗爭有可能做為國家的保衛——亦即「公民防衛」。例如參閱，史蒂芬金恩赫爾爵士(Sir Stephen King-Hall)，《核子時代的防衛》，第196-205頁。(紐約州，Nyack市，Fellowship書局，1959年；英國版，倫敦，Gollancz出版社，1958年)；及，亞當羅伯茲(Adam Roberts)，《公民防衛戰略》，羅伯茲主編，《以公民抵抗做為國家防衛》，英國版，《公民防衛的戰略》，第215-254頁。

不過，本章僅限於概略性地檢討非暴力行動之戰略與戰術的基本原則，因此不會討論這些原則如何對特定的衝突或為了特別目的之運用。



要之戰略與戰術的問題與可能性。<sup>2</sup>注意力需要同時面對廣義的戰略與戰術領域，以及在面對特別之對手，而且要達成特別目標的時候可能出現之細部的具體問題。

Strategy and tactics are of course present in various forms and degrees in many aspects of social life. They are, however, especially important in military action and nonviolent action, which are both techniques by which social and political conflicts are conducted when they have developed to the point of open struggle and a pitting of strength.

當然，戰略與戰術以各種不同的形式與程度存在於社會生活的很多面向上。不過，他們在軍事行動與非暴力行動上特別重要。當社會及政治之衝突發展到公開鬥爭及力量之比對的時候，都透過這兩種行動的技術來進行。

There appear to be some points at which insights from military strategy may be carried over into nonviolent strategy; and there are also points at which military insights must not be carried over, because the nature and dynamics of the two techniques of struggle differ radically.

看起來在某些時候，軍事戰略上所得到的深度看法可以代入應用在非暴力的戰略上；而且，也有某些時候軍事上的深入看法絕對不可以被代入來應用，因為這兩種抗爭之技術的本質與動態有極端的不同。

This section is therefore not purely descriptive or analytical of existing observations on strategy in nonviolent action; it also involves the incorporation of principles of military strategy where these seem valid for the nonviolent technique, and where the military sources are clearer and more explicit than observations from nonviolent actionists.

因此，本節不只是對非暴力行動戰略之既有觀察的單純敘述或分析，而且也會涉及在當軍事戰略對非暴力的技術似乎有效時，及當軍事的論述來源比非暴力行動者的觀察更清楚與更明確的時候，就會結合軍事戰略的原則。

Here are some brief definitions of basic strategic terms: grand strategy is the broadest conception which serves to coordinate and direct all the resources of the struggle group toward the attainment of the objectives of the conflict. Strategy, a more narrow term, is the broad plan of action for the overall struggle, including the development of an advantageous situation, the decision of when to fight, and the broad plan for utilizing various specific actions in the general conflict.

這裡有一些基本戰略性術語的簡短定義：總體大戰略是最寬廣的概念，它的功能是協調及指揮抗爭陣營的全部資源，以達到衝突抗爭的目標。策略則是一個較狹義的術語，它是全面抗爭行動的大型計畫，包括發展出有利的情勢、決



定何時進行對抗，以及在整體衝突裡如何利用各種不同之細部具體行動的大型計畫。

Tactics refers to plans for more limited conflicts within the selected strategic plan. Fuller definitions of these terms are provided in the author's *An Abecedary of Nonviolent Action and Civilian Defense*.

戰術是指爲了在所選擇策略中之更小型衝突所作的計畫。在作者的《非暴力行動與全民防衛的初學者辭典》一書裡，有這些術語的更完整定義。

## The importance of strategy and tactics 戰略與戰術的重要性

Strategy is just as important in nonviolent action as it is in military action. While military strategic concepts and principles cannot automatically be carried over into the field of nonviolent action, the basic importance of strategy and tactics is in no way diminished.

戰略對非暴力行動的重要性，就像它對軍事行動一樣的重要。雖然軍事上的戰略性概念與原則不可以自動地被代入到非暴力行動的領域，戰略與戰術的基本重要性無論如何是不會減少的。

Attention is therefore needed to the general principles of strategy and tactics appropriate to this technique

(both those peculiar to it and those which may be carried over from military strategy and other types of conflict). These aspects need to be considered, of course, within the context of the unique dynamics and mechanisms of nonviolent struggle.

因此，必須關注到適合這種技術之戰略與戰術的整體原則(這個技術所特有的，以及可能從軍事上的戰略與其他類型之衝突所引入的)。當然，這些面向都需要在非暴力抗爭獨特之動力平衡上與機制的內涵中加以考慮。

People from a military background may find it strange to discover certain exponents of nonviolent means stressing the importance of strategy and tactics. And people from a background in religious or philosophical nonviolence may also be surprised to find strategy and tactics stressed instead of moral principles and conscience. Therefore, some brief discussion is needed of the function of strategy and tactics in nonviolent action.

一個具有軍事背景的人可能會奇怪地發現，非暴力方法的某些解釋是在強調戰略與戰術的重要性。而具有宗教或者哲學非暴力背景的人可能也會吃驚地發現，它強調戰略與戰術，而不是道德規範和良心。因此，對非暴力行動之戰略與戰術的功能，有必要進行一些簡短的討論。

In order to influence the outcome of a struggle, it is

important to choose the course of action wisely and carry it out carefully and intelligently. It is quite inadequate simply to say that one will be moral and do what is right, for there may be several courses of action which are all morally “right”; what is “right” may involve maintaining or creating maximum opposition to “evil,” and if so the problem is how to do this; in order to meet one’s moral responsibility and maximize the effects of one’s action, those actions must be carefully chosen and carried out at the right time.

爲了影響一次抗爭的結果，明智地選擇行動方案，並且細心而有智慧地實現它，是重要的。僅僅用說的，那個是道德的及做正確的事，是相當不足夠的，因爲可能有許多行動方案在道德上全部是「正確」的；而所謂「正確」的可能涉及對「邪惡」維持或者製造最大的反對，如果是這樣，問題就變成了要如何來作這件事；爲了要滿足一個人的道德責任，並且使一個人的行動產生最大的影響，那些行動必須被謹慎地選擇，並且在適當的時候加以進行。

Specialists in the study and conduct of war have long since learned that the best results were not achieved simply by an uncontrolled outburst of violence and sacrifice. As Liddell Hart has said: “...the conduct of war must be controlled by reason if its object is to be fulfilled.... The better your strategy, the easier you will

gain the upper hand, and the less it will cost you.”<sup>3</sup> As in war, strategy and tactics are used in nonviolent action so that the courage, sacrifice, numbers, and so on of the nonviolent actionists may make the greatest possible impact.

研究與指揮戰爭的專家老早以前就學到，最好的結果從來不會僅僅透過一次沒有控制之武力與犧牲的爆發而達到。正如利德爾哈特(Liddell Hart)所說：「……如果戰爭的目標要完成，戰爭的行為必須以理性的方式加以控制……。你的戰略越好，你就越容易佔上風，並且付出更少的代價。」<sup>3</sup>如同在戰爭裡一樣，戰略與戰術也用於非暴力的行動，非暴力行動者的勇氣、犧牲、人數等等都會產生可能最大的衝擊。

The course of the struggle may take any of a wide variety of forms, depending on the strategies, tactics and methods chosen to meet the particular needs of the situation. The specific acts of protest, non-cooperation and intervention in the course of a nonviolent campaign will be most effective if they fit together as parts of a comprehensive whole, so that each specific action contributes in a maximum way to the development and successful conclusion of the struggle.

<sup>3</sup> Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, p. 369.  
利德爾哈特(Liddell Hart)，《戰略》，第369頁。

依照滿足情勢之特別需要所選擇的戰略、戰術與方法，抗爭的過程可能會採取廣泛多種不同的形式。在非暴力的運動中，以抗議、不合作與干涉的具體行動，如果它們可以共同契合做為整體綜合行動的一部分，將會非常有效。若能如此，每個具體行動就會對抗爭之發展與成功之結局作出最大的貢獻。

The optimal combination of specific actions is therefore best achieved where leaders with an adequate grasp of the situation and the technique are able to chart the course of the campaigns. "Only the general who conducts a campaign can know the objective of each particular move," wrote Gandhi.<sup>4</sup>

因此，具體行動之最佳組合的最好實現，取決於領導者對情勢有充分的掌握，並且有可以繪製運動方案的技術。甘地曾經寫到，「只有指揮運動的將軍才會知道每個特別行動的目標。<sup>4</sup>」

Gandhi chose the issues, places, times and methods of action with extreme care, so that his movement was placed in the strongest position possible vis-à-vis the British, and so that the actions themselves conveyed the greatest understanding to his fellow Indians and aroused

<sup>4</sup> Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, p. xi.  
甘地，《南非的堅持真理運動》，第十一頁。

the maximum sympathy and support from everyone. Just as strategy is important in labor strikes,<sup>5</sup> so it is important in more highly developed types of nonviolent struggle—even more so when it is directed against extreme dictatorships.

甘地極度細心地選擇行動的議題、地點、時間與方法，以便他的運動在可能對付英國人的時候可以放在最強有力的位置，並且讓行動自己可以傳達給他印度民衆最大的理解，以引起每個人最大的同情與支持。正如同在勞動罷工裡之戰略的重要性一樣，<sup>5</sup>在更高度發展的非暴力抗爭中，它是重要的。當面對極端獨裁政權時，它更是如此。

There is ample historical evidence of the importance of strategy and tactics.<sup>6</sup> Sometimes this evidence is of a

5 Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 126.

希勒(Hiller)，《罷工》，第126頁。

6 On strategic and tactical problems in the struggles of the American colonists, see Morgan and Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis*, p. 174 and p. 240; Gipson, *The British Empire...*, vol. XI, pp. 265-271; and Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants...*, pp. 213-215, pp. 218-220, pp. 226-234 and pp. 400-401.

On the lack of strategic planning for the Ruhrkampf, see Ehrlich (Raloff), "Ruhrkampen," p. 184, in Lindberg, Jacobsen and Ehrlich, *Kamp Uden Vaaben*. Lack of advance strategic planning for certain aspects of the 1926 British General Strike is mentioned by Symons, in *The General Strike*, p. 51. On strategic and tactical questions in the spontaneous 1905 Revolution, see Schwarz, *The Russian Revolution of 1905*, pp. 99-112, and (on conflicting views on whether strikes should lead to a violent rising) pp. 132-143, and Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 165-167, p. 175, pp. 199-206, pp. 209-210 and p. 215; p. 199 raises the question of when the optimum results might have been achieved by ending that particular struggle. On the tactical problem of what the Duma should have done when dissolved in February 1917, see Katkov, *Russia 1917*, pp. 293-294. On strategic and tactical planning of a sit-in campaign in Atlanta, see C. Eric Lincoln, 'The Strategy of a Sit-in.' in Sibley, *The Quiet Battle*, pp. 296-297. On when to call off an African bus boycott in South

negative type, showing effects of the absence of strategy or of failure to make important decisions on strategic and tactical questions.

有充分的歷史證據顯示戰略與戰術的重要性。<sup>6</sup>有時候這個證據以一種反面的方式出現，顯示缺乏戰略或者沒有在戰略與戰術的問題上作出重要決策的影響。

Sometimes difficult problems which arose in the course of given conflicts could have been avoided or more satisfactorily resolved had there been greater understanding of the role and principles of nonviolent strategy. On other occasions, nonviolent campaigns have been continued after the point when achievement of almost all the objectives and demands was possible—far more than is usually the case in military conflicts;

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Africa, see Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 178.

有關美國殖民者之抗爭的戰略與戰術的問題，參閱摩根(Morgan)與摩根(Morgan)，《郵票法案危機》，第174及240頁；吉普森(Gipson)，《大英帝國…》，第十一冊，第265-271頁；及，史列辛格(Schlesinger)，《殖民地商人…》，第213-215、218-220、226-234及400-401頁。

有關魯爾佔領事件(Ruhrkampf)中缺乏戰略規劃，參閱艾爾立奇(Ehrlich)，《Kamp Uden Vaaben》。有關1926年英國大罷工缺乏某些面向的事前戰略規劃，西繆思(Symons)《大罷工》有提及，第51頁。有關臨時起意之1905年革命的戰略與戰術問題，參閱須瓦茲(Schwarz)，《1905年的俄羅斯革命》，第99-112頁及(罷工是否會導致暴動的不同觀點)第132-143頁。及，賀卡夫(Harcave)，《第一滴血》，第165-167、175、199-206、209-210及215頁。第199頁提到，如何結束特定的抗爭以得到最佳效果的問題。有關杜馬政權(Duma)於1917年2月解體時應為而未作為的戰術問題，參閱卡特科夫(Katkov)，《1917年的俄羅斯》，第293-294頁。有關亞特蘭大靜坐運動的戰略與戰術規劃，參閱艾利克林肯(Eric Lincoln)，「靜坐的戰略」於希伯來(Sibley)，《寧靜的戰爭》，第296-297頁。有關何時取消南非的非洲人巴士抵制，參閱盧秋麗(Luthuli)，《放我的同胞走》，第178頁。

subsequent events then led to the defeat of the movement.

如果能夠對非暴力戰略的角色與原理有更多的理解，有時候在一個特定的衝突中會出現的困難問題可能就可以避免，或者被更令人滿意地獲得解決。在其他的情況下，當幾乎所有目標與需求可能完成之後，非暴力運動仍然持續進行——通常是比軍事衝突情況更長久；隨後的事件卻導致運動的失敗。

Or in other cases the nonviolent movement regarded itself as defeated even though by normal standards it was victorious; as a result, that nonviolent action was eventually replaced by military action which was believed to be more effective. The American colonists' struggles against the British government can without difficulty be interpreted in this way.

在另外一些情況，即使以正常的標準來看，非暴力運動是勝利的，但卻被認為是失敗的；結果，造成非暴力行動最終被相信是更為有效的軍事行動所替換掉。美國殖民地居民反對英國政府的抗爭，可以毫無困難地以這種角度來解釋。

Considerable light would be shed on the problems and general principles of nonviolent strategy if careful strategic and tactical analyses were undertaken of a



series of nonviolent struggles. It is also important to have acceptance by the grievance group of the strategy for the struggle; in the case of Finland in 1901, disagreement on how to deal with the opponent seems to have severely accentuated existing internal conflicts.<sup>7</sup>

如果要為一系列的非暴力抗爭，採取細心的戰略性與戰術性分析，就必須對非暴力戰略的問題與一般原理進行相當的理解。讓對社會不滿的團體接受抗爭所採取的戰略也是重要的；在1901年芬蘭的例子中，要如何與對手交往所產生意見的不合，似乎讓內部的衝突更加嚴重地出現裂痕。<sup>7</sup>

### Some key elements in nonviolent strategy and tactics 非暴力戰略與戰術的一些關鍵要素

Despite the relative absence of strategic analyses of past nonviolent struggles and the lack of systematic studies of basic principles of nonviolent strategy, it is possible to list certain fairly clear general principles which have taken concrete form in particular struggles. Clausewitz wrote that in the case of war it was easier to make a theory of tactics than of strategy.<sup>8</sup> Both theories are very difficult in nonviolent action, and the list of principles offered here is necessarily incomplete and provisional.

<sup>7</sup> See Jutikkala, *A History of Finland*, pp. 233-235.

參閱吉提卡拉(Jutikkala)，《芬蘭之歷史》，第233-235頁。

儘管對過去之非暴力的抗爭相對缺少戰略分析，而且缺乏對非暴力戰略之基本原則的系統性研究，還是有可能列舉出某些相當清晰的一般性原則，這些原則在特殊的抗爭中曾經具有具體的形式。克勞塞維茲(Clausewitz)寫到，在戰爭的情況，要形成戰術的理論要比形成戰略的理論容易得多。<sup>8</sup>在非暴力行動的情況，這兩種理論都是非常困難的，而且這裡所提供的這份原則的表單肯定是不完整的與有條件性的。

## 1. The indirect approach to the opponent's power

### 對付對手權力之間接方法

The technique of nonviolent action can be regarded as an extreme development of “the indirect approach” to military strategy as formulated by, and discussed earlier in this chapter.

非暴力行動的技術，可以把它當作軍事戰略中「間接方法」的極端發展，如利德爾哈特(Liddell Hart)所擬定的，以及本章之前已經討論的。

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Liddell Hart argued that direct strategy consolidates the opponent's strength, while an indirect approach is militarily more sound; generally effective results

<sup>8</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 107.

克勞塞維茲(Clausewitz)，《戰爭論》，第一冊，第107頁。

have followed when the plan of action has had “such indirectness as to ensure the opponent’s unreadiness to meet it.” Therefore, instead of a direct attack on the opponent’s positions of strength, Liddell Hart emphasized the importance of psychological factors; the purpose of strategy then becomes “to diminish the possibility of resistance...” “Dislocation” of the enemy is crucial, he insisted, in achieving the conditions for victory, and the dislocation must be followed by “exploitation” of the opportunity created by the position of insecurity. It thus becomes important “to nullify opposition by paralysing the power to oppose” and to make “the enemy do something wrong.”<sup>9</sup> These general principles are all applicable to the use of nonviolent action against an opponent using military means, so that the opponent’s means of action are always confronted indirectly and his power of repression made to rebound against him in a kind of political jiu-jitsu. Finally, the very sources of his power are reduced or removed without having been confronted directly by the same means of action.

利德爾哈特認為，直接的戰略會鞏固對手的力量，而間接的方法在軍事上更健全，當這個行動計畫具有「確保對手未準備就緒就要面對它之這樣的間接性」時，通常隨後會有有效的結果。因此，與其直接攻擊對方有力的陣地，利德爾哈特強調指出心理因素的重要性，那麼戰略之目的就成為

「減少抵抗的可能性……」，敵人的「心神錯亂」在實現勝利的條件中是至關重要的，而且，他堅持地認為，這個心神錯亂必須發生在「剝削」不安全之地位所創造出來的機會之後。因此，「以癱瘓反對之權力而讓反對失效」，與讓「敵人做某些錯事」就有重要性。<sup>9</sup>這些一般原則，都可以適用於使用非暴力行動以對付使用軍事手段的對手，這會使對手的行動手段總是遭到間接性的挑戰，而他鎮壓的權力就會以一種政治「柔道術」反彈對付他。最後，他的這些權力來源就會減少或消除，而不必直接地以同樣的行動手段加以面對。

## 2. Psychological elements

### 心理因素

Some of the psychological elements in military war have equivalents in “war without violence.” But the carry-over is not automatic. For example, surprise has been regarded as an essential element in certain types of military strategy. In nonviolent action, however, such objectives as throwing the enemy off guard, benefiting from his incapacity to meet the attack, and so on, which surprise has been intended to produce, are likely to a significant degree to be achieved simply by insistence on

<sup>9</sup> See Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, p. 25, p. 337, pp. 340-41, p. 349, p. 350, and p. 359.

參閱利德爾哈特(Liddell Hart)，《戰略》，第25、337、340-41、349、350及359頁。

using a technique different from that of the opponent in the struggle. At times, however, the element of surprise in nonviolent action may operate to the detriment of the nonviolent actionists, by increasing the possibility of jumpiness among troops which may in turn mean more severe repression and less chance of disaffection among them.

有些在軍事戰爭中的心理因素等同於「沒有暴力的戰爭」。但是這個移轉並不是自動的。例如，在某些類型的軍事戰略，突襲一直被視為一個重要的因素。不過，在非暴力的行動中，這些要把敵人推向無法防衛，要從他們措手不及應付攻擊而獲得好處等等這些突襲想要產生的效果，很可能在很大程度上，只要堅持使用與抗爭中對手不同的方法就可以實現。然而，有時候，非暴力行動中的突襲因素，可能會運作到損害非暴力行動者的範圍邊緣，在部隊中增加情緒不安的可能性，可能反過來意味著更嚴厲的鎮壓，以及比較沒有機會在部隊之間產生不滿的情緒。

Morale among the actionists will be important in nonviolent conflict just as it is in military conflict. It will be crucial for the population as a whole to understand well that the opponent's military might does not give him either control or victory. Confidence in nonviolent action would be fundamental, along with the qualities of "a warlike people" as described by Clausewitz: "bravery, aptitude,

powers of endurance and enthusiasm.”<sup>10</sup>

非暴力衝突抗爭中這些行動者的士氣，正如同在軍事衝突中的一樣，都是重要的。很關鍵性的，如果整體民衆可以好好了解對手的軍事力量，應該不會爲他帶來控制、也不會帶來勝利。信心應該是非暴力行動的根本素質，還要有克勞塞維茲所形容「一個善戰民族」的素質：「勇氣、能力、耐力與熱誠。」<sup>10</sup>

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### 3. Geographical and physical elements

地理與實體因素

Neither possession of nor gaining of control over particular places is regarded even in military war as important for its own sake but as “intermediate links,” as “means of gaining greater superiority” so as finally to achieve victory.<sup>11</sup> While to be totally ignored in nonviolent action, these elements assume a considerably lesser role, because the technique of struggle is dependent primarily upon the will and actions of human beings rather than on possession of geographical positions. It is possible, for example, for a territory to be physically occupied by troops without the regime which commands them having effective control over the population of the territory. Particular

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<sup>10</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 183.

克勞塞維茲(Clauswitz)，《戰爭論》，第一冊，第183頁。

places, buildings and so on may on occasion become important in nonviolent action, especially where they have high symbolic value; in such cases, the methods of nonviolent obstruction, nonviolent raids and nonviolent invasion are likely to be applied. Even then, however, the physical possession of particular points is of secondary importance to the fulfillment of the conditions which make possible the operation of the mechanisms of change in nonviolent action. There are other geographical and physical elements; on occasion the terrain, time of day and weather may be important, and there may be “camps” for volunteers and hospitals to care for the wounded.

即使在重要的軍事戰爭中，也不會將「佔有」或「取得」一些特定地方之控制的本身這件事當作是一件重要的事，而只是當作「中間環節」或是做為「獲得更大優勢的手段」，從而取得最後的勝利。<sup>11</sup>雖然在非暴力的行動中它們被「完全」忽略了，這些元素承擔了相當較小的角色，因為這個抗爭的技術主要取決於人類的意志與行動，而不是在於佔有某些地理位置。這是可能的，例如，一個實體上被部隊佔領的領土，而沒有一個指揮部隊可以有效地控制領土上之民衆的政權。特別的地方、建築物等等有時候有可能在非暴力行動變成很重要，特別是當他們有高度的象徵意義時，在這種情況下，非暴力的阻撓、非暴力的襲擊與非暴力的入侵

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 173.

同上，第173頁。

等方法，都有可能加以應用的。不過，即使如此，實際佔有特殊地點在實現非暴力行動運作改變機制的條件時還是次要的。還有其他的地理與物理實體因素，地形、一天中的時間、天氣，有時候可能是重要的。有可能需要「帳棚營地」，讓志願者住宿與做為照顧傷員的醫院。

A careful nonviolent strategist is likely to be attentive to the choice of the place at which given acts of opposition are to be undertaken. Gandhi usually paid considerable attention to this point, as was illustrated by his plans for civil disobedience of the Salt Laws in 1930. As the place where he would make salt and spark the national struggle, Gandhi chose the little-known Dandi beach on the Gulf of Cambay, not significant in itself, but a point which allowed Gandhi and his followers to walk for twenty-six days the now-famous Salt March—during which time he could arouse public interest and focus attention on his plans for civil disobedience.<sup>12</sup> Also during his investigation of the plight of the peasants in Champaran, Bihar, in 1917, when Gandhi expected arrest he went to Bettiah, preferring to be arrested among the most poverty-stricken peasants of the district.<sup>13</sup>

謹慎仔細的非暴力戰略規劃者，很可能會關注選擇在哪個地方採取反對運動的行動。甘地通常花費不少心思注意這一點，正如他在1930年計劃對「食鹽法」的公民不服從運



動所說明的。要做為可以製鹽而且激發民族抗爭的地方，甘地選擇了鮮為人知之坎貝(Cambay)灣的丹迪(Dandi)海灘，它本身並不顯著，但是這個地點讓甘地與他的追隨者可以進行現在著名的「為鹽而走」而步行26天——在此期間，他能喚起公眾的興趣而且注意力集中在他所計劃的公民不服從。<sup>12</sup>同時，在他調查1917年比哈爾(Bihar)邦之查姆帕蘭(Champan)農民的困境期間，當甘地預計將要被逮捕時，他跑到貝蒂亞(Bettiah)去，寧願在該地區最貧困的農民之間受到逮捕。<sup>13</sup>

#### 4. Timing

##### 時機

The timing of the implementation of tactics can be extremely important in nonviolent action. This timing may be of several types. For example, it is necessary to be able to judge when people are ready to take direct action, and also when a call for action would meet only a weak response or be ignored.<sup>14</sup> Timing needs to be considered in light of the whole situation; Nehru paid tribute to Gandhi's ability to do this when he wrote "...he knows his

12 Sharp, *Gandhi Wields...*, pp. 70-90.

夏普，《甘地行使...》，第70-90頁。

13 Ibid., pp. 14-15.

同上，第14-15頁。

14 Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 150.

米勒(Miller)，《非暴力》，第150頁。

India well and reacts to her lightest tremors, and gauges a situation accurately and almost instinctively, and has a knack of acting at the psychological moment”<sup>15</sup> It has been argued that the Irish “No-Rent Manifesto” would have been more successful if issued in February 1881—as the extreme wing of the Land League wanted—instead of six months later, after the leaders had been jailed and reforms were dampening the will to resist.<sup>16</sup>

執行戰術的時機在非暴力行動中可能是非常重要的。這個時機可能有許多類型。例如，必須要有能力可以判斷人們甚麼時候已經準備好採取直接行動，並且也要判斷在甚麼時候呼籲採取行動將只會得到微弱的反應或受到忽略。<sup>14</sup>時機的考慮必須從整體局勢的角度；尼赫魯(Nehru)對甘地做到這一點的能力表示敬意時，他寫道：「……他非常了解他的印度，而且可以對她最輕的震顫做出反應，他準確地與幾乎本能地衡量局勢，並且有在這個心理瞬間採取行動的訣竅。」<sup>15</sup>大家曾經爭論過，愛爾蘭的「無租金宣言(No-Rent Manifesto)」如果在1881年2月發表，可能會更成功——如同「土地聯盟」之極端右翼所希望的——而不是在6個月之

15 Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 253.

尼赫魯(Nehru)，《自傳》，第253頁。

16 Sheehy-Skeffington, *Michael Davitt*, pp. 120-121. On debate in 1775 on the timing of the American Colonists' nonimportation and nonexportation movement, see Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants...*, pp. 414-421.

雪益—史開夫英頓(Sheehy-Skeffington)，《邁可達維特(Michael Davitt)》，第120-121頁。有關1775年對於美國殖民者不進口與不出口之時機的辯論，參閱史列辛格(Schlesinger)，《殖民地商人...》，第414-421頁。

後，當時領導人已經被關進牢裡而且改革運動已經減弱了抵抗的意志。<sup>16</sup>

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Sometimes the launching of nonviolent action may be timed to coincide with some significant day or occasion. The choice of April 6, 1930, as the start of the Indian civil disobedience campaign, for example, coincided with the beginning of National Week, which was observed in homage to the victims of the Amritsar Massacre of 1919.<sup>17</sup> Timing may also be important in another sense. The hour and minute at which given nonviolent actionists are to be at certain places and the synchronization of actions of various groups may be crucial; this has been the case in certain student actions in the U.S. South.<sup>18</sup>

有時候發起非暴力行動的時機可能在時間上可以配合一些重要的日子或場合。例如，選擇 1930年4月6日做為印度公民不服從運動的開始，恰逢「國慶週」的開始，這是在家裡紀念1919年阿姆利薩屠殺慘案(Amritsar Massacre)的受害者<sup>17</sup> 節日。時機在另一種意義上也是很重要的。設定之

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17 Sharp, *Gandhi Wields...*, p. 84.  
夏普，《甘地行使...》，第84頁。

18 See Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 308; and Lincoln, "The strategy of a Sit-in," p. 297.  
參閱米勒(Miller)，《非暴力》，第308頁，及林肯，《靜坐的戰略》，第297頁。

非暴力行動者在某些不同團體同步採取行動的幾時幾分，可能是至關重要的，這一直是在美國南部某些學生行動的情況。<sup>18</sup>

In still a different sense, timing may refer to the choice of the stage at which to resist an opponent who is attempting to impose or extend his control over a society. On occasion, the opponent's demands and action may require prompt reaction and resistance if his efforts to establish or extend control are to be thwarted. In the case of an invasion, for example, this may be particularly true at three points. The first occurs after the formal seizure of power and the occupation of the country. The second is at the stage when the invader seeks the collaboration and assistance of important groups, such as police, civil service and trade unions. The last is at the point where he attempts to destroy the independent social institutions, bring all organizations and institutions under his control, and atomize the population. When each of these attacks occurs, it will be important that resistance be undertaken without delay and that people do not "wait and see" or just drift. Only prompt action can be effective. In other conflict situation, the timing of action at various stages of the struggle may also be important.

仍然還有一個不同的意義，時機可以是指選擇抵抗對

手企圖強加或延長他對社會之控制的階段。有時候，對手的  
要求與行動可能需要迅速的反應與抵抗，如果想要擊退他想  
要建立或擴大控制的努力。例如，在入侵的情況，這個可能  
在三個時間點上是特別正確的。第一個時間點是在正式奪取  
政權與佔領該國之後；第二個時間點是在侵略者尋求重要團  
體，如警察、公務人員與工會之合作與協助的階段；最後一  
個時間點是在他企圖摧毀獨立的社會機構，將所有組織與機  
構擺在他的控制之下，以及分化民衆的時候。當這些襲擊之  
一發生時，重要的是要毫不拖延地進行發動抵抗運動，而且  
人民不可以「等待觀望」或優柔寡斷。只有迅速採取行動才  
會有效果。在其他衝突的情況下，抗爭之不同階段採取行動  
的時機可能也是很重要的。

## 5. Numbers and strength

### 人數與力量

While numbers may be extremely important both in nonviolent action and in military action,<sup>19</sup> they are certainly not the only important factor and do not guarantee victory. It is fallacious to attempt “to analyze and theorize about strategy in terms of mathematics” and to assume that victory is determined simply by “a superior concentration of force at a selected place.”<sup>20</sup> In nonviolent action—especially when nonviolent coercion is being attempted, as in a general strike or a mutiny—numbers may at times be decisive. But numbers must not be considered along;

large numbers may even be a disadvantage, either for tactical reasons or because discipline and reliability have been sacrificed to obtain them, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Particular tactics and methods may in the given circumstances have their own requirements concerning the numbers of actionists. Large numbers unable to maintain nonviolent discipline and to continue action in face of repression may weaken the movement, but with the necessary standards and discipline they may become “irresistible.”<sup>21</sup>

雖然人數可能是非常重要，不管是在非暴力的行動與軍事行動中，<sup>19</sup>它們當然不是唯一重要的因素而且也不能保證勝利。企圖「以數學的方法來對戰略進行分析與理論化」是荒謬的，而且假設勝利只是由「在選定的地方集中優勢的力量<sup>20</sup>」就可以決定。在非暴力的行動中——尤其是正在嘗試非暴力強制脅迫，如在總罷工或兵變中——人數可能有時候是具有決定性的。但如本章前面所討論的，一定不可以只有考慮人數；人數多甚至可能是一個缺點，無論是戰術原因，或者是為了要獲得這個數目而要犧牲紀律與可靠性。在一個已知的情勢下，特殊的戰術與方法可能有它自身有關行動者之人數的要求。人數多而無法維持非暴力的紀律，並且

19 Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 192.

克勞塞維茲(Clausewitz)，《戰爭論》，第一冊，第192頁。

20 Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, p. 342. See also Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 97.

利德爾哈特(Liddell Hart)，《戰略》，第342頁，及克勞塞維茲(Clausewitz)，《戰爭論》，第一冊，第97頁。

在鎮壓之下無法繼續行動，可能會削弱運動，但如果具備有必要的標準與紀律，他們可能會變成是「不可抵擋的」。<sup>21</sup>

## 6. The issue and concentration of strength

### 議題與力量的集中

If there are to be wise strategy and tactics for conduction nonviolent action most effectively, then a careful selection of the points on which to fight is crucial, as discussed above. In conventional military campaigns, such points may in large degree be determined by consideration topography, supplies and the like. But in nonviolent campaigns they are almost exclusively determined by political, psychological, social and economic factors.

如果有睿智的戰略與戰術可以最有效地指揮非暴力的行動，那麼仔細地挑選打擊點是至關重要的，如前面所討論的。在傳統的軍事行動，這些點可能在很大程度上取決於考慮地形、聯勤補給等等。但在非暴力運動中，它們幾乎完全取決於政治、心理、社會與經濟的因素。

There is no substitute for genuine strength in

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21 M. K. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 288; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 288; and Dhawan, *The Practical Philosophy...*, pp. 224-5.

甘地，《非暴力抵抗》，第288頁，印度版本，《堅持真理運動(*Satyagraha*)》，第288頁，及，達丸(Dhawan)，《實踐的哲學》，第224-5頁。

nonviolent action. If this is lacking, then the attempt to fight for an objective which is too vast to be achieved may be unwise. To be effective, nonviolent action needs to be concentrated at crucial points which are selected after consideration of one's own strength, the objectives and position of the opponent (including his weaknesses), and the importance of the issue itself. Napoleon's maxim that it is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point applies here as well.<sup>22</sup> In selecting that point consideration must also be given to the probable consequences if that particular battle is either lost or won. This is very closely related to the first of the axioms of military strategy and tactics outlined by Liddell Hart:

在非暴力行動中，真正的實力並沒有代替品。如果缺乏這些，那麼努力要為一個太大而無法實現的目標而戰，可能是不聰明的。為了有效，非暴力的行動必須集中在關鍵點，選擇這些關鍵點必須考慮自己的實力、對手的目標與立場(包括他的弱點)，以及議題本身的重要性。拿破崙的格言說，在關鍵的地方不可能會有過多的力量，在這裡也同樣適用。<sup>22</sup>在選擇這個關鍵點也必須考慮到，這個特別的戰鬥是輸還是贏所可能帶來的後果。這個與利德爾哈特(Liddell Hart)所摘要之軍事戰略與戰術的第一個公理，有非常密切的關係：

<sup>22</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 214.

克勞塞維茲(Clausewitz)，《戰爭論》，第一冊，第214頁。



Adjust your end to your means. In determining your object, clear sight and cool calculation should prevail. It is folly “to bite off more than you can chew,” and the beginning of military wisdom is a sense of what is possible. So learn to face facts while still preserving faith: there will be ample need for faith—the faith that can achieve the apparently impossible—when action begins. Confidence is like the current in a battery: avoid exhausting it in vain effort—and remember that your own continued confidence will be of no avail if the cells of your battery, the men upon whom you depend, have been run down.<sup>23</sup>

「爲了你的手段調整你的目的。」在決定你的目標時，要以清晰的眼光與冷靜的計算爲準。人家說「咬下比你可以咀嚼的一大塊肉」是愚蠢的行爲，而且軍事智慧的開端就是在講什麼是有可能的。所以在仍然保持信心的同時，要學會面對事實。當行動開始，將會需要很多的信心——可以完成表面上不可能之任務的信心。信心就像是電瓶裡的電流：避免把它耗盡在徒勞無功的努力上，而且要記住，你自己持續的信心將沒有甚麼幫助，如果你蓄電的這些電瓶——就是你所依賴的這些人，他們的電量已經很低。<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, p. 348.

利德爾哈特(Liddell Hart)，《戰略》，第348頁。

There may be particular circumstances, such as the attempt to atomize the population, which may require that action be taken despite weaknesses; but even then consideration of one's real strength is required, and in formulating strategy and tactics an attempt should be made to see if the existing strength can be used to best advantage and the weaknesses either bypassed or urgently corrected.

可能會有特殊的情況，例如對方企圖將民衆加以分化，儘管有弱點可能還是需要採取行動，但即使在這種情況還是必須要考慮我方的真正力量，而且在制訂戰略與戰術的時候，應該要努力瞭解現有的力量是否可以發揮最大的優勢，以及是否可以迂迴繞過或緊急地修正這些弱點。

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自我解放戰略規劃指南——延伸閱讀①

“The principle of war, not merely one principle, can be condensed into a single word—‘concentration.’ But for truth this needs to be amplified as the ‘concentration of strength against weakness.’”<sup>24</sup> This principle of military action applies also in nonviolent action and was stressed by Gandhi. Concentration in nonviolent struggle will primarily be on certain political, social or economic points which symbolize wider general conditions. This is related to another of Liddell Hart's axioms: “Keep your object always in mind, while adapting your plan to circumstances.

Realize that there are more ways than one of gaining an object, but take heed that every objective should bear on the object.”<sup>25</sup> Nonviolent actionists will seek to attack the specific aspect which symbolize the “evil” they are fighting, which is least defensible by the opponent and which is capable of arousing the greatest strength among the nonviolent actionists and the wider population. Success on such a limited point will increase their self-confidence and ability to move forward effectively toward the fuller realization of their objectives. Having chosen the point for concentrated attack, they must not allow themselves to become sidetracked to a lesser course of action or a dead-end issue.<sup>26</sup>

「戰爭的原則，不僅僅只是一個原則，可以濃縮成一句話——『集中』。但是，就真正的意義來說，這需要將它放大為『集中力量打擊弱點』。<sup>24</sup>」甘地強調，這一個軍事行動的原則也適用於非暴力的行動。非暴力抗爭中力量的集中，主要會在某些政治、社會或經濟的焦點，它們象徵著更廣泛的一般條件。這可以連結到另一個利德爾哈特的公理：「在調整你的計劃來適應局勢的時候，要緊緊記住你的目標。要了解達到目的的方法不會只有一種，但要小心，每一

24 Ibid., p. 347.  
同上，第347頁。

25 Ibid., p. 348.  
同上，第348頁。

個目的都是要針對這個目標。<sup>25</sup>」非暴力的行動者將尋找攻擊象徵它們正在對抗之「邪惡」的具體面向，它就是對手最不容易防守的地方，而且是能夠在非暴力行動者與更廣泛的民衆激發出最大力量的地方。在這樣一個小型有限之焦點的成功會增加他們的自信心與能力，以有效地向前邁進、更充分地實現他們的目標。已經選擇了集中的攻擊點，他們必須不可以讓他們自己被牽絆在較次要之行動理念或是一條死胡同的議題上。<sup>26</sup>

## 7. The initiative

### 主動性

In nonviolent action it is highly important—even in defensive phases of the struggle—for the actionist to obtain and retain the initiative. “An able general always gives battle in his own time on the ground of his choice. He always retains the initiative in these respects and never allows it to pass into the hands of the enemy,” wrote Gandhi.<sup>27</sup> One of the important distinctions indicated by Nehru between the 1930 campaign—which could be described at least as a “draw”—and the 1932 campaign, which was a clear defeat for the Indians, was that in 1930

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.  
同上。

<sup>27</sup> Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 202.  
波西(Bose)，《甘地精選》，第202頁。

the “initiative definitely remained with the Congress and the people” whereas “the initiative early in 1932 was definitively with the Government, and Congress was always on the defensive.”<sup>28</sup> The nonviolent leadership group needs to be able to control the situation and to demonstrate that it has that control.<sup>29</sup> Nirmal Kumar Bose writes that a leader of a nonviolent campaign “...should not allow the adversary to dictate or force any step upon him...[nor] allow himself to be buffeted about by every temporary event.”<sup>30</sup> Wherever possible, then, the nonviolent group, not the opponent, will choose the time, issue and course of action and seek to maintain the initiative despite the opponent’s repression. In cases where the conflict has been precipitated by the opponent, as in a coup d’état or invasion or when new repressive measures are imposed, the nonviolent actionists will endeavor to restore the initiative to themselves as quickly as possible.

在非暴力的行動中，即使是在抗爭的防禦階段，讓行動者擁有與保持主動性是非常重要的。甘地這樣寫道：「一個有能力的將軍總是以他選擇的時間為準、發動戰鬥。他始終在這些方面保持主動性，而決不允許它流失進入敵人的手中。<sup>27</sup>」尼赫魯指出1930年與1932年兩個運動之間重要區別之一，1930年的運動可以說至少是「平盤」，而對印度人來說，1932年的運動是一個明顯的失敗，這個區別就是1930年

的「主動性肯定是在國會與人民這邊」，而後者的「主動性肯定早在1932年就由政府掌握而國會總是在防衛。<sup>28</sup>」非暴力的領導小組必須有能力控制局勢，並且展示它可以控制。<sup>29</sup>尼莫爾庫馬爾波西(Nirmal Kumar Bose)寫道，一個非暴力運動的領導人：「……不應該讓對手支配他或強迫他採取任何步驟，……也不可以讓自己在每一個暫時的活動中無所適從。<sup>30</sup>」那麼，只要有可能，非暴力陣營，而不是對手，要選擇行動的時間、議題與過程，並且儘管在對手的鎮壓之下，還是要尋求保持主動。在衝突是由對手出手的情況下，例如是軍事政變或入侵，或施加新的鎮壓措施，非暴力的行動者要努力盡快恢復自己的主動性。

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### The choice of weapons 武器的選擇

In order to achieve optimal results, the choice of nonviolent weapons to initiate and conduct the campaign will need to be made carefully and wisely. It will be necessary to determine which of the specific methods of nonviolent action described in Part Two (and possibly

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28 Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 215 and pp. 327-328.

尼赫魯(Nehru)，《自傳》，第215頁及第327-328頁。

29 Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 146 and p. 150.

米勒(Miller)，《非暴力》，第146及150頁。

30 Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 152.

波西(Bose)，《甘地精選》，第152頁。

other methods) are most appropriate to this particular conflict. This decision will need to be taken in the light of a variety of factors. These include the issues at stake, the nature of the contending groups, the type of culture and society of each, and the social and political context of the conflict. Other factors are the mechanisms of change intended by the nonviolent group (as to convert or to coerce), the experience of the nonviolent group, and their ability in applying nonviolent action. Finally, there are also the type of repression and other countermeasures expected, the ability of the nonviolent group to withstand them, and the intensities of commitment to the struggle within the nonviolent group. There are of course others.

爲了達到最佳的結果，必須謹慎地與睿智地選擇非暴力的武器，以發起與進行這個運動。有必要決定第二部分中所述之非暴力行動的哪些具體方法(可能還有其他方法)，對這個特定的衝突是最適合的。這個決定必須考慮許多不同的因素。這些因素包括爭議的議題、涉入爭議之陣營的本質、雙方各自文化與社會的類型，以及衝突的社會與政治背景。其他的因素是非暴力陣營企圖造成改變的機制(以說服轉換或強制介入脅迫)、非暴力的經驗，以及他們應用非暴力行動的能力。最後，還有預期鎮壓與其他反制措施的類型、非暴力陣營抵抗這些的能力，以及非暴力陣營內部承諾抗爭的強度。當然還有其他的因素。

The number of methods used in any single conflict will vary from only one to dozens. The choice of the specific methods to be used in a given campaign will be based on several factors. One of these is a judgment as to whether or not the basic characteristics of the method contain qualities desired for that particular conflict. For example, generally speaking, the methods of the class of nonviolent protest and persuasion (Chapter Three) are largely symbolic in their effect and produce an awareness of the existence of dissent. Their impact is proportionately greater under authoritarian regimes where opposition and nonconformity are discouraged and rare. Depending on the numbers involved, the methods of noncooperation (Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven) are likely to cause difficulties in maintaining the normal operation and efficiency of the system. In extreme situations, these methods may threaten its existence. The methods of nonviolent intervention (Chapter Eight) possess qualities of both groups, but in addition usually constitute a more direct challenge to the regime. This class of methods makes possible a greater impact with smaller numbers, providing that fearlessness and discipline are maintained.

任何一場衝突中使用方法的數目可能會從只有一個到數十個的不同。在一場已知的運動中選擇使用的特定方法會基於許多因素。其中之一就是，判斷這個方法的基本特徵是



否包含這個特定衝突所需要的品質。例如，一般來說，非暴力抗議與遊說之類型的方法(第三章)，在效應上很大程度上是象徵性的，而且會產生一個存在異議的覺醒。在反對與不順從不受到鼓勵而且稀少的獨裁政權之下，它們的衝擊會成比例的較大。與參與的人數有關，不合作的方法(第四、五、六與七章)有可能導致體制難以維持正常的運作與效率。在極端的情況下，這些方法可能會威脅到政權的存在。非暴力介入干預的方法(第八章)具有兩個類型的素質，但兩者相加通常會構成對這個政權更直接的挑戰。假設可以維持不會恐懼與紀律的條件，這個類型的方法讓以更少的人數而有可能產生更大的衝擊。

Moving from the class of nonviolent protest and persuasion to that of noncooperation and thence to nonviolent intervention generally involves a progressive increase in the degree of sacrifice required of the nonviolent actionists, in the risk of disturbing the public peace and order, and in effectiveness. The methods of noncooperation can be interpreted as withdrawal of cooperation from an evil system, and hence as having connotations of a defensive moral action. The use of this class of methods, as compared to nonviolent intervention, may also contribute to producing a relatively less explosive and dangerous social situation, in that the simply withdraw existing cooperation or withhold new forms of cooperation

with the opponent.<sup>31</sup> The penalties and sufferings imposed directly or indirectly upon non-cooperators, although severe at times, may be relatively less than those involved in nonviolent intervention. Also, the risk of such repression in any particular case may be less. It may also be easier to get people to refrain from doing something which has been ordered, i.e., to noncooperate, than to get them to do something daring which is prohibited.

由非暴力抗議與說服的類型改變到非暴力不合作的類型，然後再改變成非暴力之介入干預的方法，通常涉及需要非暴力行動者犧牲程度的持續增加，冒著擾亂公眾安寧與秩序，以及有效性的風險。不合作的方法可以解釋為從邪惡的體制中撤銷合作，從而具有道德之防禦行動的內涵。使用這個類型的方法，如與非暴力之介入干預相比，也可能有助於產生一個「相對」較不具爆炸性而且危險的社會情勢，這就是單純地撤銷既有的合作或停止與對手有新形式的合作。<sup>31</sup>直接或間接施加在不合作者身上的處罰與苦難，雖然有時候很嚴厲，可能會比那些參與非暴力介入干預者相對要少些。同時，在任何特定情況下這種鎮壓的風險也可能會較少。讓人們不要做一些被命令要去做的事情，亦即不要合作，也可能比要他們大膽地去做一些他們被禁止的事情更容易。

31 Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 156; Ind. Ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 156.

甘地，《非暴力抵抗》，第156頁；印度版本，《堅持真理運動(Satyagraha)》，第156頁。

For effective noncooperation, larger numbers of participants are usually required than for either symbolic protest or intervention, and the action usually continues over longer periods of time. Often a long duration is necessary for the noncooperation to achieve its impact. In 1930 Gandhi said that whereas the cooperation of three hundred million people would be necessary for a foreign-cloth boycott campaign to be successful, for the civil disobedience campaign an army of ten thousand defiant men and women would suffice.<sup>32</sup> Many of the methods of nonviolent intervention can only be practiced for limited period of time. A continuous effect therefore is achieved only by constant repetition of the action. These methods therefore require more skilled, reliable and determined practitioners than methods of noncooperation. Because of this, the quicker methods of nonviolent intervention usually require considerable preparations in order to be successfully applied. Also, those methods are often best combined with other forms of nonviolent action. The movement using intervention methods, too, must be more highly disciplined and better led. “The quickest remedies are always fraught with the greatest danger and require the utmost skill in handling them.”<sup>33</sup>

爲了達到有效的不合作，通常都要比不論是象徵性的抗議或者介入干預需要更多人數的參與者，而且行動通常會持續一段更長的時間。通常，不合作必須要一段長久的時間，以達到它的衝擊。在1930年甘地就說，如果有3億人的合作必然就可以讓外國布匹的抵制運動達到成功，爲了公民不服從運動，1萬名男女組成的隊伍就足夠了。<sup>32</sup>許多非暴力介入干預的方法只能實行一段有限的時間。因此，要達到持續性的效果只能不斷地重複這個行動。因此，這些方法要比不合作的方法需要更熟練的、可靠的與有決心的實踐者。正因爲如此，這個非暴力介入干預的更快方法通常需要相當的準備，以便成功地加以應用。同時，這些方法時常最好結合其他形式的非暴力行動。使用介入干預方法的運動也需要更高度的紀律與受到更好的領導。「最快的解決辦法總是充滿了最大的危險，而且在處理它們的時候需要最高度的技能。」<sup>33</sup>



Another important factor in the selection of the specific methods to be used in the campaign is whether the actionists intend to produce change by the mechanism of conversion, accommodation, or nonviolent coercion. Within that context, the specific inducements for change

32 Sharp, *Gandhi Wields...*, p. 72.

夏普，《甘地行使...》，第72頁。

33 Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 173; Ind. Ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 173.

甘地，《非暴力抵抗》，第173頁；印度版本，《堅持真理運動(Satyagraha)》，第173頁。



by the opponent which the nonviolent group is attempting to produce may be important; these may include, for example, economic losses, weakening of political position, guilt feelings, new perceptions, and the like. Where conversion of the opponent is sought, such methods as the general strike, mutiny and parallel government are obviously not appropriate. But where nonviolent coercion is intended these may be precisely the methods needed, whereas forms which rely for their impact on psychological and emotional effects on the leaders of the opponent group may be a waste of time and effort. The problem is complicated, however, and frequently methods which apply differing pressures and use different mechanisms may be combined effectively within the same campaign. Fast rules are not possible.

選擇在運動要使用之特定方法的另一個重要因素是，行動者是否打算利用說服轉換、配合調整，或者非暴力強制脅迫的機制產生改變。在這個前後關係內，非暴力陣營企圖想要產生使對手改變的具體引誘可能是重要的，這些可能包括，例如，經濟損失、政治地位的削弱、內疚的感覺、新的觀念等等。當尋求說服轉換對手的時候，類似總罷工、兵變與平行政府的這些方法顯然是不恰當的。但是，在非暴力強制脅迫就是要使用之方法的時候，這些方法可能正好就是必須要的，而依賴對敵對陣營領導者帶來心理與情緒效應之衝擊的這些方式，可能就是浪費時間與精力。不過，這個

問題是很複雜的，可以施加不同壓力與使用不同機制的方法，經常可以在同一個運動中有效地結合起來。這是不可能快速規則的。

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In most cases more than one method will be used; then the order in which the methods are applied, the ways in which they are combined, and how they influence the application of other methods and contribute to the struggle as a whole become highly important. The methods to be used in a given situation must be considered not only for their specific and immediate impact on the conflict situation and the opponent. Also important is their contribution to the progressive development of the movement, to changes in attitudes and power relationships, to alterations in the support for each side, and to the later application and effects of more radical nonviolent methods.

在大多數的情況都會使用一種以上的方法，此時候使用這些方法的順序、如何將它們結合起來、它們如何影響其他方法的使用，以及為整體抗爭做出貢獻變得非常重要。在特定的情況下，要使用的這些方法必須考慮的不僅是他們對衝突形勢與對手之具體而立即的衝擊，而且同樣重要的是他們有助於運動的逐步發展、態度與權力關係的改變、雙方各自之支持的改變，以及未來更激進之非暴力方法的應用與效

果。

Sometime the combination of methods is relatively simple, especially in a local or limited type of action. Economic boycotts have been used, for example, in support of sit-ins against racial discrimination, and picketing is commonly used in support of strikes. When a general strike is used to support the mutiny of government troops, however, the situation begins to become more complicated, with larger numbers of methods likely to become involved quickly.

有時候方法的合併是相對比較簡單的，尤其是在一個地方局部或者小型有限種類的行動。例如，經濟抵制曾經被使用來支持靜坐抗議種族歧視，而糾察線通常被用來支持罷工。不過，當使用總罷工來支持政府部隊的兵變時，局勢就會因為很快地涉入更多的方法而開始變得更加複雜。

For large-scale planned campaigns against determined opponents the question of how to combine the use of several methods is not easy to answer; it must be considered in the context both of the overall strategy of the struggle and its more localized and restricted phases. In a long struggle phasing is highly important, and the choice and sequence of methods may be the most important single factor in that phasing. Waskow speaks,

for example, of the “‘escalation’ of disorder without violence.”<sup>34</sup> The importance of this phased development of a nonviolent campaign has been stressed by specialists in Gandhi’s type of nonviolent action, such as Bose<sup>35</sup> and Bondurant. As one of nine “fundamental rules” of satyagraha Bondurant lists:<sup>36</sup>

對於對抗有決心之對手的大規模運動而言，這個要如何組合這些方法的問題就不容易得到回答，這必須在情勢範圍上同時考慮抗爭之整體戰略，以及更為當地受到限制的各個階段。<sup>34</sup> 在長期的抗爭中設定階段是非常重要的，而這些方法的選擇與排序可能是在設定階段中一個最重要的因素。例如，瓦斯科(Waskow)提到「沒有暴力之失序的『升級』」。專攻甘地式之非暴力行動的專家，如波西(Bose)<sup>35</sup>與邦都蘭德(Bondurant)一再強調非暴力運動這種分階段發展的重要性。正如邦都蘭德列舉之「沙提亞格拉哈(satyagraha，意指非暴力不合作與不服從)」九條「基本規則」之一：<sup>36</sup>

Progressive advancement of the movement through steps and stages determined to be appropriate

34 Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-in*, p. 246.

瓦斯科(Waskow)，《從種族暴動到靜坐》，第246頁。

35 Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 176.

波西(Bose)，《甘地主義研究》，第176頁。

36 Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, p. 38.

邦都蘭德(Bondurant)，《征服暴力》，第38頁。



within the given situation. Decision as to when to proceed to a further phase of the satyagraha must be carefully weighed in the light of the ever-changing circumstance, but a static condition must be avoided.

「運動的逐漸往前邁進」，在已知的情勢中經由適當之步驟與階段的決策。在非暴力「沙提亞格拉哈」之中要決策何時進行到下一個階段，必須從不斷變化之情勢的角度來認真權衡。但是絕對要避免停在靜止狀態的情勢。

It may, therefore, be determined that certain methods must precede others, in order that it may be possible later to use more radical forms.

因此，可能會決定某些方法必須優先於其他的方法，以便日後有可能使用更激進的形式。

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Gandhi frequently used the response of the volunteers and public to some specific action as a means of testing whether or not some further, more radical, form of action were possible, in such terms as degree of commitment, willingness to act, ability to withstand the opponent's sanctions, degree of discipline, and ability to remain both fearless and nonviolent. In his testimony before the Hunter Committee in 1920, for example,

Gandhi said:

甘地經常用利用志願者與大眾對一些特定行動的反應，做為測試是否有進一步的、更激進之行動形式的可能，這可以從承諾的程度、採取行動的意願、承受對手制裁的能力、守紀律的程度、保持無所畏懼與非暴力的能力來測試。例如，於1920年在亨特委員會(Hunter Committee)作證時，甘地說：

Hartal was designed to strike the imagination of the people and the government...I had no means of understanding the mind of India except by some such striking movement. Hartal was a proper indication to me how far I would be able to carry civil disobedience.<sup>37</sup>

哈達爾(Hartal，罷工)是設計來衝擊人民與政府的想像力……除了經由一些這種罷工的運動，我沒有辦法理解印度的心思。哈達爾對我來說是一個適當的指標，讓我知道我能夠繼續公民不服從的程度到多遠。<sup>37</sup>

He also used the consumer's boycott to test readiness for civil disobedience. Gandhi wrote in 1921: "It is my firm conviction that if we bring about a successful boycott of foreign cloth, we shall have produced an

<sup>37</sup> Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 25; Ind. Ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 25.

甘地，《非暴力抵抗》，第25頁；印度版本，《堅持真理運動(Satyagraha)》，第25頁。

atmosphere that would enable us to inaugurate civil disobedience on a scale that no Government can resist.”<sup>38</sup>

他還使用了消費者的抵制，以測試公民不服從的準備度。甘地在1921年寫道：「我堅信，如果我們可以成功地抵制外國布匹，我們將會製造一種氣氛，會讓我們能夠開啓公民不服從進展到沒有一個政府能夠抗拒的一個規模。」<sup>38</sup>

In May 1920 Gandhi had reported in *Young India* that the organizers of the coming noncooperation movement had decided that it should take place in four stages: 1) relinquishment of honorary posts and titles, 2) progressive voluntary withdrawal from government employment, 3) withdrawal of members of the police and the military from government service (“a distant goal”), and 4) suspension of payment of taxes (“still more remote”).<sup>39</sup> The first stage involved the minimum danger and sacrifice,<sup>40</sup> while the last two involved the greatest risks.<sup>41</sup>

甘地在1920年5月曾在「年輕印度(Young India)」報導說，未來不合作運動的組織者已經決定，這個運動應該會分成4個階段進行：1)放棄榮譽的職位與頭銜，2)逐步自願退出在政府的就業，3)從政府部門撤出警察與軍隊的成員(「一個遙遠的目標」)，以及4)暫停稅收的繳付(「更加遙

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 173.

同上，第173頁。

遠」)。<sup>39</sup>第一階段涉及最少的危險與犧牲，<sup>40</sup>而最後兩者所涉及的風險最大。<sup>41</sup>

The 1930-31 movement was planned with a different strategy. It began with methods of nonviolent protest, such as the Salt March itself and mass meetings, and mild forms of political noncooperation, such as limited withdrawals from the provincial legislatures—all involving small numbers of people. The mass movement itself began directly with civil disobedience of a law regarded as immoral, and then developed to include both milder forms of noncooperation and more radical forms of noncooperation and nonviolent intervention.<sup>42</sup>

1930年至1931年的運動是以不同的策略來設計。它開始從非暴力的抗議，例如「為鹽而走」本身與群眾大會，以及政治不合作的溫和形式，例如從省議會小型有限的撤退——都只涉及少數的人。群眾運動本身就從對被認為不道德的法律進行公民不服從開始，然後發展到包括更溫和形式之非暴力不合作，與更激進之非暴力不合作與非暴力介入干預的

39 Ibid., pp. 115-116.

同上，第115-116頁。

40 Ibid., p. 127.

同上，第127頁。

41 Ibid., p. 151.

同上，第151頁。

42 Sharp, *Gandhi Wields...*, pp. 51-206.

夏普，《甘地行使...》，第51-206頁。

形式。<sup>42</sup>

## Selecting the strategy and tactics 戰略與戰術之選擇

The general strategy, types of tactics, and choice of methods planned by the leaders in advance will usually determine the general direction and conduct of the campaign throughout its course. Their selection is therefore highly important. As in war, a large number of factors must be considered in the selection of strategy and tactics. However, the quite different dynamics and mechanisms of nonviolent struggle appear to make the interrelationships of these factors more intimate and complex than in military struggle.

領導者事前規劃之整體戰略、戰術的類型及方法的選擇，通常就會決定運動在它過程中的整體方向與進行。因此它們的選擇是高度重要的。如同在戰爭中，戰略與戰術的選擇必須考慮許多因素。不過，非暴力抗爭相當不同的動力平衡與機制，看起來會讓這些因素彼此之間的相互關係，比在軍事抗爭中更為緊密與複雜。

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Fundamental to this task is careful consideration of the opponent's primary and secondary objectives, and the various objectives of the nonviolent group. It will be highly

important to evaluate accurately the opponent's and one's own strengths and weaknesses, and to take these into account in the formulation of strategy and tactics. Failure to do so may lead either to overly ambitious plans which fail because they are not based on a realistic assessment of possibilities, or to excessively timid plans which may fail precisely because they attempt too little. Evaluation of the strengths and nature of the opponent group may assist the nonviolent leadership in formulating a course of action most likely to produce or aggravate weaknesses and internal conflicts within it. Correct assessment of the weaknesses of the nonviolent group itself may be used in the selection of strategy and tactics which are intended to bypass them, and which may possibly also contribute to strengthening them. Estimates as to the length of the forthcoming struggle will be needed and will be important for outlining the course of action. But provision must also be made for an error of judgment in such estimates and for contingency tactics if the struggle turns out to be long instead of brief.


這項任務的基本工作是細心地考量對手之主要與次要的目標，及非暴力陣營之各式各樣的目標。準確地評估對手與自己陣營的優點與弱點，並將這些納入制定戰略與戰術的考慮，這些都是非常重要的。如果沒有這樣做，可能導致因為一個過度有野心的計畫而失敗，因為它們不是建立在對可

能性的務實評估，或者導致因為一個過分膽小的計畫而失敗，就是因為它們所作的努力太少。進行敵對陣營之優點與特性的評估，可以對非暴力陣營的領導階層在制定行動的過程有所幫助，這個行動最有可能產生或者擴大敵對陣營的缺點與內部的衝突。對非暴力陣營自己缺點的正確評估可以用於戰略與戰術的選擇，這些戰略與戰術就是要用來避開這些缺點，以及可能有助於補強它們。有必要對即將發生之抗爭進行時間長度的估計，這對重點描述行動的過程是重要的。但是，如果抗爭演變成一個長期而不是短暫的時候，就必須對這種估計判斷上的錯誤及對突發情況的因應戰術做一些預備。

Careful consideration of other factors in the general situation will be necessary to determine whether conditions are suitable for the launching of nonviolent action, and, if so, what the general and specific conditions of the situation mean for the planning of the campaign. Sibley has emphasized that:

對整體情勢之其他因素的仔細考慮是必要的，以確定發動非暴力行動的條件是否合適，並且，如果是這樣，情勢的整體與細部具體條件對運動的規劃具有何種意涵。希伯來(Sibley)曾經強調：

...the effective use of nonviolent resistance depends not only on adequate training and



commitment, but also on the “objective” situation: external conditions must be ripe for effective campaigns, and if they are not, it is the part both of wisdom and of morality not to resort to nonviolent resistance.<sup>43</sup>


……要有效地使用非暴力抵抗，不僅要倚靠足夠的訓練與承諾，而且也要依靠「客觀」的情勢：有效運動的外部條件一定要成熟，而如果它們還沒有成熟，從智慧與道德上都不可訴諸於要進行非暴力的抵抗。<sup>43</sup>

Gandhi insisted that in formulating and carrying out the strategy and tactics of the struggle the leaders need to be responsive to the demonstrated qualities of their movement and to the developing situation:

甘地堅持這樣的觀念，在制定及執行抗爭的戰略與戰術時，領導者必須要對他們運動顯現的素質與情勢的發展有所回應：

In a satyagraha campaign the mode of fight and the choice of tactics, e.g. whether to advance or retreat, offer civil resistance or organize nonviolent strength through constructive work and purely selfless humanitarian service, are determined according to

43 Sibley, ed., *The Quiet Battle*, p. 371.  
希伯來(Sibley)，《寧靜的戰爭》，第371頁。





the exigencies of the situation.<sup>44</sup>

在非暴力的消極抵抗與不合作運動裡，抗爭的模式與戰術的選擇，例如，是要前進還是要撤退、提供公民抵抗或者透過有建設性的工作及完全無私的人道服務，以組織非暴力的力量，要根據情勢的危急情況來作決定。<sup>44</sup>

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Strategy and tactics are of course interdependent. Precise tactics can only be formulated in the context of the overall strategy, and an intimate understanding of the whole situation and the specific methods of action which are open. Skillful selection and implementation of tactics will not make up for a bad overall strategy, and a good strategy remains impotent unless carried to fulfillment with sound tactics: "...only great tactical results can lead to great strategical ones...."<sup>45</sup>

戰略與戰術當然是互相相關依存的。準確的戰術只能在整體策略的內涵裡，及對全部情勢以及對尚未決定之特定行動方法的緊密了解，才可以加以制定。對戰術的熟練選擇與實施將無法彌補一個不好的整體戰略，而除非透過紮實的

44 Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 202.  
波西(Bose)，《甘地精選》，第202頁。

45 Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 241.  
克勞塞維茲(Clausewitz)，《戰爭論》，第一冊，第241頁。

戰術實施，一個好的戰略仍然是無能為力的：「……只有偉大的戰術成果才能成就偉大的戰略……」<sup>45</sup>

Liddell Hart has suggested that the particular course of action should have more than one objective.

利德爾哈特曾經建議，特別的行動過程應該不止有一個目標。

Take a line of operation which offers alternate objectives. For you will thus put your opponent on the horns of a dilemma, which goes far to assure the chance of gaining one objective at least—whichever he guards least—and may enable you to gain one after the other.

採取一條可以提供不同替代目標的操作方向。因為這樣你將因此把你的對手推擠到一個兩難的尖角上，這時前進一些，就保證有機會至少可以完成一項目標——對手防衛最少的部分——並且可能讓你在完成一項目標之後再完成另一項目標。

Alternative objectives allow you to keep the opportunity of gaining an objective; whereas a single objective, unless the enemy is helplessly inferior, means the certainty that you will not gain it—once the enemy is no longer uncertain as to your aim. There

is no more common mistake than to confuse a single line of operation, which is usually wise, with a single objective, which is usually futile.<sup>46</sup>

可以二者選一的目標會讓你保持贏得一個目標的機會；而單一的目標，除非敵人是無助低能的，將確定你無法達到目的——一旦敵人對你的目的不再覺得不確定。不要再對通常是聰明的單一操作方向與通常是無用的單一目標，產生常見錯誤的混淆看法。<sup>46</sup>

To a large degree this frequently happens in nonviolent action anyhow without particular planning, since the nonviolent group aims at achieving both particular objectives and more general changes in attitudes and power relationships within each group and between the contending groups. These more general changes are likely to be taking place during the whole course of the conflict, and may be achieved to a considerable degree even in instances where the particular political goal is not won. However, attention is also needed to the possibility of applying Liddell Hart's strategic principle to concrete limited goals, so long as this does not violate the principle of concentration discussed previously.

在很大的程度上，這經常還是在沒有特殊規劃之非暴

<sup>46</sup> Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, p. 348.

利德爾哈特(Liddell Hart)，《戰略》，第348頁。

力行動過程中發生，因為非暴力陣營同時鎖定在完成特別的目標，以及在涉入陣營之雙方，各自與兩者之間態度立場與權力關係上產生更整體的改變。這些更整體的改變很可能在衝突的整個過程中發生，並且即使在沒有贏得特別的政治目標之情況下，還是可能達到完成相當的程度。不過，也同時必須注意到應用利德爾哈特戰略性原則的可能性，以達到具體的小型目標，只要這不違反前述所討論之集中力量的原則。

The progressive development of the movement, partially characterized by the staged introduction of new methods of action (as discussed in the previous section), will also benefit from careful strategic planning. Such development will help to ensure that the alteration of methods and new courses of action will contribute to the maximum utilization of the actionists' forces, facilitate an improvement in their morale, and increase the chances of victory. Without clear strategic insight, changes from one type of action to another may take place without good purpose or effect, and the discouraging results which may follow can lead first to increased uncertainty as to what to do, then to demoralization, and finally to disintegration of the nonviolent movement.

運動的逐步發展，有些部分可以用階段性引入新的行動方法來認定(像在前述章節所討論的那樣)，也可以經由細

心的戰略規劃而得到好處。這樣的發展將有助於確保方法之改變與行動之新方案，可以讓行動者的力量受到最大的利用、促進士氣的提升，以及增進勝利的機會。如果沒有清晰之戰略性的深度看法，而發生行動的類型從一種轉換成另一種，且沒有好的目的或者效應，則可能導致令人洩氣的結果，這個造成的結果可能導致不知道要做什麼之不確定性的增加，然後造成士氣的敗壞，而最後是造成非暴力運動的瓦解。

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Strategic phasing of nonviolent campaigns is not new of course. However, greater understanding of the nature of the technique and of principles of strategy now make possible a fuller development and more effective utilization of such phasing than has been possible before. Three earlier examples of phasing are offered here. The provincial convention of Virginia, meeting in early August 1774, outlined a phased campaign of economic non-cooperation to achieve its objectives. The convention set dates at which new phases of their campaign were to go into effect, subject to alterations agreed to by Virginia delegates in the Continental Congress. Stalling at once, no tea was to be imported or used. If Boston were compelled to reimburse the East India Company for losses (as of tea in the Boston Tea Party), the boycott

would be extended to all articles sold by the company until the money was returned. On November 1, an absolute boycott was to be imposed on all goods (except medicines) imported directly or indirectly from Britain, including all slaves from wherever they were brought. If colonial grievances were not corrected by August 10, 1775 (a year later), then an absolute program of non-exportation of all articles to Britain was to be imposed. The year interval before non-exportation took effect allowed for payment of debts to British merchants, and for Virginia tobacco growers to shift to crops which could be used at home.<sup>47</sup> This phased campaign drafted by Virginians foreshadowed the program adopted by the First Continental Congress.

非暴力運動的戰略性分階段當然不是全新的概念。不過，與之前的可能性相比，可以對這種技術的特性與戰略原理有更多的理解，讓這種階段性的戰略可以作更充分的發展與更有效的利用，現在變成有可能。在這裡提供三個較早時期的例子。在1774年8月初的維吉尼亞的全州大會上，重點描述了一個分階段進行的經濟不合作運動，以實現它的目標。大會以「大陸國會(Continental Congress)」中維吉尼亞代表所同意之改變為依據，設定了他們運動之新階段開始生效的日期。立刻造成停頓，沒有茶被進口或者使用。如果波

47 Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants...*, pp. 369-370.

史列辛格(Schlesinger)，《殖民地商人...》，第369-370頁。

士頓被強迫支付東印度公司的損失(如同波士頓茶黨Boston Tea Party的茶一樣)，聯合抵制將會擴大到這個公司出售的全部物品，一直到罰金被回收為止。在11月1日，一個全面的聯合抵制即將施加於從英國直接或間接進口的全部貨物(除藥品之外)，包括他們從任何地方帶來的全部奴隸。如果殖民地的不滿在1775年8月10日以前(一年之後)沒有得到改善，彼時就會對英國實施一個所有貨品都不出口的全面計畫。在不出口貨物生效之前的這一年期間，仍然允許對英國商人付清債務，而且讓維吉尼亞種菸草的農民可以轉種國內可以使用的作物。<sup>47</sup> 這個維吉尼亞人起草的草案，暗示了分階段進行的運動被第一屆「大陸國會」所採納的計畫。

A phased campaign of peasant action was issued in Russia by the Second Congress of the Peasants Union, meeting in Moscow in November 1905, during the revolution of that year. The Congress called for the use of methods of peaceful pressure (such as the peasants' collective refusal to buy or rent land from the landlords) to achieve the free transfer of land to the peasants. If these methods did not produce results, then the Union would call for a general agrarian strike to coincide with a general strike in the cities. If the tsarist government harassed the Union it would call on the peasants to refuse to pay taxes or to serve in the armed forces.<sup>48</sup>

在1905年的革命期間，那一年11月農民聯盟在莫斯科的

會議第2屆代表大會，發布了一個在俄羅斯境內農民行動的階段式運動。代表大會呼籲利用和平施壓的方法(例如，農民集體拒絕從地主那裡購買或者承租土地)，以達到將土地免費過戶給那些農民的目的。如果這些方法沒產生效果，那麼農民聯盟將會呼籲進行一次整體的農民罷工，與城市的總罷工同時進行。如果沙皇政府對聯盟進行騷擾，它將要求那些農民拒絕納稅或者不去武裝部隊服役。<sup>48</sup>

The Pan-Africanists in South Africa had planned their campaign of defiance of the Pass Laws in the spring of 1960 as simply the first stage of a three-front long-range struggle: 1) political, with the international aim of isolating South Africa (including United Nations condemnation and expulsion from the British Commonwealth) and the domestic aim of ending collaboration and submission by the African people upon which the government depended; 2) labor, the withdrawal of cheap African Labor would bring an economic collapse, and therefore stay-at-home strikes were designed to induce industrialists to demand changes in government policies; and 3) psychological, the Africans “would discover the power they have even without weapons and they would never be the same again.” Despite clear thought and certain planning for

<sup>48</sup> Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 219-220.

賀卡夫(Harcave)，《第一滴血》，第219-220頁。



a phased campaign, however, the organization had not anticipated that the government would seize the initiative by declaring a state of emergency.<sup>49</sup>

南非的泛非洲人在1960年春天計畫反抗「通行證法律 (Pass Laws)」的運動，就當作是一個三條戰線長期抗爭的第一個階段，1)政治上，以孤立南非做為國際目標 (包括聯合國的譴責與受到大英國協的開除)，以及以終結政府所依靠非洲人的合作與服從做為國內目標；2)勞動力上，撤出低廉的非洲勞工將帶來經濟上的崩潰，因此設計「呆在家裡」的罷工，將引起工業家要求政府在政策上的變化；及 3)心理上，非洲人「將發現他們甚至沒有武器而可以擁有的力量，他們就絕不會再跟過去一樣」。即使對分階段進行之運動有清晰思考與相當的計畫，不過，這個組織並沒有預期到政府會主動地宣佈緊急狀態。<sup>49</sup>

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While specific tactics for the later stages of the struggle cannot be formulated in advance, it is possible to explore a variety of general approaches for later consideration. Tactics for use in the early (and possibly intermediate) stages may, however, be successfully

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49 Interview with Pan-Africanist representatives Peter Molotsi in Accra, 26 April 1960; reported in Gene Sharp, "No-coexistence with oppression," Peace News, 13 May 1960.

1960年4月26日與泛非洲人代表彼得莫洛奇(Peter Molotsi)在Accra的面談，夏普報導於「和平新聞」之「與鎮壓無法並存」，1960年5月13日。

selected in advance if one has accurately anticipated the situation and form of attack.

雖然抗爭更晚階段的細部戰術無法在事前進行規劃，但是爲了未來的考量而進行探索多種通用的方法是可能的。不過，如果可以準確地預測情勢及攻擊的形式，初期階段所使用的戰術(也可能是中期的)，有可能在事前作出成功的選擇。

A variety of approaches may be used in tactics, involving different fronts, groups, time periods, methods and other factors. For example, the brunt of the responsibility for carrying out the action may, after certain periods of time or certain political events, be shifted from one group to another, or different roles may be assigned to particular groups. The most dangerous tasks (involving, for example, the use of the most daring methods, such as those of nonviolent intervention) could be assigned to groups with especially high discipline, experience, skill, or training, while other important but less dangerous tasks could be undertaken by groups more typical of the general population. At times particular responsibilities would fall upon certain occupational or geographical groups because of the policies and actions of the opponent. Where the initiative lay with the nonviolent actionists, they could deliberately choose to undertake simultaneous actions

on more than one front if their strength and the general situation were such as to make this wise. At times tactics could involve geographical fronts as well as political fronts, as in the use of nonviolent raids or obstruction; far more often, however, there would be no semblance of a geographical front and the resistance would be more diffuse and general, as in the case of a stay-at-home. The selection of tactics will be influenced significantly by the immediate and long-term political aims of the nonviolent actionists, and by the mechanisms through which change is sought. Various types of tactics will produce different problems for the usurper and have different effects on the nonviolent population.

可能用於戰術的方法有很多，涉及不同的面向、團體、時段、方法與其他因素。例如，在某些時期或者某些政治事件之後，對於執行行動的重責大任可能從一個團隊轉換到另一個團隊，或者可能將不同的角色分配給特別的團隊。最危險的任務(例如，包含使用最需要勇氣的方法，就像非暴力的介入干預)可能被指定給有紀律、經驗、技能，或者訓練特別好的團隊，而其他重要但危險性較小的任務，可能讓一般民衆中更傳統的團隊來承擔。有時候，因為對手的政策與作為，特殊的責任將落在某些職業的或者是地理上的團隊。當主動性落在非暴力行動者的身上時，如果他們的能力與整體的情勢允許，他們就可以聰明而有特意地選擇承擔不止一個面向的同步行動。有時候，當使用非暴力突襲或阻礙

時，戰術可能涉及地理及政治的面向；不過，更多的時候，並沒有地理面向的外表，而抵抗運動將會像「呆在家裡」的個案一樣，更加擴大且全面。戰術的選擇很明顯會受到非暴力行動者之近期與長期政治目的影響，而且會受到尋求改變之機制的影響。不同類型的戰術對篡權者會產生不一樣的問題，並且對非暴力的民衆產生不同的效應。

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Variation in tactics may be important in order to add variety and interest (and often newsworthiness) to the campaign. Such changes may serve other purposes, such as to involve new sections of the population, to augment psychological, political and economic pressures on the opponent, expand or contract the front and to test the discipline, morale and capacity of the nonviolent actionists. Tactical changes may be designed to achieve a variety of effects on the opponent, leadership, bystanders, or police and troops charged with repression. For example, Ebert points to the deliberate use in some cases of small coups of demonstrators (instead of large ones) and time gaps between demonstrations (instead of continuous ones), as means of reducing brutality in the repression by making it easier for the opponent's police and troops to see the actionists as individual human beings, and by allowing them time for reflection and reconsideration between


particular demonstrations.<sup>50</sup>

爲了增加運動的多樣性與趣味性(而且常常是它的新聞性)，戰術的變化可能對運動是重要的。這樣的變化可能具有其他的目的，包含讓新的民衆部門可以參與、增加對手之心理、政治與經濟上的壓力、擴大或者縮小陣線，並且測試非暴力行動者的紀律、士氣與能力。戰術上的變化可加以設計，以達到對對手、領導階層、旁觀者，或者受到鎮壓指令之警察與軍隊產生多種不同的影響。例如，埃伯特(Ebert)指出在某些個案中故意使用示威者的小型突然行動(取代大型的)，以及在遊行示威之間的時間差距(取代連續的)，做爲在鎮壓過程中降低殘暴的手段，以便讓對手的警察與軍隊更容易把行動者當做單獨個別的人來看待，並且讓他們在特別的遊行示威場次之間，可以有反省與重新思考的時間。<sup>50</sup>

The unrolling of the strategy and implementation of tactics in specific acts takes place in a context of a sensitivity and responsiveness to the developing conflict situation. Very careful and precise plans may have been prepared for commencing the attack. Following the beginning of the struggle, however, room must be allowed for flexibility in the further development, modification and application of the strategy and tactics.<sup>51</sup> Liddell Hart has emphasized the importance of flexibility in the formulation

<sup>50</sup> Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS pp. 313-314.

埃伯特(Ebert)，《非暴力抵抗的理論與實踐》，碩士論文，第313-314頁。



and implementation of the anticipated course of action:

特定行動中戰略的展開與戰術的實施，都會發生對衝突情勢發展具有敏感性與反應性的範圍。要開始進行攻擊時，可能就要準備好非常細心與準確的計畫。不過，在抗爭開始之後，必須為進一步的發展、戰略與戰術的修改與應用而保留彈性的空間<sup>51</sup>。利德爾哈特曾經強調過，在預定的行動過程之制訂與執行中保持靈活的重要性：

Ensure that both plan and disposition are flexible—adaptable to circumstances. Your plan should foresee and provide for a next step in case of success or failure, or partial success—which is the most common case in war. Your dispositions (or formation) should be such as to allow this exploitation or adaption in the shortest possible time.<sup>52</sup>


確保規劃與拋棄都是靈活的——可以因情勢而調整。你的規劃應該預見並且為成功或者失敗，或者部分成功準備下一步——這是戰爭中最常見的情況。你的放棄規劃(或者形成規劃)應該能夠盡可能在最短的時間內，容許對情勢加以利用或者調適。<sup>52</sup>

51 See Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, pp. 343-344 and Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 166.

參閱利德爾哈特(Liddell Hart)，《戰略》，第343-344頁，及克勞塞維茲(Clausewitz)，《戰爭論》，第一冊，第166頁。

52 Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, p. 349.

利德爾哈特(Liddell Hart)，《戰略》，第349頁。



The capacity to respond to unforeseen (or unforeseeable) events must be acutely developed. Especially important is the response, morale and behavior of the nonviolent actionists and potential supporters. If they have proved too unprepared and weak to carry out the plans, the plans must be altered, either by taking “some dramatic step which will strike the imagination of the people, and restore confidence in the possibility of full resistance through nonviolence,” or by calling a temporary retreat in order to prepare for a future stronger effort.<sup>53</sup> There is no substitute for, or shortcut to, strength in a movement of nonviolent action. If the necessary strength and ability to persist in face of penalties and suffering do not exist, that fact must be recognized and given an intelligent response. “A wise general does not wait till he is actually routed; he withdraws in time in an orderly manner from a position which he knows he would not be able to hold.”<sup>54</sup> The leadership will, just as in a military conflict, need to recognize frankly the weaknesses in their volunteers and potential supporters and find ways of correcting these.<sup>55</sup> The means for doing this will vary with the conditions of the given situation.

必須敏銳地發展對於沒有預見(或者不可能預見的)之事件作出回應的能力。特別重要的是，非暴力行動者與潛在支持者的反應、士氣與行為。如果他們已經被證明是太沒有準

備與脆弱而不能執行計畫，計畫必須作改變。可以採取「某些激烈的步驟，先衝擊人們的想像力，再重建人們對非暴力方式形成強烈反抗之可能性的信心」，或者號召暫時撤退、為下一次未來更有力的進攻作準備。<sup>53</sup>在非暴力行動的運動裡，力量是沒有替代品或者捷徑的。如果面對懲罰與承受苦難還沒有必要的勇氣與能力足以堅持，必須面對現實而作出聰明的反應。「一位聰明的將軍不會等待到他實際將被擊潰；他會從他無法固守的陣地及時而有秩序地撤離。」<sup>54</sup>就如同軍事衝突裡的一樣，領導階層需要坦白認知到他們志願者與潛在支持者的弱點，並且找到改善這些缺點的方法<sup>55</sup>。處理這些事情的方法將會隨著當時情勢的狀況而有所變化。

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On the other hand, the struggle may reveal significant weaknesses in the opponent which may call for prompt alteration of the tactics and speeding up the tempo of the struggle. At times, too, the struggle may reveal the nonviolent actionists and the general population to be stronger than had been expected, and then it may be possible to make a more rapid advance on a sound basis

53 Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 153.

波西(Bose)，《甘地主義研究》，第153頁。

54 Gandhi, quoted in Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 202.

甘地，引用於波西(Bose)，《甘地精選》，第202頁。

55 See Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, pp. 38-39 and Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 176.

參閱邦都蘭德(Bondurant)，《征服暴力》，第38-39頁，及波西(Bose)，《甘地主義研究》，第176頁。



than originally conceived.

另一方面，抗爭可能揭開對手的重要缺陷，那就可以迅速進行戰術的改變，並且加速抗爭的節奏。有時候，抗爭也可能顯示非暴力行動者與一般大眾比預期的還要堅強，此時就可能以一個比原先所設想還要紮實的基礎上，加快前進的速度。

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## Withdrawing the sources of political power 撤除政治權力的來源

The theoretical analysis of the sources of political power and their withdrawal by noncooperation, which was developed on Chapter One, now merges with our analysis of the dynamics of nonviolent struggle. In this section we shall recall the sources of political power which have already been discussed and examine how each of these may be restricted or severed by nonviolent action. Some of the examples which illustrate the restriction or severance of the particular source of power are from cases of nonviolent coercion, while others simply show the potential of nonviolent struggle to affect the particular power source. The discussion in this section will show the practical relevance of the earlier power analysis and will also help to explain how nonviolent coercion is possible. It is precisely the remarkable convergence of the necessary

sources of political power with the ways in which nonviolent action strikes at the opponent's strength and position which gives this technique the potential for high effectiveness and greater political power than violence.

對政治權力之來源以及使用不合作撤銷它們的理論分析，這是在第一章所敘述的，現在要結合我們對非暴力抗爭之動力平衡的分析。在本節中，我們將回顧已經討論過之政治權力的來源，以及探討這些中的每一個來源，如何受到非暴力行動加以限制或者中斷。其中一些展示限制或中斷特殊權力來源的例子，是非暴力強制脅迫的個案，而其他的就只有顯示非暴力抗爭可以影響特殊的權力來源的潛力。本節中的討論將顯示之前權力分析的實際相關性，而且也將有助於解釋非暴力強制脅迫如何是有可能的。就正是這些必要之政治權力來源的顯著集中，它以非暴力行動打擊對手之力量與地位的方式，而使得這項技術具有高度有效性以及比暴力更有政治力量的潛力。

As the analysis in Chapter One showed, political power emerge from the interaction of all, or several, of the following sources of power, each of which derives from the cooperation, support and obedience of the subjects: authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources and sanctions. As was noted, changes in the degree to which these sources are available to the ruler will determine the degree of

the ruler's political power. Our earlier catalogue of the methods of nonviolent action and our analysis of the dynamics of this technique show that these sources are potentially highly vulnerable to a widespread, yet qualitative, application of nonviolent action.

正如在第一章的分析所呈現的，政治權力以下列權力來源之所有或幾個之相互作用而浮現。每一項權力都來自於被統治者的合作、支持與服從：合法性、人力資源、技能與知識、無形的因素、物質資源與制裁。正如之前所指出的，這些來源提供給統治者的變化程度將決定統治者政治權力的程度。我們先前對非暴力行動之方法的目錄，與我們對這項技術之動力平衡的分析顯示，這些來源對非暴力行動廣泛的，但定性的應用具有潛在的高度脆弱性。

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It is the capacity of the nonviolent technique to cut off these sources of power which gives it the power of coercion. The precise ways in which these sources of power are restricted or severed, and the extent to which they are cut, will vary. This technique can both restrict and sever the availability of those sources of power to the opponent, and also reveal the loss of those sources by other means. This technique becomes coercive when the people applying it withhold or withdraw to a decisive degree the necessary sources of the opponent's power.

Nonviolent action makes possible “coercion through nonparticipation.”<sup>56</sup> This potential is of the greatest political significance and requires detailed attention, even at the risk of repeating points made earlier, to show how each of these sources of power may be cut off.

就是這個非暴力技術的能力可以切斷這些權力的來源，而賦予這項技術強制脅迫的權力，使這些權力來源受到限制或切斷的精確方法以及它們被切斷的程度，會有所不同。這種技術可以同時限制與切斷這些對手的權力來源，而又揭露出其他手段所產生的這些來源的損失。這個技術會在人民應用它，來對對手之必要權力來源進行保留或撤銷到一個決定性的程度時，它會變成有強制脅迫性。非暴力的行動有可能造成「以不參與達到強制脅迫<sup>56</sup>」。這個潛力具有最高的政治重要性，而且需要仔細的關注，即使冒著重複已經提過之論點的風險，以顯示這些來源的每一個可能會如何被切斷。

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自我解放戰略規劃指南——延伸閱讀①

## 1. Authority 合法性

Nonviolent action affects the opponent’s authority in three ways: 1) it may show how much authority the opponent has already lost, and a demonstrated major loss of authority will by itself weaken his power; 2) nonviolent

<sup>56</sup> This is Hiller’s phrase. See Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 125.

這是希勒(Hiller)的用語。參閱希勒(Hiller)，《罷工》，第125頁。

action may help to undermine his authority still further; and 3) people who have repudiated his authority may transfer their loyalty to a rival claimant in the form of a parallel government, which may in turn weaken his authority yet more as well as create or aggravate other serious problems. Any of these consequences for the opponent's power may be serious.

非暴力行動以三種方式影響對手的合法性：1)它可能會顯示對手「已經」損失了多少的合法性，而合法性主要損失之呈現的本身就削弱了他的權力；2)非暴力的行動可能有助於進一步損壞他的合法性；以及3)否認它合法性的人民可能移轉他們的忠誠度給競爭之平行政府形式的對手，因而反過來更加弱化它的權力以及造成或擴大其他嚴重的問題。這些後果的任何之一對對手的權力可能都是嚴重的。

Bloody Sunday—which produced a loss of authority—was followed by a warning to the Tsar from Minister of Finance Vladimir Kokovstev that something had to be done at once to regain public confidence, and also by the expressed fear of Count Witte, chairman of the Committee of Ministers, that the “aureole of the ruler would be destroyed” if Nicholas II did not publicly dissociate himself from the day's events.<sup>57</sup> Their warnings proved correct.

<sup>57</sup> Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 121.

賀卡夫(Harcave)，《第一滴血》，第121頁。

Katkov points also to the Russian liberals' campaign over some years of denouncing and discrediting the autocracy, that is destroying its authority, as paving the way for the success of the February 1917 "popular rising and the mutiny of the Petrograd garrison [which] resulted in the bloodless collapse of the monarchy ...."<sup>58</sup>

「血腥星期日(Bloody Sunday)」——它產生合法性的流失——之後從財政部部長弗拉迪米爾顆顆夫提夫(Vladimir Kokovstev)給沙皇的警告，必須立即進行恢復公眾的信心；同時由部長委員會主席維特伯爵(Count Witte)表現出來的恐懼，如果尼古拉二世(Nicholas II)沒有公開表明自己與這一天的事件無關<sup>57</sup>，「統治者的光環就要被摧毀了」。他們的警告證明是正確的。卡特科夫(Katkov)也指認俄羅斯自由派多年來譴責與詆毀專制體制的運動，正是要摧毀它的合法性，為1917年2月「民衆的叛亂與造成不流血之君主制崩潰的彼得格勒警衛軍(Petrograd garrison)兵變的成功鋪平了道路……<sup>58</sup>」

In his account of the East German Rising, Brant observes: To the people of the Soviet Zone it [the declaration of the state of emergency by the Red Army, not the East German regime] was confirmation of what they already knew: after seven years in command the

<sup>58</sup> Katkov, *Russia 1917*, p. 423.

卡特科夫(Katkov)，《1917年的俄羅斯》，第423頁。

Red republicans were still dependent on power lent them by their protectors. But lasting domination depends less upon power than upon authority; power demands constant submission, and submission can quickly turn to mutiny. Authority requires and is granted respect, which in time of trouble and unrest is confirmed in willing obedience.<sup>59</sup>

在他「東德起義(East German Rising)」的回顧，布蘭特(Brant)觀察到：對蘇聯區的人民來說，它[紅軍而不是東德政權的緊急狀態宣布]是確認他們已經知道的：經過7年的控制，紅軍共和黨仍然依賴於他們之保護者借給他們的權力。但是，持續之統治對於權力所需要的依賴度會少於對合法性的依賴度；權力會要求不斷的屈服，而屈服會很快就會轉變成兵變。合法性需要而且受到尊重，它會在麻煩與動亂的時代在有意願的服從之下得到確認。<sup>59</sup>

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In an extreme case, loss of authority in a system or regime may lead to recognition of the authority of a rival, nascent regime, and therefore the transfer of loyalty and obedience from the old to the new government. (At times loyalty may also be transferred, not to a rival regime, but to a more abstract authority, as a religious or moral system, or to a principle or ideology.)

<sup>59</sup> Brant, *The East German Rising*, p. 155.

布蘭特(Brant)，《東德的興起》，第155頁。

在極端的情況下，一個體制或政權喪失合法性可能導致承認競爭而新生政權的合法性，因此而將忠誠與服從由舊政府轉移到新政府。(有時候忠誠也有可能被轉移，不是到一個競爭的政權，而是到一個更抽象的合法性，如一個宗教或道德的體制，或者到一個信仰或意識形態。)

A parallel government will emerge only in unusual instances of nonviolent action in clearly revolutionary situations. To be successful, the new government must possess widespread and deep support, and the old regime must have lost its authority among the vast majority of the populace. However, when a parallel government develops in a serious way, the opponent's remaining authority and power will also be severely threatened.

只有在明確的革命情勢中非暴力行動之不平常的情形下，會出現一個平行政府。爲了獲得成功，這個新政府必須擁有廣泛與深厚的支持，而且這個舊政權必須已經在絕大多數的民衆當中失去了它的合法性。不過，當一個平行政府以一個嚴重的方式在發展時，對手「剩下」的合法性與權力也將受到嚴重的威脅。

Such a parallel government obviously faces a number of difficult problems, and whether it succeeds or not will depend on how they are answered. Little analytical work has been done to date on the factors leading to success



or failure of this particular method, or on the ways in which, when successful, the replacement may take place.

這樣一個平行政府顯然面臨著許多困難的問題，而且它的成功與否將取決於它們得到的回應。對導致這個特定方法之成功或失敗的這些因素或方式，到目前為止只完成了少許的分析工作，在成功時，就有可能發生這種替換。

## 2. Human resources

### 人力資源

Nonviolent action may also cut off the human resources necessary to the opponent's political power. Usually, in "normal times," rulers assume that they will receive general obedience and cooperation among the subjects who will obey and do all the things that need to be done to maintain them as rulers and to enable the system to operate. The widespread practice of nonviolent action, however, may shatter that assumption. The sheer numerical multiplication of noncooperating, disobedient and defiant members of the subordinate group and general population is likely not only to create severe enforcement problems but also to influence the ruler's power position. Nonviolent action is likely to lead not only to an increase in the refusal of consent among the subordinates directly affected by the grievance, but also to a related withdrawal of consent among the opponent's

usual supporters (assuming there is a distinction between the two.)

非暴力行動也可能切斷對手之政治權力所需要的人力資源。通常在「正常時期」，統治者會假設他們會得到普遍的服從與來自被統治者之間的合作，被統治者會作所有應該要做的事，以維持他們當統治者，並且讓體制可以運作。不過，非暴力行動的廣泛實踐可能打碎這種假設。將不合作、不服從與反威權之下屬團體與一般民衆之人數加以單純的數字相乘，就可能不只會造成嚴重的執法問題，而且也影響統治者的權力地位。非暴力行動可能導致增加：不僅使直接受到不滿情緒影響之下屬之間拒絕同意，而且使對手之一貫支持者之間也會撤銷相關的同意。(假設這兩者之間有明顯的區別)


This withdrawal of human resources will be most effective in 1) conflicts within the opponent's country in which the noncooperation of his own home population denies him the only available source of the human assistance he requires, and 2) in conflicts, as in a foreign occupation, in which the opponent is denied the assistance of both population groups, that is his usual supporters (the home population) and the grievance group (the people of the occupied country). However, even when two population groups are involved, and only one of these (as in an occupied country) withholds its human

assistance, the noncooperation may nevertheless prove effective given the presence of certain other favorable conditions.

撤銷人力資源會達到最有效，於1)衝突是在對手國家之內，而這個國家他自己的民衆拒絕他所需要之人力協助是唯一可以使用的來源，及2)在衝突中，如果是被外國佔領，這個對手會受到他往常之支持者(自己國內的民衆)的民衆團體以及不滿團體(被佔領國的人民)的同時拒絕對他的協助。不過，即使有這兩組人民群體涉入，而且只有其中一組(如在被佔領的國家之內)保留他們的人力協助，在其他某些有利條件的存在之下，不合作還是有可能被證明是有效的。

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The increased withholding of human resources both in absolute and proportionate terms may lead to a disastrous situation for the opponent. These human resources, along with other sources of power, are likely to be reduced simultaneously with an increase in the demands upon that power which have been produced by the growth of noncooperation and defiance. The opponent then may lose control of the situation and the regime may become powerless. When this happens in politics nonviolent action has produced in the political arena results comparable to an effective strike in the industrial arena. Nonparticipation may paralyze the opponent's



political system. This potentiality was clearly foreseen by Gandhi:


人力資源保留的增加無論在絕對的與相對的範圍下，都可能導致給對手一個災難性的局勢。這些人力資源與其他權力的來源一起，很可能會因為不合作與反威權的成長，而對這個權力的需求增加而同時受到削減。那麼此時的對手可能會失去對局勢的控制，而這個政權可能就會變成無力可施。當這種情況發生在政治上的時候，非暴力行動已經在政治舞台上產生與產業領域之有效罷工一樣可觀的結果。不參與就可能癱瘓對方的政治體制。甘地清晰地看到這個潛能：

I believe, and everybody must grant, that no Government can exist for a single moment without the cooperation of the people, willing or forced, and if people suddenly withdraw their cooperation in every detail, the Government will come to a stand-still.<sup>60</sup>

我相信每個人都必須同意，沒有人民的合作，不論

60 Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 157; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 157. Sometimes specific tactics and methods of nonviolent actions are used to make the optimal use of numbers in order to bring about the collapse of the government as by massive nonviolent raids on government salt depots in India in 1930. "Such a widening of the salt campaign, by substituting collective actions for individual breaches of the law, directly challenged the government's ability to maintain the public peace." Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin*, p. 70.

甘地，《非暴力抵抗》，第157頁；印度版，《堅持真理運動》，第157頁。有時候，非暴力行動使用特定的戰術與方法會以最佳的數目組合以促動政府的垮台，就如同1930年在印度以大量對政府製鹽站加以突襲。「這樣一個逐漸擴大的製鹽運動，取代了個人藐視法律的集體行動，直接挑戰了政府維持公共秩序的能力。」哥帕爾(Gopal)，《印度總督歐文勳爵(*The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin*)》，第70頁。



是自願的或是被迫的，任何政府一刻都不可能存在；而且如果人民突然在每一個細節上撤回他們的合作，政府就變成呆若木雞。<sup>60</sup>

For major periods during the Russian 1905 Revolution the situation was completely out of the control of the government and the police were powerless to intervene, so massive was the popular defiance.<sup>61</sup>

在俄國 1905年革命的主要期間，民衆的反抗巨大到使當時的形勢完全脫離政府的控制，而且警察無力干預。<sup>61</sup>

In face of massive nonviolent defiance in Peshawar in April 1930 and the Garwali mutiny, already cited, the British temporarily gave up the attempt to control the city and withdrew their troops, abandoning the city for nearly ten days until reinforcements were available.<sup>62</sup>

在1930年4月在白沙瓦(Peshawar)與已經提過之嘎爾瓦里(Garwali)兵變中，面對群眾堅實的非暴力反抗，英國人暫時放棄了控制這個城市的企圖，並且撤出他們的軍隊，放棄這個城市將近10天，一直到增援部隊的到來。<sup>62</sup>

61 Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 66 and Charques, *The Twilight of Imperial Russia*, p. 119, p. 125 and p. 132. See also, Katkov, *Russia 1917*, p. 262.

夏匹羅(Schapiro)，《蘇聯共產黨》，第66頁，及洽貴思(Charques)，《俄羅斯帝國的夕陽》，第119、125及132頁。同時參閱卡特科夫(Katkov)，《1917年的俄羅斯》，第262頁。

62 Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin*, p. 69.

哥帕爾(Gopal)，《印度總督歐文勳爵(*The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin*)》，第69頁。

The Devlin Commission's report to the British Government in 1959 revealed that the real reason for the 1958 Emergency in Nyasaland (now called Malawi) was fear that widespread African noncooperation and disobedience would lead to collapse of the government—not the “murder plot” which was so widely publicized at the time. By early March the situation reached the point where “the Government had either to act or to abdicate.”<sup>63</sup> The Commission declared: “The decision to suppress Congress, we think, owed more to the belief that its continued activities were making government impossible than to the feeling that it was, or might be, a terrorist organization.”<sup>64</sup>

在1959年德夫林委員會(Devlin Commission)對英國政府的報告中揭示出來，1958年在尼亞薩蘭(Nyasaland，現稱為馬拉威，Malawi)緊急事件的真正原因是，對非洲人普遍的不合作與不服從命令的恐懼，將會導致政府的崩潰——而不是在當時廣為流傳的「謀殺陰謀」。在3月初之前局勢就發展到一個關鍵點，「政府不是必須採取行動、不然就是要放棄。」<sup>63</sup> 這個委員會宣布：「這個壓制國會的決定，我們認為，是更多基於這個信念，即持續的活動讓政府不得不感覺

63 *Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry*, p. 74.

《Nyasaland調查委員會報告》，第74頁。

64 *Ibid.*, p. 88.

同上，第88頁。

到它是，或者可能是，一個恐怖組織。」<sup>64</sup>

### 3. Skills and knowledge


#### 技能與知識

People do different jobs, have different skills and knowledge, and a particular regime or system needs some of these more than others. A withdrawal, therefore, by key personnel, technicians, officers, administrators, etc., of their assistance to the opponent (or their reduced assistance) may have an impact on the opponent's power quite disproportionate to the numbers actually noncooperating.

人民做不同的工作，具有不同的技能與知識，而且一個特定的政權或體制，必須比其他的更需要這些技能與知識的某一部分。因此，關鍵人員、技術人員、行政管理人員等撤回他們對對手的協助(或「減少」他們的協助)，就可能會對對手之權力產生一個與實際不合作之人數不成比例的衝擊。

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Refusal of assistance by key subjects may make it difficult for the opponent to develop and carry out policies appropriate to the situation he faces. This may lead to the acceptance of policies which prove to be political mistakes or to an inability to implement chosen policies, or




difficulties in doing so.

關鍵性之被統治者的拒絕協助，可能會讓對手在發展與推動他所面對局勢之適當政策的時候發生困難。這可能導致接受一個被證明是政治上錯誤的政策、或無法執行選擇的政策、或有困難這樣做。

For example, during the Inquisition imposed by Spain's Charles V on the Netherlands which Spain then ruled, the opposition of officials and magistrates, as well as of regular citizens, seems to have been decisive in blocking its implementation. In 1550 there was an attempt to impose the most severe measure yet, the "edict of blood," which imposed the death sentence for all trespasses. It proved, however, impossible to carry out the edict on a large scale. Pieter Geyl reports that both officials and magistrates opposed it and declined to give their cooperation. "In the opinion of those who designed the system, religious persecution in the Netherlands never worked anything but defectively."<sup>65</sup>

例如，在西班牙查爾斯五世(Charles V)對當時西班牙統治之荷蘭強加的宗教法庭期間，官員與司法長官以及一般市民的反對，似乎已經決定性地阻止了它的執行。1550年當時曾經有人試圖施加最嚴厲的措施，這些「血的判決」將所有

65 Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands* (1555-1609), pp. 55-56.  
蓋爾(Geyl)，《荷蘭起義(1555-1609年)》，第55-56頁。






犯人都判處死刑。不過，事實證明，不可能執行大規模的判決。彼耶得蓋爾(Pieter Geyl)報告指出，官員與司法長官都反對，並且拒絕提供他們的合作。「從這個體制之那些設計者的意見來看，在荷蘭的宗教迫害從未真正有效地發生它的作用。」<sup>65</sup>

Gandhi maintained that if the Indians who held official posts under the British Raj were to resign them, the result would probably be the end of foreign rule without the need for the noncooperation of the masses. The alternative for Britain, he said, would be a pure despotic military dictatorship which, he argued, Britain did not dare contemplate.<sup>66</sup> Pleas were often made during the Indian struggle for officials to resign.<sup>67</sup> The key contribution made to the defeat of the Kapp Putsch by the noncooperation of civil servants and the refusal of experts to join the new cabinet has already been described above. The German government in 1923 recognized the special role of civil servants in the official passive resistance struggle against the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, as it forbade all State, provincial and local authorities and civil servants from obeying the occupation officials' orders.<sup>68</sup>

甘地一直認為，如果在英國拉吉(Raj，統治)擁有正式官位的印度人能夠辭去他們的職位，這個結果很可能就會結束外國的統治，而不需要大型群眾的不合作。他說，英國



的另一個選擇將是一個純粹的軍事獨裁專制，而他認為，英國想也不敢想。<sup>66</sup>在印度的抗爭中常常呼籲官員們辭職。<sup>67</sup>公務人員的不合作與專家拒絕加入新內閣，是造成卡普政變(Kapp Putsch)之挫敗的關鍵貢獻因素，已如上所述。德國政府在1923年認知到，公務人員在法國與比利時佔領魯爾區之官方消極被動式的抵抗運動中的特殊角色，因為它禁止所有國家、省以及地方當局與公務人員，服從佔領之政府官員的命令。<sup>68</sup>

Doubtless in some political and social situations the chances of the administrators and officials—the bureaucracy—shifting their loyalty are greater than in other situations, but if it happens, it may prove decisive. The opponent's political power may be weakened also by internal conflicts within his own regime, both at upper and lower levels. These conflicts may be independent of the nonviolent action, or may be accentuated by it, or perhaps even created by it—as on such questions as whether

66 Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 121; Ind. Ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 121. See also Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 199.


甘地，《非暴力抵抗》，第121頁；印度版，《堅持真理運動》，第121頁。及，波西(Bose)，《甘地精選》，第199頁。

67 Gopal, *The Viceroyalty...*, p. 80.

哥帕爾(Gopal)，《印度總督...》，第80頁。

68 Sternstein, "The Ruhrkampf of 1923," p. 114. See also p. 111, p. 115, p. 117, p. 123 and pp. 132-133.

史特恩斯使頓(Sternstein)，《1923年魯爾的占領》，第114頁，同時參閱第111、115、117、123及132-133頁。



to make concessions and what repression should be applied. While the regime may give the impression to the outside world that it is firmly united, the actual situation may be quite different, with or without a major nonviolent action movement.<sup>69</sup>

毫無疑問的，在某些政治與社會局勢下，行政管理人員與官員——這個官僚機構——轉移他們忠誠度的機會要比其他的情況還要大，但如果它發生，它可能會證明是決定性的。對手的政治權力可能也會因他自己政權在高層與基層兩者的內部衝突而受到削弱。這些衝突可能是與非暴力行動不相關的，或者可能受到它而被擴大了，或者甚至是它創造出來的——就如這些問題像是是否要作出讓步，而且要施加什麼樣的鎮壓。雖然這個政權可能給予外界的印象是，它是堅定地團結在一起，實際的情勢可能是完全不同的，不管有沒有一個重大之非暴力行動的運動。<sup>69</sup>

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The theoretically omnipotent Russian Tsar, for example, in 1904 could neither impose his will on his advisors nor stop their intrigues and disputes. The split inside the Soviet Communist Party and the regime in 1924-27 is another example.<sup>70</sup> Various splits also occurred within the Nazi regime over policy and administration of

<sup>69</sup> Seton-Watson, *The decline of Imperial Russia*, p. 214.

賽通—瓦茲瑟(Seton-Watson)，《俄羅斯帝國的傾頹》，第214頁。

the occupied areas of the Soviet Union.<sup>71</sup> Khrushchev's admission of disputes within the Russian leadership on how to react to the Hungarian Revolution is confirmation that such conflicts may exist in response to a major challenge outside the regime. The mere existence of such internal conflicts under various conditions may accentuate the impact of nonviolent action.

例如，理論上全能的俄羅斯沙皇在1904年既不能對他的顧問們強加他的意志，也不能停止他們的陰謀與糾紛。另一個例子是1924至27年在蘇聯共產黨內與政權的分裂。<sup>70</sup> 不同方式的分裂也發生在蘇聯佔領地區之納粹政權的政策與行政管理。<sup>71</sup> 赫魯曉夫承認俄羅斯領導層內部對要如何反應匈牙利革命的分歧，是確認這些衝突的存在可能是反應政權外部的重大挑戰。在各種條件下，僅僅存在這種內部的衝突就可能加劇了非暴力行動的衝擊。

The analysis of the dynamics of nonviolent action suggests that for a variety of reasons such internal conflicts may be more probable in face of major nonviolent action, although documentary proof is at present not available. Where they occur, such internal conflicts in the

70 Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, pp. 286-308.

夏匹羅(Schapiro)，《蘇聯共產黨》，第286-308頁。

71 Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945*, passim.

達林(Dallin)，《德國在俄羅斯的統治，1941-1945年》，各處。

opponent's regime will affect detrimentally the degree to which the regime's full potential of skills, knowledge, insight, energy, etc., is available for dealing with the challenge.

非暴力行動之動態的分析顯示，在面對重大之非暴力行動下，有許多不同的理由讓這種內部的衝突「更有」可能發生，雖然目前並沒有文書上的證明。在他們發生的地方，這種對手體制的內部衝突將會關鍵性地影響政權之技能、知識、洞察力、能力等處理這個挑戰之全部潛力的可用程度。

#### 4. Intangible factors

##### 無形因素

Such factors as habits of obedience, political beliefs and the like may be significantly threatened by widespread nonviolent action. Such a movement involves the destruction of the habit of unquestioning obedience and the development of conscious choice to obey or disobey. This development would tend to make the opponent's political power more dependent upon the active and deliberate support of the subjects.

諸如服從、政治信仰等等習慣的因素可能會明顯地受到普遍非暴力行動的威脅。這種運動涉及破壞無條件之服從的習慣與自覺性選擇服從或不服從的發展。這種發展往往會使對手的政權更加依賴於被統治者之積極的與特意的支持。

Nonviolent action may also be associated with changes in outlook and political beliefs. Nonviolent action in some situations (not necessarily the majority) reflects the spread among the subjects of views which challenge officially blessed doctrines. In most situations, however, the actionists are likely to be concerned instead with either particular grievances or a single broad political principle or objective, or with both. Even such cases may contribute to further erosion of unquestioning belief in an official doctrine. In such a struggle, events may refute official dogmas. For example, effective nonviolent challenge to the dictatorship may refute the view that violence is omnipotent. Or, the doctrine that the dictatorship reflects the will of the “people,” or is a “workers’ State,” may be questioned when the general population, or the workers, demonstrate in the streets against it, go on strike, or noncooperate politically.

非暴力行動也可能與世界觀及政治信仰的改變有關係。非暴力行動在某些情況下(不一定是大多數)，反映了被統治者之間流傳挑戰官方期盼之教條觀點的傳開。不過，在大多數的情況下，這些行動者很可能會關注特殊的不滿或單一廣泛的政治原則或目標，或是兩者兼有。即使是這種情況，可能有助於對官方教條勿庸置疑之信仰「進一步」的侵蝕。在這種抗爭中，事件可能會駁倒官方的教條。例如，有效之非暴力挑戰獨裁政權可以駁倒這樣的觀點，認為暴力是萬能

的。或者，這個教條說獨裁政權會反映「人民」的意志，或者是「工人的國家」，可能會受到質疑，當一般民衆或工人，上街示威反對它、罷工，或採取政治上之不合作的時候。

Or, a belief that the dictatorship is benevolent and humanitarian may be shattered by repression against nonviolent people whose demand seems reasonable. The degree to which members of the population as a whole, and particularly members of the dominant group (the government, the Party. etc.) will be able and willing to re-examine the official political ideology will vary. At times firm adherence to the official ideology may ensure that repression is swift and harsh, although this may be a temporary phase. In other conflicts the actionists may be seen as trying to implement the “real” principles underlying official doctrines, while the existing regime is viewed as violating and distorting them to support despicable policies.

或者，一個認為獨裁政權是仁慈與人道主義的信念，可能會受到以鎮壓對付非暴力且要求似乎合理的人民而破滅。特別地，全體人民之成員以及統治陣營(政府、政黨等)之成員，能夠並願意重新檢討官方政治意識形態的程度會有所不同。有時候堅定奉行官方的意識形態，可以確保鎮壓是快速的與嚴厲的，雖然這可能是一個暫時的階段。在其他衝

突中，行動者可能會被認為企圖在官方的教條之下實施「真正的」信仰，而現有的政權會被當作是違反與扭曲它們而去支持卑劣的政策。

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This discussion is only illustrative of ways nonviolent action may alter the intangible factors which help to secure the subjects' obedience and to preserve the ruler's power.

這裡的討論只是說明非暴力行動的方式可能會改變這些無形的因素，這些因素有助於確保被統治者的服從與維護統治者的權力。

## 5. Material resources

### 物質資源

Nonviolent action also may regulate the degree to which material resources are available to the opponent. These resources include control of the economic system, transportation, means of communication, financial resources, raw materials, and the like. The capacity of nonviolent action to impose economic penalties on the opponent should already be clear, for of the 198 methods of this technique described in earlier chapters 61 are directly economic, boycotts, strikes or intervention. In addition certain other methods may also have indirect



economic effects, as from political disruption or by increasing costs of enforcement, or by losing goodwill for the opponent, or public confidence, so that third parties withhold loans, investments, trade and the like. A view popular among economic determinists—that nonviolent action is inevitably ineffective and irrelevant because financial and material factors determine the course of politics—is therefore based upon a fundamental gap in their understanding of this technique.

非暴力行動還可以統制可提供對手之物質資源的程度。這些資源包括控制經濟體系、交通、通訊的工具、財政資源、原材料等等。非暴力行動對對手施加經濟處罰的能力應該已經明白，因為之前章節中所描述這個技術之198方法中，有61種方法就是直接經濟性的抵制、罷工或介入干預。除此之外，某些其他方法可能也有間接性的經濟效應，當從政治混亂或增加強制實施的成本，或者對手失去善意或公眾的信心，以致使得第三者停止貸款、投資、貿易等。在經濟決定論者之間流行的一種觀點——即非暴力的行動必然是無效的與不相關的，因為財政與物質因素決定政治的過程——因此，是基於他們對這項技術了解上的一個根本落差。

The Townshend duties, against which the American colonists complained so harshly, had been imposed to reduce the burdens on the British taxpayer by raising

revenue in North America. The colonists' campaign of noncooperation not only blocked achievement of that objective, but also imposed additional economic losses on the Mother Country. A correspondent (probably Benjamin Franklin) pointed out in the London Public Advertiser on January 17, 1769, that only a maximum revenue of £ 3,500 had been produced in the colonies, while the British business loss due to the American nonimportation and nonconsumption campaign was estimated at £7,250,000. He also pointed to the possibility of war if the policy were continued, which would take the British at least ten years to win, cost at least £100,000,000 and leave a loss of life and a legacy of hatred. In Britain by that time, says Gipson, "...most men in public life were persuaded that to attempt to collect such duties in face of colonial opposition was economically unsound and politically unwise."<sup>72</sup>

湯森(Townshend)貨物稅，受到美國殖民者抱怨而非常激烈地反對它，曾經強制實施，以減少英國納稅人的負擔而提高在北美的稅收。殖民者不合作的運動不僅阻止這個目標的實現，而且還造成母國額外的經濟損失。一位記者(可能是本傑明富蘭克林)在1769年1月17日倫敦「大眾廣告報(Public Advertiser)」上指出，在殖民地最高只有產生3,500英鎊的稅收，而由於美國的禁止進口與不消費運動所造成英國商業上的損失，估計在7,250,000英鎊。他還指出，如果政策要加以繼續時，就有發生戰爭的可能性，這

將需要英國至少花10年才能獲勝，成本至少是100,000,000英鎊，並留下生命的喪失與遺留的仇恨。屆時在英國，吉普森(Gipson)說，「……在公共生活的大多數人都被說服，面對殖民地的反對要試圖徵收這些稅款，在經濟上是不健全而且在與政治上是不明智的。」<sup>72</sup>

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It would be possible to offer innumerable examples from the two centuries since 1769 in which nonviolent action has inflicted such material losses on opponents that their economic, and consequently their power position, were both placed in jeopardy. Many examples described in Chapters Five and Six are of this type, especially of generalized strikes, general strikes and economic shutdowns.

可能可以從 1769年以來兩個世紀中提供無數的例子，其中非暴力行動曾經對對手造成這種物質上的損失，而讓他們經濟上的，因而他們的權力地位，兩者都處在危險之中。第五及第六兩章所描述的許多例子就是這種類型，尤其是總體性的罷工、總罷工與經濟罷市。

However, only one more example of how nonviolent action affects the economic resources of the opponent will

<sup>72</sup> Gipson, *The Coming of Revolution, 1763-1775*, p. 193.

吉普森(Gipson)，《革命即將來臨，1763-1775年》，第193頁。

be offered: the nonviolent Indian struggles against British rule. These economic losses are in the main attributed to three sources: direct revenue refusal, increased expenditure for administration and enforcement, and deliberate economic boycotts.

不過，只要再提供一個例子說明非暴力行動如何影響對手的經濟資源：印度反對英國統治的非暴力抗爭。這些經濟損失主要歸因於三個來源：直接拒絕稅徵、行政管理與執法之支出的增加，以及蓄意的經濟抵制。

During the Indian 1930-31 struggle, as a result of tax refusal and boycott of goods providing government revenue, and with increased expenditure to deal with the civil disobedience movement, the British regime faced deficits in the provincial governments. At various times the government of the Punjab faced a deficit of Rs. 10,000,000 the Bombay government faced a deficit of Rs. 10,250,000 the Central provinces Rs. 5,000, 000 Madras Rs. 8,700,000, Bengal Rs. 9,482,000 and Bihar Rs. 4.200,000.<sup>73</sup> Gandhi's Young India commented: "When we check the nourishment from passing from the victim to the parasite the latter naturally weakens and dies while the former revives."<sup>74</sup> It is clear that revenue refusal was an important aspect of that movement.<sup>75</sup>

在印度1930至31年的抗爭期間，因為拒絕繳稅與抵制提

供政府稅收之貨物，以及對付公民不服從運動增加開支的結果，英國執政當局面臨省級政府的赤字。在不同時期旁遮普(Punjab)省政府面臨10,000,000盧比的赤字，孟買政府面臨的赤字是10,250,000盧比，中央省5,000,000盧比，馬德拉斯(Madras)8,700,000盧比，孟加拉(Bengal)9,482,000盧比及比哈爾(Bihar)4,200,000盧比。<sup>73</sup>甘地在印度青年報(Young India)上評論說：「當我們阻止營養從受害者輸送到寄生蟲時，後者自然就會減弱與死亡，而前者就會復活。」<sup>74</sup>很顯然地，拒絕繳交稅收是那個運動一個重要的面向。<sup>75</sup>

Year 年	Total Exports of the United Kingdom to British India in Million of Pounds 大英國協輸出到英屬印度的全部出口百萬英鎊
1924	90.6
1925	86.0
1926	81.8
1927	85.0
1928	83.9
1929	78.2
1930 (boycott year) (抵制年)	52.9 <sup>76</sup>

73 Sharp, *Gandhi Wields...*, p. 179, p. 189, p. 190, p. 200, p. 204, and p. 219, respectively. 夏普，《甘地行使...》，分別為第179、189、190、200、204及219頁。

74 *Ibid.*, p. 179.

同上，第179頁。

75 *Ibid.*, p. 106, pp. 126-128, p. 134, p. 160, p. 175, pp. 182-183, p. 190, pp. 192-193, p. 196, p. 205, and p. 211, and Gopal, *The Viceroyalty...*, pp. 79-80 and pp. 86-87.

同上，第106、126-128、134、160、175、182-183、190、192-193、196、205及211頁。及，哥帕爾(Gopal)，《印度總督...》，第79-80及86-87頁。

People who argue that Gandhi's nonviolence had nothing to do with the British leaving India, that the real reasons were instead economic, erroneously assume that there was no contact between the two. There was, however, a close relationship, which included an immediate reduction of trade and profits.

認為甘地之非暴力與英國離開印度無關的人們爭論說，真正的原因不會是經濟性的，他們錯誤地假設兩者之間是沒有聯繫的。不過，它有一個密切的關係，其中包括貿易與利潤的立即減少。

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A survey of exports to India over several years is instructive.

對印度出口進行多年的調查是有啟發性的。

For certain specific items the decrease in imports from Great Britain between 1929 and 1930 ranged from eighteen percent to forty-five percent.<sup>77</sup> The Secretary of State for India told the House of Commons at the end of 1930 that the general depression in world trade accounted for a drop of twenty-five percent in exports to India, while he credited a drop of a further eighteen percent to the

76 Shridharani, *War without violence*, p. 24; Br. ed.: p. 43.

希利達哈拉尼(Shridharani)，《沒有暴力的戰爭》，第24頁；英國版，第43頁。

Congress' boycott.<sup>78</sup> Even eighteen percent is a significant figure, but the boycott may have been even more effective. Imports of British cotton cloth to India dropped far more that year than imports of cotton cloth from all foreign countries combined.<sup>79</sup> Between October 1930 and April 1931, when the boycott was at its height, there was a decline of eighty-four percent in imports of British cloth. Lancashire millowners and workers petitioned the Secretary of State for India to “do something about India”.<sup>80</sup>

在1929年與1930年之間，對於來自英國進口某些特定項目的減少介於百分之18到百分之45之間。<sup>77</sup>印度事務部的部長在1930年年底告訴眾議院，世界貿易之一般經濟不景氣造成出口到印度有百分之25的下降，但他歸功另外百分之18的下降是因為國會黨的抵制。<sup>78</sup>即使百分之18就是一個有重要意義的數字，但是抵制可能比這個更有效。進口英國棉布到印度的下跌遠遠超過了當年來自外國進口棉布的總和。<sup>79</sup>於

77 Gopal, *The Viceroyalty...*, p. 97, based on telegrams of the Viceroy to the Secretary of State.

哥帕爾(Gopal)，《印度總督...》，第97頁，依據總督與國務卿的電報。

78 Cited by Kumarappa in “Young India”, and quoted in Sharp, *Gandhi Wields...*, p. 186.

卡瑪拉帕(Kumarappa)引用於《年輕的印度》，及夏普引用於《甘地行使...》，第186頁。

79 Shridharani, *War without violence*, p. 25; Br. ed.: p. 44; Shridharani reports that these figures are based upon the Statistical abstract for the United Kingdom 74th number, and Trade and Navigation, The United Kingdom.

希利達哈拉尼(Shridharani)，《沒有暴力的戰爭》，第25頁；英國版，第44頁。希利達哈拉尼報告說，這些數據是依據聯合帝國統計摘要第74號，及聯合帝國之貿易與航運。

1930年10月至1931年4月之間，在抵制的高峰，英國布匹的進口有百分之84的下降。蘭開夏(Lancashire)郡之織布廠廠主與工人向印度事務部的部長請願要求對「印度做點事」。<sup>80</sup>

These cases are simply illustrative, and quite mild at that. Large-scale strikes and economic shutdowns affect much more severely the economic resources available to the opponent and the degree of political power he can wield, as the Great October Strike of 1905 or the 1944 economic shutdowns in El Salvador and Guatemala illustrate. International consumers' boycotts and embargoes may also influence the outcome of the struggle.

這些個案僅僅是做例證，而且是相當溫和了。大規模之罷工與經濟罷市會更嚴重地影響對手可以使用的經濟資源，以及他可以運用之政治權力的程度，如同在薩爾瓦多與瓜地馬拉1905年10月的大罷工或1944年的經濟罷市所例證的。國際性之消費者的抵制與禁運也可能影響抗爭的結果。

## 6. Sanctions

### 制裁

Even the opponent's ability to apply sanctions may on occasion be influenced by nonviolent action. We saw in

<sup>80</sup> Shridharani, *War without violence*, p. 25; Br. ed.: p. 44.

希利達哈拉尼(Shridharani)，《沒有暴力的戰爭》，第25頁；英國版，第44頁。



Chapter One that fear of the ruler's sanctions is one of the reasons for obedience. We also noted that the threat or use of sanctions does not necessarily produce obedience, and that they can be neutralized by massive defiance.

即使對手施加制裁的能力可能有時候會受到非暴力行動的影響。我們在第一章看到，統治者之制裁所造成的恐懼就是產生服從的原因之一。我們還注意到，威脅或使用制裁不一定會產生服從，而且它們可以透過大規模的反威權而變得無效。

In addition, sanctions as a source of the ruler's power may be reduced or removed by nonviolent action by those who help to provide the sanctions. Usually, this means that police and troops carry out orders for repression inefficiently, or disobey them completely. Sometimes the actions of others may also cut off the supply of weapons and ammunition, as when foreign suppliers halt shipments, or when strikes occur in domestic arms factories and transport. These means of control may be very important in certain situations.

除此之外，把制裁當作統治者的權力來源，可能受到那些幫忙提供制裁之人們的非暴力行動而減少或消除。通常，這意味著警察與軍隊可以沒有效率地執行鎮壓命令，或者完全不服從它們。有時候其他人的行動也可能切斷武器與彈藥的供應，如外國供應商停止出貨時，或當國內的軍火工

廠與運輸發生罷工時。這些控制的手段可能在某些情況下是非常重要的。

The opponent's ability to apply sanctions may also be influenced by the degree to which his agents of repression—police and troops—are willing to carry out orders. In some situations there may be too few such agents because they have not volunteered or because conscripts have refused duty. In other situations, the existing police or troops decline to carry out orders efficiently, or refuse them completely—i.e. mutiny. Mutinies have occurred in wartime, in face of violent revolution, and in cases of mixed violent and nonviolent struggle.


對手實施制裁的能力也可以受到他的鎮壓代理人——警察與軍隊——有意願執行命令之程度的影響。在某些情況下，可能有太少這樣的代理人，因為他們沒有自願或者因為義務兵拒絕執行任務。在其他情況下，現有的警察或軍隊拒絕有效地執行命令，或者完全拒絕它們——也就是說兵變。兵變發生在戰時、在面對武裝革命的時候，以及在暴力與非暴力抗爭混合的時候。

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As we have already discussed, there is good reason to believe that mutiny is much more likely in face of nonviolent resistance. The troops or police then do not

face injury or death from the “rebels” and they must decide whether to obey orders to inflict severe repression against nonviolent people. Laxity in obedience and finally open mutiny will only occur in special circumstances, however. Police and troops will vary in their sensitivity or callousness to the sufferings they inflict on the nonviolent group. The potential for reduced reliability of the agents of repression nevertheless exists; this may be described as a tendency in nonviolent conflicts. Gandhi was quite convinced that soldiers who wound and kill nonviolent actionists undergo a traumatic experience which in time will bring them to contrition: “...an army that dares to pass over the corpses of innocent men and women would not be able to repeat that experiment.”<sup>81</sup>

正如我們已經討論過的，有很好的理由相信，兵變更有可能發生在面對非暴力抵抗的時候。那麼軍隊或警察不會面對受到「造反派」的傷害或死亡，而且他們必須決定是否要服從命令，以造成對「非暴力」之人民的嚴重鎮壓。不過，對服從的鬆弛以及最後的公開叛變，只會出現在特殊的情況。警察與軍隊對他們造成非暴力陣營痛苦之敏感或麻木不仁的程度，會有所不同。即使如此，減少鎮壓代理人之可靠性的潛能是存在的，這可能解讀為非暴力衝突的一個趨勢。甘地相當相信，傷害與殺死非暴力行動者的士兵會產生一個創傷經驗，而這個經驗會及時讓他們悔悟：「……一個敢跨越過無辜男人與婦女之屍體的軍隊，將沒有能力重複這



個實驗。」<sup>81</sup>

Efforts to convert the opponent group may produce both laxity in obeying orders for repression and open mutiny among police and troops, which may lead to nonviolent coercion of the opponent leadership. In other cases, mutiny may occur without conscious efforts at conversion. In any case, disobedience by the agents of repression will reduce the opponent's power, in some cases decisively. Widespread mutinies of Russian troops during the revolutions of 1905 and February 1917 have already been described above.<sup>82</sup> In the latter case they played a major role in achieving the disintegration of the tsarist regime.


努力說服轉換對手的陣營可能會產生對鎮壓命令服從的鬆懈，而且同時會產生警察與軍隊的公開叛變，這可能導致對對手之領導階層的非暴力強制脅迫。在其他的情況，兵變可能會在說服轉換之不自覺的努力時發生。在任何的情況，鎮壓代理人的不服從將減少對手的權力，在某些情況下是關鍵性的。1905年與1917年2月革命中，俄羅斯部隊廣泛的兵變已經在前面描述過了。<sup>82</sup>在後一種的情況，他們發揮

81 Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 361; Ind. Ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 361.

甘地，《非暴力抵抗》，第361頁；印度版，《堅持真理運動》，第361頁。

82 See also Katkov, *Russia 1917*, p. 262, p. 274, pp. 276-282, and pp. 340-341.

同時參閱卡特科夫(Katkov)，《1917年的俄羅斯》，第262、274、276-282及340-341頁。



了重要的作用，實現瓦解了沙皇的政權。


The Nazis recognized well that if they lost control of the Army their power would be drastically weakened; Goebbels reveals that in early February 1938 the Nazis feared most of all not a coup d'état but the collective resignation of all high-ranking officers<sup>83</sup>—a form of noncooperation.

納粹也都承認，如果他們失去對軍隊的控制，他們的權力將大大地受到削弱；戈培爾(Goebbels)透露，在1938年2月初納粹最害怕的不是一場「軍事政變」，而是所有高階官員的集體辭職<sup>83</sup>——不合作的一個方式。

During the predominantly nonviolent East German Rising of June 1953 police sometimes withdrew completely or willingly gave up their arms. Among the East German armed forces there were some cases of mutiny and laying down of arms. There were even evidences of sympathy from Russian soldiers and of reluctance to fire on the civilians. The overwhelming number of Russians who obeyed orders apparently suffered reduced morale.<sup>84</sup> It is reported that some one thousand Soviet officers and other ranks refused to fire at demonstrators, and that fifty-

<sup>83</sup> Gorlitz, *The German General Staff*, p. 319. See also, p. 341.

葛麗茲(Gorlitz)，《德國參謀總部》，第319頁。同時，第341頁。



two Party members and soldiers were shot for disobeying orders.<sup>85</sup>

在主要非暴力之1953年6月東德起義，警方有時完全撤回或自願放棄他們的武器。在東德武裝部隊之中有一些兵變與放下武器的個案。甚至有來自俄羅斯士兵同情與不願對平民開火的證據。絕大多數服從命令的俄羅斯人顯然遭受士氣降低之痛苦。<sup>84</sup>根據報導，大約有1000名蘇聯軍官與其他階級的軍人拒絕向示威者開火，而有52名黨員與士兵因為不服從命令而被槍殺。<sup>85</sup>

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


Large-scale deliberate inefficiency among troops and police is likely to reduce the regime's power. When officials realize that obedience is uncertain, especially if small mutinies have already occurred, they may hesitate before ordering severe repressive actions which might provoke mutiny. That hesitation also limits sanctions as a source of power. A major mutiny is bound to alter power

84 Stefan Brant, *The East German Rising*, p. 86, p. 106, pp. 149-153. On the behavior of East German police and troops, and the Russian troops during the rising, see also Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance against Communist Regimes?" pp. 187-190.

史帝芬布蘭特(Stefan Brant)，《東德的興起》，第86、106、149-153頁。有關東德興起時，東德警察與軍隊及俄羅斯軍隊的行為，同時參閱埃伯特(Ebert)，《以非暴力抵抗共產黨政權？》，第187-190頁。

85 Das Parlament (Bonn), 15 June 1955. Cited in Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS p. 254.

「國會(波昂)」，1955年6月15日。引用於埃伯特(Ebert)，《非暴力抵抗的理論與實踐》，碩士論文，第254頁。



relationships radically, and the opponent is unlikely then to be able to withstand the demands of the nonviolent actionists. In fact, his regime may then disintegrate.

軍隊及警察之間大規模故意的低效率很可能減少政權的權力。當官員認識到服從是不確定的時候，特別是如果已經發生過小型的兵變，他們在下令嚴厲鎮壓行動之前可能會有所猶豫，這個做為可能會引發兵變。這個猶豫也會限制住做為權力來源的制裁。一個主要的兵變必將激烈地改變權力關係，而且對手將不可能承擔非暴力行動者的要求。事實上，那麼他的政權可能就會瓦解。

### Some factors influencing nonviolent coercion 影響非暴力強制脅迫的一些因素

There is no single pattern for producing nonviolent coercion. The factors which produce it occur in different combinations and proportions; there appear to be at least eight such factors. The role and combination of these will not be the same when the nonviolent coercion has been largely produced by mutiny, for example, as when the coercion has been achieved by economic and political paralysis. The contribution of each factor will depend upon the degree to which it regulates one or more of the opponent's necessary sources of power.

沒有單一的模式可以產生非暴力的強制脅迫。這些產生它的因素以不同的組合與比例發生；看起來至少有8種這

樣的因素。這些因素的角色與組合將不會是相同的，當兵變大部分造成非暴力之強制脅迫的時候，例如，當經濟性與政治性的癱瘓達到強制脅迫時。每個因素的貢獻將取決於它控制一個或多個對手必要之權力來源的程度。

Generally speaking, nonviolent coercion is more likely where the numbers of nonviolent actionists are very large, both in absolute numerical terms and in proportion to the general population. It is then possible for the defiance to be too massive for the opponent to control: paralysis by noncooperation is more likely. There, too, may be a greater chance of interfering with the sources of power which depend upon manpower, skilled or unskilled.

一般來說，在非暴力行動者的人數非常大的時候，更有可能出現非暴力的強制脅迫，無論是絕對的數字與整體民衆所佔的比例。那麼這就有可能讓反威權的抵抗，變得超出對手無法控制那樣的強大：更有可能讓不合作造成癱瘓。在那種情況，也就可能有更大的機會可以介入干預這個依靠人力，熟練地或不熟練地的權力來源。

The degree of the opponent's dependence on the nonviolent actionists for the sources of his power is also important. The greater the dependence, the greater the chances of nonviolent coercion. It therefore becomes important to consider exactly who is refusing assistance



to the opponent. "The extent of nonparticipation required to produce measurable political effects varies with the strategic position of the strikers," argued Hiller.<sup>86</sup> Under certain circumstances the opponent may be relatively indifferent to large numbers of noncooperating subjects and in other circumstances he may be nonviolently coerced by the action of a relatively few.

對手爲了他的權力來源而依賴於非暴力行動者的程度也是很重要的。依賴性越大，就越有發生非暴力脅迫的機會。因此，考慮真正到底是「誰」要拒絕協助對手，就有它的重要的。希勒(Hiller)<sup>86</sup>說，「要產生可觀之政治效應的不參與程度，會隨著罷工者的戰略地位而有所不同。」在某些情況下，對手可能對人數很多之不合作的被統治者表現相對冷漠，而在其他情況下，他可能會受到相對較少人之行動而達到非暴力的強制脅迫。

The ability of the nonviolent group to apply the technique of nonviolent action will be very important. The role of fighting skill here is comparable to its importance in any other type of combat. Skill here includes the capacity to choose strategy, tactics and methods, the times and places for action, etc., and ability to act in accordance with the dynamics and requirements of this nonviolent

<sup>86</sup> Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 233.

希勒(Hiller)，《罷工》，第233頁。

technique. Ability to apply nonviolent action skillfully will help to overcome the weaknesses of the nonviolent group, to capitalize on the opponent's weaknesses, and to struggle against the opponent's countermeasures.

非暴力陣營運用非暴力行動之技術的能力，將是非常重要的。在這裡所講之戰鬥技能的角色，相當於任何其他類型之戰鬥的重要性。這裡的技巧包括選擇戰略、戰術與方法；採取行動之時間與地點等的能力，以及按照這個非暴力技術之動態與必要條件的行動能力。能夠熟練地運用非暴力行動的能力將有助於克服非暴力陣營的弱點、利用對手的缺陷，以及抵抗對手的反制措施。

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Whether or not nonviolent coercion is achieved will also depend on how long the defiance and noncooperation can be maintained. A massive act of noncooperation which collapses after a few hours cannot nonviolently coerce anyone. Willingness and ability to maintain nonviolent action for a sufficient duration despite repression are necessary to reduce or sever sources of the opponent's power.

是否可以實現非暴力的強制脅迫，還取決於反威權抵抗與不合作能夠維持多久。一個不合作的群眾行動會在數小時之內無法以非暴力強制脅迫任何人而倒塌。不管鎮壓而有意願並且有能力在足夠長的時間內保持非暴力的行動，是滅

少或斷絕對手的權力來源所必須要的。

The sympathy and support of third parties for the nonviolent group may be important in producing nonviolent coercion if the opponent depends on them for such things as economic resources, transportation facilities, military supplies and the like. Such supplies may then be cut off and his power position thereby undermined.

要產生非暴力的強制脅迫，第三者對非暴力陣營的同情與支持可能是重要的，如果對手在經濟資源、交通設施、軍用補給等等方面是依賴這些第三者的。這些供應可能被切斷，而且他的權力地位就會從而受到破壞。









The means of control and repression which the opponent can use, and for how long, in an attempt to force a resumption of cooperation and obedience are also important. Even more important is the actionists' response to them.

在要強迫恢復合作與服從的企圖中，對手可以使用之控制與鎮壓的手段，而且會使用多久，也是很重要的。而更重要的是行動者對它們的回應。

The final factor contributing to nonviolent coercion is opposition within the opponent group either to the policies at issue or to the repression, or to both. The number of

dissidents, the intensity of their disagreement, the types of action they use, and their positions in the social, economic and political structure will all be important here. On occasion splits in the ruling group itself may occur. Should this happen, or should a general strike or major mutiny of troops or police take place in opposition to repression of the nonviolent actionists, it would be a major factor in producing nonviolent coercion.

有助於非暴力強制脅迫的最後一個因素是「對手陣營內部」對爭議之政策或鎮壓，或是兩者的反對。持不同意見者的人數、不同意見的強度、他們使用行動的類型，以及他們在社會、經濟與政治結構上的地位，都是十分重要的。有時候，統治集團本身可能會發生分裂。如果這種情況發生，或者出現總罷工或軍隊或警察發生反對鎮壓非暴力行動者的重大兵變，這將是產生非暴力強制脅迫的一個主要因素。



美國紐約市中央公園的甘地塑像



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## 貳、確實有實際可行的替代方案

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II

*There Are Realistic Alternatives*



Developing a Realistic  
Alternative to War and Other Violence  
發展一個可以替代戰爭  
與其他暴力的實際方案

 P.1

Violence in society and politics, whether in the form of war, terrorism, dictatorship, oppression, usurpation, or genocide, is widely recognized as a grave problem.

社會與政治上的暴力，不論是以戰爭、恐怖主義、獨裁政權、壓迫體制、篡奪權力或者種族大屠殺的形式，都廣泛地被認為是一個極度嚴重的問題。

All the proposals to solve the problem of violence, or particular expressions of it, have been unsuccessful. It is probable that the problem remains unsolved because such proposals have been based on inadequate understandings of its nature. Without understanding a problem, it is difficult, if not impossible, to solve it.

要解決暴力問題或者它特別外在形式的全部提議，還不曾成功過。這個問題還一直未曾獲得解決，很可能是因為這些提議的基礎是對暴力本質的瞭解並不足夠。對一個問題不了解，要解決它，如果不是不可能的話，也是困難的。



The objective of this essay is to explore a different perspective on the nature of the problem of widespread violence in society and politics that suggests what will be required for its resolution.<sup>1</sup>

這篇論文的目的是要從不同的角度來探討社會與政治裡普遍存在之暴力問題的本質，根據這個瞭解進而提議找出解決方法的必要條件。<sup>1</sup>

We need to analyze the conditions under which it will be possible to reduce drastically the reliance on military and other violent means of conflict. We need to examine why violence is so widely regarded as necessary for good causes as well as for bad ones, and how fundamental change away from that syndrome might be achieved.

我們必須分析一些條件，在這些條件之下有可能大幅度地降低對衝突抗爭之軍事與其他暴力手段的依賴。我們必須研究為何暴力會廣泛地被當作要完成良好目的的必要手段，也是達到不良目的之必要手段，以及要如何達到遠離這種症候群的根本改變。

The perspective in this essay is simple, but perhaps

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1 “Violence” is used here with the restricted meaning of physical violence against persons to inflict injury or death, or action dependent on the threat of such results, not as a term of moral or political opinion.

「暴力」在這裡是狹義的定義，是指對別人以肢體的暴力造成傷害或死亡，或者依靠造成這種結果之威脅的行動，而不是一個道德或者政治的看法。

fundamental to solving the problem of violence in political and international conflicts.

這篇論文的觀點很簡單，但這也許是在政治與國際衝突裡要解決暴力問題的根本所在。

It is important to recognize that conflict in society and politics is inevitable and, in many cases, desirable. Some conflicts can be resolved by mild methods, such as negotiation, dialogue, and conciliation—methods that involve compromise. These are feasible when the issues at stake are not fundamental. Even then, the resolution of a conflict by negotiation is more often influenced by the relative power capacities of the contenders than by reasoned joint assessment of where justice lies.

重要的是要認知到，社會與政治上的衝突是不可避免的，在許多情況它是令人期待的。有一些衝突可以使用溫和的方法，例如談判、對話與調解等妥協的方法來解決。當面臨的那些議題不是基本議題的時候，這些方法是可行的。儘管這樣，透過妥協來解決衝突的時候，時常會受到參與雙方之相對權力能量的影響，這比依據邏輯聯合評估正義何在的影響來得多。

 P.2

However, in many conflicts fundamental issues are, or are believed to be, at stake. These are “acute conflicts.”

They are not deemed suitable for any resolution that involves compromise.

不過，在很多衝突中，涉及的議題正是或者被相信是基本的議題。這些衝突是「尖銳的衝突」。它們就不被認為適合任何妥協方式的解決方案。

In acute conflicts at least one side regards it as necessary and good to wage the conflict against hostile opponents. Acute conflicts are often believed to be waged to advance freedom, justice, religion, or one's civilization, or to resist and defeat hostile violence. Hostile violence may be applied to impose oppression, injustice, or dictatorship. Hostile violence also may be applied to attack one's moral or religious principles or human dignity, or even to threaten the survival of one's people.

在尖銳的衝突中，至少有一方認為向有敵意之對手發動抗爭是有必要的。一般都認為發動尖銳的衝突是為了促進自由、公義、宗教，或者自己的文明、或者抵抗及擊敗有敵意的暴力。具有敵意之暴力可能被應用來施加壓迫、不公義或者獨裁政權。具有敵意之暴力，也有可能被應用來攻擊一個人的道德或者宗教信仰或者人類尊嚴，或者甚至威脅一個族群的生存。

In acute conflicts at least one side regards submission, capitulation, or defeat as disastrous for its

principles, convictions, whole society, and at times even to life itself. In such situations, people believe it is necessary to wage the conflict as strongly as possible.

在尖銳的衝突內，至少有一方認為屈服、投降或者挫敗，對他們的原則、信念、整個社會，並且有時甚至他們的生命是災難一場。在這樣的情勢下，人們會認為有必要發動盡可能強烈的衝突抗爭。

### The need for a means of waging conflicts 發動衝突抗爭之手段的需求

War and other violence have been applied for diverse purposes, but in acute conflicts political and international violence has served as a means of waging the conflict to protect and advance causes believed to be good and noble. Violence has been believed to be the necessary alternative to passive submission to great evil.

戰爭與其他暴力已經被應用於許多不同的目的，但在尖銳的衝突中，政治與國際性暴力，被當作發動衝突抗爭的手段以保護及促進善良與高尚的理念。一般人都相信，暴力是取代不願意被動地屈服於惡魔之必要替代對策。

In most political systems, war and other violence serve as an “ultimate sanction.” That is, forms of violence are believed to be the means of last resort, the most powerful activity that can be applied, the final means

of applying pressure, punishment, or power when all presumably milder means are seen to have failed, or to be destined to fail. Violence is used then, it is believed, to advance and defend all that is held to be good and worthwhile.

在大多數的政治體制裡，戰爭與其他暴力方式都被當作一種「終極的制裁」。這就是說，一般都相信暴力的形式是最後可以使用的手段、可以使用之最強而有力的活動，在所有假設之溫和手段被認為失效或者註定失敗的時候，它是可以使用來行使壓力、處罰或者權力的最後手段。大家相信暴力在那時候，是被使用來促進及捍衛所有認為是善良與值得的東西。

Unless this role of violence is understood, there is no possibility of a major reduction of reliance on war and other violence in acute conflicts.

除非暴力的這個角色被理解，否則在尖銳衝突中對戰爭與其他暴力行為的倚賴，是不可能會有明顯的減少。

In conflicts with basic issues at stake it is naive to think and act as though the offer of negotiation or dialogue is an adequate response. Hostile opponents are most unlikely to abandon their goals or means without a struggle. It is unreasonable to aim for a “win-win” resolution. Brutal dictators and perpetrators of genocide

do not deserve to win anything.

在涉及基本議題的衝突中，如果把談判或者對話的提議認為及當作是適當的回應，就太天真了。有敵意的對手最不可能在沒有抗爭下放棄他們的目標或手段。追求一個「雙贏」的解決方案是不合乎邏輯的。殘暴的獨裁者與種族大屠殺的作惡者，沒有權利值得贏得任何東西。

### P.3

We have many decades of evidence that violence in the conduct of conflicts is not eliminated by protests against such violence. In acute conflicts, the majority of people will not reject war and other violence because they believe, or are told, that such violence violates ethical or religious principles. Adherence to expectations to the contrary is unrealistic.

我們數十年的證據顯示，衝突過程中的暴力不會因為反對這些暴力的抗議而被消除。在尖銳的衝突裡，多數人們不會拒絕戰爭與其他暴力，因為他們相信或是聽別人這樣說，這種暴力違背倫理或者宗教信仰。堅持期待要做到與這種想法相反是不切實際的。

It has been nearly forty years since psychiatrist Jerome D. Frank reminded us that for most people peace is not the highest value.<sup>2</sup>

從精神科醫師傑羅米法蘭克(Jerome D. Frank)開始提醒

我們起，已經差不多有40年了。他說，對許多人來說，和平並不是最高的價值。<sup>2</sup>

People, groups, and governments will not renounce violence when that is seen to mean becoming powerless and helpless in a conflict in which their basic beliefs and the nature of their society are, or are believed to be, under attack.

在這一場他們社會的基本信仰與他們社會的本質正在，或者被認為受到攻擊的衝突中，而當這樣做會被理解是意味著他們正變得無力感與茫然無助的時候，人民、團體與政府是不會唾棄暴力的。

In acute conflicts in order for war and other violence not to be used as the final means of action to advance or defend one's principles, ideals, society, or existence, some other means of strong action need to be available. There has to be a substitute means of conducting the conflict powerfully with the chance of success equivalent to or greater than the violent option.

在尖銳的衝突中，爲了不使戰爭與其他暴力，被用來

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2 Jerome D. Frank, "Psychological Problems in the Elimination of War" in *Preventing World War III: Some Proposals*, New York. Simon and Schuster, 1962.

傑羅米法蘭克(Jerome D. Frank)，《消除戰爭的心理問題》在《預防第三次世界大戰：一些提議》，紐約，西門與休斯特，1962年。

做為促進或捍衛自己原則、理想、社會或生存之行動的最後手段，必須要有強大行動的一些其他手段。這就必須在進行抗爭的時候有替代性而且強有力，同時比選擇暴力有相當的或是更多成功機會的手段。

Of necessity, such a functional alternative must be able to deal satisfactorily with the “hard cases” for which violence has in the past been believed to be required. These “hard cases” include conflicts against dictatorships, foreign invasions and occupations, internal usurpations, oppression, attempted genocide, and mass expulsions and killings.

出於必要，這種具有功能的替代手段必須有能力把過去被認為需要使用暴力之「艱難個案」，處理到令人滿意的程度。這些「艱難個案」包括對抗獨裁政權、外國侵略與佔領、內部的篡奪權位、壓制脅迫、種族大屠殺與集體群眾驅逐與殺害。

A very important clue that such an alternative is possible lies in the fact that the strength of even dictatorships is dependent on sources of power in the society, which in turn depend on the cooperation of a multitude of institutions and people—cooperation which may or may not continue, as we shall see later in more detail.



有可能有這樣一個替代手段的很重要線索，就是存在於這樣的事實，即使這些獨裁統治的權力也是依賴於社會的權力來源，這樣一來它們就是倚賴許多機構與人民的合作——這個合作可能會或者可能不會持續，如同我們稍後可以瞭解到的更多細節。


 P.4

## There is another technique of struggle 有另外一種抗爭的技術

Such a substitute for violent conflict is a realistic option. It is often forgot that war and other violence have not been universal in the conduct of acute conflicts. In a great variety of situations, across centuries and cultural barriers, another technique of struggle has at times been applied. This other technique has not been based on turning the other cheek, but on the ability to be stubborn and to resist powerful opponents powerfully.

這樣一種暴力衝突的替代方案是一種實際可行的選擇。人們經常忘記戰爭與其他暴力在尖銳的衝突中並不是普遍的通則。在許多不同的情勢下，跨越數個世紀與文化的障礙，有時候曾經使用抗爭的另一種技術。這個另一種技術並不是建立在將另一個面頰轉向敵人的理論基礎上，而是以堅定固執的能力與可以強力抵抗龐大對手的能力為基礎。

Throughout human history, in a multitude of



conflicts one side has fought—not by violence, but—by psychological, social, economic, or political methods, or a combination of these. This type of conflict has been waged not only when the issues were relatively limited and the opponents relatively decent. Many times this alternative form of struggle has been applied when fundamental issues have been at stake and when ruthless opponents have been willing and able to apply extreme repression. That repression has included executions, beatings, arrests, imprisonments, and mass slaughters. Despite such repression, when the resisters have persisted in fighting with only their chosen nonviolent weapons, they have sometimes triumphed.

在整個人類的歷史上，有許多不同的衝突，一方的戰鬥——不是用暴力——而是以心理、社會、經濟、或者政治方法、或者這些方法的組合來進行。這種類型之衝突的發動，不僅僅是在議題是相對小型有限而且對手是比較文明的情況。許多時候，這種抗爭的替代手段在涉及根本議題，與殘酷之對手有意願而且有能力使用極端鎮壓的時候都曾應用過。這種鎮壓包括行刑、拷打、逮捕、監禁與集體屠殺。儘管有這樣的鎮壓，當抵抗者僅僅以他們所選擇之非暴力武器持續抗爭堅持的時候，他們有時曾經勝利過。

This technique is called nonviolent action or nonviolent struggle. This is “the other ultimate sanction.”

In acute conflicts it potentially can serve as an alternative to war and other violence.

這種技術被稱之為非暴力行動或者非暴力抗爭。這就是「另類的最終制裁」。在尖銳的衝突中，它具有潛力做為戰爭與其他暴力的替代方案。

## Cases of nonviolent struggle 非暴力抗爭的個案

Nonviolent struggle has occurred in widely differing cultures, periods of history, and political conditions. It has occurred in “the West” and in “the East”. Nonviolent action has occurred in industrialized and nonindustrialized countries. It has been practiced under constitutional democracies and against empires, foreign occupations, and dictatorial systems. Nonviolent struggle has been waged on behalf of a myriad of causes and groups, and even for objectives that many people reject. It has also been used to prevent, as well as to promote, change. Its use has sometimes been mixed with limited violence.

非暴力抗爭已經在廣泛不同的文化、歷史時期與政治情況中發生過。它曾經在「西方」並且在「東方」發生過。非暴力行動曾經在工業化及非工業化國家裡發生過。它曾經在憲政民主國家及對抗帝國、外國佔領與獨裁體制時被實踐過。非暴力抗爭已經用來為了無數的理念與團體，甚至為了很多人拒絕的目的而發動，它也曾經被用來預防及促進改

變。它有時曾經與小型的暴力混合使用。

#### P.5

The issues at stake have been diverse. They have included social, economic, ethnic, religious, national, humanitarian, and political matters, and have ranged from the trivial to the fundamental.

涉及的這些議題非常廣泛，它們包括社會、經濟、種族、宗教、族群、人道主義與政治的事務，並且它的散佈從日常可見的議題到根本的議題。

Although historians have generally neglected this type of struggle, it is clearly a very old phenomenon. Most of the history of this technique has doubtless been lost, and most of what has survived has been largely ignored.

雖然歷史學家通常都會忽略這種類型的抗爭，很清楚的它是一種古老的現象。這種技術的大部分歷史毫無疑問地已經流失了，而大多數倖存的部分卻被大多數人忽略了。

Many cases of the use of nonviolent action have had little or nothing to do with governments. Cases include labor-management conflicts and efforts to impose or resist pressures for social conformity. Nonviolent action has also been used in ethnic and religious conflicts and many other situations, such as disputes between students and

university administrations. Important conflicts between the civilian population and governments where one side has employed nonviolent action have also occurred very widely. The following examples are often of this type.

許多使用非暴力行動的個案與政府很少有關係或者一點關係也沒有。這些個案包括勞工與管理階層的衝突及爲了社會的一致性而施加或者抵抗壓力的努力。非暴力行動也曾經用於種族與宗教的衝突及很多其他的情況，例如學生與大學行政單位之間的爭論。在公民大眾與政府之間的重要衝突中，其中一方曾經運用非暴力行動也已經非常廣泛地發生了。下列這種類型是常見的例子。

From the late eighteenth century through the twentieth century the technique of nonviolent action was widely used in highly diverse conflicts: colonial rebellions, international political and economic conflicts, religious conflicts, and anti-slavery resistance. This technique has been aimed to secure workers right to organize, women's rights, universal manhood suffrage, and woman suffrage. This type of struggle has been used to gain national independence, to generate economic gains, to resist genocide, to undermine dictatorships, to gain civil rights, to end segregation, and to resist foreign occupations and coups d'état,

從18世紀末期到20世紀，非暴力行動的技術被廣泛地應

用在非常完全不同的衝突：殖民地的反叛、國際的政治與經濟衝突、宗教衝突及反奴隸制度的抵抗運動。這種技術之目的曾經用在確保工人結社的權利、婦女民權、普世的成年男子投票權與婦女的選舉權。這類的抗爭曾經用來獲得國家獨立、促進經濟所得、抵抗種族大屠殺、破壞獨裁政權、爭取公民權利與終結種族隔離，並且抵抗外國的佔領與政變。

Cases of the use of this technique early in the twentieth century included major elements of the Russian 1905 Revolution. In various countries the growing trade unions widely used the strike and the economic boycott. Chinese boycotts of Japanese products occurred in 1908, 1915, and 1919. Germans used nonviolent action against the Kapp Putsch in 1920 and against the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. In the 1920s and 1930s, Indian nationalists used nonviolent action in their struggles against British rule, under the leadership of Mohandas K. Gandhi.

在20世紀早期這個技術使用的個案包括俄羅斯之1905年革命的主要部分。在許多不同的國家，日益成長的工會組織廣泛地使用罷工與經濟聯合抵制。在1908年、1915年，以及1919年中國聯合抵制日本商品。德國人在1920年使用非暴力行動抵抗卡普政變(Kapp Putsch)，及在1923年抵抗法國與比利時對魯爾(Ruhr)的佔領。在20世紀20年代與30年代，在聖雄甘地的領導下，印度民族主義者在他們對抗英國統治的抗

爭中使用非暴力的行動。

 P.6

From 1940 to 1945 in various European countries people, especially in Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands, used nonviolent struggle to resist Nazi occupation and rule. Nonviolent action was used to save Jews from the Holocaust in Berlin, Bulgaria, Denmark, and elsewhere. The military dictators of El Salvador and Guatemala were ousted in brief nonviolent struggles in the spring of 1944. The American civil rights nonviolent struggles against racial segregation, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, changed laws and long-established policies in the US South. In April 1961 noncooperation by French conscript soldiers in the French colony of Algeria combined with popular demonstrations in France and defiance by the Debré-de Gaulle government defeated the coup d'état in Algiers before a related coup in Paris could be launched.

從1940年到1945年在不同的歐洲國家，特別是挪威、丹麥與荷蘭，人們使用非暴力抗爭抵抗納粹的佔領與統治。非暴力行動被用來保護猶太人免於在柏林、保加利亞、丹麥與其他地方的集體大屠殺。在1944年春天，薩爾瓦多與瓜地馬拉軍事獨裁者在很快速的非暴力抗爭下被驅趕下台。美國民權運動以非暴力抗爭反對種族的隔離，特別是20世紀50年

代與60年代，在美國南方修訂了法律與長期既定的政策。在1961年4月法國徵召的士兵以不合作的方式在法屬阿爾及利亞的殖民地，結合法國的群眾示威與戴高樂政府的反抗威權行動，戰勝了在阿爾及爾內的政變，及在巴黎一個相關而可能被啓動的政變。

In 1968 and 1969, following the Warsaw Pact invasion, Czechs and Slovaks held off full Soviet control for eight months with improvised nonviolent struggle and refusal of collaboration. From 1953 to 1990 dissidents in Communist-ruled countries in Eastern Europe, especially in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic States, repeatedly used nonviolent struggles for increased freedom. The sophisticated Solidarity struggle in Poland began in 1980 with strikes to support the demand of a legal free trade union, and concluded in 1989 with the end of the Polish Communist regime. Nonviolent struggle also brought about the end of Communist dictatorships in Czechoslovakia in 1989 and in East Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1991.

在1968年與1969年，繼華沙公約軍隊的侵略，捷克人與斯洛伐克人用即興式的非暴力抗爭與拒絕合作，阻擋住蘇聯的完全控制有8個月之久。從1953年到1990年，在東歐共產統治國家的政治異議份子，特別是東德、波蘭、匈牙利與波羅的海，一再重複使用非暴力抗爭來增進自由。波蘭組織精



密的團結工聯抗爭在1980年開始，以罷工來支持法律自由工會的訴求，並且得到1989年終結波蘭共產政體的成果。非暴力抗爭也在1989年造成捷克斯洛伐克及1991年在東德、愛沙尼亞、拉脫維亞與立陶宛之共產獨裁政權的終結。

The attempted “hard-line” coup d’état in Moscow in 1991 was defeated by noncooperation and defiance. Nonviolent protests and mass resistance were highly important in undermining the Apartheid policies and European domination in South Africa, especially between 1950 and 1990. The Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines was destroyed by a nonviolent uprising in 1986.

1991年在莫斯科「死硬派」政變的企圖被不合作與反抗運動打敗。非暴力的抗議與群眾抵抗運動，在破壞南非的種族隔離政策與歐洲白人的控制有非常大的重要性，特別是在1950年與1990年之間。菲律賓的馬可仕獨裁政權在1986年被一場非暴力的群眾運動所摧毀。

In July and August 1988 Burmese democrats protested against the military dictatorship with marches and defiance, brought down three governments, and finally that struggle succumbed to a new military coup d’état and mass slaughter. In 1989 Chinese students and others in over three hundred cities (including in Tainanmen Square, Beijing) conducted symbolic protests against

government corruption and oppression, but the protests finally ended following massive killings by the military.

在1988年7月與8月，緬甸的民主人士用遊行與反抗權威挑戰抗議軍事獨裁政權，打倒三個政府，但是那個抗爭最後因為一個新的軍事政變與集體屠殺而粉碎。在1989年中國學生與其他民衆，在超過300個城市(包括在北京的天安門廣場)進行象徵性反對政府腐敗與壓迫的抗議，但是抗議最後在軍隊的大規模殺戮之後就結束了。

#### P.7

In Kosovo the Albanian population between 1990 and 1999 conducted a noncooperation campaign against repressive Serbian rule. When the de facto Kosovo government lacked a nonviolent strategy for gaining de jure independence, a guerrilla Kosovo Liberation Army initiated violence. This was followed by extreme Serbian repression and massive slaughters by so-called “ethnic cleansing,” which led to NATO bombing and intervention.

在1990年與1999年之間，科索沃的阿爾巴尼亞人(Albanian)對高壓的塞爾維亞統治進行一場不合作運動。當時科索沃的實際政府缺乏一個非暴力之戰略以獲得法理上的獨立，打游擊的科索沃解放軍(Kosovo Liberation Army)卻發動了暴力抗爭。隨之而來的是塞爾維亞人之極端高壓統治及被稱為「種族清除」的集體屠殺，導致北約組織的轟炸與介入干涉。

Starting in November 1996 Serbs conducted daily parades and protests in Belgrade and other cities against the autocratic governance of President Milosovic and secured correction of electoral fraud in mid-January 1997. At that time, however, Serb democrats lacked a strategy to press on the struggle and failed to launch a campaign to bring down the Milosovic dictatorship. In early October 2000, the Otpor (Resistance) movement and other democrats rose up again against Milosovic in a carefully planned nonviolent struggle and the dictatorship collapsed.

從1996年11月開始，塞爾維亞人在貝爾格勒(Belgrade)與其他城市進行每日遊行與抗議以反對米羅塞維奇總統的獨裁統治，並且確保1997年1月中旬選舉舞弊的修正。不過在當時，塞爾維亞的民主人士缺乏一個可以讓抗爭使力的戰略，以致未能發動一場推翻米羅塞維奇獨裁政權的運動。在2000年10月初，歐特破(Otpor，抵抗)運動與其他民主人士，以仔細規劃的非暴力抗爭再一次站起來反抗米羅塞維奇，獨裁政權終於垮台。

In early 2001 President Estrada, who had been accused of corruption, was ousted by Filipinos in a “People Power Two” campaign.

在2001年年初，伊斯特拉達總統(President Estrada)受到貪污腐敗的指控，被菲律賓人在「第二次人民力量」的運動

下趕下台來。

In order to understand better those conflicts and their outcomes it is important to understand the nature of this technique.

爲了對這些衝突與它們之結果有更好的理解，瞭解這種技術的本質是有其重要性的。

## Characteristics and methods of nonviolent struggle 非暴力抗爭之特性與方法

In this type of struggle, instead of using violence people have practiced three general types of behavior. First, they have engaged in symbolic protests, such as marches, vigils, distributing leaflets, or wearing of specific colors to communicate their support for, or opposition to, some objective.

在這種抗爭的類型裡，人們不是使用暴力而是實踐三種一般類型的行爲。首先，他們從事象徵性的抗議，例如遊行、守夜、分發傳單，或者配戴特定的顏色以傳達他們對某些目標的支持或者反對。

Second, the resisters have refused to continue existing cooperation, or to begin new cooperation, with the opponents or with certain practices. They have practiced noncooperation. This has taken social, economic, and

political forms.

其次，抵抗者拒絕與對手或是以某些慣例，繼續現有的合作或者拒絕開始新的合作。人們曾經實踐過不合作的行動，這個行動有社會、經濟與政治的形式。

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For example, the resisters have practiced social boycotts of opponents or have refused to participate in observances or celebrations, or to attend meetings or schools that they believe support their opponents.

例如，抵抗者實施社會聯合抵制對手，或者拒絕參加觀禮儀式或慶祝活動，或者拒絕參加他們認為支持對手的會議，或者拒絕就讀這樣的學校。

The resisters have at times discontinued economic cooperation by refusing to supply or transport goods and services or by refusing to buy or sell materials or products. Sometimes economic relations with an opponent country have been halted by government initiative. These all have been forms of economic boycott.

抵抗者有時候透過拒絕供應或者運輸貨物與服務，或者拒絕購買或者出售材料或產品，以中斷經濟上的合作。有時候，政府可以主動地停止與一個敵對國家的經濟關係。這些全部都是經濟聯合抵制的形式。

Labor strikes have taken various forms, such as a short symbolic work stoppage, a single factory strike, a massive general strike, or an economic shut-down of a city or a country.

勞工的罷工曾經採取各種不同的形式，例如一個短暫象徵性的停工、單一工廠的罷工、集體總罷工，或者一個城市或者國家的經濟霸市。

Political noncooperation has included boycotts of rigged elections, rejection of the legitimacy of a regime, non-obedience without direct supervision, noncooperation by government employees, and civil disobedience of “immoral” laws.

政治不合作包括杯葛被操縱的選舉、否定政權的合法性、沒有直接監督的不服從、政府員工的不合作，與公民對「不道德」之法律的不服從。

Third, active intervention and disruption of the normal operation of the system has been applied in various psychological, social, economic, physical, and political forms. The many methods of nonviolent intervention include occupation of offices, sit-downs on the streets, hunger strikes, establishment of new economic institutions, nonviolent invasions, overloading of administrative facilities, seeking imprisonment, and

parallel government.

第三，曾經以各種不同之心理、社會、經濟、實境，與政治的形式對政權體制進行積極的介入干涉與擾亂。很多非暴力介入干涉的方法包括佔領辦公室、在街頭靜坐、絕食、建立新的經濟機構、非暴力的侵入、讓行政管理設備超載、想辦法被監禁與設立平行政府。

The methods of nonviolent action are identified and categorized by the type of action applied, not by the motives or beliefs of the people applying it. Very importantly, this technique has been applied by people of diverse beliefs and clearly does not require a belief in ethical or religious nonviolence, which is a very different phenomenon. Most often, the participants and the leaders (if identifiable) have refrained from violence because it was understood to be both unnecessary and counterproductive. The 198 classified methods of nonviolent action are listed in Appendix Two, and presented in full with historical examples in Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part Two, The Methods of Nonviolent Action*. (See Appendix Three: For Further Reading)

這些非暴力行動方法之辨認與分類，是由所應用之行動的類型而定，而不是依照應用它們之人們的動機與信仰而決定。非常重要的，這種技術曾經被完全不同信仰的人們所

使用，並且清楚地不必有倫理上或者宗教上的非暴力理念，它們是一個非常不同的現象。最經常性地，那些參與者與領導者(如果是可以辨識的話)與暴力保持距離，因為大家了解這些是不必要的而且會有反效果的。非暴力行動之198種分類的方法列舉在附錄二，並且在吉恩夏普所著《非暴力行動的政治》第二冊：《非暴力行動的方法》裡提出歷史上的完整例子。(進一步的閱讀請見該書附錄三)

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## Misconceptions 錯誤的觀念

A widespread series of false conceptions and misperceptions have plagued the understanding of nonviolent struggle. The following are some corrections:

有一系列廣泛之錯誤觀念與誤解已經對非暴力抗爭的理解造成困擾。下列是一些修正的觀念：

- It is widely believed that violence always works quickly, and nonviolent struggle always takes very long. Both of these beliefs are false.
- 大家廣泛地相信暴力總是迅速而有效的，而非暴力抗爭總是需要很長久的時間。這兩個想法都是錯誤的。
- Nonviolent struggle is often believed to be weak, but in fact it can be very powerful. It can paralyze and even disintegrate a repressive regime.



- 非暴力抗爭經常被認為是軟弱的，但是它實際上可以是非常強而有力的。它能夠癱瘓並且甚至可以分支瓦解一個高壓的政權。
- Nonviolent struggle does not need a charismatic leader.
- 非暴力的抗爭並不需要一位有領袖魅力的領導者。
- Nonviolent struggle is a cross-cultural phenomenon.
- 非暴力的抗爭是一個跨越不同文化的現象。
- Nonviolent struggle does not require any religious beliefs (certainly no specific religious beliefs), although at times it has been practiced with religious motives.
- 非暴力抗爭不需要任何宗教信仰(當然沒有特定的宗教信仰)，雖然有時候它曾經為了宗教的動機而實施。
- Nonviolent struggle is not the same as religious or ethical principled nonviolence, but a very different phenomenon. This distinction must be made clear and not downplayed.
- 非暴力的抗爭與宗教或者倫理主義的非暴力並不相同，而是一個非常不同的現象。這種區別必須說明清楚而不要加以輕視。
- Although it is still widely believed that this technique can succeed only against humanitarian and democratic opponents, it has at times been successful against brutal regimes and dictatorships,

including Nazi and Communist ones.

- 雖然它仍然被廣泛地相信這種技術只對人道主義與民主的對手才會成功，它有時對殘暴的政權與獨裁專政、包括納粹分子與共產主義者的政權都曾經成功過。
- It is said by some persons and groups that nonviolent struggle only succeeds by melting the hearts of the oppressors. However, it has been coercive and even destroyed extreme dictatorships.
- 有一些人與團體傳說，非暴力抗爭只透過軟化那些壓迫者的心才能成功。不過，它曾經強制脅迫並且甚至摧毀極端的獨裁政權。

## Requirements for success 成功之必要條件

The choice to use this type of struggle is not a guarantee of success, just as the use of violence is not a guarantee of success. There are requirements for achieving success with this technique, just as there are with violence. Simply refraining from violence and speaking the word “nonviolent” does not produce the desired results.

選擇使用這種類型的抗爭並不保證一定成功，就如同使用暴力並不保證成功一樣。使用這種技術需要一些必要的

條件才會成功，這正如同使用暴力一樣。僅僅與暴力保持距離並且一直說「非暴力」這個名詞，並不會產生預期如願的結果。

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Some of the past instances of nonviolent action failed to accomplish their objectives. Some won only limited victories. Sometimes a victory was short-lived because people did not then use it to consolidate and perhaps institutionalize their gains, nor did they effectively resist new threats to their liberty. In other instances, victory in a single campaign won concessions, but new struggles were required to achieve the full objectives.

有一些非暴力行動過去的實例並沒有成功實現他們的目標。有一些只贏得小型的勝利。有時候，勝利是短暫的，因為人們沒有隨後使用它來鞏固並且將它們的收穫加以制度化，它們也沒有能夠有效地為他們的自由而抵抗新的威脅。在其他的實例裡，單一場次運動的勝利贏得一些讓步，而必須要有新的抗爭以達到全部的目標。

In some cases, however, major victories were achieved that would have been impossible by resistance with violence. In order to better understand these outcomes, it is necessary to understand the nature of this

technique.

不過，有些個案，完成了不可能以暴力的抵抗運動來完成的重大勝利。爲了對這些結果有更好的理解，有必要對這種技術的本質加以理解。

Although the ways nonviolent struggle “works” differ widely from case to case, it is important to identify two crucial special processes that may be present in certain nonviolent conflicts, but not in every one. These are: (1) an ability to defy and at times to reverse the effects of repression, and (2) an ability to undermine and sever the sources of power of the opponents.

雖然非暴力抗爭「運作」的方式因個案不同而有很大的不同，很重要的是要在某些非暴力衝突中辨認兩個會出現之關鍵的特別過程，但這些不是在每一個衝突中都會出現。這兩個是：(1)反抗而且有時候可以翻轉鎮壓之效果的能力，及(2)破壞並且切斷那些對手之權力來源的能力。

## Repression and political jiu-jitsu 鎮壓與政治柔道術

Naturally, dictators are sensitive to actions and ideas that threaten their power to do as they like. Oppressors are therefore likely to threaten and punish those who disobey, strike, or refuse to cooperate. However, repression and even brutalities do not always produce a

resumption of the necessary degree of submission and cooperation to enable the regime to function.

本能地，獨裁者對威脅到他們予取予求之權力的行動與理念都很敏感。因此壓迫者很可能威脅並且處罰那些不服從、罷工或者拒絕合作的人。不過，鎮壓及甚至殘暴的行為並不總是會產生讓政權能夠運作之屈服與合作，可以恢復到必要的程度。

Under some circumstances, but not in every case, severe repression may initiate a special process called “political jiu-jitsu.”

在某些情形下，但在不是每一個個案，嚴厲的鎮壓可能會啟動一個特別而被稱之為「政治柔道術」的過程。

The opponents' difficulties in dealing with nonviolent action are primarily associated with the special dynamics and processes of this technique. It is designed to operate against opponents able and willing to use violent sanctions. However, political struggle by means of nonviolent action against violent repression creates a special, asymmetrical, conflict situation. The nonviolent resisters can use the asymmetry of nonviolent means versus violent action in order to apply to their opponents a political operation analogous to the Japanese martial art of jiu-litsu. The contrast in types of action throws the

opponents off balance politically, causing their repression to rebound against their position and weaken their power. By remaining nonviolent while continuing the struggle, the resisters will improve their own power position. This process is called political jiu-litsu.

對手在處理非暴力行動的困難主要與這種技術的特別動力平衡與過程相關。它是設計來對付那些有能力而且有意願使用暴力制裁的對手。不過，以非暴力行動的手段來對抗暴力壓迫的政治抗爭，創造出一個特別而不對稱的衝突情況。爲了對他們的對手施展一種類似於日本「柔道」武術的政治操作，非暴力的抵抗者能夠利用非暴力手段與殘暴行爲之間的不對稱性。這個行動類型的對比可以讓對手在政治上失去平衡而將之推倒，造成對他們的鎮壓產生反彈而反抗他們的權位，並且削弱他們的權力。透過讓抗爭繼續保持非暴力，抵抗者就可以改善他們自己的權力位置。這個過程被稱之爲政治柔道術。

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Political jiu-jitsu causes increased alienation from the opponents by any or all of three possible groups: members of the opponent group itself, members of the population affected by the issues, and third parties not directly involved in the conflict. That alienation can result in the growth of internal opposition in the opponents' camp. It can also increase the numbers of resisters and

the extent of resistance. It also often turns third parties against the opponents and in favor of the resisters.

政治柔道術讓下列任何一個或全部三個陣營持續與對手保持距離：對手陣營自己的成員、受議題影響民衆之陣營的成員，與不直接涉及衝突之陣營的第三者。那種疏離能夠導致對手陣營內部反對意見的成長。它也能增加抵抗者的人數與抵抗運動的深度。它也經常使第三者轉而反對那些對手，並且贊成抵抗者。

## Undermining the opponents' power 破壞對手的權力

Political jiu-jitsu does not operate in all situations or in every case of nonviolent action. The other major way nonviolent struggle operates is through undermining the sources of power required by the opponents, even dictatorships. This process operates primarily in struggles when the objective is to pressure or coerce a government to do or not to do something, or when the objective is to disintegrate the regime.

政治柔道術並不是在非暴力行動的所有情況下或者在每一個個案裡都可以操作。非暴力抗爭操作之另一個主要的方式在於破壞對手，甚至獨裁政權所需要的權力來源。這個過程主要在當抗爭之目標是在對政府施展壓力，或者強制脅迫它去做或者不去做某件事的時候，或者這個目標是分支瓦解這個政權。

The principle is simple. Dictators require the assistance of the people they rule, without which they cannot secure and maintain the sources of political power they require. These sources of political power include:

這個原則是簡單的。獨裁者需要有他們統治之人民的協助，沒有這些協助他們不能確保及保持他們所需要的權力來源。這些政治的權力來源包括：

- Authority, or legitimacy;
- 權威性或者合法性；
- Human resources, the persons and groups that obey, cooperate with, or assist the rulers;
- 人力資源，就是服從、合作或協助統治者的個人與團體；
- Skills and knowledge, needed by the regime and supplied by the cooperating persons and groups;
- 技能與知識，就是政權所需要，而且由合作的個人與團體所提供；

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- Intangible factors, psychological and ideological factors which may induce people to obey and assist the rulers;
- 無形因素，就是可以促使人們服從及協助統治者之心理與意識形態上的因素；



- Material resources, control of or access to property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, and means of communication and transportation; and
- 物質資源，就是對財產、自然資源、財務資源、經濟體系、通信管道與運輸之管控與處理；及
- Sanctions, punishments, threatened or applied, to ensure the submission and cooperation that are needed for the regime to carry out its policies and to exist.
- 制裁，就是威脅使用或者已經使用處罰，以確保政權要完成其政策及生存所需要的屈服與合作。

All these sources, however, depend on acceptance of the regime, on the submission and obedience of the population, and on the cooperation of many people and institutions of the society.

不過，所有這些來源，取決於政權被接受的程度、人們的屈服與服從，以及社會上許多人與機構的合作。

Political power, therefore, is always dependent for its strength and existence upon a replenishment of its sources by the cooperation of a multitude of institutions and people—cooperation that may or may not continue. Political power is therefore always potentially fragile and is

always dependent on the society over which it is applied.

因此，政治權力的力量與存在總是依賴於經由許多不同人們與機構之合作所補充的來源，這個合作可能會繼續或者可能不會繼續。因此政治權力總是存在著潛在的脆弱性，並且總是倚賴於它所運用權力的社會。

This necessary submission and cooperation are not guaranteed, and each source of power is vulnerable to restrictions or losses. Nonviolent action can be directly targeted to strike at the availability of each of these sources. Depending on several factors, the supply of all these sources of power potentially can be weakened and even severed.

這個必要的屈服與合作並沒有得到保證，並且每一項權力來源都容易受到限制或者流失。非暴力的行動可以直接瞄準以打擊這些權力來源中每一項的可使用性。因為這些權力來源都依賴於許多因素，所有這些權力來源的供應都會潛在地被削弱並且甚至被切斷。

Noncooperation and defiance subvert the needed obedience and cooperation that supply the necessary sources of power. For example, rejection of the rulers' legitimacy reduces a crucial reason for obedience by both aides and the general populace. Extensive popular disobedience and defiance creates immense

enforcement problems. Massive strikes can paralyze the economy. Widespread administrative noncooperation of the bureaucracy can thwart governmental operations. Mutinies of the opponents' police and troops can dissolve the opponents' capacity to repress nonviolent resisters and to maintain their regime.


不合作與反抗破壞了提供必要之權力來源所必須的服從與合作。例如，否定統治者的合法性，就會降低官員之助理與一般民衆兩者之服從的關鍵性理由。普遍廣泛之大眾的不服從與反抗會產生巨大的強制執法問題。大規模的罷工能夠讓經濟癱瘓。官僚體制行政的擴大不合作能夠阻礙政府的運作。對手之警察與軍隊的兵變，能夠鬆散對手鎮壓非暴力抵抗者與維護他們政權的能力。

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Without availability of those sources of power, the opponents' power weakens and finally dissolves. The regime dies from political starvation.

缺乏那些權力來源的可使用性，對手的權力減弱了並且最後就消失無蹤了。這個政權就會因政治性的飢餓而滅亡。

Contrary to popular opinion, even totalitarian dictatorships are dependent on the support of the population and the societies they rule, as the political



scientist Karl W. Deutsch noted in 1953.<sup>3</sup>

與普遍之意見相反的，如同政治科學學者卡爾德意契(Karl W. Deutsch)在1953年所指出，即使極權的獨裁專政也是倚賴它們所統治之人民與社會的支持。<sup>3</sup>


## Four ways to success 邁向成功的四種方法

Successful nonviolent struggles have “worked” in four basic ways. These differing ways of operation depend to a high degree on the specific conflict situation, the issues at stake, the social structure of the resisting population, the nature of the opponents, the chosen grand strategy (if any), the preferred mechanism of change, the specific methods used, and the skill, discipline, and tenacity of the resisters. The pressures exerted may be psychological, social, economic, and political, each in varying degrees.

成功的非暴力抗爭曾經以四種基本的模式成功運作過。這些不同的操作模式與特定的衝突情勢、涉及爭議的議題、抵抗民衆的社會結構、對手的本質、選擇的總體大戰略(如果有的話)、偏好的改變機制、使用的具體方法及抵抗者

3 Karl W. Deutsch, “Cracks in the Monolith: Possibilities and Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian Systems” in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Totalitarianism*, pp. 308-333. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1954.

卡爾德意契(Karl W. Deutsch)，《巨石的裂縫：極權政權體制瓦解的可能性與模式》，卡爾佛列德烈希(Carl J. Friedrich)編輯，《極權獨裁主義》，第308-333頁，劍橋，麻州，哈佛大學出版社，1954年。



的技能、紀律與堅持等，都有很高的相關性。這些施加的壓力可能是心理的、社會的、經濟的與政治的，每一項的程度也不相同。

Additionally, the nonviolent struggle may affect the stability of the social or political system or may change its operation. The struggle also may affect the opponents' ability to continue specific policies. In certain conflicts nonviolent noncooperation and defiance may undermine the opponents' capacity to continue to govern, or may even disintegrate their regime.

另外，非暴力抗爭可以衝擊社會或者政治體制的穩定性，或者可以改變它的運作。這種抗爭也會影響對手繼續實施特定政策的能力。在某些衝突中非暴力的不合作與反抗可能破壞對手繼續執政的能力，或者甚至可能分支瓦解他們的政權。

There are major differences in how nonviolent struggle operates in different conflicts. For example, the dynamics in a local labor strike for increased wages will differ from those in a conflict conducted by a minority group for greater rights, or those of a struggle to destroy a dictatorship.

在不同的衝突中，非暴力抗爭的運作會有很大的不同。例如，爲了增加工資之地方性勞動罷工的動力平衡關

係，就會與那些爲了少數族群之更多權利或者那些摧毀獨裁政權的抗爭有所不同。

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In cases of success, the change may come as a result of one of four mechanisms. Rarely, as a result of nonviolent struggle, changes of attitude have led the opponents to make concessions voluntarily because it is right to do so—conversion. Far more often, the withdrawal of economic or political cooperation has forced the opponents to agree to a compromise—accommodation. At times the defiance and noncooperation have been so strong and so skillfully targeted, and the sources of the opponents' power have been sufficiently weakened that the opponents have been left with no option but to capitulate—nonviolent coercion. In some rare instances, the defiance and noncooperation have been so massive, and the severance of the sources of the opponents' power has been so complete, that the regime has simply fallen apart—disintegration.

有一些成功的個案，改變可能是由四個機制其中的一種所造成。想要以心態的改變來促成對手只因爲這樣做就是對的而自願讓步——稱之爲「說服轉變」，很少這樣做就會產生非暴力抗爭的結果。更經常的是，撤回經濟上或者政治上的合作會迫使那些對手同意一個「配合調處」。有時候反

抗與不合作變得如此強大及可以如此熟練地設定目標，而且對手之權力已經充分地被削弱的時候，對手已經沒有其他的退路，只有投降一途——這是「非暴力強制脅迫」。在某一些極少的實例裡，這些反抗與不合作變得如此有力，並且斷絕對手的權力來源已經如此徹底的時候，這個政權就只能單純地被粉碎了——「分支瓦解」。

### Uses of a refined technique 一種精進技術的使用

Whether or not this technique of nonviolent struggle is, or can be made to be, a major contribution to the resolution of the problem of violence in society and politics hinges to a high degree on if it can help to reduce reliance on violence in acute conflicts. Can it be made sufficiently effective so as to be used in acute conflicts in place of violence? In some cases the answer offered by some persons may be a clear “yes,” but in other cases the answer may be “perhaps,” “doubtful,” or “no.” Those answers will likely depend upon the degree of understanding those persons have of this technique and the degree to which nonviolent struggle is judged capable of providing an effective substitute for violence in acute conflicts.

這個非暴力抗爭的技術是否現在或是將來，可以讓它對解決社會與政治之暴力問題做出主要的貢獻，大部分要看

它是否能夠幫助降低在尖銳性衝突中對暴力的依賴性。看它是否能夠足夠有效地在尖銳的衝突中被使用來取代暴力的方式？有些情形某些人提出的答案可能清楚地是「會」，在另外一些情形，這個答案可能是「也許」、「令人懷疑」或者「不會」。這些答案的不同可能性取決於這些個人對這個技術了解的程度及在尖銳衝突中，非暴力抗爭被認定為是可以取代暴力方式之有效替代方式的程度。

It is possible to learn how to make this type of struggle more effective than it has been in its past improvised applications. This can be done by increasing our knowledge of the requirements of this technique, spreading widely this knowledge and understanding, and increasing general and specific planning and strategy for the use of this technique in future acute conflicts.

學習如何讓這個類型的抗爭變得比它在過去被即興式的使用更為有效，是一件可能的事。這可以透過增加我們對這種技術之必要知識的瞭解、廣泛地傳播這種知識與理解，並且增加為了未來尖銳衝突中使用這個技術之整體與特定的規劃與戰略。

The development of a satisfactory solution to the problem of violence, and the examination of the future political development of nonviolent struggle, require that we give attention to the present and potential future role of



this technique. This is especially important in those acute conflicts in which many people and governments believe that military means and other violence are required. The questions are: to what extent we can understand and refine this technique, and how far can it be effectively substituted for violence?

要對暴力之問題發展一個令人滿意的解決答案，以及要研究非暴力抗爭在將來政治上的發展，我們必須關注到這個技術目前與潛在之未來的角色。這在很多人與政府都相信，那些軍事手段與其他暴力是有必要性的衝突裡，是特別重要的。這些問題是：我們能夠理解並且精煉這種技術到什麼程度，以及可以多麼有效地以這個技術取代暴力？

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The future political development of nonviolent struggle needs to include nonviolent alternatives to violence in the following types of conflicts:

非暴力抗爭在未來政治上的發展，必須在下列衝突的類型中包括取代暴力之非暴力替代方案：

- Dismantling dictatorships;
- 拆除獨裁政權；
- Blocking new coups d'état and preventing new dictatorships;
- 阻止新的軍事政變，以及防止新的獨裁政權；

- Defending against foreign aggression and occupation;
- 防衛抵抗外國的侵略與佔領；
- Preserving the existence and ways of life of indigenous peoples;
- 保護原住居民的生存與生活模式；
- Lifting social and economic injustices;
- 解除社會與經濟的不公不義；
- Developing, preserving and extending democratic practices and human rights; and
- 發展、維護與延續民主的生活方式與人權；及
- Incorporating in additional ways nonviolent means into democratic societies.
- 以其他的方式將非暴力手段整合進入民主的社會。

## Reducing reliance on war and other violence 降低對戰爭與其他暴力的倚賴

For these and other general purposes, and for specific conflicts, practical strategic plans need to be developed to enable the nonviolent option to be effectively applied. As this is done incrementally, it will be possible in instance after instance to substitute refined nonviolent struggle for the use of violence in acute conflicts.

爲了這些與其他一般的目的及爲了特定的衝突，必須發展務實的戰略規劃以便使非暴力的替代方案可以被有效地

使用。因為這可以逐漸地來完成，它有可能在尖銳衝突中一案接一案地使用精煉過的非暴力來取代暴力。

In order to meet this challenge—to explore and develop the potential of nonviolent action to address acute conflicts—a great deal more research, analysis, strategic studies, policy development, planning, and courageous action is required.

爲了迎接這項挑戰——探討及發展對付尖銳衝突的潛在非暴力行動——就必須有更多的研究、分析、戰略研究、政策發展、規劃與更多的勇敢行動。

The tools of historians, social psychologists, sociologists, social and political theorists, political scientists, strategists, and others are needed. It is important not only to study nonviolent struggle, but also to examine other topics, including the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of dictatorships and other systems of oppression.

歷史學家、社會心理學家、社會學家、社會與政治理論家、政治學家、戰略規劃者與其他領域所使用的工具，是必須的。不僅研究非暴力抗爭是重要的，而且研究其他主題也是重要的，包括獨裁政權與其他壓迫體制的弱點與容易被攻擊的脆弱處。

It is also important to learn how to develop and spread the capacity to think strategically and to plan strategies for future nonviolent struggles.

爲了未來的非暴力抗爭，學習如何發展並且傳播戰略性的思考與策略規劃的能力也有其重要性。

The application of these efforts will require going beyond, and often against, important established trends of modern society and powerful national and international forces. The centralization of power, the militarization of inter-state politics, the hegemony of traditional methods of problem solving, these and other factors work against reasoned consideration of the potential relevance of nonviolent struggle.

應用這些努力將有必要超越而且時常違反，現代社會既有的重要趨勢及強有力之國內與國際的勢力。權力的中央集中化、國家之間政治的軍事化、解決問題之傳統方法的霸道……，這些與其他因素運作的方式，都違反非暴力抗爭潛在關聯性的邏輯推理思考。

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However, there are grounds to suggest that whether a society chooses to rely ultimately on violent or nonviolent struggle in certain acute conflicts has highly important consequences for the social and political structure. It

strongly appears that violent conflict tends to produce a more centralized and potentially repressive political system, whereas nonviolent conflict tends to produce a more decentralized and popularly controlled political system. Military capacity can be used internally to repress the population, while nonviolent struggle can be used by the population to achieve and defend freedoms and to resist centralized repression.

不過，有一些理由來建議，一個社會在某些尖銳的衝突中是否選擇最終要倚賴暴力或者非暴力抗爭，會對社會與政治結構產生高度重要的後果。看起來強烈明顯的是，暴力的衝突有造成一個更中央集權與潛在高壓體制的趨勢，而非暴力衝突會傾向於產生一個權力更分散，以及由民衆控制的政治體制。軍事能力會被用來做國內對人民的鎮壓，而人民可以運用非暴力抗爭來實現與捍衛自由，以及抵抗中央集權的鎮壓。

Careful informed consideration of the potential relevance and viability of means of applying nonviolent pressures and power is likely to reveal realistic options that have hitherto been inadequately explored. This approach has the potential for making fundamental changes in modern politics and international relations through reducing reliance upon violence.

仔細而有充分資訊的思考、施加非暴力之壓力與權力

的潛在關聯性與手段的存活性，可能顯示實際可行的替代方案至今不曾被充分的探索過。透過降低對暴力的信賴，這種處理問題的方法具有使現代政治與國際關係產生基本改變的潛力。

How much we will succeed in replacing violent with nonviolent forms of conflict, thereby reducing drastically the reliance on military and other violent means, will to a very high degree be determined by the extent to which we can develop and apply effective nonviolent alternatives of conflict.

我們會多麼成功地以非暴力衝突的形式來取代暴力的方式，而因此會大幅度地降低對軍事與其他暴力手段的倚賴，在很大程度上，會由我們可以發展與運用在衝突中有效之非暴力替代方法的範圍與程度而定。

The unavoidable question is whether we are now going to attempt to refine this technique and adapt and adopt it for use in conflicts to challenge, replace, and remove extreme expressions of violence by effective and powerful action.

不可避免的問題是，我們是否現在就要嘗試精煉這種技術並且適應而且採用它，以有效而且有力的行動，用於衝突中來挑戰、更換及驅逐極端暴力的壓迫。

The Importance of  
Strategic Planning in Nonviolent Struggle  
非暴力抗爭中  
戰略規劃的重要性

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The use of strategy is best known in military conflict. For centuries military officers have engaged in strategic planning for military campaigns, and important thinkers such as Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Liddell Hart have analyzed and refined military strategy. In conventional military warfare and in guerrilla warfare, the use of sophisticated strategy is a basic requirement for effectiveness.

戰略的運用在軍事衝突中是眾所周知的。數世紀以來軍官們曾經從事軍事戰役的戰略規劃，而且重要的思想家如孫子、克勞塞維茲(Clawsewitz)與利德爾哈特(Liddell Hart)曾經分析並且精煉軍事的戰略。在傳統的軍事戰爭及游擊戰爭中，使用精細複雜的戰略是達到有效性的基本要求。

Just as effective military struggle requires wise strategies, planning, and implementation, nonviolent action will be most effective when it also operates on the basis of sound strategic planning. The formulation and

adoption of wise strategies can greatly increase the power of nonviolent struggle.

正如同有效之軍事抗爭需要有睿智的戰略、計畫與執行一樣，非暴力的行動也會在根據紮實之戰略規劃的基礎操作時，變得最為有效。睿智之戰略的擬定與採用可以大幅度增加非暴力抗爭的威力。

## The importance of strategy 戰略的重要性

If one wishes to accomplish something, the chances of achieving that goal will be greatest if one uses one's available resources and leverage to maximum effectiveness. That means having a strategic plan that is designed to move from the present (in which the goal is not achieved) to the future (in which it is achieved). Strategy pertains to charting the course of action that makes it most likely to get from the present to a desired situation in the future.

如果一個人希望完成某些目標，就是當一個人可以使用這個人可以得到之資源並且可以操作到最大之效力的時候，達到那個目標的機會就將會是最大的。這就是說要設計一個由目前狀況(目標沒被達到)邁向未來(目標已完成)的戰略規劃。戰略包涵描繪行動的過程，這些行動可以讓目前的狀況朝向一個期待之未來的情勢前進。



For example, if one wants to travel from one place to another, one needs to plan in advance how to do so. Will one walk? Take a train? Drive a car? Fly? Even then the plan is far from complete. Does one have the money to pay for the cost of the trip and other expenses? If the trip is a long one, where will one sleep and eat? Are travel documents, passports, or visas required, and if so how will one obtain them? Are there matters to be arranged to cover one's absence during the trip?

例如，如果一個人想要從一個地方旅行到另一個地方，他就必須要事前規劃如何做。用走的嗎？搭乘火車嗎？駕駛汽車嗎？搭飛機嗎？儘管此時這個規劃離完整還遠。這個人有錢支付旅行的費用與其他的開銷嗎？如果這次旅行是長途旅行，他將在這裡吃與住？需要旅行的文件、護照，還有簽證嗎？如果是，它將如何取得這些？旅行期間他不在的時候，需要替他安排處理一些事務嗎？

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This type of thinking and planning which some individuals undertake for ordinary purposes in daily life, should be undertaken by leaders of social and political movements. Unfortunately however, strategic planning is rarely given the attention it deserves with such movements.

這種思考與規劃的方式，對某些人來說，日常生活中

爲了普通的目的而使用的，應該讓社會與政治運動的領導者加以運用。不過令人遺憾的，戰略規劃很少得到這些運動給予它應有的關注。

Some people naively think that if they simply assert their goal strongly and firmly enough, long enough, it will somehow come to pass. Others assume that if they remain true to their principles and ideals and witness to them in the face of adversity, then they are doing all they can to help to achieve them. Assertion of desirable goals and remaining loyal to ideals are admirable, but are in themselves grossly inadequate to change the status quo and bring into being designated goals.

有一些人天真地認爲如果他們僅僅主張他們的目標有足夠的力道與堅持、時間足夠長，不管如何它將會過關。另有一些人假設，如果他們面對逆境時保持他們對信仰與理想的忠貞及見證這樣的忠貞，那麼他們就正在爲了完成目標而做他們可以做得到的事情。確認期待的目標與保持對理想的忠誠是令人敬佩的，但光是這樣做，大體上還不足以改變現狀並且帶往事先設定的目標。

Of course seeking to change a society, or to prevent changes in a society, or to remove a foreign occupation, or to defend a society from attack, are all far more complicated tasks than planning a trip. Yet only rarely

do people seeking such objectives fully recognize the extreme importance of preparing a comprehensive strategic plan before they act.

當然想辦法要改變社會、或者在防止社會的改變、或者驅逐外國的佔領、或者保護社會免受攻擊，全部都遠比規劃一次旅行的工作複雜得多。然而卻只有極少數尋找這些目標的人充分認知到，在他們行動之前準備一個綜合性之戰略規劃的極端重要性。

Very often in social and political movements, the individuals and groups involved recognize that they need to plan how they are to act, but do so only on a very limited, short-term, or tactical, basis. They do not attempt to formulate a broader, longer-term, or strategic plan of action. They may not see it to be necessary. They may at the time be unable to think and analyze in those terms. Or, they may allow themselves to be repeatedly distracted from their larger goal by focusing continually on small issues, repeatedly responding to the opponents' initiatives, and acting feverishly on short-term activities. They may not allocate time and energy to planning a strategy, or exploring several alternative strategies, which could guide their overall efforts toward achieving their goal.

很常見地在社會與政治運動裡，涉入的個人與團體認知到，他們必須規劃如何行動，但是只在很小型而短期或者

戰術性的基礎上有這麼作。他們並沒有試圖爲了行動擬定一個更廣泛而長期的或者戰略性的規劃。他們可能不了解它的必要性。他們可能在那個時候沒有能力在那些方式之下去思考與分析。或者，他們可能讓他們自己反覆地連續集中於小的議題而偏離他們之更大目標的注意力，反覆地應付對手主動的出擊、在短期的活動上心急如焚地行動。他們可能沒有分配時間與精力來規劃戰略，或者探討許多替代方案的策略，這些替代方案可以引導他們整體的努力，以邁向完成他們的目標。

Sometimes, too, it must be admitted, people do not attempt to chart a strategy to achieve their goal, because deep down they do not really believe that achieving their goal is possible. They see themselves as weak, as helpless victims of overpowering forces, so the best they can do, they believe, is to assert and witness, or even die, in the faith that they are right. Consequently, they do not attempt to think and plan strategically to accomplish their objective.

有時候，也必須承認，人們並不想要繪製這個戰略來達到他們的目標，因爲他們的內心深處並不真正相信有可能實現他們的目標。他們把他們自己當作高壓力量的無助受害者，因此他們相信他們能夠做得到最好的，就是主張與見證，或者甚至保持他們是正確的信仰一直到死爲止。由此可見，他們並沒有企圖以戰略性的思考與規劃來完成他們的目

標。

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The result of such failures to plan strategically is that the chances of success are drastically reduced, and at times eliminated, One's strength is dissipated. One's actions are ineffective. Sacrifices are wasted and one's cause is not well served, The failure to plan strategically is likely to result in the failure to achieve one's objectives.

沒有進行這種戰略性規劃的結果，會使成功的機會大幅度的降低，有時候會完全消失。人們的力量被消耗掉。人們的行動會毫無效果。犧牲被浪費掉而且人們的理念沒有受到尊重。沒有進行戰略性的規劃很可能導致無法完成人們的目標。

Without the formulation of a careful strategic plan of action:

沒有擬定一個詳細的行動戰略規劃：

- one's energy can be deflected to minor issues and applied ineffectively;
- 人們的能量會被偏向轉移到較小的議題並且不會被有效地使用；
- opportunities for advancing one's cause will go unutilized;

- 促進人們理念的機會沒有好好運用；
- the opponents' initiatives will determine the course of events;
- 對手的主動性將決定事件的走向；
- the weaknesses of one's own side will grow and have detrimental effects on the attempt to achieve the goal; and
- 人們自己這邊的弱點將會滋長並且對完成目標之企圖產生關鍵性的影響；及
- the efforts to reach the goal will have very little chance of being successful.
- 要達到目標的努力將會有很少的成功機會。

On the contrary the formulation and adoption of brilliant strategies increase the chances of success. Directed action in accordance with a strategic plan enables one to concentrate one's strengths and actions to move in a determined direction toward the desired goal. They can be focused to serve the main objectives and to aggravate the opponents' weaknesses. Casualties and other costs may be reduced and sacrifices may serve the main goal more effectively. The chances of the nonviolent campaign succeeding are increased.

反之，精明之戰略的擬定與採用會增加成功的機會。依據戰略規劃而受到指導之行動，能夠讓人們將力量與行動

集中往一個已經決定的方向前進，邁向渴望的目標。他們可以聚焦在實現主要的目標並且擴大對手的弱點。傷亡與其他的成本就有可能降低，而且付出的犧牲可以更有效地用來服務實現主要的目標。非暴力運動的成功機會就會增加。

## Formulating wise strategies 擬定睿智的戰略

The selection, or formulation, of a wise strategy requires:

選擇或者擬定一個睿智的戰略必須：

- an accurate sense of the whole context in which the struggle is to be waged;
- 對即將啓動之抗爭的整個背景有正確的認識；
- identification of the nature of the difference between where one is and where one wants to be;
- 辨認我方現在與我方期待之狀況兩者差異的本質；
- assessment of the impediments to achieving the goal and the factors that may facilitate the task;
- 評估完成目標所面對的障礙，以及可以促成達到這項任務的因素；
- assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of one's opponents, of ones own group, and of third parties which may assist or hinder the campaign;
- 評估對手陣營、我方陣營與可能協助或妨害運動之第

三者的優勢與弱點：

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- evaluation of the merits and limitations of several potential courses of action one might follow;
- 評估我方可能採用不同潛在行動路線的優點與限制；
- selection of a viable course among existing options or the charting of a completely new one; and
- 在現有的方案中選擇一條可行的路徑或者繪製一份全新的戰略；及
- identification of an overall plan of action which determines what smaller (tactical) plans and specific methods of action should be used in pursuit of the main goal. (i.e., what specific localized or shorter-term activities or steps should be taken to implement the overall strategic plan.)
- 確認一份全面整體的行動規劃，它決定要使用甚麼更小的(戰術上的)計畫與特定之方法來追求主要的目標。(亦即：應該採取甚麼特定局部或者更短期的活動或者步驟，以執行總體的戰略規劃。)

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自我解放戰略規劃指南  
— 延伸閱讀 ①

## Levels of planning and action 規劃與行動的層次

In developing a strategic plan one needs to understand that there are different levels of planning and



action. At the highest level is grand strategy. Then there is strategy itself, followed by tactics and methods.

在發展一個戰略計畫的過程中，必須瞭解規劃與行動的不同層次。最高的層次是總體大戰略。其次就是策略，隨後有戰術與方法。

“Grand strategy” is the overall conception which serves to coordinate and direct all appropriate and available resources (economic, human, moral, political, organizational, etc.) of the nation or other group to attain its objectives in a conflict.

「總體大戰略」是爲了要協調與指揮這個國家或者其他團體，所有適當的以及可以利用的資源(經濟上、人力上、道德上、政治上、組織上等等)的整體概念，以便在衝突中實現它的目標。

Grand strategy includes consideration of the rightness of the cause, assessment of other influences in the situation, and selection of the technique of action to be used (for example, nonviolent struggle, conventional politics, guerrilla warfare, or conventional warfare), how the objective will be achieved, and the long-term consequences.

總體大戰略包括理念之正當性的考慮、對情勢之其他影響的評估，以及欲使用之行動技術的選擇(例如，非暴力

抗爭、傳統的政治、游擊戰爭或者傳統戰爭)，如何達到目標與長期的後果。

Grand strategy sets the basic framework for the selection of more limited strategies for waging the struggle. This level of planning also includes the allocation of general tasks to particular groups and the distribution of resources to them for use in the struggle. Furthermore, it includes consideration of how the struggle itself relates to the achievement of the objectives for which the conflict is waged.

總體大戰略為啓動抗爭所需要選擇更小型之策略建立了基本架構。這個規劃的層次也包括給特殊團體分配一般任務，與提供他們在抗爭中所需要使用的資源。甚至，它包括思考抗爭本身如何與完成啓動這場衝突之目標的關聯性。

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“Strategy” is the conception of how best to achieve objectives in a conflict (violent or nonviolent). Strategy is concerned with whether, when, or how to fight, and how to achieve maximum effectiveness in order to gain certain ends. Strategy is the plan for the practical distribution, adaptation, and application of the available means to attain desired objectives.

「策略」是在一場(暴力的或者非暴力的)衝突中如何以

最好的方式完成目標的概念。策略關注在是否、何時或者如何作戰，以及爲了贏得某些目的而要如何獲得最大的效用。策略是爲了實際上的分配、調適以及可以使用之手段的應用，以實現預期目標的計畫。

Strategy may also include efforts to develop a strategic situation so advantageous that it may bring success without open struggle. Applied to the struggle itself, strategy is the basic idea of how the campaign shall develop, and how its separate components shall be fitted together most advantageously to achieve its objectives.

策略也可能包括發展有利的戰略性情勢，以致可以不用公開之抗爭而能帶來成功的努力。應用到抗爭它本身的時候，策略是如何發展運動的基本理念，與它的個別項目要如何作最有利的組合以達到它的目標。

Strategy involves consideration of the results likely to follow from particular actions; the development of a broad plan of actions; the skillful determination of the deployment of conflict groups in smaller actions; consideration of the requirements for success in the operation of the chosen technique; and making good use of success.

策略涉及由特別行動產生之可能結果的考慮；發展一個廣泛的行動計畫；在更小之行動中部署抗爭團體的熟練決定；考慮對已經選擇之技術操作的成功要件；及充分利用成

功的戰果。

Strategy operates within the scope of grand strategy. Tactics and methods of action are used to implement the strategy. To be most effective, the tactics and methods must be chosen and applied so that they really assist the application of the strategy and contribute to achieving the requirements for success.

策略在總體大戰略的範疇內運作。行動的戰術與方法用來實現這個策略。爲了讓它最有效，一定要如此選擇並且使用這些戰術與方法，以便它們真的能夠幫助這個策略的應用，並且有助於完成成功的必要條件。

In formulating strategy in nonviolent struggle, the following aspects are to be taken into account: one's own objectives, resources and strength; the opponents objectives, resources, and strength; the actual and possible roles of third parties; the opponents' various possible courses and means of action; one's own various possible courses and means of action (both offensive and defensive); the requirements for success with this technique, its dynamics of action, and its mechanisms of change.

在非暴力抗爭的戰略擬定中，有必要納入考慮下列的面向：我方自己的目標、資源與優勢；對手目標、資源與優

勢；第三者實際的與可能的角色；對手各種不同可能的行動過程與手段；我方自己各種不同可能的行動過程與手段(攻擊性與防禦性的)；運用這種技術達到成功的必要條件、行動的動態過程，以及達到改變的機制。

A “tactic” is a limited plan of action, based on a conception of how best to utilize the available means of fighting to achieve a restricted objective as part of the wider strategy. A tactic is concerned with a limited course of action which fits within the broad strategy, just as a strategy fits within the grand strategy. A particular tactic can only be understood as part of the overall strategy of a battle or a campaign.

「戰術」是行動的一個小型計畫，是基於如何利用戰鬥的手段以完成較大策略中一個小型目標的概念。戰術會顧慮到在廣泛的策略中妥當安排小型行動的過程，正如同一個策略要在總體大戰略的範圍內安排妥當一樣。一個特殊的戰術，只能被理解為一場戰鬥或者運動之整體策略的一部分。

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Tactics deal with how particular methods of action are applied, or how particular groups of combatants shall act in a specific situation. Tactics are applied for shorter periods of time than strategies, or in smaller areas (geographical, institutional, etc.), or by a more limited

number of people, or for more limited objectives, or in some combination of these.

戰術要處理如何應用特殊的行動方法，或者戰鬥的團體在特定的情境下如何採取行動。戰術應用的時間比策略的時間短，或者在較小的範圍內(地理的、機構性的等等)，或者更有限的人數參加行動，或者爲了更小型的目標，或者是這些項目的一些組合。

“Method” refers to the specific means of action within the technique of nonviolent struggle. These include dozens of particular forms of action, such as the many kinds of strikes, boycotts, political noncooperation and the like. (For a listing of 198 methods of nonviolent action that have been used in historical instances, see Appendix Two.)

「方法」是指在非暴力之抗爭技術內行動的具體手段。這些包括行動之數十種特殊的形式，例如許多罷工的形式、聯合抵制、政治不合作等等。(歷史上使用過非暴力行動的198種方法之實例列表，參閱附錄二。)

The development of a responsible and effective strategic plan for a nonviolent struggle depends upon the careful formulation and selection of grand strategy, strategies, tactics, and methods.

爲了非暴力抗爭而發展一個負責任與有效之戰略性計

畫，有賴於總體大戰略、策略、戰術與方法的細心擬定與選擇。


## Some key elements of nonviolent strategy 非暴力戰略的一些關鍵要素

There is no single strategy for the use of nonviolent struggle that is appropriate for all occasions. Indeed, the technique of nonviolent action makes possible the development of a variety of strategies for meeting various types of conflict situations. Additionally, nonviolent struggle may often need to be combined in a grand strategy with the use of other means of action.

運用非暴力抗爭的時候，並沒有一個單獨的戰略可以適用所有各種情勢。的確，非暴力行動之技術，讓爲了滿足不同的衝突情勢而發展許多不同的戰略變得有可能。除此之外，非暴力抗爭在總體大戰略之下，可能經常必須與其他的行動手段相結合。

This does not mean that nonviolent struggle is compatible with all other techniques of action. For example, the use of violence along with nonviolent struggle destroys various processes by which nonviolent struggle operates, and thereby contributes to its ineffectiveness at best and its collapse or defeat at worst.

這並不意味著非暴力抗爭與所有行動的其他技術是可




以相容的。例如，非暴力抗爭中使用暴力會破壞許多以非暴力抗爭操作的過程，因此最好的時候充其量會造成沒有效果，而在最壞的情形時會導致潰散或慘敗。

However, it is fairly obvious that such means as fact-finding, publicity, public education, appeals to the opponents, negotiations, and the like could beneficially in many situations be used in connection with the use of nonviolent struggle. These means are often used in connection with economic boycotts and labor strikes, for example.

不過，這是相當明顯的，這些手段例如事證蒐集、宣傳、公共教育、向對手呼籲、談判等等能夠有效地在很多情況下與非暴力抗爭連結來使用。例如，這些手段經常與經濟上的聯合抵制與勞動罷工聯合運作。

Essential to the planning of nonviolent struggle campaigns is a basic principle: Plan your struggle so that the success of the conflict becomes possible by reliance on yourselves alone. This was Charles Stewart Parnell's message to Irish peasants during a rent strike of 1879-1880 "rely on yourselves," and not on anyone else.

對非暴力抗爭運動之規劃很重要的一個基本原則：規劃你的抗爭時，要以單獨依靠自己就有可能讓抗爭可以成功為原則。這是查理斯斯圖爾特帕內爾(Charles Stewart






Parnell) , 在1879-1880年之拒付租金罷工對愛爾蘭農民所傳達的訊息，「依靠你們自己」而不是依靠在其他任何人身上。

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Assuming that a strong nonviolent struggle is planned and being waged, it is fine to seek limited and nonviolent assistance from others, but winning the struggle must depend on one's own group. Then, if no one else provides help, assuming that the strategic planning has been sound, one still has a chance to succeed. However, if the responsibility for success and failure has been given to others, when they do not come forward the struggle will fail. In any case, responsible external support is more likely to be forthcoming when a strong nonviolent struggle is being conducted by the aggrieved population, acting correctly as though success or failure will be determined by its efforts only.

假設已經規劃了一個強大的非暴力抗爭而且正在啓動，尋求其他人的小型與非暴力協助是可以接受的，但是要贏得抗爭必須依靠我方自己的團體。此時，如果沒有其他人提供幫忙，假設戰略性的規劃做得很紮實，我方仍然有成功的機會。不過，如果將成功與失敗的責任推給其他人，當他們沒有站出來的時候，抗爭必定失敗。無論如何，當一場強大的非暴力抗爭正由感到被迫害的人們來進行的時候，而且





正確地進行就像成功或失敗會單獨由自己的努力來決定的時候，有責任的外部支援才更有可能會出現。

The formulation of wise strategies and tactics for nonviolent struggles requires a thorough understanding of the dynamics and mechanisms of nonviolent struggle, such as is presented in *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. (See Appendix Three: For Further Reading.) It is necessary to be attentive to the development of those plans and actions that facilitate their operation and to reject those that, if implemented, would disrupt the very factors that can contribute to effectiveness.

擬定非暴力抗爭之睿智的戰略與戰術、需要對非暴力抗爭之動態情勢與機制有一個完整的了解，例如在《非暴力行動的政治》一書中提到的。(深入閱讀請見該書附錄三)有必要注意那些促進他們行動之計劃與行動的發展，而且要對那些如果加以執行，會對助長干擾有效性之因素的計畫與行動加以拒絕。

Attention will also be needed to such additional factors as psychological elements and morale, geographical and physical elements, timing, numbers and strength, the relation between the issue and the concentration of strength, maintenance of the initiative, and the choice of specific methods of action that can



contribute to achieving the objectives of the strategy and tactics.

有必要將注意力放在這些額外的因素，諸如心理要素與士氣、地理與物理實體要素、時機、數量與優勢、議題與力量集結的相關性、主動性的維持，與選擇能夠有助於完成戰略與戰術之目標的行動具體方法。

The importance of strategic planning for nonviolent struggle cannot be overemphasized. It is the key to making social and political movements more effective. It may not guarantee that a movement will achieve its objectives, but it will certainly make the possibility of success more likely.<sup>1</sup>

非暴力抗爭之戰略性規劃的重要性怎麼強調也不會過分。這是讓社會與政治運動變得更為有效的關鍵。它不可能保證一場運動都可以完成它的目標，但是它確定可以將成功的機會變得更有可能。<sup>1</sup>

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1 For guidance on how to plan strategies for future nonviolent struggles, see Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth Century Practice and Twenty-First Century Potential*. Forthcoming.

有關如何為未來之非暴力抗爭進行戰略規劃的指南，請參閱吉恩夏普著《啓動非暴力抗爭：20世紀的實例與21世紀的潛力》，出版中。

Steps in Strategic Planning For-  
nonviolent Struggles Against Repressive Regimes  
對抗壓迫政權之非暴力  
抗爭的戰略規劃步驟

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Nonviolent struggle is a technique for conducting conflicts by social, psychological, economic, and political methods of protest, noncooperation, and disruptive intervention.

非暴力抗爭是以社會、心理、經濟與政治之抗議、不合作及阻斷式的介入干預方法以指揮衝突之進行的一種技術。

It is a technique built on the social, economic, and political application of basic human stubbornness—the determination and ability to dissent, to refuse to cooperate, to defy and to disrupt. In other words, people may refuse to do things they are asked to do, and may do what they are forbidden to do.

它是一種建立於基本人類擇善固執而在社會上、經濟上與政治上的應用，這個擇善固執是表達不滿意、拒絕合作、反對權威與中斷擾亂的決心與能力。換句話說，人們可以拒絕做他們被要求做的事情，而且可以做他們被禁止做的

事情。

All governments rely on cooperation and obedience for their very existence. When people choose to withhold or withdraw that cooperation, governments are left without any pillars to support their weight.

所有政府的存在都倚賴於人們的合作與服從。當人民選擇對合作加以保留或撤回的時候，這些政府就失去了支撐他們重量的任何支柱。

Nonviolent struggle has been applied in various types of conflicts throughout human history to resist oppression, undermine dictatorships, oppose foreign occupations, defend detested minorities, and to expand freedom.

在整個人類的歷史上，非暴力抗爭曾經在不同類型之衝突中被使用來抵抗壓迫、破壞獨裁政權、反對外國的佔領、保護受欺負的少數族群，並且擴展自由。

Such struggles in the past have largely been the result of intuition, chance events, improvisation, and people acting without clearly identifying their objectives, or without understanding what was really required to achieve them.

過去這樣的抗爭有一大部分是直覺、機遇的事件、即興式創作的結果，而且是人民在沒有明顯確認他們目標的行

動，或者不瞭解需要用甚麼行動可以完成這樣的目標。

Some of these struggles displayed a degree of tactical (or short-term) planning, but very few operated under grand strategic plans for the development and conduct of the overall struggle.

這些抗爭其中有一些顯示出具有戰術上(或者短期)的規劃程度，但是非常少有抗爭是在爲了整體抗爭之發展與指揮的總體大戰略下進行運作。

Now, groups engaged in nonviolent struggle no longer need to re-invent the wheel. Through deeper understanding of this technique, the sharing of this knowledge, and the use of strategic, or long-term, planning, nonviolent struggle is becoming more effective.

現在這個時候，從事非暴力抗爭的團體不再需要爲了騎車而重新發明車輪。透過對這個技術的深入理解與使用戰略性的或者長期的規劃，非暴力的抗爭正變得更爲有效。

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## Elements of strategic planning 戰略規劃的要素

The following are some of the key elements requiring attention when planning a nonviolent struggle:

規劃一場非暴力之抗爭的時候，下列是必須注意的一

些關鍵要素：

### Phase I: Initial assessment and analysis

#### 第一階段：最初的評估與分析

- Examine the issues at stake as seen by both sides.
- 研究雙方所認知之涉及爭議的議題。
- Prepare an analysis of the cultural, political, and socio-economic systems present in the society or country, as well as the population distribution.
- 準備一份存在於社會或者國家之文化、政治與社會經濟體制與人口分佈的分析。
- Prepare a strategic estimate<sup>1</sup>, meaning: identify the strengths and weaknesses of both sides to the conflict. This includes identification of the sources of power for the contending sides and the institutions that serve as their pillars of support, an analysis of resources available to or controlled by each side, an examination of the degrees of dependency each side has on the other for meeting particular needs, and the relative struggle power of the two sides.

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1 This term and concept was introduced to *the field of strategic nonviolent action* by Robert Helvey.

這個名詞與觀念是由羅伯赫爾維(Robert Helvey)在《戰略性非暴力行動》一書中提出。

- 準備一份戰略性的估計<sup>1</sup>，用意在於：確認衝突中雙方的優勢與弱點。這個包括確認參與抗爭之雙方與機構的權力來源，這些是支撐他們的支柱。一份雙方各自掌握可以利用的或者可以控制的資源分析、一份雙方彼此互相依賴以滿足特殊需求的研究，以及雙方相對的抗爭力量。
- Identify which of the opponents' sources of power can be best targeted to be weakened or removed.
- 確認對手之權力來源中的哪些是要加以削弱或者移除的最好目標。
- Identify and examine the potential roles and attitudes of third parties to the conflict, including the “non-committed” population-at-large.
- 確認並且研究對衝突中第三者之潛在的角色與態度，包括「尚未承諾」的一般社會大眾。
- Identify other external factors affecting possible courses of action: geography, weather, climate, infrastructure, etc.
- 確認影響行動之可能過程的其他外部因素：地理、天氣、氣候、基礎設施等等。
- Identify what other kinds of pressures may lead to gaining the resisters objectives.
- 確認有什麼其他類型的施壓可能導致達到抵抗者的目標。
- Examine the above factors to identify whether



existing conditions are favorable or unfavorable to conducting a nonviolent struggle within a particular timeframe. Which of those conditions are “fixed,” which are variable, and which can be directly influenced by the actions of the resisters or their adversaries?

- 研究上述因素以確認現有的狀況，對在一個特別的期程內進行一次非暴力抗爭是有利還是不利。這些條件中的哪些是「固定的」，哪些是可變的，與哪些是會直接受到抵抗者行動的影響或對手的影響？

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## Phase II: Strategy development

### 第二階段：戰略的發展

- Develop a grand strategy for the overall conflict. Identify the objective of the struggle in clear, specific terms. Calculate in general terms how the nonviolent struggle should operate in order to achieve that objective. This is the broad, long-term, master concept for the conduct of the struggle, coordinating and directing all appropriate and available resources of the struggle group.
- 為整體衝突抗爭發展一份總體大戰略。以清楚而具體的用詞確認抗爭的目標。使用一般的詞彙計算要如何

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運作抗爭以達到那個目標。這是爲了抗爭的指揮、協調與引導抗爭團體，所有適當與可以運用之資源而做的一個廣泛而長期之主導概念。

- Can the primary objective of the conflict be achieved in a single all-out campaign? If so, plan how to do that. If not, the struggle will need to be deliberately phased to include more limited campaigns for secondary but important objectives.
- 有可能在一次單獨而傾巢而出之運動中完成衝突的主要目標嗎？如果是這樣的話，要計畫如何做到。如果不是，這個抗爭就必須特意地轉化作階段式而包括更小型之運動以追求次要的目標。
- Develop strategies for individual campaigns for more limited objectives to be obtained during the course of struggle. This is where the broad framework of the grand strategy becomes more detailed, to answer the who, what, where, when, and how in the planning of a particular campaign in the conflict.
- 發展個別運動的一些策略以便在抗爭的過程中可以實現一些更小型的目標。這個總體大戰略廣泛的架構就是在此處變成更爲詳細，以便回應抗爭之特殊運動規劃中的誰、什麼、何處、何時與如何。
- Select specific short-term tactics and individual methods of action that will implement the chosen

strategy. It is very important to select tactics and methods carefully within the framework of a particular strategic campaign, and only after one has developed a grand strategy. Nonviolent methods that can be selected include those of protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention. Some will work better than others in different situations, depending largely on the grand strategy and overall objective, the strategic estimate, and the objective of the individual campaign. Some methods will be more capable than others of restricting and severing the regime's sources of power.

- 欲執行選出的策略就要選擇行動之具體而短期的戰術與個別方法。在一個特殊策略性運動的架構中，而且只在我方已經發展一個總體大戰略之後，仔細選擇戰術與方法是非常重要的。可以選擇的非暴力方法包括抗議與說服、不合作及介入干預。在不同的情勢下，有一些方法會比其他的方法運作得好，這種情形大部分由總體大戰略及其整體目標、戰略性的估計與個別運動的目標而決定。就限制與中斷政權之權力來源的目的來看，一些方法會比其他的方法更有能力。
- Ensure that the adopted strategic plan is harmonious in its objective, types of pressures to be applied, and selected tactics and methods.
- 確保採用的策略性計畫在它的目標、施用壓力的類

型，及選擇戰術與方法上保持協調一致。

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### Phase III: Capacity building 第三階段：能力的建立

- Ensure that the selected strategies for the struggle are within the capacity of the population to implement. If they are not, deliberate efforts will be needed to strengthen the population's capacity. Or, the strategies will need to be modified.
- 確保爲了抗爭所選出的策略是在人們的執行能力之內。如果它們不是這樣，必須用心努力加強人們的能力。否則，這些策略就有必要加以修改。
- Strengthen organizations and institutions that are outside the opponents control, especially if the grand strategy calls for using these independent bodies during the struggle for applying noncooperation and defiance.
- 強化對手控制之外的組織與機構，特別是當總體大戰略在應用不合作與反權威的抗爭中號召運用這些獨立團體的時候。
- Plan for third-party assistance, but do not rely on it.
- 規劃獲得第三者協助的計畫，但是不要倚賴他們。

## Phase IV: Open struggle

### 第四階段：公開的抗爭

- Concentrate the resisters' strengths against the opponents' weaknesses to gain selected objectives according to the grand strategy, strategy, and selected methods, especially in restricting and severing the opponents' source's of power.
- 按照總體大戰略、策略與選擇的方法，將抵抗者的力量集中到對手的弱點以獲得設定的目標，特別是限制與切斷對手的權力來源。
- Ensure that the strategic plan is applied in a disciplined way without violence that will weaken the resistance.
- 確保戰略性的計畫以有紀律的方式來運用，不會使用會削弱抵抗運動力量的暴力。
- Ensure that the struggle activities help to empower the resisters.
- 確保抗爭的活動可以幫助提升抵抗者的權能。
- Ensure the resisters' access to critical resources.
- 確保抵抗者取得擁有重要資源的管道。
- Keep the opponents off-balance.
- 讓那些對手失去平衡。
- Defy the opponents' repression but stick to one's

own forms of struggle.

- 反抗這些對手的鎮壓，但是保持我方自己的抗爭形式。
- Act, rather than react. Maintain the initiative and momentum. The struggle should be conducted on the terms of the resistance group, not the opponents.
- 行動，而不是回應。保持主動性與動量。抗爭應該以抵抗運動團體的條件來進行，而不是那些對手的條件。
- Continuously re-assess and evaluate the conduct of the struggle according to the strategic plan.
- 依據戰略性的計畫持續重新評估並且考核抗爭的操作進展。

### Phase V: Conclusion of the conflict

#### 第五階段：衝突的結束

- Success, failure, or mixed results?
- 成功，失敗，還是混合性的結果嗎？
- Conduct a post-conflict assessment and plan for the future.
- 進行一次抗爭後的檢討並且規劃未來。

These are only elementary notes for the application  
of strategic nonviolent struggle.<sup>2</sup>

這些只是應用戰略性非暴力抗爭的基本要點。<sup>2</sup>

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2 For more detailed recommendations for strategic planning, see Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth Century Practice and Twenty-First Century Potential*. Forthcoming.

更詳細的戰略規畫的推薦讀物，參閱吉恩夏普著，《啟動非暴力抗爭：20 世紀的實例與21世紀的潛力》，出版中。

## Appendix One: Glossary of Important Terms in Nonviolent Struggle 附錄一：非暴力抗爭之重要詞彙總表

### P.31

#### **Accommodation**

A mechanism of change in nonviolent action in which the opponents resolve, while they still have a choice, to agree to a compromise and grant certain demands of the nonviolent resisters. Accommodation occurs when the opponents have neither changed their views nor been non-violently coerced, but have concluded that a compromise settlement is desirable.

#### **配合調處**

非暴力行動造成改變的一個機制，在其中這些對手仍然還保有一個選擇，決定同意妥協並授與非暴力抵抗者某些要求。當這些對手不會改變他們的觀點，也不會受到非暴力的強制脅迫，但是認為需要一個妥協的結局時，協調應付才會發生。

The accommodation may result from influences that, if continued, might have led to the conversion, nonviolent coercion, or disintegration of the opponents' system or regime.

這種配合調處可能由於影響造成的，如果持續下去，可能導致說服轉換、非暴力的強制脅迫或者對手體制或者政體的分支瓦解。

#### **Authority**

The quality that leads the judgments, decisions, recommendations, and orders of certain individuals and institutions to be accepted voluntarily as right and therefore to be implemented by others through obedience or cooperation. Authority is a main source of political power,



but is not identical with it.

### 合法性

導致判斷、決定、建議及會被某些個人與機構自願地認為是權利之命令的素質，因此會由其他人透過服從或合作的方式來完成執行。權威性是政治權力的一個主要來源，但不是完全等同於它。

### Boycott

Noncooperation, either socially, economically, or politically.

### 聯合抵制

可以是社會的、經濟的，或者政治的不合作。

### Civic abstention

A synonym for acts of political noncooperation.

### 公民棄權

政治不合作之行為的一個同義詞。

### Civic action

A synonym for nonviolent action conducted for political purposes.

### 公民行動

為了政治目的而進行之非暴力行動的同義詞。

### Civic defiance

Assertive acts of nonviolent protest, resistance or intervention conducted for political purposes.

### 公民反抗運動

為了政治目的而進行之非暴力抗議、抵抗或者介入干預的堅持行動。

### Civic resistance

A synonym for nonviolent resistance with a political objective.

## 公民抵抗運動

具有政治目的之非暴力抵抗運動的同義詞。

### Civic strike

An economic shut-down conducted for political reasons. Not only workers may go on strike, but importantly students, professionals, shopkeepers, white-collar workers (including government employees), and members of upper classes may participate.

### 公民罷市

為了政治的理由而進行的經濟罷市。不僅工人可能進行罷工，而且重要的是學生、專業人士、店家老闆、白領工人(包括政府員工)，而且上層社會階級的成員可能會參加。

### P.32

### Civil disobedience

A deliberate peaceful violation of particular laws, decrees, regulations, ordinances, military or police orders, and the like.

### 公民不服從

對特殊法律、法令、規章、行政命令、軍隊或者警察之命令等等的故意而和平的違抗。

These are usually laws that are regarded as inherently immoral, unjust, or tyrannical. Sometimes, however, laws of a largely regulatory or morally neutral character may be disobeyed as a symbol of opposition to wider policies of the government.

這些是通常被認為天生不道德、不公義或者是暴政的法律。不過，有時候，一些基本上具有規章上或者道德上中立性的法律可能不會被遵守，當作對政府更廣泛之政策的象徵性反對。

## Conversion

A change of viewpoint by the opponents against whom nonviolent action has been waged, such that they come to believe it is right to accept the objectives of the nonviolent group. This is one of four mechanisms of change in nonviolent action.

### 說服轉換

以啟動非暴力行動改變這些對手的觀點，讓他們最後決定接受非暴力團體的目標是正確的。這是非暴力行動之四個改變機制的一種。

## Disintegration

The fourth mechanism of change in nonviolent action, in which the opponents are not simply coerced, but their system or government is disintegrated and falls apart as a result of massive noncooperation and defiance. The sources of power are restricted or severed by the noncooperation to such an extreme degree that the opponents' system or government simply dissolves.

### 分支瓦解

非暴力行動的第四個改變機制，在其中這些對手不僅受到強制脅迫，而且他們的體制或者政府會在大規模的不合作與反抗之下分支瓦解而粉碎。透過不合作來限制或者切斷權力來源到一個極端的程度，以致於對手的體制或者政府只有消散無蹤一途。

## Economic shut-down

A suspension of the economic activities of a city area, or country on a sufficient scale to produce economic paralysis. The motives are usually political.

### 經濟霸市

停止一個城市地區或者國家的經濟活動，達到足夠的規模以造成經濟的癱瘓。這個動機通常是政治的。

This may be achieved with a general strike by workers while management, business, commercial institutions, and small shopkeepers close their establishments and halt their economic activities.

要達到這個目的可以透過工人的總罷工，而管理階層、生意、商業機構與小的店家關閉他們生意場所並且停止他們的經濟活動。

### **Freedom (political)**

A political condition that permits freedom of choice and action for individuals and also for individuals and groups to participate in the decisions and operation of the society and the political system.

#### **自由(政治的)**

一種政治上的條件，允許個人擁有選擇與行動的自由，以及個人與團體也可以參與社會與政治體制的決策與運作。

### **P.33**

### **Grand strategy**

The broadest conception of how an objective is to be attained in a conflict by a chosen course of action. The grand strategy serves to coordinate and direct all appropriate and available resources (human, political, economic, moral, etc.) of the group to attain its objectives in a conflict.

#### **總體大戰略**

以選擇一個行動的過程如何透過抗爭而完成一個衝突之目標的最廣泛概念。這個總體大戰略用來協調與導引這個團體所有適當而且可以使用的資源(人力的、政治的、經濟的、道德的等等)，以便在一次衝突中實現它的目標。

Several more limited strategies may be applied within a grand strategy to achieve particular objectives in subordinate phases of the

overall struggle.

在總體大戰略之下，於整體抗爭下之各個階段可以應用許多更小型的策略以達到特殊的目的。

### **Grievance group**

The general population group whose grievances are issues in the conflict, and are being championed by the nonviolent resisters.

#### **不滿的團體**

這個一般人民團體的不滿與痛苦是衝突中的議題，而且受到非暴力抵抗者的首要擁護。

### **Human resources**


A term that is used here to indicate the number of persons and groups who obey the ruler (meaning the ruling group in command of the state), cooperate with, or assist the ruling group in implementing their will. This includes the proportion of such persons and groups in the general population, and the extent, forms, and independence of their organizations.

#### **人力資源**

這個詞彙在這裡是指服從統治者(就是發號施令的統治集團)、與他們合作、幫助統治集團執行他們意志之人們與團體的數量。這個包括在整體人們之中這樣之個人與團體的比例，以及這些人之組織的程度、形式與獨立性。

A ruler's power is affected by the availability of these human resources, which constitute one of the sources of political power.

統治者的權力會受到這些人力資源之可以使用性的影響，這是組成政治權力的來源之一。



### **Material resources**

This is another source of political power. The term refers to property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, means of communication, and modes of transportation. The degree to which the ruler controls, or does not control, these helps to determine the extent or limits of the ruler's power.

#### **物質資源**

這是政治權力的另一個來源。這個詞彙是指財產、自然資源、財務資源、經濟體系、通信管道與運輸的模式。統治者控制，或者沒有控制這些資源的程度，幫忙決定統治者權力的範圍或者限制。

### **Mechanisms of change**

The processes by which change is achieved in successful cases of nonviolent struggle. The four mechanisms are conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration.

#### **改變的機制**




在非暴力抗爭的成功個案中達到改變的一些過程。這四個機制是說服轉換、配合調處、非暴力的強制脅迫與分支瓦解。

### **Methods**

The specific means of action within the technique of nonviolent action. Nearly two hundred specific methods have thus far been identified. They are classed under three main classes: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation (social, economic, and political), and nonviolent intervention.

#### **方法**

在非暴力行動技術內之行動的具體手段。到目前為止將近有200種具體的方法被辨認出來。他們被分為三種主要的類別：非暴力抗議與說服、不合作(社會的、經濟的與政治的)，以及非暴力的介入干預。



### Noncooperation

A large class of methods of nonviolent action that involve deliberate restriction, discontinuance, or withholding of social, economic, or political cooperation (or a combination of these) with a disapproved person, activity, institution, or regime.

#### 不合作

非暴力行動之方法的一個大類別，它涉及對不認同的個人、活動、機構或者政權施以故意的限制、中斷、或者保留社會的、經濟的、或者政治的合作(或者這些方式的組合)。

The methods of noncooperation are classified in the subcategories of social noncooperation, economic noncooperation (economic boycotts and labor strikes), and political noncooperation.


這些不合作的方法再分為社會不合作、經濟不合作(經濟聯合抵制與勞動罷工)，以及政治不合作的次類別。

### Nonviolence (religious or ethical)

Beliefs and behavior of several types in which violent acts are prohibited on religious or ethical grounds. In some belief systems, not only physical violence is barred but also hostile thoughts and words. Certain belief systems additionally enjoin positive attitudes and behavior toward opponents, or even a rejection of the concept of opponents.

#### 非暴力主義(宗教的或者倫理的)

基於宗教的或者倫理的立場，禁止暴力行動的信仰與許多不同形式的行為。在某一些信仰體系裡，不僅禁止肢體的暴力，而且也禁止有敵意的想法與語言。除此之外，某些信仰體系採取以正面的態度與行為對待對手，或者甚至拒絕有對手的這種概念。



Such believers often may participate in nonviolent struggles with people practicing nonviolent struggle for pragmatic reasons, or may choose not to do so.

這樣的信仰者經常可能為了務實的理由而參加由實踐非暴力抗爭之人民進行的非暴力抗爭，或者可以選擇不要如此做。

### **Nonviolent action**

A general technique of conducting protest, resistance, and intervention without physical violence.

#### **非暴力行動**



一種進行抗議、抵抗與介入干預而沒有肢體暴力的通用技術。

Such action may be conducted by (a) acts of omission — that is, the participants refuse to perform acts that they usually perform, are expected by custom to perform, or are required by law or regulation to perform; or (b) acts of commission — that is, the participants perform acts that they usually do not perform, are not expected by custom to perform, or are forbidden by law or regulation from performing; or (c) a combination of both.

這個行動之進行可以透過(1)不做為的行動——也就是參與者拒絕執行他們經常會執行、依照慣例要執行，或者依照法律或規定要執行的行動；或者(2)有做為的行動——就是，參加者執行他們通常不會執行、依照慣例不會執行，或者依照法律或者規章禁止執行的活動；或者(3)兩者的組合。

The technique includes a multitude of specific methods that are grouped into three main classes: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention.

這種技術包括許多特定的方法，可以分成三個主要的類別：非暴力的抗議與說服、不合作與非暴力的介入干預。





### **Nonviolent coercion**

A mechanism of change in nonviolent action in which demands are achieved against the will of the opponents because effective control of the situation has been taken away from them by widespread noncooperation and defiance. However, the opponents still remain in their official positions and the system has not yet disintegrated.

#### **非暴力的強制脅迫**

一個非暴力行動的改變機制，它達成對抗對手之意志的要求，因為透過廣泛的不合作與反抗，對手已經無法有效的控制情勢。不過，這些對手仍然保持在他們正式的權位上，而且體制還沒有被瓦解。

### **Nonviolent insurrection**

A popular political uprising against an established regime regarded as oppressive by use of massive noncooperation and defiance.

#### **非暴力的抗暴起義**

一個以群眾不合作與反抗運動，對抗一個既有而被認定是壓迫政權之常見的政治起義。

### **Nonviolent intervention**

A large class of methods of nonviolent action that in a conflict situation directly interfere by nonviolent means with the opponents' activities and operation of their system. These methods are distinguished from both symbolic protests and noncooperation. The disruptive intervention is most often physical (as in a sit-in) but may be psychological, social, economic, or political.

#### **非暴力的介入干預**

非暴力行動的一個大類別。它在衝突的情勢下以非暴力的手段，直接介入干預對手他們體制的活動與操作。這些方法有別於象徵性的抗議與

不合作兩種方式。中斷式的介入干預最經常的是肢體的(就像靜坐抗議)，但是可能是心理的、社會的、經濟的或者政治的。

### **Nonviolent protest and persuasion**

A large class of methods of nonviolent action that are symbolic acts expressing opposition opinions or attempting persuasion (as vigils, marches or picketing). These acts extend beyond verbal expressions of opinion but stop short of noncooperation (as a strike) and nonviolent intervention (as a sit-in).

#### **非暴力的抗議與說服**

非暴力行動的一個大類別。它是表示反對意見或者企圖說服的象徵性行動(就像守夜、遊行或者用糾察線圍住)。這些行動超越以文字表達意見的模式，但是還不到不合作(例如罷工)以及非暴力的介入干預(例如靜坐抗議)的地步。

### **Nonviolent struggle**

The waging of determined conflict by strong forms of nonviolent action, especially against determined and resourceful opponents who may respond with repression.

#### **非暴力抗爭**

以強烈形式的非暴力行動啟動已經決定的衝突，特別是對抗有可能以鎮壓做為反應而固執且有資源的對手。

### **Nonviolent weapons**

The specific methods of nonviolent action.

#### **非暴力武器**

非暴力行動的一些具體方法。

### **Pillars of support**

The institutions and sections of the society that supply the existing regime with the needed sources of power to maintain and expand its power capacity.

### 支撐的支柱

是指機構與社會的某些部門，他們對既有政權提供維持與擴展它權力能量所需要的權力來源。

Examples are the police, prisons, and military forces supplying sanctions, moral and religious leaders supplying authority (legitimacy), labor groups and business and investment groups supplying economic resources, and similarly with the other identified sources of political power.

例子是警察、監獄與軍隊提供制裁、道德與宗教領袖提供權威(合法性)、勞工團體與商業及投資團體提供經濟資源，與其他被確認之權力來源的類似方式。

### P.36

### Political defiance


The strategic application of nonviolent struggle in order to disintegrate a dictatorship and to replace it with a democratic system.

### 政治反抗運動

為了瓦解獨裁政權並且以民主體制取代它，所採取的非暴力抗爭之戰略性應用。

This resistance by noncooperation and defiance mobilizes the power of the oppressed population in order to restrict and cut off the sources of the dictatorships power. Those sources are provided by groups and institutions called “pillars of support”.

這個透過不合作與反抗之抵抗運動，動員受壓迫人民的力量以達到



限制及切斷獨裁政權的權力來源。由團體與機構提供的這些來源稱之為「支撐的支柱」。

When political defiance is used successfully, it can make a nation ungovernable by the current or any future dictatorship and therefore able to preserve a democratic system against possible new threats.

當政治反抗運動被成功地使用的時候，它可以讓現在的或者任何未來的獨裁政權沒有能力管理一個國家，因此就能夠保護民主體制以對抗可能的新威脅。



### Political jiu-jitsu

A special process that may operate during a nonviolent struggle to change power relationships. In political jiu-jitsu negative reactions to the opponents' violent repression against nonviolent resisters is turned to operate politically against the opponents, weakening their power position and strengthening that of the nonviolent resisters. This can operate only when violent repression is met with continued nonviolent defiance, not violence or surrender. The opponents' repression is then seen in the worst possible light.

#### 政治柔道術

在非暴力抗爭中可能操作以改變權力關係的一個特別過程。在政治柔道術內，利用對手以暴力壓制非暴力抵抗者所產生的負面反應、進行政治操作反制對手、削弱他們的權力地位，並且強化抵抗者的權力地位。這個過程只能在以暴力壓制對付持續之非暴力的反權威時才可以運用，而不必使用暴力或者投降。此時對手的鎮壓在最惡劣的時刻就可以被理解為一線曙光。

Resulting shifts of opinion are likely to occur among third parties, the general grievance group, and even the opponents' usual supporters. Those shifts may produce both withdrawal of support for the opponents



and increased support for the nonviolent resisters. The result may be widespread condemnation of the opponents, internal opposition among the opponents, and increased resistance. These changes can at times produce major shifts in power relationships in favor of the nonviolent struggle group.

造成意見的轉變可能發生在第三者、一般的不滿團體，而且甚至在對手經常的支持者當中。這些轉變可能同時撤回對手的支持度與增加對非暴力抵抗者的支持度。這個結果可能是對那些對手普遍的譴責、對手內部之間的反對，並且增長了抵抗運動。這些改變有時候會產生有利於非暴力抗爭團體之權力關係的主要轉變。

### P.37

Political jiu-jitsu does not operate in all cases of nonviolent struggle. When it is absent the shift of power relationships depends highly on the extent of noncooperation.

不是在所有非暴力抗爭的個案中都會運用政治柔道術。當不使用它時，權力關係的轉變就高度地依賴不合作的程度而決定。

### Political power

The totality of influences and pressures available for use to determine and implement official policies for a society. Political power may be wielded by the institutions of government or in opposition to the government by dissident groups and organizations, Political power may be directly applied in a conflict, or it may be held as a reserve capacity for possible later use.

### 政治權力

一個社會決定及執行正式政策之所有可以運用的影響力與壓力。政治權力可能由政府的機構或者反對政府的異議團體與組織所交叉組成。政治權力有可能直接在衝突中被加以使用，或者有可能被保留做為稍後要運

用的儲備能力。

### **Sanctions**

Punishments or reprisals, violent or nonviolent, imposed either because people have failed to act in the expected or desired manner or because people have acted in an unexpected or prohibited manner.

#### **制裁**

因為人們未能以受期待的或者預期想要的方式行動，或者因為人們已經以料想不到的或者被禁止的方式行動，而加諸於他們身上暴力的或者非暴力的處罰或者報復。

Nonviolent sanctions are less likely than violent ones to be simple reprisals for disobedience and are more likely to be intended to achieve a given objective. Sanctions are a source of political power.

非暴力的制裁不太可能比暴力的制裁只是對不服從的報復，而且更有可能是為了要達到一個既定目標的意圖。制裁是一種政治權力的來源。

### **Self-reliance**

The capacity to manage one's own affairs, make ones own judgments, and provide for oneself, one's group or organization, independence, self-determination, and self-sufficiency.

#### **自力更生**

管理自己個人事務、替自己做判斷、提供自己個人、自己的團體與組織之獨立性、自主決定與自給自足的能力。

### **Skills and knowledge**

A source of political power. The ruler's power is supported by the skills, knowledge and abilities that are provided by persons and groups in the society (human resources) and the relation of those available skills,

knowledge and abilities to the ruler's needs for them.

### 技能與知識

政治權力的一種來源。統治者的權力是由社會裡的個人與團體(人力資源)所提供的技能、知識與能力所支撐，以及統治者對這些技能、知識與能力資源之需求的關係。

### Sources of power

These are origins of political power. They include: authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources and sanctions. These derive from the society. Each of these sources is closely associated with and dependent upon the acceptance, cooperation, and obedience of the population and the society's institutions. With a strong supply of these sources the ruler will be powerful. As the supply is weakened or severed, the ruler's power will weaken or collapse.


### 權力的來源

這些是政治權力的根源。它們包括：權威性、人力資源、技能與知識、無形因素、物質資源與制裁。這些都衍生來自於社會。這些來源中的每一項都與人民與社會機構的接受度、合作與服從有密切的關係以及因此而決定的強度。如果有這些來源的強大供應，統治者就會強而有力。當這種供應被削弱或者被切斷時，統治者的權力就會被削弱或者崩潰。

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### Strategic nonviolent struggle

Nonviolent struggle that is applied according to a strategic plan that has been prepared on the basis of analysis of the conflict situation, the strengths and weaknesses of the contending groups, the nature, capacities, and requirements of the technique of nonviolent action, and especially strategic principles of that type of struggle. See also: grand strategy, strategy, tactics, and methods.



## 戰略性的非暴力抗爭

以分析衝突情勢、參與團體之優劣勢、非暴力行動技術之本質、能力與必要條件，特別是這個抗爭形態的戰略性原則為基礎而準備戰略規劃，依照這份戰略規劃而運用的非暴力抗爭，稱之為戰略性非暴力抗爭。也請參閱：總體大戰略、策略、戰術與方法。

### Strategy

A plan for the conduct of a major phase, or campaign, within a grand strategy for the overall conflict. A strategy is the basic idea of how the struggle of a specific campaign shall develop, and how its separate components shall be fitted together to contribute most advantageously to achieve its objectives.

### 策略

整體衝突之總體大戰略下，主要階段或者運動之行動方式的計畫。一個策略是一場特定運動之抗爭要如何發展的基本想法，及它的個別小型運動將如何搭配，以有助於形成最有利的情勢並完成運動的目標。

Strategy operates within the scope of the grand strategy. Tactics and specific methods of action are used in smaller scale operations to implement the strategy for a specific campaign.




策略在總體大戰略的範圍內進行運作。在更小型的運作中使用行動的戰術與具體方法以執行一場特定運動的策略。

### Strike

A deliberate restriction or suspension of work, usually temporarily, to put pressure on employers to achieve an economic objective or sometimes on the government in order to win a political objective.

### 罷工

故意對工作的限制或者停止，通常只是短暫的，對雇主施壓以完成





一個經濟的目標，或者有時對政府施壓以贏得政治目的。

### **Tactic**

A limited plan of action based on a conception of how, in a restricted phase of a conflict, to use effectively the available means of action to achieve a specific limited objective. Tactics are intended for use in implementing a wider strategy in a phase of the overall conflict.

#### **戰術**

一個行動的小型計畫。在一個有限的衝突階段，建立於如何利用行動可以使用的手段以達到一個特定而小型之目標的概念。戰術是為了要執行整體衝突中一個階段之更廣泛的策略。

### **Violence**


Physical violence against other human beings that inflicts injury or death, or threatens to inflict such violence, or any act dependent on such infliction or threat.

#### **暴力**

對其他人類施加肢體暴力以致於造成傷害或者死亡，或者威脅予以這樣的暴力，或者倚賴這種打擊或者威脅的任何行為。

Some types of religious or ethical nonviolence conceive of violence much more broadly. This narrower definition permits adherents to those beliefs to cooperate with persons and groups that are prepared on pragmatic grounds to practice nonviolent struggle.

有一些宗教或者倫理之非暴力類型對暴力有更廣泛的看法。這個比較狹窄的定義允許擁護那些信仰，以便與基於務實立場而實踐非暴力抗爭之人們與團體合作。



Appendix Two:  
198 Methods of Nonviolent Action  
附錄二：非暴力行動的198種方法

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The Methods of Nonviolent Protest and Persuasion  
非暴力的抗議與說服的方法

The following 198 methods of nonviolent action have all been used in historical instances of nonviolent struggle. Definitions of these methods and examples are provided in Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Part Two, *The Methods of Nonviolent Action*.<sup>1</sup>

下列198種非暴力行動的方法全部曾經被用於非暴力抗爭的歷史實例。這些方法與例子的定義可以在吉恩夏普所著《非暴力行動的政治》、第二冊《非暴力行動的方法》<sup>1</sup>找到。

**Formal statements**正式的聲明

1. Public speeches 公開講演
2. Letters of opposition or support  
表示反對或支持的信函
3. Declarations by organizations  
and institutions 組織與機構發表  
的宣言
4. Signed public statements 有簽名  
的公開聲明
5. Declarations of indictment and  
intention 起訴與意向宣言

6. Group or mass petitions 團體或  
群眾集體的請願


**Communications with a wider  
audience**向更多的公眾傳達信息

7. Slogans, caricature, and symbols  
口號、漫畫與象徵符號
8. Banners, posters, and displayed  
communications 橫幅、標語與張  
貼的宣傳品
9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books  
傳單、小冊子與書籍

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自我解放  
戰略規劃  
指南  
—  
延伸閱讀  
①

<sup>1</sup> Boston, Porter Sargent, 1973 and later edition.  
波士頓，波特薩金特出版社，1973及其後之版本。



10. Newspapers and Journals 報紙  
與期刊雜誌

11. Records, radio, and television  
唱片、廣播電台與電視台

12. Skywriting and earthwriting 天書  
(註：租用飛機在天空噴出煙霧  
寫成文字)與地書(註：在山坡或  
空地上書寫標語)

### Group representations 團體表達意願

13. Deputations 代表團

14. Mock awards 嘲笑式的頒獎

15. Group lobbying 集體遊說

16. Picketing 抗議糾察線

17. Mock elections 嘲笑式的選舉

### P.40

### Symbolic public acts 象徵性的公開行動

18. Display of flags and symbolic  
colors 展示旗幟與象徵性的顏色

19. Wearing of symbols 配戴符號  
標記

20. Prayer and worship 祈禱與禮拜

21. Delivering symbolic objects 傳  
送象徵式的物品

22. Protest disrobing 脫光衣服抗議

23. Destruction of own property 破  
壞自有財產

24. Symbolic Lights 象徵意義的燈

光

25. Displays of portraits 懸掛相片

26. Paint as protest 為抗議而繪畫

27. New signs and names 新的標語  
與名字

28. Symbolic sounds 象徵意義的聲  
音

29. Symbolic reclamations 象徵式  
的教化

30. Rude gestures 粗魯的姿態

### Pressures on individuals 對個人施壓

31. "Haunting" officials 「搜尋」官員

32. Taunting officials 辱罵嘲笑官員

33. Fraternalization 交友結盟

34. Vigils 燭光守夜

### Drama and music 戲劇與音樂

35. Humorous skits and pranks 幽  
默小品與惡作劇

36. Performance of plays and  
music 戲劇與音樂表演

37. Singing 唱歌

### Processions 各種遊行

38. Marches 排隊行進

39. Parades 遊行

40. Religious processions 宗教遊行

41. Pilgrimages 進香朝拜

42. Motorcades 摩托車隊

### P.41

**Honoring the dead** 尊崇逝者

43. Political mourning 政治性悼念  
 44. Mock funerals 嘲笑式的葬禮  
 45. Demonstrative funerals 示威性的葬禮  
 46. Homage at burial places 在墓地公開集會致敬

**Public assemblies** 公開集會

47. Assemblies of protest or support 表示抗議或支持的集會  
 48. Protest meetings 抗議性集會  
 49. Camouflaged meetings of protest 偽裝的抗議性集會  
 50. Teach-ins 大型上課抗議

**Withdrawal and renunciation**  
撤退與放棄

51. Walk-outs 退場  
 52. Silence 靜默  
 53. Renouncing honors 放棄榮譽  
 54. Turning one's back 轉身蔑視

**THE METHODS OF SOCIAL NONCOOPERATION****社會性不合作的方法****Ostracism of persons**  
對個人的排斥

55. Social boycott 社會性抵制  
 56. Selective social boycott 選擇性的社會抵制

57. Lysistratic nonaction 萊希斯脫拉塔式(Lysistratic)的不行動

58. Excommunication 開除教籍逐出教會

59. Interdict 禁制、停權

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**Noncooperation with social events, customs, and institutions**  
與社會活動、習俗及機構的不合作

60. Suspension of social and sports activities 暫停社交與體育活動  
 61. Boycott of social affairs 抵制社會事務  
 62. Student strike 學生罷課  
 63. Social disobedience 社會性的不服從  
 64. Withdrawal from social institutions 退出社會機構

**Withdrawal from the social system** 退出社會體系

65. Stay-at-home 呆在家裡  
 66. Total personal noncooperation 個人的全方位不合作  
 67. Flight of workers 工人出走  
 68. Sanctuary 避難所  
 69. Collective disappearance 集體失蹤  
 70. Protest emigration (hijrat) 抗議性的移民

**THE METHODS  
OF ECONOMIC  
NONCOOPERATION**

**經濟性不合作的方法**

**(1) ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS**

**經濟性抵制**

**Action by consumers**

**消費者的行動**

71. Consumers' boycott 消費者抵制

72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods 不消費被抵制商品

73. Policy of austerity 節儉政策

74. Rent withholding 拒交租金

75. Refusal to rent 拒絕租讓房屋

76. National consumers' boycott 全國性消費者抵制

77. International consumers' boycott 國際性消費者抵制

**Action by workers and producers**

**工人與生產者的行動**

78. Workmen's boycott 工人抵制

79. Producers' boycott 生產者抵制

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**Action by middlemen**

**中間人的行動**

80. Suppliers' and handlers' boycott 供貨商與中間商的抵制

**Action by owners and management**

**僱主與管理階層的行動**

81. Traders' boycott 貿易商的抵制

82. Refusal to let or sell property 拒絕出租或出售財產

83. Lockout 停業

84. Refusal of industrial assistance 拒絕工業援助

85. Merchants' "general strike" 商人的「集體罷市」

**Action by holders of financial resources** 擁有財金資源者的行動

86. Withdrawal of bank deposits 擠兌銀行存款

87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments 拒絕支付各種費用與規費

88. Refusal to pay debts or interest 拒絕支付欠款或利息

89. Severance of funds and credit 斷絕資金與信用貸款

90. Revenue refusal 拒受收益

91. Refusal of a government's money 拒絕政府的錢

**Action by governments**

**政府的行動**

92. Domestic embargo 國內禁運

93. Blacklisting of traders 貿易商黑名單

94. International sellers' embargo 國際性賣主禁運

95. International buyers' embargo  
國際性買主禁運

96. International trade embargo  
國際性貿易禁運

(2) THE STRIKE 罷工

**Symbolic strikes** 象徵性罷工

97. Protest strike 抗議性罷工

98. Quickie walkout (lightning  
strike) 閃電式罷工

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**Agricultural strikes** 農業罷工

99. Peasant strike 農民罷工

100. Farm workers' strike 農場工人  
罷工

**Strikes by special groups**  
特殊團體的罷工

101. Refusal or impressed labor  
拒絕強制性勞役

102. Prisoners' strike 監獄犯人罷工

103. Craft strike 手工藝業者罷工

104. Professional strike 專業人員罷  
工

**Ordinary industrial strikes**  
一般的工業罷工

105. Establishment strike 有名企業  
罷工

106. Industry strike 行業罷工

107. Sympathetic strike 同情性罷工

**Restricted strikes** 有限的罷工

108. Detailed strike 企業內部分行業  
工人罷工

109. Bumper strike 輪流罷工

110. Slowdown strike 消極怠工

111. Working-to-rule strike 「照章  
辦事」磨洋工

112. Reporting "sick" (sick-in) 請病假

113. Strike by resignation 以辭職罷  
工

114. Limited strike 有限罷工

115. Selective strike 選擇性罷工

**Multi-industry strikes** 多行業罷工

116. Generalized strike 多行業同步  
罷工

117. General strike 總罷工

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**Combinations of strikes and  
economic closures**

罷工與經濟性停業相結合

118. Hartal 聯合停業停工

119. Economic shutdown 停止經濟  
活動

**THE METHODS  
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NONCOOPERATION**  
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120. Withholding or withdrawal of

- allegiance放棄或撤回效忠
121. Refusal of public support拒絕提供公開的支持
122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance主張抵抗的文字與言論

**Citizens' noncooperation with government**公民對政府的不合作

123. Boycott of legislative bodies抵制立法機構
124. Boycott of elections抵制選舉
125. Boycott of government employment and positions抵制政府工作與職務
126. Boycott of government departments, agencies and other bodies抵制政府部門機構和其他組織
127. Withdrawal from government educational institutions退出政府教育機構
128. Boycott of government-supported organizations抵制政府支持的組織
129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents拒絕幫助執法人員
130. Removal of own signs and placemarks拆除屬於自己的標

牌與地標

131. Refusal to accept appointed officials拒絕接受被任命的官員
132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions拒絕解散現有的機構

**Citizens' alternatives to obedience**公民不服從的替代辦法

133. Reluctant and slow compliance消極的與緩慢的服從
134. Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision在沒有直接監督的情況下拒絕服從
135. Popular nonobedience公眾的不服從
136. Disguised disobedience隱蔽的不服從
137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse拒絕散會

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**Action by government personnel**  
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142. Selective refusal of assistance  
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143. Blocking of lines of command  
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阻攔

145. General administrative  
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149. Quasi-legal evasions and  
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150. Noncooperation by constituent  
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152. Delay and cancellation of  
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**THE METHODS  
OF NONVIOLENT  
INTERVENTION**

**非暴力干預的方法**

**Psychological intervention**  
心理干預

158. Self-exposure to the elements  
自我承受要求

159. The fast 禁食

(a) Fast of moral pressure 道德  
壓力的禁食



- (b)Hunger strike絕食
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- 160.Reverse trial反訴(變原告為被告)
- 161.Nonviolent harassment非暴力騷擾

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肢體的介入干預

- 162.Sit-in(在特定的建築物內)靜坐
- 163.Stand-in(在特定的建築物前)強行站立
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- 165.Wade-in(在特定的池塘)強行涉水
- 166.Mill-in(在特定的場所)強行逗留遊蕩
- 167.Pray-in強行祈禱
- 168.Nonviolent raids非暴力進襲
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- 171.Nonviolent interjection非暴力突然發聲
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- 社會性的介入干預
- 174.Establishing new social patterns建立新的社交模式
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- 176.Stall-in強行進住塞爆
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- 178.Guerrilla theater游擊劇場
- 179.Alternative social institutions建立取代性社會機構
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**Economic intervention**  
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- 181.Reverse strike倒罷工(無償工作)
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- 184.Defiance of blockades反抗封鎖禁運
- 185.Politically motivated counterfeiting為達成政治目的而印製偽鈔
- 186.Preclusive purchasing壟斷性購買
- 187.Seizure of assets沒收資產
- 188.Dumping傾銷








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| 189. Selective patronage 選擇性的<br>照顧                     | 194. Disclosing identities of secret<br>agents 暴露特務身分          |
| 190. Alternative markets 設立替代<br>性市場                    | 195. Seeking imprisonment 設法入<br>獄                             |
| 191. Alternative transportation<br>systems 建立替代性交通系統    | 196. Civil disobedience of “neutral”<br>laws 公民不服從「中立性」的<br>法律 |
| 192. Alternative economic institutions<br>成立替代性經濟機構     | 197. Work-on without collaboration<br>堅守崗位、拒絕與篡權者合作            |
| <b>Political intervention</b><br>政治性的介入干預               | 198. Dual sovereignty and parallel<br>government 雙重主權與平行<br>政府 |
| 193. Overloading of administrative<br>systems 使行政系統超越負荷 |  |

Without doubt, a large number of additional methods have already been used but have not been classified, and a multitude of additional methods will be invented in the future that have the characteristics of the three classes of methods: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention.

毫無疑問的，另外有許多方法曾經被使用了，但是沒有被分類，並且將來還會有眾多另外的方法會被發明而具有3種類型：非暴力的抗議與說服、不合作及非暴力介入干預的特性。

It must be clearly understood that the greatest effectiveness is possible when individual methods to be used are selected to implement the previously adopted strategy. It is necessary to know what kind of pressures are to be used before one chooses the precise forms of action that will best apply those pressures.

必須清楚地理解，當要使用的個別方法有所選擇以實現之前採取的策略時，要達到最大的效力才有可能。有必要在人們選擇行動的精準形式之前，知道要使用哪種壓力才會將這些壓力應用得最好。



美國紐約市中央公園的甘地塑像



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# 參、反政變

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# III

## The Anti-Coup

## The Anti-Coup 反政變

 P.1-59

Supporters of political democracy, human rights, and social justice have good reasons to be alarmed about coups d'état. These abrupt seizures of the state apparatus have occurred with great frequency in recent decades. Coups have overthrown established constitutional democratic systems of government, halted movements toward greater democracy, and have imposed brutal and oppressive regimes. Coups d'état are one of the main ways in which new dictatorships are established. Coups may also precipitate civil wars and international crises. Coups remain a major unsolved defense problem.

凡是支持政治民主、人權與社會正義的人都有充分的理由對軍事政變保持警覺。這類以突發方式來竊佔國家機器的作為在近數十年來層出不窮。政變推翻了既有憲政的民主政府體制、阻礙了民主的深化運動、建立了野蠻與暴虐的政權。軍事政變是建立新獨裁政權的主要方式之一。政變也可能帶來內戰與國際上的危機。政變仍然是防衛上一個還沒有得到解決的問題。

A coup d'état<sup>1</sup> is a rapid seizure of physical and political control of the state apparatus by illegal action of a conspiratorial group backed by the threat or use of violence. The members of the previous government are deposed against their will. Initially the coup group rapidly occupies the centers of command, decision-making, and administration, replacing the previous chief executive and top officials with persons (military or civilian) of their choice. Eventually they gain control of the whole state apparatus. Successful coups are usually completed quickly, at most within forty-eight hours.

軍事政變<sup>1</sup>是指一個陰謀集團以威脅或使用暴力的非法行動，快速地奪取國家機器實質上與政治上之控制的行爲。前朝政府的官員在被迫之下受到罷黜。開始的時候，政變集團迅速地佔據指揮、決策與行政中心，以他們自己所指定的人(軍人或平民)來取代原來的最高首長與政府高層，到最後他們取得整個國家機器的控制。成功的政變通常會快速地完成，最多不會超過四十八小時。

Coups d'état have taken place in dozens of countries in nearly every region of the world in recent decades, including in Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Liberia, Chile, Fiji, Greece, Libya,

1 The terms "coup d'état" and "putsch" are used synonymously in this paper.  
「軍事政變(coup d'état)」與「武力奪權(putsch)」兩個詞彙在本文中互為使用。



Laos, Guatemala, Argentina, Grenada, Poland, and the Soviet Union.

近數十年來，軍事政變發生在世界上數十個國家與幾乎每一個地區，包括泰國、緬甸、菲律賓、巴西、捷克斯拉夫、迦納、賴比瑞亞、智利、斐濟、希臘、利比亞、寮國、瓜地馬拉、阿根廷、格瑞納達、波蘭及蘇聯。


Coups have been very widespread in Africa in the post-colonial independent countries. The first of these was a military coup which ousted Kwame Nkrumah as President of Ghana in 1966. There were five coups in Thailand between 1951 and 1976, making the growth of democracy difficult. In Libya Muammar Khadafi took power as a result of a 1969 military coup. The Allende government in Chile was deposed by a military coup in 1973. The 1964 military coup in Brazil brought in a repressive military regime that ruled for years. In Guatemala the 1982 coup was followed by another coup which eventually placed retired General Rios Mott in charge. The 1981 declaration of emergency and installation of General Jaruzelski as president in Poland to repress the Solidarity independent labor union, as well as the failed hard-line coup attempt in the Soviet Union in August 1991, are among the best known examples in recent decades. Coups and coup attempts continue.



在非洲一些後殖民時期的獨立國家中，政變的發生非常普遍。當中的第一次就是1966年罷黜迦納總統克威姆恩克魯瑪(Kwame Nkrumah)的軍事政變；泰國在1951至1976年之間發生過五次政變，使民主的成長倍覺艱辛；在利比亞，墨阿馬卡達費(Muammar Khadaffi)於1969年以軍事政變取得政權；智利的艾倫德(Allende)政府在1973年被軍事政變所推翻；巴西1964年的軍事政變產生一個高壓的軍事政權，統治多年；在一次政變之後，瓜地馬拉在1982年的政變，終於讓原已退休的里歐斯摩特(Rios Mott)將軍再度掌權；波蘭在1981年宣布緊急狀態，任命賈魯爾柴爾斯基(Jarulzelski)將軍就職為總統來壓制獨立的「團結工聯」；還有蘇聯在1991年8月鷹派政變企圖的失敗等，都是近數十年來最為人知的例子。政變與政變的企圖仍在持續中。

Some writers have commented that coups d'état—not elections— “have been the most frequent means for changing governments” and that for postcolonial Africa “the military coup has, in effect, become the institutionalized method for changing governments....”<sup>2</sup>

2 See, for example, Rosemary H.T. O’Kane, *The Likelihood of Coups* (Aldershot, England etc.: Avebury, 1987), p. 1; Steven R. David, *Defending Third World Regimes from Coups d'état* (Lanham, Maryland etc.: University Press of America, 1985), p. 4; J. Craig Jenkins and Augustine J. Kposowa, “The Political Origins of African Military Coups: Ethnic Competition, Military Centrality, and the Struggle over the Postcolonial State,” in *International Studies Quarterly* (1992), Vol. 36, pp. 271-272; Steven R. David, *Third World Coups d'état and International Security* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), pp. 1-2; and Steven R. David, “The Superpower Competition for Influence in the Third World” in Samuel P. Huntington, Editor, *The Strategic Imperative:*



有些作家評論軍事政變——不是選舉——「是改變政府最常用的手段」而對後殖民的非洲來說，「軍事政變實質上已經成為用來改變政府的制度化手段……」<sup>2</sup>

It has been suggested that coups are now occurring with less frequency than previously, but also that this decline may be short-lived and that even when a coup has been avoided for many years a country may remain vulnerable.<sup>3</sup>

一般人認為，這個時候政變的發生已不如往年那樣頻繁了，但也認為這種衰退只是短暫的，而且認為即使許多年已經避開政變的國家還是很容易受到它的攻擊。<sup>3</sup>


Massive efforts and sums of money are regularly

*New Policies For American Security* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1982), p. 236. The quotations are respectively from O’Kane, *The Likelihood of Coups*, p. 1 and Jenkins and Kposowa, “The Political Origins of African Military Coups,” p. 271.

參閱，例如羅絲瑪莉歐凱恩(Rosemary H.T. O’Kane)著《政變的可能性》，(阿爾德夏特，英格蘭等：艾夫博立出版社，1987年)，第1頁；史蒂芬戴維德(Steven R. David)著《從政變防禦第三世界的政權》，(嵐黑姆，馬里蘭州等，美國大學，1985年)，第4頁；葛雷格傑金斯(J. Craig Jenkins)及歐葛絲丁凱波梭瓦(Augustine J. Kposowa)著《非洲軍事政變的政治根源：種族競爭、軍事集權與後殖民國家的抗爭》，國際研究季刊，1992年，第36期，第271-272頁；史蒂芬戴維德著《第三世界政變與國際安全》，(巴爾地摩與倫敦，約翰哈普金斯大學出版社，1987年)，第1-2頁；及史蒂芬戴維德著《超級強權對第三世界影響力的競爭》，發表於《戰略性的鐵則：美國國家安全的新政策》，山姆爾赫庭遜(Samuel P. Huntington)編輯，(劍橋，麻州，博齡格出版社，1982年)，第236頁。這些辭句分別引述自歐凱恩《政變的可能性》，第1頁，與傑金斯及凱波梭瓦《非洲軍事政變的政治根源》，第271頁。

3 David, *Third World Coups d’état and International Security*, pp. 153-154, and O’Kane, *The Likelihood of Coups*, p. 135.

戴維德，《第三世界的政變與國際安全》，第153-154頁，與歐凱恩，《政變的可能性》，第135頁。



devoted to prepare to resist foreign aggression. Yet, virtually nothing is done to prepare societies to deal with the defense problem of coups d'état, despite their frequency in world politics. Serious consideration of anti-coup defense is long overdue.

我們經常性地投入大量的努力與龐大的金錢準備抵禦外國的侵略。可是，儘管軍事政變在世界的政治舞台還是頻繁出現，實際上社會並沒有準備好應該如何防衛軍事政變的問題。對防衛反政變的嚴肅考量已經等待太久了。

## How coups operate 政變如何運作

Seizure of the actual political machinery of command and administration will often begin by action against top personnel of the previous government, and seizure of government buildings and offices, military and police headquarters, and control centers for communications and transportation. Coups normally operate very quickly, often within a few hours, and therefore secret conspiratorial planning is important.

要奪取指揮與行政管理的實質政治機器，通常都是先由反對前朝政府之高層官員的行動，以及佔領政府機關的大樓與辦公室、軍隊與警察的總部，及通訊與運輸的控管中心開始。政變的發動大致上都相當迅速，通常是在幾小時內，因此事前秘密的陰謀計畫就很重要。

Coups are most often conducted by a critical part of the military forces, acting alone or in alliance with political cliques, intelligence organizations (domestic or foreign), or police forces. Sometimes coups have been executive usurpations: an established head of state (president or prime minister, for example), falsely claiming an emergency, acts to suspend constitutional government and establish a dictatorship.<sup>4</sup> Sometimes coups have been led by a dictatorial political party, with or without its own paramilitary forces. Coups may also be initiated by a section of the ruling elite backed by other groups. If the coup is to succeed it is important that nonparticipants in the coup be supportive, remain passive, or be made ineffective. Because of its minority and conspiratorial nature, a coup is the opposite of a mass popular revolution. (although putschists may call their action a “revolution”)

政變最常由軍隊的關鍵部門來發動指揮、單獨行動或是與政治集團、情治組織(本國或外國)，或是警察部隊等結盟。有時候，政變是行政官員的叛變：現任的國家領袖(例如，總統或總理)誤導地宣布緊急狀態，採取中止憲政

4 Genuine emergency action by an executive that then quickly relinquishes such prerogatives and restores regular constitutional procedures do not constitute coups d'état. 真正的緊急狀態是由行政部門採取行動，然後很快地撤銷這種特權並且恢復沒有政變的憲政程序。

政府職權的行動，進而建立獨裁政權<sup>4</sup>。有時候，政變是由某一個獨裁政黨所領導，可能有也可能沒有使用他們所屬自己的軍事力量。政變也可能由某些其他團體支持的一些統治菁英所策動的。如果政變要獲得成功，未參與政變者的支持、或是保持消極的態度、或者被變得沒有效率，就很重要。因為以其少數及陰謀性的本質，政變與大型的群眾革命是對立相反的。(雖然，政變者可能也會將他們的行動稱之為「革命」)

The group initiating the coup usually intends to use the power of the section of the state which it already controls (or over which it expects at first to gain control) against the other sections in order to gain complete control of the state. Often the other sections readily capitulate. They may do this in face of perceived overwhelming forces supporting the coup. They may also capitulate because they do not strongly support the established government, have active sympathy for the putschists, or feel helpless, not knowing what else they can do.

發動政變的集團通常企圖利用國家裡面，已經受他們控制之部門 (或者是他們一開始預期所能掌控之部門) 的權力去對抗其他部門，以期達到對國家的完全控制。這些其他部門通常都會欣然地投降。他們會這麼做可能是因為覺得有壓倒性的勢力在支持政變，他們的投降也可能因為原本就不是那麼強烈地支持現有的政府、或是積極同情政變者、或是

不知自己能做些什麼而感到無助。

The usurpers normally intend to maintain order and to keep the bureaucracy, civil service, military forces, local government, and police intact (at least for the time being), but to bring them under their command. (The new government imposed by a military coup may be fully military, partially military, or fully civilian in personnel.) The combined power of the state under the usurpers can then if necessary be applied against the rest of the society to extend and consolidate the control of the whole country.

在一般情形下，篡位者都會想要維持秩序並且讓官僚體系、公務人員、軍隊、地方政府與警察(至少暫時在政變期內)維持不動，但要求在她們的指揮下運作(軍事政變建立的新政府人員可能是完全軍事的、部分軍事的或者完全平民的)。篡位者掌握之下國家的綜合權力，被用來打擊社會其餘的部門，以擴張並鞏固對全國的控制。

### When are coups likely to occur? 何時可能發生政變？

In some countries an internal coup is unthinkable, as in Norway and Switzerland, for example. Some conditions tend to impede coups. Where democratic constitutional procedures exist, are respected, and provide for peaceful institutionalized means to resolve internal conflicts, to

change governments, and to hold government officials accountable, a coup d'état will be less likely. If the groups capable of conducting a coup—as the army—believe in democratic processes and respect the limits that have been placed on their authority, they are unlikely to attempt a coup. They may instead exert self-restraint, believing that it would be wrong to stage a coup.

在某些國家，很難想像會有內部政變的發生，例如挪威與瑞士。某些特定的條件會有防止政變的趨勢。當民主憲政的程序存在、受到尊重，並且提供和平而制度化的方式來解決內部衝突、更換政府、追究政府官員責任的時候，政變發生的可能性就很低。假如某一些有策動政變能力的團體——例如軍隊——堅信民主程序並且尊重國家賦予他們職權的限制，他們就不太可能企圖發動政變。反而，他們會保持自制，並且相信發動政變是不對的。

The social structure of the society is also influential in determining whether a coup d'état is likely to happen. Where the civil, non-state, institutions of the society are strong and democratically controlled, and military institutions and anti-democratic political parties are in comparison weaker, a coup is not likely to occur.

一個社會的社會性結構，對於是否有可能發生軍事政變也具有決定性的影響。當社會上公民的、非官方的機構是健全的並且受到民主制約，而軍事機構與反民主的政黨相形

下較為弱勢時，政變就不可能發生了。

Where the society works together in relative harmony a coup is not likely. That situation, however, is rare and is not required to prevent a coup. If the internal problems are at least of limited severity and can be dealt with by institutionalized and other peaceful procedures, a coup is less likely. Or, if acute conflicts are present but are conducted nonviolently instead of by internal violence, the stage will not be set for a coup by a group that promises to end internal violence and to restore law and order. Where politicians seek to serve the society and avoid corruption, one “justification” for a coup will be removed.

各行各業分工合作而相對和諧的社會也不容易發生政變。不過，這種情形是很稀有的，而且也不是預防政變所必須的。如果內部的問題至少存在著小幅度有限的嚴重性，而且可以以制度化的方式或其他和平的程序去處理，政變也比較不可能發生。或者，如果社會已呈現出尖銳的衝突但能夠引導至以非暴力而不是以內部暴力的方式來解決，就不會為一個承諾結束內部暴力及恢復法律與秩序之團體打造政變的舞台空間。當政治人物想要替社會服務而且避免貪腐的時候，則政變的這一個「合理化說詞」就不能成立了。

On the other hand, when those conditions are not present, the society may be vulnerable to coups. The roots



of democratic political systems may be shallow or eroded. The government may be seen as illegitimate, and there may be widespread dissatisfaction with its performance. Perhaps it may be charged with incompetence, corruption, or indecisiveness in times of crisis. Confidence in the capacity of democratic procedures to remedy the situation may be widely lacking, and in some cases there may be no agreed procedures for succession of governments.

從另一方面來看，如果這些條件不成立，社會將可能容易受到政變的攻擊。民主政治體制的根基可能太淺薄或是遭到腐蝕，政府可能被視為不合法，人民對其表現也普遍性地感到不滿。也許政府可能會被指控為無能、腐敗，或在危機處理時優柔寡斷。可能廣泛地缺乏有能力以民主程序去應變這種狀況的信心，而且在某些情況上可能對於政府之繼承沒有共識的程序。

The civil non-state institutions of the society—voluntary institutions of many types, political parties, independent educational institutions, religious bodies, trade unions, and many other types—may be weak or nearly non-existent. Also, the general population may lack significant participation in the political system. Consequently, there would be no groups and institutions capable of opposing a seizure of the state apparatus.

社會的公民非政府機構——各種形式之自願性機構，

如政黨、獨立教育機構、宗教團體、工會與許多其他形式的機構——可能非常微弱或者幾近是不存在。同時，一般民衆缺乏參與重要性的政治體制。這樣的後果導致沒有任何團體與機構有能力去反對竊據國家機器的作爲。

The society may have very serious internal problems associated with violence. Serious social unrest, acute economic problems, sharp political conflicts, or internal violence and assassinations may make the major parts of the society willing to accept a new strong government which promises to act to “restore order” and to end the crisis.

這樣的社會可能會有非常嚴重與暴力相關的內部問題。嚴重的社會不安、尖銳的經濟問題、劇烈的政治衝突或內部暴力與暗殺事件等，會讓社會中的大多數人，有意願接受一個承諾可以恢復秩序與結束危機之新而強大的政府。

Unfavorable economic conditions, interacting with political factors, may make a society vulnerable to coups, and it has been argued that lack of diversification in exports and excessive dependency on a variable international market for exports can create conditions in which a coup is likely.<sup>5</sup>

在不受歡迎的經濟條件與政治因素交互影響下，可能使得社會變得容易受到政變攻擊。而且一般都強調，出口缺

乏多元化與出口過度依賴於一個變化多端的國際市場，可能創造可能發生政變的條件。<sup>5</sup>

At times, individuals, powerful groups, a dictatorial party, or a military clique may simply lust for power and domination—with or without the guise of noble objectives.<sup>6</sup>

有時候，不論是個人、有力的團體、一個獨裁的政黨或是軍中的一支派系都可能渴望獲得權力與支配權，而不管是否具有崇高的目標。<sup>6</sup>

Such conditions do not necessarily produce a coup, however. Even when conditions for a coup may be favorable and the potential putschists lack self-restraint, they may not make the attempt because it would likely fail. This propensity to failure may derive from several sources. Important sections of the military personnel, the police, and the civil servants, as well as lower levels of government, may be viewed as unsupportive of a

5 See O’Kane, *The Likelihood of Coups*, and for a contrasting view Jenkins and Kposowa, “The Political Origins of African Military Coups.”

參閱歐凱恩，《政變的可能性》，與相對的觀點，傑金斯及凱波梭瓦，《非洲政變的政治根源》。

6 For a discussion of six types of military coups in third world countries, classified according to motivations and effects, see Steven R. David, *Third World Coups d’état and International Security* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), pp. 13-16.

有關第三世界國家6種軍事政變類型的討論，依照動機與結果而分類，參閱史蒂芬戴維德，《第三世界軍事政變與國際安全》，(巴爾地摩與倫敦，約翰哈普金斯大學出版社，1987年)，第13-16頁。

coup and likely to resist the attempt. The independent institutions of the society may be inclined to oppose the coup and are strong enough to act powerfully against it.

不過，這些條件並不必然都會發生政變。即使當這些條件都有利於政變，而潛在的政變者本身也缺乏自制的時候，他們還是不一定會付諸行動，因為政變還是很可能會失敗。這種可能失敗的固有天性來自於一些根源，軍事人員、警察、公務人員、政府的基層人員等之重要部門可能被認為對政變不支持，並且很可能抵抗這樣的企圖。社會的獨立機構可能傾向於反對政變，並且可以強有力地採取行動對抗它。

The ability of these possible opponents of a coup to act powerfully against a coup attempt can significantly influence the decision of potential coup-makers about whether to make the attempt or not. If a society is likely to resist firmly an attempted takeover, a coup is less likely to occur.

政變之這些可能的反對者所具備可以強力對抗政變的能力，對潛在政變者的決策會有重大的影響，讓他們決定是否要進行政變。如果社會可以堅定地抵抗這樣佔領的企圖，則實際的政變就難以發生。

Those who attempt a coup must be able to assume that once they have seized power they will encounter

minimal resistance from the bureaucracy and the populace. In societies where the masses are politically mobilized, involved, and powerful, this assumption cannot be made.<sup>7</sup>

那些企圖發動政變的人必須能夠假設，一旦他們掌握到權力的時候，他們會遭遇到來自官僚體系及民間最少的抵抗。如果一個社會的群眾已經被政治性地動員、參與，並且是有力的，就不能做這種假設了。<sup>7</sup>

## Support for coups 支持政變的要素

The basic prerequisite of a coup is that the putschists' organizational and repressive forces are believed to be more powerful than the other institutions and forces of the society. In short, civil society is weaker than the military forces. Indeed, in many countries, the military forces have been in recent decades expanded to be by far the strongest institution of the whole society. These military forces have often been turned against the very society and population on which their existence has depended and which they were supposed to defend. Such a military coup is more likely if the soldiers are more loyal to their officers than they are to the democratic government.

<sup>7</sup> David, *Defending Third World Regimes from Coups d'état*, pp. 4-5.  
戴維德，《從軍事政變防衛第三世界政權》，第4-5頁。

政變基本的必要條件就是政變者要有相當把握，自己的組織與壓制力遠強於社會其他的機構與力量。簡言之，就是公民社會的力量比軍隊勢力還要微弱。的確，在許多國家中，他們的軍隊勢力在近數十年來擴張到目前為止變成整個社會最強大的機構。這些軍隊勢力，常被用來對付原本他們賴以存在與要保護的這個社會與民衆。如果這些士兵比較效忠於他們的長官而非民主的政府，則這樣就很容易發生如此的軍事政變。

If the coup is instead an executive usurpation (sometimes called a “self-coup”<sup>8</sup>), it is necessary that the combined governmental civil bodies and military forces assisting the takeover are more powerful than the civil institutions of the society. Instead, the coup may be one conducted by a disciplined political party with its own paramilitary forces. The party’s supporters may also at times operate from key ministries in a coalition government or with support from significant sections of the military and police. To succeed, that party must be more able to act than are other sections of the society which might oppose the take-over. In some situations, agents of a foreign government may assist internal political or military groups in carrying out a coup.

8 From the Spanish *autogolpe*, used to describe cases in Latin America in the early 1990s. 出自西班牙文的「*autogole*」，用來描述1990早期年代南美洲的政變個案。

如果這個政變是行政階層所發動的 (有時稱為自我政變<sup>8</sup>「self-coup」)，則由文人政府機關與軍隊勢力協助接收政權的組合，必須是比社會的民間機構更為有力。相反的，這個政變也有可能由一個有紀律的政黨以他們所屬的軍事力量領導。這個政黨的支持者也可能有時候負責聯合政府的主要部會，或者得到軍隊與警察重要部門的支持。為了獲得成功，該政黨必須比社會上可能反對這個奪權行動之其他機構更具有行動力。在某些情況下，一些外國政府的情報人員，也可能會協助內部政治或軍事的集團來完成政變。

In past coups, supporters of political freedom have often been silent and have passively submitted. This does not mean that when a coup attempt succeeds that the general population favored it. In many cases the population may be actually opposed, but does not know what to do. A civil war against the military forces and their allies—a war which democrats would certainly lose—has understandably inspired few. Believers in constitutional procedures and social justice have usually not known how else a coup backed by the military forces could be defeated.

在過去的政變中，政治自由的支持者時常保持沉默並且都是被動性地屈服。但這並不意味著政變企圖的成功就是表示一般民衆認同它。在許多案例中，民衆可能實際上是反對的，但卻不知道應該要怎麼做。以內戰的形式來對抗軍隊

勢力及其同伙——這是一場民主人士必然會輸的戰爭——很容易理解它並不會帶給大家多少鼓舞。憲政程序與社會正義的信仰者，通常都不知道該如何去擊敗一個有軍隊勢力做為後盾的政變。

Without serious preparations for an anti-coup defense, a lasting democratic system is very doubtful in many countries, especially in those with a history of coups. Even in countries that have achieved a relatively democratic political situation, anti-coup measures are important despite public statements of innocent intentions by those individuals and groups that are capable of conducting a coup.

缺乏一套嚴格之反政變的防衛準備而卻想要維繫持久的民主體制，這在許多國家是很受人質疑的，特別是那些曾經有過政變歷史的國家。即使是在那些已經達到相對民主政治狀態的國家來說，反政變的手段還是很重要的，儘管那些有能力發動政變之個人與集團，對群眾所作的公開宣示是多麼天真的企圖。

### Attempts to prevent coups 預防政變的做法

Obviously it is better to have prevented coup attempts from occurring than it is to have to defend against them. One important issue therefore is how coups can be



prevented and blocked.

顯然的，能夠預防政變企圖的發生要比發生政變再來防衛對抗它來得好。因此，如何預防及阻擋政變就成爲一項重要的課題。

In many constitutional democracies it has been assumed that if the constitution and the laws prohibit coups d'état, then the democracy is safe. That is demonstrably not true, as too many countries have discovered to their peril. Democracies with constitutional provisions or laws against attempts to seize control of the state by coups have themselves been victims of coups. Such legal prohibitions should exist, but many times they have failed to block coups. Coups are in fact always conducted by groups which are quite willing to violate constitutional and legal barriers to their intended actions. This does not mean that such constitutional and legal provisions are not useful, but that they are insufficient. Means of enforcing them are clearly needed.

在許多憲政民主體制中，一般都假設只要憲法與法律有明文禁止軍事政變，民主體制就得以保全。但從許多國家所經歷過的危險，就可以看出來這樣的論述並不正確。以憲法條款或法律反對以政變的方式來奪佔國家的民主體制，它們自己卻都曾經是政變的受害者。這些法律上的明文禁止應該存在，但許多時候它們是沒有能力阻擋政變的。事實上，

政變總是由那些很有意願去違反憲政上與法律上的設限來符合他們企圖的行動。這並不意味著這些憲法與法律的條款完全沒有用處，但是光這樣是不夠的。強制執行這些條款的手段很清楚地是有必要的。

Persons and groups willing to push aside or murder executive officials in order to install themselves as rulers find no problem in violating existing constitutional or legal barriers to their action. Military groups determined to “save the nation” or to establish their own dominance will not be seriously impeded by a legal barrier. Disciplined political parties that see themselves to be the saviors of the people and the makers of a future ideal society may respect no barriers to their taking state power in order to implement their mission.

這些願意罷黜或謀殺行政官員以便將他們自己任命為合法統治者的個人與團體，並不會在他們政變的行動中對打破既有之憲政與法律的設限覺得有任何困難。軍事集團決定要「拯救國家」或者要建立他們自己的統治，就不會受到法律障礙的阻撓。受過訓練的政黨會視他們自己為人民的解救者與未來理想社會的創建者，可能為了奪取國家的權力以便執行他們的任務，而不會遵守這些法律上的設限。

Efforts to remove justifiable grievances in the society are also needed, but they too are insufficient. Such

grievances may genuinely motivate potential putschists or may be merely excuses for a coup which is attempted for less honorable motives.

努力要消除社會上具有正當性的不滿情緒也是必須的，但這些還是不足夠的，這些不滿可能真實地反映出武力政變的動機，或者可能只是爲了不是那麼高尚理由之政變企圖的藉口。

International condemnation and sanctions are also unlikely to deter determined putschists.<sup>9</sup> It is naive to expect that international influences will be able to prevent, or unseat, an internal take-over. At best they

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9 This is not to deny that in some circumstances foreign intervention may block or even overturn a coup, especially where an overwhelming military invasion is possible, as in the United States' action in Grenada in 1983. The point is that these cases are exceptions and those means are not dependable. If they are used, they take control of the situation away from the local population.

It could be very easy to underestimate the difficulties that would face the United States, or any future superstate, that adopted a policy of threatening or applying military intervention to block coups d'état generally. Steven R. David has pointed to these: "The difficulties inherent in protecting regimes from the consequences of large-scale military threats pale in comparison to the problems involved in devising strategies for the protection of leaderships from indigenously created coups d'état." (David, "The Superpower Competition for Influence in the Third World," p. 242.)

這不是否認在某些情況下，外國的介入干涉可能阻擋或者甚至推翻一場政變，特別是有絕對優勢的軍事介入的時候，就像美國於1983年在格納達(Granada)的行動一樣。重點是，這些是例外的個案，而且那些手段並不可靠。當它們被運用的時候，它們將當地民衆對情況的控制拿走了。

很容易低估美國或任何未來的強國，在採取以威脅或使用軍事介入來阻擋軍事政變，做為一般性的政策時所面對的困難。史蒂芬戴維德對此曾經指出：「以大規模軍事威脅的結果來保護執政當局所附帶的困難，與要在精心安排之軍事政變中設計保護領導階層之策略所涉及的困難相比，是微不足道的。」(戴維德，《強權對第三世界影響力的競爭》，第242頁。)

may support a strong indigenous capacity to block attempted usurpations. At other times, certain international influences may support the coup, or even be a main force in its instigation, as for example has the United States government been in several cases.

國際的譴責或制裁未必能夠嚇阻已經下定決心的軍事政變者<sup>9</sup>，期待以國際的影響力就可以預防或者推翻一場國內的奪權，是天真的想法，頂多他們只能夠支持那些有足夠能力去阻撓企圖政變的勢力者。在其他的情況，某些國際的影響力可能是支持政變的或者甚至成為煽動政變的力量，在許多個案中美國政府就是這樣的例子。

Obviously, then, something more is required: strong barriers to coups d'état. This essay will argue that these barriers can be erected within the country by a prepared anti-coup defense policy. This policy would not only have the potential of defeating coups. It could also serve as a potential deterrent to these attacks, rooted in the capacity for effective defense.

因此，顯然地還需要有更多的東西：軍事政變的堅固屏障。本文主張這些屏障可以在一個國家內建立在一套完整的反政變防衛政策上面。這個政策不僅擁有擊敗政變的潛力，而且能夠潛在地嚇阻這些攻擊，並扎根在有效的防衛能力上。

Because coups have so often been successful, populations are often unlikely to think that effective anti-coup barriers can be erected. The confusion and sense of powerlessness which often accompany coups have been aggravated by the population's absence of planning, preparations, and training to block coups. When the coup is commonly backed by the military forces, the supposed defenders of the society, against which there can be no military power applied, the anguish and despair of the population increases.

因為這些政變時常成功，民衆時常不會認為可以建立有效的反政變屏障。伴隨政變而來的混淆與無力感，都因為民衆對阻擋政變沒有參與事前之規劃、準備與訓練而被擴大。當一場政變通常有軍隊做後盾時，社會預期的防衛者會因為沒有軍事力量可以使用來對抗政變，而增加民衆的痛苦與沮喪。

### Coups have been defeated 被擊退的政變

The problem of how to block coups d'état would seem insoluble, except for the important fact that sometimes coups have been defeated. Despite often disadvantageous conditions, civilians have at times been able to block illegal seizures of state power. These cases have been remarkable.

對於如何阻擋軍事政變的問題看來似乎無法解決，除了有一個重要的事實，那就是有時候政變曾經被擊敗過。儘管時常處於不利的條件下，平民有時候也有能力去阻擋非法奪佔國家權力的行爲。這些個案都是很著名的案例。


Sometimes coups fail because noncooperation and defiance break the intended link between physical control of government facilities, and the political control of the state. Civil servants, bureaucrats, military groupings, and other state employees at times steadfastly refused to cooperate with putschists, denying control of the state apparatus. Coups have also been imperiled by severance of the link between control of the central state machinery and control of the society—including independent social institutions, local governments, and the population as a whole. Putschists have often narrowly assumed that dominance of state structures equals political and social control. However, without the submission of all these sections of the society the coup leadership cannot become a lasting government.

有時候政變的失敗是因為在政府機構「實質」掌控與國家的「政治」控制之間，預期的連結被不合作與反威權行動打斷了。公務人員、官僚、軍方及其他政府員工有時候堅定地拒絕與政變者合作，否定他們對國家機器的控制。政變也會因為中央國家機器與社會之控制——包括獨立的社會機

關、地方政府與整體民衆——之間的聯繫被切斷而瀕臨危險狀態。政變者常會狹隘地假設國家結構的支配就等同於取得政治與社會的控制。不過，缺乏社會上所有這些機構的歸順，政變的領導階層不會變成能夠持久的政府。

The defeat of the attempted hard-line take-over in the former Soviet Union in August 1991 is one relatively recent case of mass noncooperation against a coup. Prominent earlier cases of successful anti-coup defense occurred in Germany in 1920 against the Kapp Putsch (which threatened the new Weimar Republic) and in France in 1961 against the Algiers generals' revolt (which aimed to keep Algeria French by ousting the de Gaulle-Debré government). In these three cases, and a few others, the coups were blocked by internal nonviolent resistance. Only occasionally, as during the 1991 coup in the Soviet Union, has serious supportive international diplomatic and economic action been threatened or taken.

發生在前蘇聯1991年8月強硬派企圖奪取政權的失敗，就是民衆以不合作的方式對抗政變相對比較近期的例子。更早一些顯著的反政變防衛案例發生在1920年的德國，對抗卡普(Kapp)的政變(此政變威脅到新的威瑪共和，Weimar Republic)，與法國在1961年對抗阿爾及爾將領的叛變(此政變目的在驅逐戴高樂政府以維持法屬阿爾及利亞的地位)。在這三個案例及一些其他的個案中，政變都是受到內部的不




合作抵抗而受到阻擋。只有偶而，像是在1991年蘇聯的政變中，有受到威脅或已經採取國際外交與經濟行動之重要支持的影響。

## Germany 1920<sup>10</sup> 1920年德國的個案<sup>10</sup>

On 12 March 1920, unofficial Freikorps units of ex-soldiers and civilians occupied Berlin in a coup against the Weimar Republic organized by Dr. Wolfgang Kapp and Lieutenant-General Walter von Lüttwitz. The coup aimed to establish an authoritarian regime of “experts”. The small German army remained “neutral.” The legal democratic

10 This account as based on Wilfred Harris Crook, *The General Strike* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1931), pp. 496-527; Donald Goodspeed, *The Conspirators* (New York: Viking, 1962), pp. 108-188; Erich Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 129-160; Karl Raloff (pseudo.: Karl Ehrlich), “Den Ikkevoldelige Modatand: den Kvalte Kapp-Kupet,” in K. Ehrlich, N. Lindberg, and G. Jacobsen, editors, *Kamp Uden Vaaben* (Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard, Einar Munksgaard, 1937), pp. 194-213; and John Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1953), pp. 63-82. See also Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 40-41 and 79-81.

這是依據威爾弗列德哈里斯柯魯克(Wilfred Harris Crook)的記載，《總罷工》，(教堂嶺，北卡州，北卡大學出版社，1931年)，第496-527頁；唐納谷德史匹德(Donald Goodspeed)，《陰謀者》，(紐約，維京書局，1962年)，第108-188頁；艾力克艾席克(Erich Eyck)，《威瑪共和之歷史》，(劍橋，麻州，哈佛大學出版社，1962年)，第1卷，第129-160頁；卡爾羅洛夫(Karl Raloff，筆名卡爾艾爾立奇Karl Ehrlich)，《非暴力抗爭：勒死卡普政變》於卡爾艾爾立奇(K. Ehrlich)、林德賈(N. Lindberg)及傑柯伯遜(G. Jacobsen)編，*Kamp Uden Vaaben*，(哥本哈根：Levin & Munksgaard, Einar Munksgaard, 1937年)，第194-213頁；及約翰威勒博雷特(John Wheeler-Bennett)，《權力的報應》，(紐約：聖馬丁出版社，1953年)，第63-82頁。另參閱吉恩夏普，《非暴力行動的政治》，(波士頓，波特薩金特出版社，1973年)，第40-41頁及第79-81頁。





government under President Friedrich Ebert fled. Though not well prepared, the coup might well have succeeded had there been no resistance.

1920年3月12日，由沃爾夫岡卡普(Wolfgang Kapp)博士與沃特馮路特維茲(Walter von Lüttwitz)中將把退役士兵及平民組成非正式之「自由兵團」(Freikorps)聯盟，以政變的方式佔據柏林來對抗威瑪共和，政變之目的是要建立一個「專家的」威權體制政權。為數不多的德國陸軍維持「中立」的立場，由弗里德里奇艾伯特 (Friedrich Ebert)總統領導的合法民主政府被迫逃亡，雖然政變不是準備得很周全，但政變也可能因為沒有遭受抵抗而獲得成功。

The legal government proclaimed that all citizens should obey only it, and that the provinces should refuse all cooperation with the Kapp group. After a workers' strike against the coup broke out in Berlin, a proclamation calling for a general strike was issued under the names of President Ebert and Social Democratic ministers— though without their official approval.

合法的政府宣告所有的公民都應該只服從原來的政府，而且各省也要拒絕與卡普集團合作。在柏林爆發工人罷工對抗政變後，以艾伯特總統及社會民主黨部長們之名義(雖然沒有他們正式的同意)號召了一場總罷工。

The Kappists were quickly met with large-scale

noncooperation by civil servants and conservative government bureaucrats, among others. Qualified persons refused to accept ministerial posts in the new regime. Kappist repression was harsh, and some strikers were shot to death. However, the strength of the noncooperation grew, and a general strike paralyzed Berlin. The Reichsbank refused funds to the usurpers. On March 17 the Berlin Security Police demanded Kapp's resignation. He fled to Sweden the same day, many of his aides left Berlin in civilian clothes, and Lüttwitz resigned. The Freikorps then marched out of Berlin, killing and wounding protesting civilians as they did so.

卡普集團份子迅速地面臨大規模公務人員與保守政府官僚等的不合作運動，有資歷的人物都拒絕接受新政權的部長任命，卡普集團份子施以強力的壓制，有些罷工者也因此遭到射殺死亡。不過，不合作運動的強度持續成長，這場總罷工癱瘓了整個柏林，德意志中央銀行也拒絕提供資金給予篡位者。3月17日，柏林治安警察要求卡普辭職。卡普當天就逃到瑞典，許多他的助理換著便衣逃離柏林，路特維茲(Lüttwitz)也辭去職務。「自由兵團」隨後撤出柏林，沿途還是與往常一樣殺戮與傷害抗議的平民。

The coup was defeated by the combined action of workers, civil servants, bureaucrats, and the general population who had refused the popular and administrative

cooperation that the usurpers required. The Weimar Republic survived to face other grave internal problems. The financial costs of the resistance to the attempted coup were modest, and an estimated several hundred persons had been killed and others were wounded by the Kappists.

由於工人、公務人員、官僚與一般民衆一起聯合行動，拒絕與篡位者所要求的在一般與行政管理上合作，而將政變加以擊敗。威瑪共和得以存活下來去面對其他更嚴肅的內部問題。爲了抗拒政變企圖而付出的財務成本不算太大，並且據估計，有數百人遭到卡普集團殺死與一些人受傷。

## France 1961<sup>11</sup> 1961年法國的個案<sup>11</sup>

French President Charles de Gaulle in early April indicated that he was abandoning the attempt to keep Algeria French. In response, on the night of 21-22 April rebelling French military units in Algeria seized control of the capital city of Algiers and nearby key points. However, the coup there could only succeed by replacing the Legal

<sup>11</sup> This account is based on that of Adam Roberts, "Civil Resistance to Military Coups," *Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo), vol. xii, no. 1(1975), pp. 19-36. All quotations are from that source.

這是根據亞當羅伯茲(Adam Roberts)的資料，《軍事政變的公民抵抗》，和平研究期刊(奧斯陸)，第12卷，第1期，1975年，第19-36頁。所有的引言都是從這個來源。

government in Paris.

法國總統查爾斯戴高樂(Charles de Gaulle)在4月初宣布他放棄擁有法屬阿爾及利亞的企圖。得到的回應是，在4月21到22日之交的晚上，在阿爾及利亞叛變的法國軍隊，佔據並控制了首都阿爾及爾與附近的重要據點。不過，政變必須換掉在巴黎的合法政府後才能算是成功。

On 23 April the political parties and trade unions in France held mass meetings and called for a one-hour general strike. That night de Gaulle broadcast a speech, heard also in Algeria, urging people to defy and disobey the rebels, ordering the use of “all means” to bring them down. “I forbid every Frenchman, and in the first place every soldier, to carry out any of their orders.” Prime Minister Debré warned of an airborne attack from Algiers. However, instead of ordering military action, he called upon the general population to act: “As soon as the sirens sound, go there [to the airports] by foot or by car, to convince the mistaken soldiers of their huge error.”

4月23日，在法國的各政黨與工會舉行了大型會議，並號召了為時一個鐘頭的總罷工。戴高樂當晚也透過廣播，發表了在阿爾及利亞也能收聽到的演說，鼓勵人民對叛軍進行反抗與不服從，命令使用「所有各種手段」來推翻他們。

「我禁止每一個法國人，尤其是士兵，去執行他們的任何命令。」首相狄布勒(Debré)警告大家來自阿爾及爾的空降攻

擊。不過，他並沒有下令軍事行動而是呼籲一般民衆採取行動：「一聽到警報響起，立即趕到機場去，不管用雙腳或是開車，去說服那些犯下大錯的士兵們。」

Copies of de Gaulle's speech were duplicated and widely distributed by the population and loyal French soldiers in Algeria. De Gaulle later declared: "From then on, the revolt met with a passive resistance on the spot which became hourly more explicit."

戴高樂的演說稿廣泛地被在阿爾及利亞的民衆與忠誠的法國士兵們複製並傳播。戴高樂之後又發表聲明：「從那時候起，叛變立即面臨消極的抵抗，而且每個小時都變得愈加明顯。」

On 24 April ten million workers took part in the symbolic general strike. At airfields, people prepared vehicles to be placed on runways to block the landing of planes. A financial and shipping blockade was imposed on Algeria.

4月24日，一千萬的勞工參與了這個具有象徵性的總罷工。在機場，人民將車輛排在跑道上以阻擋飛機降落。對阿爾及利亞實施財務與船運的封鎖。

Loyal French troops in Algeria acted to undermine the rebels. Two-thirds of the transport planes and many fighter

jets were flown out of Algeria, while other pilots blocked airfields or pretended mechanical failures. Army soldiers simply stayed in their barracks. There were many cases of deliberate inefficiency, with orders and files “lost” and communication and transportation delayed. Civil servants hid documents and withdrew.

阿爾及利亞忠誠的法國部隊採取行動以破壞叛軍的行動。有三分之二的運輸機與許多噴射戰鬥機飛離了阿爾及利亞，同時，其他的飛行員擋住跑道或者假裝機械故障。陸軍士兵則單純地待在他們的營房內。有許多故意的沒有效率、接到命令但回報「遺失」及耽擱通訊與運輸的個案，公務人員更將公文藏匿並撤銷。

On 25 April de Gaulle broadcast an order to loyal troops to fire at the rebels, but there was no need. The coup had already been fatally undermined. The rebel leaders resolved to call off the attempted coup, and during the night of 25-26 April the parachute regiment that had originally seized Algiers withdrew from the city.

4月25日，戴高樂透過廣播命令忠於國家的部隊向叛軍開火，但是這已經沒有必要，這個政變其實已經受到致命性的破壞。叛軍的領導們決定取消政變的企圖，在4月25與26日之間的晚間，原本佔領阿爾及爾的空降部隊便撤離了。

There were a few casualties, probably three killed

and several wounded in Algeria and Paris. The attack on the de Gaulle government had been defeated by defiance and dissolution.

此事件造成了些許的傷亡，在阿爾及利亞與巴黎可能共有三人死亡與數人受傷。對戴高樂政府的攻擊事件是被反抗威權與軍事瓦解的行動所擊敗。

## The Soviet Union 1991<sup>12</sup>

### 1991年蘇聯的個案<sup>12</sup>

On 18 August 1991 in an effort to block the radical decentralization of power in the Soviet Union, a group of hard-line Soviet officials detained Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and demanded that he turn over all executive powers to his vice-president. Gorbachev refused.

<sup>12</sup> This account of the August 1991 Soviet coup has been prepared by Bruce Jenkins, and was previously published in Gene Sharp with the assistance of Bruce Jenkins, *Self-Reliant Defense Without Bankruptcy or War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Albert Einstein Institution, 1992), pp. 16-19. It was compiled from the following source: The Boston Globe, 20-23 August 1991; The Economist, 24-30 August 1991; Stuart H. Loory and Ann Imse, *Seven Days That Shook The World*, CNN Reports, (Atlanta: Turner Publishing, Inc.: 1991); Newsweek, 2 September 1991; The New Yorker, 4 November 1991; The New York Times, 20-25 August 1991; Time, 2 September 1991; The Washington Post, 21 August 1991.

這個1991年8月蘇聯政變的記載是根據布魯斯傑金斯(Bruce Jenkins)所準備，之前由他協助吉恩夏普發表的《不至於破產與戰爭之自力更生的防衛》，(劍橋，麻州：亞伯特愛因斯坦研究院，1992年)，第16-19頁。它是由以下來源之資料整理而成：波士頓環球報，1991年8月20-23日；經濟學人週刊，1991年8月24-30日；史都華盧麗(Stuart H. Loory)及安伊姆西(Ann Imse)，《震驚世界的七天》，CNN報導(亞特蘭大，透納出版公司)；新聞週刊，1991年9月2日；紐約客雜誌，1991年11月4日；紐約時報，1991年8月20-25日；時代雜誌，1991年9月2日；華盛頓郵報，1991年8月21日。

1991年8月18日，在試圖阻擋蘇聯進行激進的地方分權計畫中，一支強硬派的蘇維埃軍官拘押總統米克哈伊爾戈巴契夫(Mikhail Gorbachev)，並要求他將行政權移交給副總統。戈巴契夫拒絕了。

The self-declared “State Committee for the State of Emergency”—composed of, among others, the Soviet vice-president, prime minister, defense minister, chairman of the KGB, and interior minister—declared a six-month “state of emergency.” Opposition newspapers were banned, political parties suspended (except the Communist Party), and demonstrations forbidden. The junta’s first decree asserted the primacy of the Soviet constitution over those of the republics and mandated adherence to all orders of the Emergency Committee.

這個自稱為「國家緊急狀態委員會」——成員由蘇維埃副總統、總理、國防部長、國安局(KGB)局長及內政部長等人所組成——宣布為期六個月的「國家緊急狀態」。禁止發行反對言論的報紙、停止政黨活動(除了共產黨外)，也嚴禁示威遊行。軍人集團第一個法令即宣稱蘇維埃憲法高於所轄共和國的憲法，並且必須服從緊急委員會的所有命令。

It appeared that the junta had the entire military forces of the Soviet Union at their disposal. Armored divisions and paratroops were deployed throughout



Moscow. In the Baltics, pro-coup forces seized telephone, radio and television facilities and blockaded key ports. Armored assault units outside Leningrad began to move on the city.

這顯示出全蘇聯的軍事力量都在這個軍人集團的支配下。整個莫斯科都部署了裝甲部隊與傘兵部隊。在波羅的海三國，支持政變的軍隊佔據了電話、無線電與電視設備並且封鎖了重要港口。駐防在列寧格勒外的裝甲攻擊部隊開始進入城市。

In Moscow, tens of thousands of people gathered spontaneously in the streets to denounce the coup. In a dramatic show of defiance, Russian Federation President Boris 'Yeltsin climbed upon a hostile tank and denounced the putschists' action as a "rightist, reactionary, anti-constitutional coup." Yeltsin proclaimed "all decisions and instructions of this committee to be unlawful" and appealed to citizens to rebuff the putschists and for servicemen not to take part in the coup. Yeltsin concluded with an appeal for a "universal unlimited strike." Later that day Yeltsin ordered army and KGB personnel within the Russian republic to obey him, not the putschists.

在莫斯科，成千上萬的人民立即齊聚街頭同聲譴責政變，在一場戲劇性的反抗活動中，俄羅斯邦聯總統伯里斯葉爾欽(Boris Yeltsin)爬上了叛軍的坦克上，並譴責軍事政變行

動是一個「右派的、反動的、違憲的政變」，他聲明：「這個委員會所有的決定與方針都是不合法的。」同時請求公民反抗叛變者，並且請求軍人不要參與這個政變，葉爾欽最後還呼籲：「全面無限期的罷工。」當天稍晚，葉爾欽也命令在俄羅斯共和國內的軍隊與KGB人員服從他的命令，而不是政變者的命令。

Thousands gathered in front of the Russian “White House” (parliament building) to protect it from attack. Barricades were erected; trolley buses and automobiles blocked the streets. Although the call for a general strike went largely unheeded, miners in the Kuzbass coal fields and near Sverdlosk did strike.

數千人聚集在俄羅斯的「白宮」（國會大廈）前防衛以免它受到攻擊，並用路障、電動巴士與車輛封鎖街道。雖然總罷工的呼籲沒有受到廣泛的注意，不過在西伯利亞庫茲巴斯（Kuzbass）及斯佛洛斯克（Sverdlosk）煤田區的礦工倒是響應了罷工行動。

The putschists decreed a special state of emergency in Moscow because of “rallies, street marches, demonstrations and instances of instigation to riots.” On the second night of the coup, resistance organizers pasted leaflets throughout the city’s subway system calling for a mass demonstration in front of the “White House” the

following day.

叛變者在莫斯科頒布一個特殊的國家緊急命令，它的理由是因為：「群眾集會、街道遊行、示威與一些煽動暴亂的個案。」政變的第二天晚上，組織抵抗叛變的人員在城內各個地鐵站張貼傳單，號召次日在「白宮」廣場前舉行大規模的示威活動。

In Leningrad, 200,000 people rallied in response to Mayor Anatoly Sobchak's call for "the broadest constitutional resistance" to the coup. Tens of thousands in Moldavia blocked the streets to keep Soviet troops at bay. Leaders of the Ukraine and Kazakhstan denounced the coup. A large rally in Minsk called for mass civil disobedience. Lithuanian President Landsbergis appealed to citizens to surround the parliament building in Vilnius for protection from attack. Emergency sessions of the parliaments of Latvia and Estonia declared full independence from the Soviet Union.

在列寧格勒，二十萬人民聚集響應市長安納托利梭柏恰克(Anatoly Sobchak)的呼籲，發動對政變進行「憲政上最大的反抗」。在摩爾達維亞 (Moldavia) 的數萬民衆，封鎖住街道使蘇維埃的部隊停留在海灣而無法接近。烏克蘭與哈薩克斯坦的領袖們也同聲譴責政變。在明斯克(Minsk，譯注：白俄羅斯首都)，一個集會呼籲進行大型的公民不服從運動。立陶宛總統蘭茨柏吉斯(Landsbergis)，請求公民包圍

維爾紐斯(Vilnius，立陶宛首都)的國會大廈以保護它遭受攻擊。拉脫維亞與愛沙尼亞的國會緊急會議宣布脫離蘇聯，完全獨立。

In Moscow, banned opposition newspapers secretly printed “The Common Paper” which called on citizens to resist. A donated radio transmitter allowed the Russian government to broadcast resistance information across the nation through local relay stations. The banned independent radio station “Echo Moscow” continued to broadcast, carrying live speeches from an emergency session of the Russian parliament. Although prohibited, Russian Television technicians put their news programs on videotape and distributed them to twenty cities around the Soviet Union.


在莫斯科被禁止出版的反對運動報紙秘密發行「日常報」(The Common Paper)，呼籲公民起來反抗。有人捐贈廣播電台，讓俄羅斯政府透過全國各地方電台連線向全國廣播抵抗的訊息。被禁止的獨立無線電電台「莫斯科之聲」，持續播放俄羅斯國會緊急會議的實況演說。雖然被禁，俄羅斯電視台的技工也將新聞節目透過錄影帶傳送到蘇聯的二十幾個城市去。

Officials in the state controlled media refused cooperation with the putschists. The defiant speeches

of Yeltsin and Sobchak were aired on the nightly news program which the Emergency Committee's KGB censor chose not to block. Afterwards, the First Deputy Chairman of Soviet Television, Valentin Lazutkin, received a call from Interior Minister Pugo: "You have disobeyed two orders.....You have given instructions to the people on where to go and what to do. You will answer for this." Defiant crowds swelled in front of the White House that night to protect the Russian government.

國家控制的媒體主管也拒絕與叛變者合作，葉爾欽與梭柏恰克的反對演說透過每日晚間新聞播出，緊急委員會負責的KGB審查人員選擇不加以封鎖。之後，蘇維埃電視台的第一副主席蔚藍廷拉組特金(Valentin Lazutkin)，收到了來自內政部長普戈(Pugo)的警告：「你已經違抗了兩次命令……你已經教導人民該往哪裡走及應該做什麼，你要為此負責。」當晚，群眾湧入白宮前方廣場以保護俄羅斯政府。



Concerted efforts were made to undermine the loyalty of the putschists' forces. Leaflets and food were distributed to soldiers. Citizens pleaded with tank crews to switch sides. Yeltsin urged discipline: "Don't provoke the military. The military has become a weapon in the hands of the putschists. Therefore we should also support the military and maintain order and discipline in contact with them."



大家也做了一些協同的努力以破壞反叛軍隊的忠誠度。宣傳單與食物一起送給士兵，公民請求坦克車的隊員換邊站，葉爾欽則強烈要求紀律：「不要去激怒軍隊，軍隊已成為反叛者手上的一項武器，因此我們在與他們接觸時，也應該要支持他們，並且維持秩序與紀律。」

In several cases, entire military units deserted the putschists. Ten tanks in front of the White House turned their turrets away from the parliament building, pledging to help defend it against attack. Mutinies against the putschists were reported at the Leningrad Naval Base and at a paratrooper training academy. Units in the Far East refused to support the junta. In the Russian republic, local interior ministry police and KGB units declared loyalty to Yeltsin. Defense Minister Yasov ordered the Tula division to withdraw from its positions near the White House because of the troops' uncertain loyalty. Interior Minister Pugo disbanded the Moscow police out of fear of disloyalty to the putschists.

有數個個案，整個軍事單位拋棄了叛軍。十輛在「白宮」前的坦克轉移了對著國會大廈的砲塔，並且承諾在面對攻擊時會幫忙守護它。列寧格勒海軍基地與傘兵訓練學校，也傳出了官兵反對政變的倒戈消息。駐防遠東地區的軍事單位拒絕支持叛軍。在俄羅斯共和國，地方的內政部警察與KGB單位宣示效忠葉爾欽。國防部長亞所夫(Yasov)命令土



拉(Tula)的師團自「白宮」附近的位置撤退，因為部隊的忠誠度不明。內政部長普戈(Pugo)因為懷疑莫斯科警察的忠誠度而將其解散。

In the afternoon of the second day of the coup, the putschists attempted to put together a new assault team to attack the Russian White house. Army paratroops and Interior ministry forces were to surround the White House, clearing the way for an attack by the elite KGB Alpha Group. The head of the Army's paratroops and the commander of the Soviet Air Force, however, refused to take part in the attack. Hours before the planned attack, the commander of the KGB Alpha Group stated that his forces would not take part. "There will be no attack. I won't go against the people."

在政變第二天的下午，叛軍企圖集結組成一支攻擊隊伍來攻擊俄羅斯的「白宮」。企圖以陸軍的傘兵部隊與內政部武裝部隊集結包圍「白宮」，清出路線以供國安精英的阿爾發(Alpha)部隊發動攻擊。不過，陸軍傘兵部隊隊長與蘇維埃空軍指揮官卻拒絕參與這項攻擊行動。在預定攻擊的幾個鐘頭前，國安局的阿爾發部隊指揮官聲明不參與攻擊行動：「不會有攻擊行動，我不會去對抗人民。」

The following morning, the Defense Board of the Soviet Union voted to withdraw the troops from

Moscow. Members of the Emergency Committee were subsequently arrested (one committed suicide). President Gorbachev returned to power. Casualties were low—a total of five people were reported killed during the coup attempt. The coup had been defeated. Mass public defiance and disobedience in the military thwarted the hard-liners' attempt to return to authoritarian rule.

次日早上，蘇維埃聯邦的國防委員會開會決議從莫斯科撤出部隊，緊急委員會的成員隨後便被逮捕(有一人自殺)，戈巴契夫重掌政權。此次傷亡不多，報告指出有五人在政變中喪生。這個政變被擊敗了。民衆的反威權抵抗與軍隊的不服從，擊退了強硬派重掌威權體制統治的企圖。

These three cases of successful resistance—Germany in 1920, France in 1961, and Russia in 1991—establish that successful defense against coups is possible. Certainly there are other cases in which similar resistance did not succeed, but the existence of successes establishes that under at least some conditions coups can be defeated.

1920年在德國、1961年在法國及1991年在俄羅斯，這三件個案都是成功抵抗政變的案例，建立了一個事實，成功防衛對抗政變是可行的。當然，也有其他類似的抵抗事件是失敗的，但這些成功案例的存在就是告訴我們，至少在某些條件下，政變是可以被擊敗的。



## Anti-coup defense 反政變的防衛

Attention to how coups d'état work and how they can be defeated teaches us much. Together they show that there is no need to be passive and helpless in face of these blows against freedom and justice. Defense can be waged by the attacked society itself.

檢視軍事政變是如何運作及如何加以擊敗讓我們獲益良多。這兩個資訊教導我們，在面對違反自由與正義之政變爆發的時候，並不需要感到消極與無助。防衛是可以由遭受攻擊的社會本身來啟動的。

The basic point of this essay is that a defense policy against coups d'état is possible. The essence of such a defense policy is two-fold: (1) that those who attack the constitutional system and intend to replace the elected government by a regime of their own choosing must be denied all legitimacy—they have no moral or political right to become the government and (2) they must be denied all cooperation—no one in the government or in the population should assist or obey them in anyway.

本文的基本論點，就是認為以一個防衛性的政策來對抗軍事政變是有可能性的。這樣的防衛性政策有兩個基本重點：(1)那些想要藉由攻擊憲政體制民選的政府而代之

以他們自己政府的政權，必須完全否定他們所有的「合法性」，他們沒有任何道德上與政治上的權利成爲一個執政的政府；(2)要拒絕所有與他們的「合作」，無論在政府或在民間，無論以何種方式，都沒有人應該去協助或服從他們。

In a coup d'état, the seizure of government buildings, transportation and communication centers, and key geographical points is not done for its own sake. Rather, the purpose of those seizures is to control the state apparatus, and hence the country as a whole. The putschists must secure that broad control if the coup is to be successful.

在一場軍事政變中，佔據政府建築、運輸與通訊中心及關鍵性的地理位置並不代表大勢已經底定。而是，這些佔據的目的是要控制國家機器，進而控制整個國家。如果政變者要能成功，他們必須確實掌握更廣泛的控制。

However, the seizure of such points does not by itself give the putschists the control they seek over the government and the society. They will not initially control the population, the political, economic, or social organizations, the governmental structures, nor even all of the military forces and the police. Nor will the putschists be in a position immediately to accomplish any possible

ideological objectives. After military, or para-military, forces have occupied government buildings and key centers of communication and transportation, a crucial period inevitably follows in which the putschists must establish and consolidate their control. Even in the absence of resistance, that control requires time and effort to achieve. This need to consolidate control—and the time it takes to effect this—makes an effective defense by the society possible.

不過，實際上佔據這些重要據點並不代表政變者已經達成控制政府與社會的企圖。他們在一開始時並不能控制人民、政治、經濟，或社會組織、政府機構，甚至所有的軍隊與警察。政變者也無法立即取得位置完成意識形態之目的。在軍隊或輔助軍隊以武力佔據了政府建築及關鍵的通訊與運輸中心之後，隨著會有一段無法避免的關鍵期，因為叛變者必然要建立並且鞏固他們的控制。即使在沒有抵抗的情況下，要達成這樣的控制也需要時間及付出相當的努力。這個需要鞏固控制的必要性——及它的奏效所需要的時間——使得社會有可能可以做出有效的防衛。

### The putschists require 政變者的需求

Immediately after the coup is started, the putschists require legitimacy, that is, acceptance of their moral and political right, or authority to rule. Endorsements by moral

and religious leaders, respected political personages, and in some cases royalty or past officials, will help them to gain that acceptance.

緊接政變發動之後，叛變者立即需要合法性，也就是人民對他們在道德上、政治權利上的接受度或者統治的權威性。由道德與宗教領袖、受到尊重之政治上的要人，甚至在某些案例中，皇室成員或退職的達官顯要為其背書，也能增強他們的被接受度。

The putschists require that their control of the state apparatus be accepted by the persons and institutions in whom moral and legitimate political authority resides, whether they are elected officials, unofficial moral leaders, or royalty.

政變者需要他們對國家機器的控制被一些具有道德與合法政治職權的個人及機構所接受，不管他們是民選的官員、沒有官方色彩的道德領袖或是皇室成員。

The first basic principle of anti-coup defense is therefore to deny legitimacy to the putschists.

因此，反政變防衛之首要基本原則便是否認叛變者的合法性。

The putschists also require that the civilian leaders and population be supportive, confused, or just passive.

The putschists additionally require the cooperation of specialists and advisors, bureaucrats and civil servants, administrators and judges in order to consolidate their control over the society. Journalists and broadcasters, printers and technicians are required to do as they are told. Police, prison officials, and soldiers need to follow orders to make arrests, jail protesters, and execute people as commanded. The putschists also require that a multitude of people who operate the political system, the society's institutions, and the economy will passively submit and carry out their usual functions as modified by the putschists' orders and policies.

叛變者也需要公民領袖與民衆的支持，不管是陷於混亂或者是消極而被動。爲了要能鞏固他們對社會的控制，政變者另外需要一些專業人才與顧問、政府官員與公務人員、行政首長與法官等的合作，也需要新聞記者與新聞主播、出版機構與技術人員等能夠按照政變者的意思去做。警察、獄吏與士兵也必須能夠遵循他們的命令去從事逮捕、拘禁與處決抗議者的行動。叛變者也需要大量從事政治體制、社會機構與經濟運作的人員，被動順從地依照他們修改過的命令與政策去執行他們平常的功能。

In short, in order to consolidate their control putschists require a significant degree of not only legitimacy but also cooperation from the society they intend to rule.

總之，爲了鞏固他們的控制，政變者不但需要相當程度的合法性，而且需要來自他們想要統治之社會的合作。

Few or none of these required acts of submission, cooperation, and assistance may be fulfilled, however. They may be jeopardized by repudiation, noncooperation, and defiance. Both the needed legitimacy and the essential cooperation are vulnerable. All these groups and the general population may refuse to do as ordered. The claims to legitimacy can be rejected. The necessary cooperation, obedience, and support can be denied. The consolidation of the putschists' rule can thereby be blocked.

不過，這些必要的歸順與合作行爲只有很少數或甚至沒有一項會完成。這些政變者很可能受到否定、不合作與反抗而瀕臨危險的境地。必要的合法性與重要的合作兩者都是很脆弱的。所有的團體與一般的民衆都可能拒絕他們的命令。叛變者所宣稱的合法性可能會被拒絕，必須的合作、服從和支持會被否定，叛變者統治的鞏固會因此而受到阻擋。

Even moderate opposition may force the attackers to make significant efforts to secure the needed acceptance, cooperation, and support. In a powerful anti-coup defense, the population would prevent the attackers' control of the state apparatus and the country by massive and selective noncooperation, while maintaining their support

for the legal government and its call to resist. Strong, determined, and widespread repudiation, noncooperation, and defiance of the coup by the society can block the putschists' objectives and defeat the coup.

即使溫和的反對運動都可能迫使攻擊者在必要的接受度、合作與支持上付出心血。但在一個強有力的反政變防衛下，人民應該會以大規模的或選擇性的不合作方式，去預防攻擊者對國家機器與整個國家的控制；同時，維持他們對合法政府的支持，並且接受號召起來抵抗。社會也可以藉著強大、堅定及廣泛對政變之拒絕、不合作，甚至反抗的手段，就可以阻擋叛變者的目的並將政變加以擊敗。

The second basic principle of anti-coup defense is to resist the putschists with noncooperation and defiance.

反政變防衛的第二個基本原則就是，以不合作及反威權的方式去抵抗叛變者。

If both legitimacy and cooperation are denied, the putsch may die of political starvation.

如果合法性與合作兩個要素都被拒絕，政變將會因在政治上的飢餓而死亡。



## Direct defense of the society 社會的直接防衛

Therefore, an anti-coup policy is focused on defense

of the society by the society itself, not on defense of points of geography, nor even governmental buildings. Geography and buildings are ultimately important to coup leaders only when possession is accompanied by human assistance. Seizure of a school building, for example, is of no use to someone seeking to control education without a functioning school including the cooperative pupils, teachers, and administrators. Occupation of a railroad yard gives no control over that piece of transportation if the railroad workers and managers are unwilling to operate the trains according to orders. Control of a parliament building itself gives no control over the actual members of parliament or over the population as a whole which believes in parliamentary government.


因此，反政變政策要將焦點放在社會的防衛就是「社會自己本身」，而不是放在地理位置，甚或是政府建築物的防衛。佔有地理位置與建築物對政變領導者來說，只有隨之而來的人為協助最後才會變成重要的。以佔據學校「建築物」為例，如果無法得到包括學生、教師及行政人員之合作而有一間可以正常營運的學校，對一個想要控制教育的人來說，佔據學校校舍是毫無幫助的。如果鐵路員工與經理不願根據命令去營運火車班次，只是單純地佔據鐵路停車場也是無法控制這個部門的運輸。控制了國會大廈它本身，並不代表實際控制國會議員或者那些相信議會型政府的全部民衆。





Instead of attempting to provide constitutional defense by fighting over buildings and geographical points, people actively defend their institutions, society, and freedoms directly. The priorities of action here are crucial. Insistence on abiding by constitutional procedures, or the maintenance of a free press, for example, are of more direct importance to democracy than possession of a given street intersection or building.

不必企圖由爭奪建築物與地理要點來提供對憲政的防衛，人民可以積極地直接防衛他們的機構、社會與自由。此處這些行動的優先順序是具有關鍵性的。舉例來說，堅持要維繫憲政程序或者維護言論自由的民主，是比佔據十字路口或建築物更直接而重要的。



It is of course true that sometimes certain sites and buildings have a special symbolic importance. Civilian defenders may then want to attempt to block the seizure of these sites by placing their bodies between the attackers and the buildings. In 1991, for example, both the Lithuanian parliament building and the Russian “White House” were so protected by people power. One should not generalize too widely from these two cases, however. It should first be noted that a human barricade is not always realistic. Under extreme weather conditions, especially cold, it would be virtually impossible for a

human barricade composed of the same individuals to remain in position for very long. Therefore, it is important to remember that anti-coup defense is a defense of the society, not of geographical points or buildings, which the putschists are able to seize if they are willing to kill enough people.

當然，有時候某些特定的場所與建築物具有其特殊象徵意義的重要性。此時，公民防衛者可能會企圖用自己的身體擋在這些建築物與攻擊者之間來阻擋它們被佔據。舉例來說，在1991年立陶宛的國會大廈與俄羅斯的「白宮」就是這樣受到人民力量的保護。但我們也不能因這兩個案例而將它們擴大到一般的情形，首先應該要注意到人身路障並非總是切實可行的。在極端惡劣的天候條件下，特別是嚴寒時，一道由相同一群人所組成的人身路障是不可能在同一個地方持續很久的。因此，要特別牢記，所謂的反政變防衛是一個社會的防衛，而非地理位置與建築物的防衛。只要叛變者願意殺足夠多的人，他們就可以佔據這些地點。

If the putschists are uncertain of their own intentions and methods, or if their troops are unwilling to kill many of the defenders, then a defense by human barricades may be successful. However, a serious danger exists in attempts to defend key buildings or other sites by human barricades. If, despite the defenders' efforts, the building is

successfully seized by the putschists, the defenders and general population may become unjustifiably demoralized. The defenders may then believe not that only the parliament building has been seized, but that parliament itself has been destroyed. The defenders and population may believe that the mere physical occupation of the former government headquarters has put the putschists in control.

如果叛變者對他們自己的意圖與方法都不確定，或是他們的部隊不願意去殺害那麼多防衛的人，那麼人身路障的策略也許會成功。不過，這些企圖去防衛關鍵建築物或場所的人身路障也存在著嚴重的危險。不管這些防衛者的努力，如果建築物還是被叛變者成功地佔領，這些防衛者與一般民衆可能毫無理由的損失了士氣。這些防衛者可能會相信不只是國會「大廈」被佔據而已，甚至連「國會本身」都被摧毀了。這些防衛者與一般民衆可能會認為，單單原來政府總部被叛變者所佔據已經讓政變者控制了整個局勢。

Extreme care therefore must be used in formulating strategies and tactics for defense of buildings, so that the defenders and population put the emphasis on defense of the constitutional system and the society's institutions themselves, which can continue whatever the fate of the buildings. The coup leaders cannot control the society's population, institutions, organizations, and government

without the submission and cooperation of the population.

因此，要非常謹慎地去擬定保衛這些建築物的策略與戰術，就是無論這些建築物的命運是如何，可以讓防衛者與民衆把重點放在他們自己防衛憲政體制與社會機構上，而且可以一直持續他們的防衛行動。在沒有民衆之屈服與合作的狀態下，政變領導者是無法控制社會的民衆、機構、組織與政府的。

### The need for preparations 準備的必要性

In the three cases reviewed earlier, the defense was improvised, without the advantage of advance planning and preparations. It is surprising how powerful even improvised social action can be. Inevitably, however, such unprepared resistance will be weaker than if careful plans have been laid for defense against such attacks. Confusion, uncertainty as to what to do, ineffectual or counterproductive protests, and costly delays in taking resolute action can all potentially be avoided or reduced significantly by preparations. Conversely, anti-coup defense by an assertive citizenry can be greatly strengthened by specific preparations and guidelines. These guidelines would aim to prepare the citizenry and social institutions to offer collective resistance to any coup. Such preparations would need to include both

general guidelines for the defense and also designated responsibilities for members of particular population groups and institutions, such as civil servants, religious leaders, police, journalists, transportation employees, and many others.

之前所舉的三個案例都是臨時發生，並不具有預先規劃與準備的優勢。令人驚訝的是，即使這樣即席發生的社會行動竟然有如此大的力量。不過，像這類沒有充分準備過的抵抗運動，無可避免地會比有完整規劃對抗這些政變攻擊的防衛計畫來得微弱許多。混亂、不確定該做甚麼、徒勞無功或者產生反效果的抗議、延遲有效解決行動的代價，都有潛力藉由事先的準備而明顯地降低或避免。相反的，一個堅定公民群體的反政變防衛可以藉由特定的準備與指導原則來大力強化。這些指導原則之目的就是為這個公民群體與社會機構做好準備，以提供集體對抗任何政變的能力。這些準備應該有必要包括防衛的一般指導原則，也要設定特定民間團體與機構之成員的責任，諸如公務人員、宗教領袖、警察、記者、運輸人員等等。

Such planning and preparations for anti-coup defense are possible. Whether independent institutions of the society or the government (with cooperation of nongovernmental institutions and organizations) initiate and carry out anti-coup defense will largely be determined by the political situation in the country and the degree of


strength and vitality of the society.


這種反政變防衛的規劃與準備是可能的。到底社會上這些獨立的機構或是政府 (配合非政府機構與組織的合作)，是否要主動開始並且實施反政變的防衛，大致上要由這個國家的政治情勢與這個社會的力量與活力而決定。

## The civilian defenders aims 公民防衛者的目標

Under an anti-coup policy, the resisters will aim to:  
在反政變的政策下，抵抗者的目標是在：

- Repudiate the putschists as illegitimate with no rightful claim to become the government;
- 強烈駁斥叛變者的合法性，他們並沒有權利要求成為政府；
- Make the attacked society unrulable by the attackers;
- 讓遭受攻擊的社會無法接受攻擊者的統治；
- Block the imposition of viable government by the putschists;
- 阻擋由叛變者所強加栽培的政府；
- Maintain control and self-direction of their own society;
- 維持他們自己社會的控制與自治；
- Make the institutions of the society into omnipresent

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- resistance organizations against a coup;
  - 讓社會的各種機構成爲全面抵抗政變的組織；
  - Deny to the putschists any additional objectives;
  - 拒絕政變者任何其他額外的目的；
  - Make the costs of the attack and attempted domination unacceptable;
  - 將政變攻擊及企圖統治的成本提高到無法忍受；
  - Subvert the reliability and loyalty of the putschists' troops and functionaries and induce them to desert their mutinous officers;
  - 破壞政變部隊及附屬單位的信賴度與忠誠度，並且誘導他們拋棄他們軍方長官；
  - Encourage dissension and opposition among the putschists' supporters;
  - 鼓勵政變支持者之間的分化與反對；
  - Stimulate international opposition to the coup by diplomatic, economic, and public opinion pressures against the attackers; and
  - 藉由外交、經濟及輿論對攻擊者的壓力，激發國際反對這個政變；以及
  - Achieve international support in communications, finances, food, diplomacy, and other resources.
  - 爭取國際在通訊、財務、食物、外交與其他資源方面的支持。




## Resistance: general and organized 抵抗運動：一般性的與有組織的

Strategies of anti-coup defense might be grouped initially into two broad categories, “general” and “organized.”<sup>13</sup> Well in advance of an attack, a number of key points would be selected and identified to the general population as points at which the population should resist, even in the absence of any specific instructions at the time from a leadership group. This type of resistance is called “general resistance.” These points might include, for example, efforts to promote the attackers’ regime as legitimate, attempts to remake or abolish the elected legislature, measures to remake the courts or impose a new constitution, abridgments of freedom of speech and religion and efforts to control the society’s independent institutions.

反政變防衛的戰略起初可能先大致分為兩大類，即「一般性的」與「有組織的」。<sup>13</sup>在受到一個政變攻擊很久

13 This clarification was introduced by the late Lars Porsholt. See Lars Porsholt, “On the Conduct of Civilian Defence” in T. K. Mahadevan, Adam Roberts, and Gene Sharp, editors, *Civilian Defence: An Introduction* (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, and Bombay: Baratiya Vidya Bhavan, 1967), pp. 145-149.

這個分類由已逝之拉斯波爾夏爾特(Lars Porsholt)所提出。參閱拉斯波爾夏爾特，《公民防衛行為之研究》，發表於馬哈得遠(T. K. Mahadevan)、亞當羅伯茲、吉恩夏普編輯之《公民防衛之緒論》，(新德里，德里和平基金會及龐貝：巴拉提亞維迪亞巴梵，1967年)，第145-149頁。





之前，需要為一般民衆去釐清並辨認出一些關鍵的重點，才能在即使事發時沒有領導階層的具體指示下，民衆也能知道要抵抗的重點，這種形式的抵抗就是所謂的「一般性的抵抗」。例如，這些抵抗的重點包括了：攻擊者政權提升合法性的努力；重塑與廢棄選出之立法機關的嘗試；剝奪言論與宗教信仰自由；控制社會上獨立機關的努力。

Infringement by the attackers on any of these points would be the population's signal to resist. The advance provision of guidelines for general resistance would make wise resistance possible even if the legitimate officials or the initial defense leaders have been arrested or executed. General resistance could also be practiced if the defense leaders' communications with the population have been blocked.

當攻擊者碰觸到上述任何一點時，就是民衆要開始抵抗的信號。這個一般性抵抗之事前防備的指導原則，讓明智的抵抗方式變得有可能，即使在合法的政府及初始的防衛首長被逮捕或處決的情形下也能照樣運作。如果防衛者之領導者對民衆的通訊被阻斷時，一般性的抵抗還是可以照樣實行。

“Organized resistance” differs from general resistance in that the defenders act in accordance with a call or instructions from an anti-coup defense leadership

group. This group might consist of members of the legitimate government, officials of the anti-coup defense planning body, or persons selected in some other way. This leadership might, for example, be comprised of representatives of voluntary organizations (educational, civic, labor, religious, political, and others) who have been informally accepted by the society (whether or not their individual identities are publicly known).

「有組織的抵抗」不同於一般性的抵抗，防衛者是配合反政變防衛領導團體的號召與指示而採取行動。這個團體的成員可能由合法政府、反政變防衛規劃組織，或其他方式所選出之個人等成員所組成。舉例來說，這個領導階層可能由自願性的代表(如教育、公民、勞工、宗教、政治與其他方面的人)組成，這些人非正式地被社會所接受(不管他們個人身分是否為民衆所熟知)。

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Organized resistance would supplement, not replace, general resistance. Often, organized resistance would consist of acts focused on a specific event, or would occur in a specific place or at a designated time. Such resistance may take the form of specific acts of symbolic protests or resistance, of which there are dozens of possible types. Examples would include demonstrations, short strikes, protest marches, protest black-outs, tolling of church bells, defiant flying of national flags (perhaps

at half mast), organized letter writing campaigns, the simultaneous reading in religious services of official statements from religious leaders, organized hunger strikes, radio broadcasts from hidden transmitters, and expressions of mourning (either because of brutalities by the attackers or acts of terrorism by one's own people).

有組織的抵抗可以補強一般性的抵抗，而非取代它。通常有組織的抵抗會將重點放在一個特定的事件上、或者是發生在某一特定場所、或是在一特定時機點。這種抵抗會以象徵性之抗議或抵抗的特定行動形式來展現，大約有數十個可能形式。這些例子包括示威、短暫罷工、遊行抗議、熄燈抗議、教堂鳴鐘、挑釁地揮舞國旗(也許降半旗)、組織寫信攻勢、藉由宗教聚會同步宣讀由宗教領袖發布的正式聲明、組織性的絕食、地下電台發布廣播、舉行哀悼儀式(藉以悼念受政變者之殘暴行為或我方自己恐怖行動下的受難者)。

Both general resistance and organized resistance are very important in defense struggles against coups d'état. The proportional roles of each will vary with the specific situation.

在對抗軍事政變的防禦中，一般性的抵抗與有組織的抵抗兩者都是非常重要的，而它們角色的比例會隨著具體情況的不同而改變。

## The importance of strategy 戰略的重要性

The general technique that has been most effective in anti-coup defense is nonviolent struggle. This avoids fighting the putschists with military weapons, with which the usurpers usually have the advantage. The nonviolent technique also maximizes the power of the defenders, vastly increases the possible number of resisters over those able and willing to use violence, and very importantly helps to undermine the morale and reliability of the putschists' soldiers.

在反政變防衛的一般技巧中，非暴力抗爭的方式最有效率。這個技巧可以避免與叛變者以軍事武器作戰，軍事武器通常是篡位者的優勢。非暴力的技巧也可以將防衛者的力量擴展到最大，會廣泛地增加抵抗者的可能數量，超越過那些有能力而且有意願使用暴力的政變者，並且更重要的，會有助於破壞政變士兵的士氣與可靠度。

The weapons, or methods, of nonviolent struggle—such as strikes, boycotts, types of political noncooperation, and mutiny—are not to be applied randomly. These methods should not be selected in accordance with the whims of individuals or in response to minor events, nor should they be applied in a hodgepodge, improvised,

or intuitive way. These methods instead will be most effective if they are applied as component parts of a comprehensive, carefully chosen strategy of anti-coup defense.

非暴力抗爭的武器或方法，諸如罷工、聯合抵制、政治上不合作的形式、士兵倒戈等也不是可以隨便任意運用的。這些方法都不應依照個人的幻想或對小事件做反應而濫用，也不該以大雜燴、即興演出或光憑直覺的方式來隨意應用。如果將這些方法，當做一個全面而仔細篩選之反政變防衛戰略的組成部分來應用，這些方式反而是相當有效率的。

Attempting to provide defense without formulating a strategy for the struggle is foolhardy. It is also potentially disastrous. One of the major reasons for the failure of some past nonviolent struggles has been the choice of a poor strategy or very often the neglect to develop any strategy at all. Strategy is just as important in nonviolent struggles as it is in military warfare.

想要提供防衛卻沒有戰略的規劃是有勇無謀的做法，也會導致潛在的災難。在一些過去非暴力的抗爭中，失敗的主要原因之一就是選擇了拙劣的戰略，或根本就完全忽略了擬定任何戰略。戰略對非暴力抗爭的重要性，就如同軍事戰爭中的戰略一樣重要。

There needs to be an overall plan for conducting

the entire conflict. This is called a grand strategy. Within it, individual strategies need to be formulated to achieve major objectives in the conflict or for use in broad phases of the struggle. A strategy is a conception, a general plan, of how best to act in order to achieve ones objectives in a mayor phase of a conflict, within the framework of the chosen grand strategy. The aim is to use one's resources to maximum advantage to gain ones objective at minimum cost. The chosen strategy determines whether, when, and how to fight.

必須有一個全盤的計畫來指導整個衝突抗爭，稱之為「總體大戰略」(grand strategy)。在計畫中，不管是在衝突中或在抗爭的各個階段，需要擬定個別的策略以實現主要的目標。「策略」是一個觀念，是一個通則性的規劃，它是在所選擇之總體大戰略的結構下，在衝突的主要階段如何採取最佳的行動來達到目標。它的目的是以最有利而成本最低的方式，運用自己資源以實現自己的目標。選出的策略就是決定是否、何時與如何進行戰鬥。

Within a strategy particular tactics—plans for limited actions—and individual methods—specific forms of action—are used to implement the strategy. These actions are more limited in time, scale, or specific issues in order to achieve intended limited objectives.

在策略中的特殊「戰術」——小型行動的計畫——與

個別的「方法」——行動的具體形式——都是用來執行這個策略的。爲了達成設定的目標，這些行動在時間、規模或特定議題上的限制更大。


Strategies for anti-coup defense need to be planned with much thought and extreme care. The strategies need to draw upon the best available resources about strategic principles. They also need to be based on knowledge of nonviolent struggle, the dynamics of coups, the particular conflict situation, and the strengths and weaknesses of both the defending population and the putschists.

反政變防衛的策略必須以更多的心思與謹慎來規劃。這些策略必須在戰略原則上，面對既有資源的基礎上來進行，也必須奠基在對非暴力抗爭、政變的動力學、特殊的衝突情勢、防衛民衆與叛變者雙方之強弱點等的知識基礎上。

Issues of strategy are more varied and complex than indicated here and readers facing strategic decisions are urged to consult more extensive discussions elsewhere.<sup>14</sup>

14 For a good discussion of strategic principles in nonviolent struggle generally, see Peter Ackerman and Christopher Krueger, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger 1994). See also Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth Century Practice and Twenty-First Century Potential*. Forthcoming.

For more detailed discussions of civilian-based defense strategy, see Gene Sharp, *Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 89-111; Gene Sharp, *Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defense* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Books,



策略議題的多樣性與複雜度遠遠超過這裡所指出的，而讀者在面臨策略決定的問題時，我們也強烈建議去諮詢其他更全面的討論。<sup>14</sup>


## Anti-coup weapons 反政變之武器

The selection of the most suitable methods of action is of vital importance. The initial anti-coup strategy may use certain of the following nonviolent weapons: a stay-at-home by everyone; paralysis of each part of the political system that the putschists attempt to seize; persistent operation of uncontrolled parts of the political system according to pre-attack policies and laws (ignoring decrees and policies of the putsehists); filling streets with

1986), pp. 88-118, (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), pp. 113-151; and Adam Roberts, “Civilian Defense Strategy” in Adam Roberts, editor, *The Strategy of Civilian Defense* (London: Faber & Faber, 1967); U. S. edition: *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense* (Harrisburg Pa: Stackpole Books, 1968) pp. 215-251. Other sources are cited in Sharp, *Making Europe Unconquerable* (Ballinger edition), pp. 160-161, n. 1.

有關一般非暴力抗爭之策略性原則的討論，參閱彼得艾克曼(Peter Ackerman)及克利斯多福克魯格勒(Christopher Kruegler)，《戰略性的非暴力抗爭：21世紀人民力量的動力學》，(威斯波特，康州與倫敦，培雷格出版社，1994年)。另參閱吉恩夏普，《啓動非暴力抗爭：20世紀的實踐與21世紀的潛力》，出版中。

有關公民防衛策略更詳細的討論，參閱吉恩夏普，《公民防衛：超軍事的武器系統》，(普林斯頓，紐澤西州，普林斯頓大學出版社，1990年)，第89-111頁；吉恩夏普，《讓歐洲無法被征服：公民嚇阻與防衛的潛力》，(劍橋，麻州，博齡格書局，1986年)，第88-118頁，(倫敦，泰勒與佛蘭西斯出版社，1985年)，第113-151頁；及，亞當羅伯茲，《公民防衛之戰略》，發表於亞當羅伯茲編輯之《公民防衛之戰略》，(倫敦，發巴與發巴出版社，1967年)；美國版：《公民抵抗之國家防衛》，(哈里斯堡，賓州，史塔克波爾，1968年)，第215-251頁。其他的來源在夏普《讓歐洲無法被征服(博齡格版本)》，第160-161頁。





demonstrators; conversely leaving the streets completely empty; massive subversion of the attackers' troops and functionaries; defiant publication of newspapers and broadcasts by radio and television with news of the attack and resistance; a general strike; and an economic shutdown (by both workers and managers).

選擇出最合適的行動方法是最重要的，最初的反政變戰略可能會使用下列某些非暴力的武器：每個人都待在家裡；癱瘓叛變者想佔據之政治體系中的每個部門；根據攻擊之前的政策與法律(蔑視叛變者的命令與政策)，努力去維持政治體系中未受控制部門的運作；讓示威者到處充滿街道；或相反地讓街道完全淨空；大規模去顛覆攻擊者的部隊與執行的官員；反威權地出版報紙與無線電及電視廣播，有關政變攻擊與抵抗的新聞；總罷工；及讓經濟停擺(員工與管理者一起做)。

It is important to give primary responsibility in the defense struggle to those methods that directly counter the putschists' initial objectives. These objectives will be primarily related to achieving and consolidating control over the political system and undermining the opposition to the coup. Economic aims are unlikely to be among the putschists' initial objectives. (Economic objectives may be in some cases longer-term aims, such as to keep control of the economic system primarily in the hands of

an existing elite or to use the state to take over control or ownership of the economic system.)

賦予防衛抗爭中這些方法的主要任務是有其重要性的，因為這些方法直接槓上叛變者最初的目標。叛變者的這些目標主要就是要達到與鞏固政治體系的控制，並且破壞政變的反對勢力。經濟不太可能是叛變者最初的目標。(在某些案例中，經濟可能是較長期的目標，例如掌握由既有菁英手中的經濟體系，或以國家的身分去接管經濟體系的控制權或所有權)。

Control of the economic system is seldom, if ever, an initial objective of a coup d'état. Therefore, general strikes or economic shut-downs are rarely the most relevant and effective substantive resistance methods in anti-coup action. Applied in short bursts, they can, however, demonstrate the solidity of the will to resist. When applied for an extended period, however, these economic weapons can imperil the capacity of the attacked society to survive its own defense. A general strike, for example, would usually be used only at the very beginning of the anti-coup defense to show the determination of the society to resist the attack, or later in the struggle for some specified but limited purpose, such as to protest extreme brutalities. The general strike or an economic shut-down might also be used when it was thought that a massive

and dramatic expression of resistance might strike a coup de grâce to the attack.

控制經濟體系的做法，如果有的話，很少是軍事政變者的初期目標。因此，總罷工或經濟的停擺在反政變行動中很少是最相關與最有效而重要的抵抗方法。不過，它們可以用短暫爆發的方式來展示抵抗意志的堅定。然而，如果應用的時間延長了，這些經濟武器可能破壞這個受攻擊的社會在它自己的防衛中存活下來的能力。舉例來說，一個總罷工通常會用在反政變防衛的初期，以展現社會抵抗政變攻擊的決心，或者在之後某些特定而小型的目標，例如抗議極端殘暴的行爲。在認為以大規模與戲劇性地展示抵抗力量有可能對政變給予最後致命的一擊(coup de grâce)的時候，也可以使用這個總罷工與經濟的停擺。

Much more important initially will be those specific methods that aim directly at the putschists' initial objectives. These would be ones that: (1) show repudiation of the putschists' claims to legitimacy; (2) block their taking control of the political machinery of the state (as by noncooperation of civil servants, police, military forces, lower levels of government, etc.); (3) demonstrate the populations repudiation of the coup and its noncooperation and disobedience against it; (4) block the putschists' efforts to control the means of communication and instead maintain this through various

means including print media and radio; and (5) defy the putschists' efforts to neutralize or control the independent institutions of the society. If the means of defense cited here can be applied massively and effectively to achieve these aims, the coup can only collapse.

在政變初期更重要的是那些針對叛變者之最初目標的具體方法。這些應該就是：(1)展現出拒絕叛變者宣稱的合法性；(2)阻撓他們對國家政治機器的控制(如公務人員、警察、軍隊、地方政府等等的合作)；(3)展示民衆對政變的排斥及他們以不合作、不服從的態度來對抗它；(4)阻擋叛變者控制通訊工具的努力，反而透過多樣的手段，維持對包括平面媒體與無線電台的抵制；(5)公然反抗叛變者要控制或使社會上之獨立機構維持中立的努力。如果以上這些防衛的手段都能廣泛地並有效率地應用來達到所要的目標，那政變就只能崩潰了。

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自我解放戰略規劃指南——延伸閱讀①

## Guidelines for general resistance 一般性抵抗的指導原則

Guidelines for general resistance against coups can be formulated in advance of any possible coup. Such guidelines would constitute basic elements for an effective anti-coup strategy, instructing the population on how to resist. These could include the following:

對抗政變之一般性抵抗的指導原則可以在任何可能的政變之前就加以擬定。為了一套有效率的反政變戰略以指導

民衆如何抵抗，這樣的指導原則可由一些基本要素來組成，包括了下列各項：

- Repudiate the coup and denounce its leaders as illegitimate, meriting only rejection as a government. The denunciation of the putschists as illegitimate should be supported by moral, political, and religious leaders, officials and members in all of the society's institutions (including education, the media, and communications), and national, local, regional, and provincial governments and officials (including heads of state and any royalty). Refuse to give any legitimacy to the putschists by any means, including efforts to negotiate a compromise between them and the legitimate political leaders.
- 否定政變並且譴責政變領導者是非法的，不值得接受它成爲一個政府。對叛變者非法性的譴責應由道德、政治與宗教的領袖、所有社會機構（也包含教育、媒體與通訊等）及全國性、地方性、區域性及省級政府官員（包括國家行政首長與皇室）與成員的共同聲援。拒絕以任何方式給予叛變者任何的合法地位，包括政變者與合法之政治領導者之間協商的努力。
- Regard all decrees and orders from the putschists contradicting established law as illegal, and refuse to obey them.

- 把所有叛變者與現有法律產生矛盾的政令與命令均視為違法，並且拒絕遵從。
- Keep all resistance strictly nonviolent in order to make the anti-coup defense the most effective possible. Refuse to be provoked into violent or other imprudent action.
- 所有的抵抗運動嚴格遵守非暴力之方式，以便將反政變防衛發揮至最高效率。拒絕被激化演變成暴力或其他魯莽的行動。
- Refuse and disobey all attempts by the putschists to establish and extend controls over the governmental apparatus and society.
- 拒絕並且反抗叛變者想要建立與擴張對政府機關及社會控制的企圖。
- Noncooperate with the putschists in all ways. This applies to the general population; all experts and technocrats; all leaders of the previous governments and of political parties; all branches of the central or federal government, state, regional, and local governments, including their civil servants and bureaucrats; key occupational and professional groups; all staff of the media and communications; all staff of transportation systems; the police; members and units of the military forces; all judges and employees of the judicial system; the staffs

of all financial institutions, both governmental and private; and officers and members of all other institutions of the society.

- 以所有的方式對叛變者採取不合作的行動，這適用於一般民眾、所有專家與技術人員、所有前政府與政黨的領導者、所有中央或聯邦政府的分支機構、州級、區域性與地方政府，包括他們的公務人員及官員、關鍵性職業與專業性的團體、媒體及通訊所有的從業人員、運輸系統所有的從業人員、警察、軍隊的單位與成員、所有法官及司法系統人員、所有公家及私人的金融機構從業員，還有社會上其他機構的幹部與成員。
- Persist in maintaining the normal operations of the society in accordance with the pre-attack constitution, laws, and policies of the legitimate government and the society's independent institutions. This should be continued until and unless the persons are physically removed from their workplaces, offices, and activity centers. Even then as far as possible, continue normal operations from other locations. This applies especially to officials and employees of all branches, departments and levels of government.
- 堅持按照政變攻擊之前的規章、法律、合法政府與社會獨立機構的政策，維持社會正常的運作。這要一直

維持到除非這些人的肢體已經被撤離了原來的工作崗位、辦公室與活動中心為止。即使到了這個時候，要盡可能地從別的地方維持這些正常的運作。這特別適用於各級政府之分支機構與部門的官員與員工。

- Preserve the functioning of legitimate political and social organizations. Create backup organizations which may need to assume the functions of organizations attacked or closed down by the putschists.
- 保存合法政府與社會組織的功能性。要建立後備的組織，以便在受到叛變者之攻擊或者關閉後還能繼續發揮其功用。
- Refuse to supply vital information to the putschists and their helpers. For example, where it will help, remove road signs, street names, traffic signs, house numbers, etc. to impede the putschists' activities and protect people from arrest.
- 拒絕提供叛變者及其幫凶重要的資訊。例如，移動路標、街名、交通號誌、門牌號碼等，對阻礙叛變者行動及保護人民而不會被逮捕是有幫助的。
- Refuse to supply the putschists with needed supplies and equipment, hiding these when appropriate.
- 拒絕提供叛變者必須的物資與裝備，適當的時候也可以將這些東西隱藏起來。



- Engage in friendly “creative communication” with the functionaries and troops serving the putschists while continuing resistance. Explain to them the reasons for the defense struggle, affirm the absence of any intended violence against them, seek to undermine their reliability, and try to induce them to be helpful to the defenders. This help might take the forms of deliberate inefficiency in repression, passing information to the defenders, and in extremes to desertion, with soldiers instead joining the defenders in nonviolent struggle for freedom. Attempt to persuade soldiers and functionaries of the need instead to adhere to constitutional and legal procedures.
- 在持續抵抗時，可與為叛變者服務的機關與部隊建立友善的「創造性溝通」，向他們解釋防衛抗爭的理由，向他們確保不會以暴力的方式來對付他們，想辦法破壞他們的可靠度，並規勸他們幫助防衛者。這個幫助可能的形式可以是故意變得沒有效率、傳遞訊息給防衛者，及在極端的情況下拋棄政變，甚至為了爭取自由而加入非暴力抗爭的防衛者。反而有必要試圖說服士兵與機關的官員應該要堅守憲政與法律程序。
- Refuse to assist the putschists in disseminating their propaganda.
- 拒絕為政變者散播他們的宣傳。

- Document in writing, sound, and film the putschists' activities and repression. Preserve the documentation and also distribute the information widely to the defenders, internationally and to the putschists' supporters.
- 將叛變者的活動與鎮壓行為用影、音、文字等方式紀錄成文件，保留並廣泛地散發這些資訊給予防衛者、國際，甚至政變的支持者。

### Treatment of the usurpers' troops and functionaries

#### 對待政變之部隊及其官員的方式

Very early in the coup, the defenders would attempt to communicate with and to warn the putschists, their functionaries, and their troops about the population's hostility to the attack. Words and symbolic actions would be used to communicate the will to resist, to show the type of defense that would be waged, and to urge the putsehists to withdraw.

在政變的最早期，防衛者應該企圖想辦法與叛變者、他們的官員、他們的部隊溝通並提出警告，民衆對政變攻擊所抱持的敵意。應該使用文字與象徵性的行動來表明抵抗的意志、展現即將啓動的防衛方式，並且催促政變者撤退。

Efforts would be made at all phases of the coup to

undermine the loyalty of the putschists' individual soldiers and functionaries. This would be relatively easier in anti-coup resistance than in cases of foreign invasions because the soldiers and functionaries would usually speak the same language as the resisters or at least a common language they both understood. If this were not the case, then communication would still be possible in other ways such as the use of translated leaflets and slogans, or linguistically skilled resisters, or through the defenders' behavior and symbols.

在政變的所有階段都要持續這種破壞叛變者個別士兵與官員之忠貞度的努力，這種方式用在反政變抵抗中會比被外國入侵時相對地容易許多，因為這些士兵與官員，通常和抵抗者都是使用相同的語言或者至少是雙方都能瞭解的共同語言。如果不是在這種情形下，還是可以用其他的溝通方式，例如用翻譯過的傳單與口號、具有語言技術能力的抵抗者，或透過防衛者的行為及象徵圖騰來表達。

The putschists' soldiers would initially be informed that there will be resistance, but that the resistance will be of a special type. In this resistance, the defense would indeed be directed against the attempt to seize control by the coup but would be conducted without harming the soldiers as individuals. If this could be communicated, the soldiers might be more likely to help the defending

population in small ways, to avoid brutalities, and to mutiny at a crisis point, than if the troops expected at any moment to be killed by snipers or bombs.

要讓政變者的士兵一開始就知道將會有抵抗，但這個抵抗將會是一個特別的形式。在這個抵抗中，防衛會確實針對抵抗政變奪取控制的企圖而不會導向傷害士兵的個人安全。如果這樣的訊息能有效地傳達，則士兵們可能在某些小地方上會較願意去幫助防衛的民衆而避免粗暴行爲，甚至在關鍵的時刻倒戈，而不是讓部隊時時擔心會被狙擊手或炸彈殺害。

Repeated demonstrations that there is no violent intent or threat toward the individual soldiers, accompanied by clear resistance, are very important. This combination has the greatest chance of increasing the effectiveness of the anti-coup defense. Strong resistance without personal threat or violence may, at least among some soldiers, create or aggravate their morale problems. The problems may be expressed in uncertain loyalties to the putschists, problems of maintaining self-respect while inflicting repression on nonviolent people, and in extremes, disaffection and mutiny.

一再的示威表達在明確的抵抗下，不會有針對士兵個人有暴力意圖或傷害，這是很重要的。這樣的結合最有機會增加了反政變防衛的效力。沒有針對個人的威脅或暴力之強

力抵抗，可能至少會讓某些士兵產生或擴大他們士氣的問題。這些問題可能表現在對叛變者忠誠的不確定性、在對非暴力人民強力鎮壓時要維持自尊，在極端的情形下產生不滿而倒戈。

There can be no guarantee, however, that the putschists' troops will be favorably affected by the nonviolent discipline, especially in the short run. They may still perpetrate brutalities and kill nonviolent resisters. Such tragedies do not, however, mean the failure of the resistance. Instead, given continued, disciplined resistance, brutalities can weaken the putschists and strengthen the defense struggle, as discussed in later sections.

不過，無法保證叛變者的部隊會因非暴力原則而產生有利的影響，特別是在短期內。他們可能仍然犯下暴行並且殺害非暴力的抵抗者。不過，這樣的悲劇並不意味著抵抗的失敗。相反地，如果繼續有紀律地抵抗，殘暴的行動會削弱叛變者的力量，並且會強化防衛的抗爭，如以下章節之討論。

## Facing attack: obstruction and communication 面對攻擊：阻斷與溝通

Although this anti-coup defense does not work by attacking the putschists' troops militarily, some limited

action affecting the troops would be taken even at the first stage of an attack. If identified in time, the deployment of the putchists' troops could be temporarily blocked by obstructionist activities on highways, streets, airports, railroads, and the like. The entry or movement of troops could be delayed by such means as refusal to operate the railroads, blocking highways and airports with many abandoned automobiles and at times on streets and roads by human barricades.

雖然這個反政變防衛不會以武力方式來攻擊叛變者的部隊，但在政變攻擊的初始階段可以採取一些小型可以影響部隊的行動。如果在時間上可以及時辨認，叛軍部隊的調動部署可以藉著阻礙的行動，暫時將他們阻斷在公路、街道、機場、鐵路及類似的地方。部隊的進入與移動可以藉著諸如拒絕鐵路的運作、用許多棄置的車輛封鎖公路與機場、有時也用人身路障來擋住街道與馬路等，讓他們受到延誤。

Although such obstructionist activities against the deployment of troops would only be effective briefly, these actions would make clear to the individual soldiers that, whatever they might have been told, they were not welcome as troops of the coup. The people will also urge the soldiers not to believe the coup leaders propaganda.

雖然以這樣的阻斷行動來對抗部隊部署只能短暫地有效，但這些行為無疑可以清楚地讓個別的士兵知道，不管別

人告訴他們什麼，他們屬於政變部隊的一員是不受歡迎的。同時人民也要鼓勵士兵不要相信政變領導者的宣傳。

As other symbolic actions, the people could wear mourning bands, stage a stay-at-home, conduct a limited general strike, or defy curfews. Such actions would serve two purposes. They would give notice to friend and foe that the coup will be firmly resisted. At the same time the actions would help to build up the people's morale so as to discourage submission and collaboration with the putschists. These actions, however, would be only a symbolic prelude to the later substantive resistance.

做其他象徵性的行動，人民可以戴起哀悼緞帶、發期待在家裡、進行小型的總罷工或反抗宵禁。這些行動有兩個目的，它們可以同時昭告朋友與敵人，政變將會堅定地受到抵抗。同時，這樣的行動有助於建立人民的士氣，以便使那些想要向叛變者屈服或合作的人覺得沮喪。不過，這些行動只是為日後主要抵抗揭開了具象徵意義的序幕。

The following symbolic methods might be used to help communicate the population's will to resist to the putschists and their forces: leaflets, letters, radio and television broadcasts, personal conversations, newspapers, posters, banners, diplomatic messages, statements at regional and United Nations meetings,

third-party assistance, painted messages and slogans, and special types of demonstrations. These means of communication and warning could be aimed at the attackers' troops, leaders, and current and potential supporters of the coup.

以下一些象徵性的方法可以用來幫忙將民衆抵抗的意志傳達給叛變者與他們的部隊：傳單、信件、無線電台與電視的廣播、私人的對話、報紙、海報、布幅、外交訊息、聯合國與地區性會議的聲明、第三者的協助、圖畫的訊息與標語及特殊形式的示威活動。這些溝通與警告的工具可以針對政變攻擊者的軍隊、領袖及政變當前與潛在的支持者。

## Facing attack: repudiation and rejection 面對攻擊：否定與拒絕

In the first hours, days and weeks after a coup d'état is attempted it is extremely important to take quick and solid action to block the putschists from becoming accepted and from establishing effective control over the state apparatus and the society. An immediate strategy of repudiation and rejection of the putschists and their attack is called for in order to defeat the coup quickly. That strategy would combine repudiation of claims to legitimacy and rejection of cooperation. It would include total or near total noncooperation with the putschists. An early defeat of the coup would make unnecessary a later long-term



struggle with an entrenched and therefore much stronger oppressive regime.

在軍事政變發動後最初的幾個小時、幾天、幾週，最重要的就是採取快速而堅定的行動去阻擋政變者變成被接受，及讓他們無法對國家機構與社會建立有效的控制。呼籲立即採取一個否定與拒絕政變者與政變攻擊行為的戰略，以便快速地擊退政變。這個戰略結合否定政變者宣稱的合法性及拒絕與其合作，可以包括全面性或幾乎全面性的對叛變者採取不合作。早期就將政變擊敗，可以因此免去日後長期與更強大的壓迫政權做艱困的抗爭。

Because coup attempts are generally at their weakest point in the first hours and days, it is vital that anti-coup defenders undertake immediate and resolute action against the attackers. The defense must be broad and deep enough in the society to constitute a resolute repudiation of the putschists. The attackers' appeals for "national unity"—meaning supporting them—and to allow them time to prove their good intentions, must be dismissed.

因為政變通常在最初的數個小時與數天是最脆弱的，因此反政變防衛者要立即採取立即而堅決的行動對抗攻擊者是很重要的。這個防衛的範疇必須更廣泛與更深入，才能讓社會形成對叛變者堅決的否定。政變者會以「國家團結」作訴求——意味著要支持他們——並允許他們用時間來證明他

們的好意，這種訴求要斷然加以駁回。

## Blocking control by the putschists 阻擋叛變者的控制

Politicians, civil servants, and judges, by ignoring or defying the attackers' illegal orders, would keep the normal machinery of government and the courts out of the putschists' control—as happened in the German resistance to the Kapp Putsch in 1920.

政治人物、公務人員與法官都可藉著忽略與藐視攻擊者的非法命令，而使得政府與法庭的正常機器不會受到叛變者的控制，如同1920年德國抵抗卡普的叛亂事件一樣。

The legislature would neither receive the putschists themselves nor comply with any orders or requests from them. Instead, the legislature might continue sitting and operating under the established constitution, unless or until the members were actually physically removed by the putschists' forces. Or, the legislature could disperse after issuing a call for popular and governmental resistance to the coup. The members of the legislature could then join the population in other aspects of the defense struggle.

立法機關也不要接見政變者及遵守任何來自叛變者的命令或要求。反而，立法機關應繼續不為所動而在原有的憲政機制下運作，除非或者直到其成員被叛變者的武力所移除

爲止。否則，可以在發佈要政府與民衆抵抗政變的命令後解散國會，然後立法機關的成員便可從其他方面加入民衆從事防衛抗爭。

Neither the government treasury nor private banks would provide money or credit to the putschists. In 1920, for example, the German Reichsbank refused money to the putschists, declaring that the name of Dr. Kapp, a main coup leader, was not on the list of approved signers for the withdrawal of state funds.

不論是政府的國庫或私人銀行都不要提供金錢或借貸給予叛變者。例如，1920年德國的德意志中央銀行便拒絕提供資金給叛變者。銀行宣稱，政變之主要領導者卡普博士的名字，並不在可以提領國家基金的認可簽字名單上。

The judiciary would declare the putschists and their helpers an illegal and unconstitutional body. The courts would continue to operate on the basis of pre-invasion laws and constitution. They would refuse to give moral, legal, and repressive assistance to the attackers, even if they had to close the courts. Order would then be maintained by social pressures, solidarity, and nonviolent sanctions; underground courts and independent arbiters could be used.

司法部門要聲明叛變者及其同黨是非法與違憲的集

團，法庭則要繼續以入侵前的法律與憲法來運作，他們應該要拒絕給予攻擊者在道德的、合法的與壓制上的協助，即使他們必須關閉法庭也一樣。秩序將由社會壓力、團結、非暴力制裁來維繫，可以運用地下法庭與獨立仲裁者。

The putschists should be met with a blanket refusal by the government bureaucracy and civil servants to carry out their instructions, as occurred in the resistance to the Kapp Putsch. Or, the bureaucrats and civil servants might simply continue the old policies, ignoring the putschists' orders, and disrupting the implementation of new policies.

政變者應該遭遇到來自政府官員與公務人員全面性地拒絕執行其指示，如同發生在卡普叛亂事件中的抵抗一樣。否則，政府官員與公務人員只要繼續執行舊的政策、忽略叛變者的命令，及中斷新政策的執行。

Police could be most effective when they brazenly defy the putschists, refusing illegitimate instructions while attempting to continue their normal duties. When under extreme duress, they could fake compliance with the putschists' orders but by evasion and deliberate inefficiencies never implement them.

警察可以做得最有效，在他們執行例常勤務時，公然地反抗叛變者、拒絕其不合法的指示。當在極端無理的壓力下，他們可以假裝遵守叛變者的命令，但是以逃避及故意沒

有效率的方式，而實際上卻從未去執行。

Journalists and printers, refusing to submit to the putschists' censorship, would publish banned newspapers, newsheets, and other publications in large or many small editions. Broadcasters and technicians would broadcast resistance radio programs from hidden transmitters or from uncontrolled or even foreign territory. For example, President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Debré broadcast appeals from Paris aimed at French army conscripts and officers involved in the coup in Algeria, calling on them to disobey their rebellious officers.

記者與出版業者拒絕屈服於叛變者的審查制度，應該要大規模的或是以許多小型版面發行被禁的新聞報紙、新聞快報與其他刊物。廣播員與技工可以從地下電台、未淪陷區，甚或從國外播放抵抗運動的廣播節目。例如，戴高樂總統與狄布勒(Debré)首相從巴黎透過廣播，鎖定在阿爾及利亞參與政變的法國士兵及官員，呼籲他們不要服從叛亂的長官。

At the same time, efforts should be made to persuade persons who are participating in the coup, and especially those in lower ranks of the military or other organizations who are being ordered to support the coup, that they should instead refuse to obey orders to carry out illegal

activities. Where the dangers to such persons would be great, they might take various types of evasive action or disappear into the general population rather than support the anti-constitutional usurpation.

在同一時刻，也要努力去說服那些參與政變的人，特別是那些軍中或其他組織中接到命令要支持政變的基層人員，反而要他們拒絕遵守與執行非法行動的命令。這些人可能會有很大的危險，因此他們會採取各種逃避的方式或者消失在民衆之中，而不會支持違憲的叛亂。

In some past cases, resisters to government oppression have actively attempted to befriend troops under hostile command to induce them to be mild in their repression or even to join in the democratic resistance. At times such efforts have succeeded. Resisters to coups need to be aware of such options and prepared to apply them.

從過去的例子來看，對抗政府壓迫的抵抗者曾經積極地嘗試與奉有敵意命令的部隊保持友好關係，並規勸他們在鎮壓行動中以溫和的方式進行，甚至加入民主抵抗運動。有時候，這樣的努力曾經成功過。政變的抵抗者必須要察覺這種替代方案是可行的，並且準備去運用它們。

The cumulative impact of such institutional noncooperation is to prevent the coup leaders from

controlling both the government and the society. By blocking such control, the defenders maintain and even increase their ability to continue long-term resistance, should that be required in case the coup does not collapse quickly.

這種制度性之不合作的累積效應，就是爲了避免讓政變領導者能夠同時控制政府與社會。假如政變無法迅速崩潰，必須藉著阻擋他們的控制，防衛者才可以維持或甚至增強他們持續長期抵抗的能力。

## Defying repression and intimidation 鎮壓與威脅的反抗

Putschists facing strong and well-prepared anti-coup defense are likely to be seriously threatened, and therefore may respond with repression. This is certain to be a difficult time for the defenders and the whole population. Arrests, imprisonment, beatings, concentration camps, shootings, executions, for example, may take a heavy toll on the defenders. However, in themselves the repressive measures are not decisive unless they invoke fear and submissiveness in the defenders. In fact, the opponents' repression is evidence of the power of the nonviolent struggle, and is no more reason for despair than if, in a regular war, the enemy shoots back, wounding and killing one's own soldiers.

叛變者面對強大而準備完善的反政變防衛很可能會感

到嚴重的威脅，因而可能用鎮壓的方式來回應。無疑地，這對防衛者與全體民衆來說，是一個很艱困的時刻。諸如逮捕、監禁、毆打、集中營、槍殺、處決等都會造成防衛者重大的傷亡。不過，除非它們會造成防衛者的恐懼與屈服，這些鎮壓的手段「本身」並不具有決定性的影響。事實上，對手的高壓正是非暴力抗爭具有力量的最佳證明，而且比起正規作戰中，敵我士兵相互傷害與槍殺來說，這並沒有理由讓人感到洩氣沮喪。

Against an anti-coup defense, repression may be used to crush resistance and also to instill fear. The Chinese saying is: "Kill the chicken to scare the monkey." However, as has occurred in numerous struggles, if the resisters and population refuse to be intimidated into submission and passivity, then the repression may fail.

爲了對付反政變防衛，鎮壓就是用來粉碎抵抗同時要造成恐懼，中國諺語就這麼說：「殺雞儆猴。」不過，就許多抗爭的案例來看，只要抵抗者與民衆拒絕因受到威嚇而屈服順從，鎮壓終歸會失敗。

Nonviolent defiance often risks serious casualties, but it seems to produce far fewer casualties than when both sides use violence. At the same time, persistence in nonviolent struggle contributes to much greater chance for success than if the resisters had chosen to fight a



militarily-prepared opponent with violence.

非暴力的反抗時常冒著嚴重傷亡的危險，但比起雙方都使用暴力來說，它所製造的傷亡是「少很多」的。同時，堅持使用非暴力抗爭的方式，比起選擇使用暴力方式而與做好武力準備的對手打仗，會大大地提高了成功的機會。

The putschists may demonstrate grave ruthlessness, such as by killing the head of state and other top political leaders. This brutality may not only be done to frighten the population into acceptance of the coup. Such killings also create clear vacancies in government leadership which the putschists aim to fill themselves. Therefore, an important part of anti-coup preparations is to determine clearly the line of political succession, minimally for several replacements.

政變者會藉著諸如殺害國家元首與其他高層的政治領袖來展現他的冷血無情，這樣的暴行可能不只是爲了要讓民衆因爲恐懼而接受政變，這樣的殺害更是爲了製造政府領導的空缺而讓政變者可以填補上他們自己。因此，在反政變準備中的一個重要部分就是清楚地決定政治繼承的順序，更換職務要盡量做到最少程度。

## The importance of nonviolent discipline 非暴力紀律的重要性

Recognizing that violence undermines the dynamics

and strength of nonviolent struggle, the putschists may often deliberately seek to provoke the resisters to use violence. Violence and plans to use violence may be falsely attributed to resisters. Repression, particularly brutal repression, may be intended to provoke the resisters into a violent response. At other times, agents provocateurs are placed within resistance groups to instigate or even commit acts of violence in order to support the charge that the resisters are using violence. All these provocations to violence must be rebuffed if the defenders are not to undermine their own defense.

認知到暴力會破壞非暴力抗爭的動力平衡與力量後，叛變者可能會企圖蓄意去煽動抵抗者使用暴力。故意將暴力與使用暴力的計畫栽贓給抵抗者，並使用鎮壓，特別是殘暴的鎮壓方式去激起抵抗者的暴力反應。有時候會在抵抗團體中安插「挑唆特務」來慫恿民衆或甚至自己故意犯下暴行，成爲抵抗者使用暴力的罪證。如果防衛者不想破壞他們自己的防衛，便要嚴厲拒絕那些刺激挑起暴力的行爲。

This anti-coup defense is based on the technique of nonviolent struggle. A grand strategic requirement of nonviolent struggle is that courageous struggle must be combined with nonviolent discipline.<sup>15</sup> Nothing is to

<sup>15</sup> See Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp. 586-620.

參閱吉恩夏普，《非暴力行動的政治》，第586-620頁。

be gained, and a lot can be lost, by the killing of young soldiers who have found themselves in the putschists' army. The perpetration of violence, especially killings by the resisters, helps to undermine the otherwise nonviolent struggle in several ways. Resistance violence may help unite the putschists' basic supporters and military forces against the anti-coup defenders. In contrast, the main defense strategy regarding such soldiers is to undermine their morale and to induce them to become unreliable and even to mutiny. That aim is made almost impossible to achieve when the soldiers are targets of resistance violence.

這個反政變的防衛是奠立於非暴力抗爭技巧的基礎上。非暴力抗爭中總體大戰略的必要條件就是，勇敢的抗爭必須與非暴力的紀律互相結合。<sup>15</sup> 殺害那些知道自己身處於叛軍中的年輕士兵是得不償失的做法。陷入暴力的使用，特別是抵抗者造成的殺戮，會在許多其他方面破壞非暴力抗爭。抵抗運動的暴力會幫助政變的基本支持者與軍隊，更加團結來對付反政變的防衛者。相反的，對付這些士兵的主要防衛戰略就是要去破壞他們的士氣，並藉規勸他們使之不再可靠而動搖，甚至倒戈。當士兵是抵抗者之暴力攻擊目標的時候，這樣的目標就幾乎不可能達到了。

Violence by the defenders will be used by the putschists to “justify” overwhelming repression which they

wanted to use anyhow. It will be used to claim that the putschists are saving the country from terrorism or civil war, and are preserving “law and order”. Violence by the defenders may also weaken their own side, as people may be less willing to support or employ violence than participate in a fully nonviolent resistance.

防衛者的暴力行爲會被叛變者拿來做爲「合理化」他們本來無論如何都會做全面鎮壓的理由，它也會被叛變者利用來宣稱他們可以將國家從恐怖主義與內戰中拯救出來，並且維持「法律與秩序」。防衛者的暴力行動也會削弱他們自己的力量，人民會參與一場完全非暴力的抵抗運動而較不願意去支持或使用暴力。

Repression of defiant and disciplined nonviolent resisters can at times have the opposite effect to that intended by the repressor. In this situation there is a strong tendency for the violent repression to react against the repressors own power position. This is the process called “political jiu-jitsu.”

用鎮壓對付反威權而有紀律的非暴力抵抗者，有時候也會產生出乎鎮壓者意料之外的效果。在這種情形下，這個暴力的鎮壓就會出現一個強烈的傾向反向作用到鎮壓者自己的權力地位上，這種過程稱之爲「政治柔道術」(political jiu-jitsu)。

Repression against courageous but nonviolent resisters can harm the repressors' power position in several ways. Such repression and the impact of brutalities may at times help to increase the numbers of resisters among the defending population and increase their determination. They may also sow doubts and reservations in the minds of the putschists' troops and other supporters, creating unease, opposition, and finally disaffection and resistance among the attackers' own population, functionaries, and military forces. Heavy repression against the nonviolent defenders may also amuse stronger international opposition to the coup and mobilize international opinion and diplomatic and economic action against the putschists.

用鎮壓來對抗勇敢但有紀律的非暴力抵抗者，會在許多方面對鎮壓者的權力地位產生傷害。這樣的鎮壓與殘暴的衝擊可能有時候會有助於增加防衛民衆中的抵抗者人數，並且提升他們的決心，也會在叛軍及其支持者心中留下質疑與異議，造成心神不安、反對，而最後導致在政變攻擊者自己民衆、官員與軍隊中產生不滿與抵抗。用劇烈的鎮壓來對抗非暴力的防衛者也可能引起國際上強烈地反對政變，並促使國際以輿論、外交與經濟的行動來對抗叛變者。

This process of political jiu-jitsu is a great help when it occurs. However, the strategy of the anti-coup defense

should not depend upon it. The strategy should instead concentrate primarily on the repudiation of the putschists' legitimacy and defy their attempts to gain control through massive noncooperation and political defiance.

這種政治柔道術的過程發生時，是很有幫助的。不過，反政變防衛的戰略不應該依賴在它身上。這個戰略應該主要集中在否定叛變者的合法性，並且透過大規模的不合作與政治上的反抗去對抗叛變者奪取控制的企圖。

In summary, maintenance of nonviolent resistant behavior by the anti-coup defenders is likely to contribute to: (1) winning sympathy and support, (2) reducing casualties, (3) inducing disaffection and mutiny of the opponents' troops, (4) attracting maximum participation in the nonviolent struggle, and (5) winning wider support. Nonviolent discipline is a key factor in achieving these aims.

總結的說，反政變防衛者保持「非暴力」抵抗行為可能有助於：(1)贏得同情與支持，(2)降低傷亡，(3)引起對方部隊的不滿與反叛，(4)吸引最多之非暴力抗爭的參與，(5)贏得更廣泛的支持。非暴力的紀律就是達到這些目標的關鍵要素。

## International support 國際的支持

Only occasionally, as against the August 1991 Soviet

coup, as well as in opposition to the September 1991 coup in Haiti, has serious supportive international diplomatic and economic action been threatened or taken against coups d'état. However, as the case in Haiti of international sanctions to restore President Aristide suggests, successful defense against coups by largely international action may not be effective. Instead, successful defense primarily depends on noncooperation and defiance within the attacked country.

很少有像1991年8月對抗蘇維埃的政變與1991年9月海地政變的反抗一樣，有受到來自國際外交與經濟行動的重大支持，而會去威脅或用來對抗軍事政變。不過，就海地的案例來看，國際制裁要使艾里斯泰德(Aristide)總統復位，說明了藉著大規模的國際行動來對抗政變不見得是有效的。相反的，成功的防衛主要依靠在發生政變之國內的不合作與反威權抵抗。

Sometimes, however, international support can be influential in assisting anti-coup struggles. Governments could refuse diplomatic recognition of the putschists and declare a prohibition on economic aid, as the United States and other countries did in reaction to the 1991 Soviet coup attempt. Such governments and societies could also provide technical and economic assistance, publishing, radio, and television services, and telecommunications support to the civilian defenders.

Such measures could be planned in advance.

但是有時候國際的支持對反政變的抗爭有正面影響，外國政府可以拒絕對叛變者做外交上的承認並做出禁止經濟援助的聲明，就像美國與其他國家在1991年對蘇維埃政變時所做的反應一樣。這些外國政府與社會團體，也可以提供技術上與經濟上的援助、出版、無線電、電視、電信等援助給防衛的公民。這些手段可以在事先就規劃好。

The nonviolent and defiant character of this type of anti-coup defense may stimulate much international publicity and sympathy. At times political sympathy may lead to diplomatic and international economic pressures against the putschists. In the defeat of the August 1991 attempted coup d'état in the Soviet Union, the internal actions—especially reluctance of soldiers within the military to obey the putschists' orders—seem to have been much more important. However, the diplomatic pressures and threats of international economic action seem to have been a significant supplementary factor. This case illustrates that under certain conditions international pressures can further weaken the putschists and strengthen the cause of the civilian defenders. However, there should be no romanticism that international public opinion or even international diplomatic and economic pressure can defeat a coup without determined and strong



defense by the attacked society itself.

這種具非暴力與反抗特質的反政變防衛類型，可能會激發出來許多國際的輿論注意與同情。有時候政治上的同情可能會引發對叛變者外交上與國際上的經濟壓力。1991年蘇聯軍事政變的失敗，國內的行動——特別是叛軍的士兵不願服從叛變者的命令——可以說佔了較重要的角色。不過，外交壓力與國際經濟行動的威脅似乎也是重要的互補因素。這個例子說明了在某種條件下，國際壓力會進一步削弱叛變者，並且強化公民防衛的理由。不過，不應該抱持太浪漫的想法，認為只靠國際的輿論、外交與經濟壓力就可擊敗政變，而不需要受攻擊之社會本身堅定與強大的防衛。

## Shifts in strategy during the struggle 抗爭中的戰略調整

Shifts in strategy by the civilian defenders may be required at certain points to counter new objectives of the attackers, to correct for exposed weaknesses or unexpected strengths among the defenders, and in order to maximize the impact of the defenders' resistance—based on denying legitimacy and refusing cooperation.

在否定合法性與拒絕合作的基礎上，到了某些特定的時刻，公民防衛者可能有必要做戰略的調整，以對付攻擊者的新目標、修正防衛者已暴露的弱點或意料之外的優點，並且將防衛者抵抗運動之影響擴增到最大限度。

The coup leaders may soon discover that they are confronted by a comprehensive fighting force of the general population, organized through its social institutions. The putschists may at some point realize that they are unable to bring the society under their control, and that the defense is strong enough to force them to call off the whole venture. If this does not occur, the defenders must intensify their efforts to undermine the attackers' regime.

政變的領導者很快地便會發現，他們所面對的是一股結合由社會機構所組織起來之一般民衆的全面戰鬥力量。叛變者可能到了某個時刻會瞭解到，他們無法控制住整個社會，而且抵抗的力量會強大到足以使他們取消整個冒險的行動。但如果這個事情沒有發生，防衛者就必須加強努力去破壞攻擊者的政權。

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Where the putschists' control has already weakened significantly, or appears likely to do so shortly, it may be time for another intense application of the strategy of repudiation and rejection. This may prove, however, to be simply another phase of the conflict followed instead by a strategy of concentrating resistance only at especially important issues. Or, the total noncooperation strategy may prove to be a final blow to the coup.

當叛變者的控制已經明顯地受到削弱或者很快就可能

變成這個樣子的時候，這就是開始要在那裡應用更強烈之否定與拒絕戰略的時候。不過，這可能證明只是針對特殊重要議題之集中抵抗戰略衝突之後的另一個階段。否則，全面不合作的戰略可以證明就是給予政變的最後一擊。

## A durable success 可長可久的成功

Success in anti-coup defense depends on several key factors. These include, among others, the spirit of resistance, the solidarity of the defending population, the strength of the defending society, the ability of the people to maintain resistance and nonviolent discipline, the strengths and weaknesses of the putschists, the choice of the putschists' strategy of attack, and the wisdom of the defense strategies.

反政變防衛的成功有賴幾個關鍵要素，這些因素當中包括抵抗的精神、防衛民衆的團結、防衛之社會的力量、人民維持抵抗與非暴力紀律的能力、叛變者的優劣點、叛變者選擇的攻擊戰略與防衛者戰略的智慧。

Victory with this anti-coup defense will come only to those who have developed it into a refined and powerful political tool operating with a wise strategy. As with military conflict, genuine power capacity and defense strength are required in this type of defense. Defeat of

the constitutional defenders is always possible, just as defeat occurs in traditional war. However, there are strong signs that a determined people will have strong chances of achieving success with such an anti-coup defense, and that with fewer casualties and less destruction than would accompany a military struggle.

只有那些能夠利用明智戰略以擬定精心及強力之政治工具的人才能在反政變防衛中取得勝利。和軍事中的衝突一樣，真實權力的能力與防衛的力量在這種類型的防衛中都是必要的。憲政的防衛者被擊敗是有可能的，就如在傳統戰爭中會戰敗一樣。不過，有強烈的跡象顯示，在這樣的反政變防衛中，有決心的人民會有更大的機會達到成功，並且與軍事抗爭相比，會有較少的傷亡與較低程度的破壞。

## In case of need for long-term defense 有長期防衛的必要時

If the anti-coup defense is not successful within days or a few weeks, a new strategic situation will have been created. The putschists will have probably succeeded in establishing a modicum of legitimacy, acceptance, cooperation, and control. The conflict will then have been changed from a short-term anti-coup defense to a longer-term struggle against an established dictatorship. For that rather different conflict situation only some suggestive

lines of resistance can be outlined here.<sup>16</sup>

如果反政變防衛無法在數日或幾個禮拜內成功，就會產生新的戰略情勢。叛變者可能已經成功地建立一個較低程度的合法性、接受度、合作與控制。衝突會從短期的反政變防衛演變成要與已建立之獨裁政權做較長期的抗爭。因為這是個相當不同的衝突情勢，這裡只能建議一些抵抗方式的大致方向。<sup>16</sup>

In that resistance a strategy of total noncooperation with the new government would probably not be viable because of the need of the society to survive a longer-term struggle. Instead, a policy of concentrating resistance at various key points would be needed until a resulting change in the balance of forces merited an application of more widespread or total noncooperation in order to bring final success.

在這樣的抵抗裡，因為社會必須能夠維持長期的抗爭，與新政府全面不合作的戰略可能無法持久。反而，爲了要能取得最後的成功，可能必須採取在許多關鍵重點上集中抵抗的政策，直到雙方力量的平衡出現改變，才可開始使用更廣泛或全面的不合作。

16 See Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*. (Bangkok: Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma, 1993 and Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2002.)

參閱吉恩夏普，《從獨裁走向民主：一個解放的觀念架構》，（曼谷，緬甸民主重建委員會，1993年；波士頓，亞伯特愛因斯坦研究院，2002年）。

A longer-term defense strategy against an established dictatorship needs to focus on two main objectives. First, the attackers must be prevented from obtaining any other major objectives beyond the dictatorship itself. If the dictators seek other forms of domination, as economic, ideological, or political, then liberation plans need to concentrate on blocking these. This produces a strategy of “selective resistance,” sometimes called “resistance at key points.”

一個抵抗已建立獨裁政權之較長期的防衛戰略必須聚焦在兩個主要的目標上。第一，要避免政變者獲取任何獨裁政權本身以外其他主要的目標。如果獨裁者尋求其他類型的宰制，如經濟、意識形態或政治等，那麼防衛的規劃就必須集中在阻擋這些目標。這就產生所謂「選擇性抵抗」的戰略，有時也稱之為「重點式的抵抗」。

Under a strategy of selective resistance, people in various professions and occupations might resist only on crucial issues. For example, the police, while attempting to keep criminal elements from taking advantage of the situation, might selectively refuse to locate and arrest democratic resisters, perhaps warning people of impending arrests and repressive actions. Teachers would refuse to introduce the regime’s propaganda into the schools. Workers and managers would use strikes,

delays, and obstructionism to impede exploitation of the country. Clergymen would continue to preach about the duty to refuse to help the dictators.

在選擇性抵抗的戰略下，在各種專業與職業的人們可以只針對重要的議題去抵抗。例如，警察可以在避免犯罪者利用這個情勢作怪的同時，選擇性地拒絕去尋找及逮捕民主陣營的抵抗者，或許可以警告人民即將採取逮捕與鎮壓的行動。老師可以拒絕將政權的宣傳介紹至校園裡，工人與經理人員可以藉著罷工、延誤與蓄意阻撓來阻止國家受到剝削，神職人員可以藉著講道的機會來宣導拒絕幫助獨裁者的責任。

The second main objective of long-term defense is the protection of the autonomy of the society's institutions. When quick success of the anti-coup resistance has not occurred, the new dictators may attempt to control and silence various institutions of the society. These attempts would especially focus on those institutions that have been involved in the earlier defense struggle, such as the courts, schools, unions, cultural groups, professional societies, religious institutions, and the like. If control over such institutions is achieved, the future capacity of the society for resistance will be further weakened. Therefore, the long-term democratic struggle must firmly resist any efforts of the invader to control the society's institutions.

Such institutions are not only points of resistance. They are also actual or potential resistance organizations which can act to defend the society from dictators and to restore the legitimate political system.

長期防衛的第二個主要目標就是要保護社會機構的自治。當反政變抵抗無法快速成功時，新的獨裁者可能會企圖控制社會的各種機構並使他們保持沉默。這些企圖也會特別針對那些在早期曾涉入防衛抗爭的機構，像是法庭、學校、工會、文化團體、專業社團、宗教機構等等，如果他們完全控制了這些機構，社會未來的抵抗能力就會更為薄弱了。因此，長期的民主抗爭必須堅定地抵抗入侵者對社會機構之控制的任何努力。這些機構也是實際上或潛在的抵抗組織，他們可以防衛社會免於受到獨裁者的控制，並且恢復合法的政治體制。

The strategy of selective resistance is cited here only to show that an initial failure to defeat a coup need not doom the society to long-term dictatorship. However, the main anti-coup defense should aim to block the usurpation fully and quickly, well before the putschists have consolidated their control.

這裡強調這個選擇性抵抗的戰略只是要說明，即使最初的政變防衛失敗也不必然會將整個社會帶入長期獨裁政權的毀滅道路上。不過，在叛變者鞏固他們的控制之前，主要的反政變防衛目的應該是將奪權者加以全面與快速的阻擋。



## Collapsing the coup 政變的癱瘓

Such a long-term defense against an established dictatorship may not be needed, however. The initial anti-coup defense struggle may well succeed. If the civilian defenders maintain their discipline and persist in their defiance and noncooperation despite repression, and if they involve significant sections of the populace, the putschists' drive to achieve their aims can be frustrated and finally blocked.

不過，這種對抗已建立獨裁政權之長期防衛並不一定有必要，最初的反政變防衛抗爭可能早就獲得成功。如果公民防衛者即使受到鎮壓能夠維持他們的紀律並且堅持反抗威權與不合作，並且讓民衆的主要部分都能參與，叛變者要完成他們目標的努力，將會受挫並且最後受到阻擋。

The resistance of a prepared people and their institutions may finally prove to be too much for the coup leaders. Their objectives may be denied to them. Their effort to establish control over the society may have failed. The coup attempt may have merely placed the putschists in a political hornets' nest. The numbers of determined, noncooperating, and disobedient defenders may steadily grow. It may become clear that the defiant defenders are

headed for success, a victory enhanced with new vitality and durability.

一個有完善準備之人民及他們所屬機構所組成的抵抗，最終會向政變領導者證明他們的麻煩很大。他們政變的目標被拒絕了，政變者要建立對社會的控制失敗了，政變的企圖只是引起公憤，將叛變者放在一個政治的黃蜂巢內，而有決心、不合作，與不服從之防衛者的數量會持續增加。很清楚地，反抗的防衛正走向成功、一場具備新活力與持久力的勝利。

Great care will then be needed in the transition back to the constitutional system, especially if former political leaders have been killed by the putschists. Where possible, constitutionally selected leaders should be restored to their positions and the previous constitution and laws applied, to be amended in the future where appropriate. Steps should be taken as soon as possible to begin correcting any legitimate problems and grievances that led dissatisfied people to support the coup. The society and government will also do well to consider carefully how the government's democratic qualities can be improved.

在回歸憲政體制的過渡期中必須更加謹慎，特別是在原來的政治領袖們被叛變者所殺害的狀況下。可能的話，恢復憲政程序所選出之領袖們以前的職位，應用原有的憲法與


法律，在未來適當的時候再加以修正。要盡快展開步驟以便開始修正合法性的問題與解決造成人民支持政變的社會不滿。社會與政府也必須要好好努力謹慎思考如何提升政府的民主素質。

## Deterring coups d'état 嚇阻軍事政變

A well-prepared defense capacity against coups d'état can constitute a formidable deterrence against would-be putschists. When a society is known to have a well-prepared anti-coup defense, would-be usurpers anticipating at best a very hard struggle and at worst an ignominious defeat, may well never even attempt a coup.

妥善準備一套對抗政變的防衛能力，會對想成爲叛變者的人具有令其畏懼的威嚇作用。當一個社會清楚地知道有一套完善準備的反政變防衛措施時，可能的篡奪者將會預期在最佳的狀況下會遭受到頑強的抵抗，而最糟糕的狀況下則是可恥地被擊敗，他們自然就絕不會想要政變了。

If would-be putschists or even current government leaders know that if they do not abide by the constitutional limits on their authority, the democratic will of the society will be enforced by political defiance and noncooperation, then they may well decide to stay within their appropriate constitutional roles.




假如可能的叛變者或甚至目前政府的領導者，都知道如果他們不能容忍憲政對他們職權的限制，而政治上的反抗與不合作將會加強社會的民主意志，他們就可能還是會安於扮演他們原本的憲政角色。

This deterrence capacity is completely dependent upon a credible capacity to wage effective resistance against coups d'état. Hence, the only way to prepare deterrence of internal usurpations is to lay the groundwork for strong noncooperation and defiance against such attacks.

這種嚇阻能力完全寄託在一股可靠的能力上，一股能夠運作出有效對抗軍事政變的抵抗能力。因此，嚇阻內部叛亂之唯一的準備方式就是，建立對抗政變攻擊之強力不合作與反抗威權的基礎。

As in military defense, no deterrence capacity is guaranteed to succeed. Attacks may nevertheless occur. If a coup is attempted despite extensive preparations for resistance, then this type of defense could defeat it effectively and potentially very quickly, and restore constitutional government, without the risk of civil war.

和軍事防衛一樣，嚇阻能力並不能夠保證成功。政變攻擊還是可能會發生。儘管全面性的做好準備而政變發生了，那麼這種類型的防衛就可以有效地、有潛力很快地擊敗



政變，並且恢復憲政政府，而不必冒著內戰的風險。

## Promoting an anti-coup defense 反政變防衛之倡導

An early step toward this policy will need to be dissemination throughout the society of the concept of anti-coup defense and exploration of the forms of resistance that are most powerful in defending against usurpations. An informational and educational program can be initiated by individuals and organizations even while the concept is quite new. Articles, newspaper reports, public meetings, discussion groups, radio, television, panel discussions, speakers for various organizations, pamphlets, and books, are among the means of communication and education which can be used. Familiarity with the concept that coups can be successfully resisted through noncooperation and defiance is a prerequisite for the needed careful consideration and active support from the major civil institutions of the society and for organized preparations for such defense.

這個政策的早期步驟就是必須散播反政變防衛的觀念到整個社會，與探討對對抗篡位者最強而有力的形式。即使這個觀念還很陌生，個人與組織也可以創立一個資訊性與教育性的計畫。也可運用文章、新聞報導、大眾會議、討論團體、無線電廣播、電視、專題討論、各種組織的演講、小冊

子、書本等都是溝通與教育的工具。深入了解政變是可以成功地透過不合作與反抗威權來抵抗的觀念，是社會主要公民機構必須仔細思考與積極支持，及爲了進行有組織之準備的先決要件。

Obviously, consideration, adoption, and implementation of this anti-coup defense should not expect support from cliques intent on potentially conducting a coup. However, the anti-coup policy will be strengthened if it receives “transpartisan” consideration, support, and participation. A transpartisan approach would aim to incorporate people and groups with differing convictions and political opinions in support of the development, adoption, and implementation of the anti-coup policy. Given such varied and wide-ranging consideration the support of most of the population for the anti-coup policy will likely be stronger and more united.

顯然地，思考、採納與實踐這個反政變的防衛時，不應該期待得到有潛在政變意圖之黨派的支持。不過，如果反政變政策能夠得到「跨黨派」的考慮、支持及參與，它將會更形堅固。跨黨派做法的目的是要整合不同理念與政治立場的個人與團體，取得他們對反政變政策的發展、採用與實踐等方面的支持。有了這麼多元與大範圍集思廣益之民衆的支持後，反政變的政策會更堅強，而且更加團結。

## Adopting an anti-coup defense 反政變防衛之採用

There are three main ways in which a strong anti-coup defense capacity can be adopted:

有三個可以採用強有力之反政變防衛能力的主要方式：

1.through widespread dissemination, throughout all levels of the society, of knowledge and understanding of the grand strategy and broad forms of anti-coup resistance, as just discussed;

1.透過向社會各階層進行廣泛的宣傳，加強對總體大戰略的理解與知識，及反政變抵抗的各種形式，如上述之討論；

2.through the organization of the institutions of civil society so that they are prepared to confront and resist such an attack; and

2.透過組織公民社會的各機構，讓他們能夠面對並且做好抵抗這類攻擊的準備；及

3.through constitutional and legal changes and organizational efforts within the governmental structure so that it will not be at the disposal of putschists.

3. 透過修改憲法、法律等與政府結構內各種組織的努力，杜絕叛變者的控制。

Ideally, all three of these ways should be applied in sequence or some combination, depending on what is possible or most feasible at the time in the particular situation. However, it is possible to begin the process of education and consideration without certainty as to what will be the final manner of adoption and implementation.

理想上，所有這三種方式都應該按照順序或某種組合，視特殊情況之下的可能性或最有可行性而決定。不過，即使在不知道最後確定要採用與執行的方式下，可以開始進行教育與思考的過程，這是可以做得到的。

### Preparations by the civil institutions 公民機構的準備

Despite the vulnerability of many democratic governments, not all political leaders will see the desirability and feasibility of preparing for anti-coup defense. A capacity for defense against coups d'état is nevertheless important, and needs to be developed. Where the government for whatever reason does not take the initiative in adopting an anti-coup defense policy and preparing for it, the way is open in societies with any degree of civil liberties for the society itself to take action.



In these cases there is a very important role for direct preparations for anti-coup defense by the civil institutions themselves.

儘管許多民主政府是脆弱而易受攻擊的，但並非所有的政治領袖都了解要準備反政變防衛的需求性與可行性。具備抵抗軍事政變防衛能力不僅重要，而且必須加以發展。當政府不管基於何種理由而沒主動採取反政變防衛的政策，而且為它做準備，這些方式在具有任何程度的公民自由社會中是開放的，社會自己本身就可以採取行動。從這些例子中可以得知，由公民機構自己直接做的反政變防衛準備扮演非常重要的角色。

In many situations the basic concept of anti-coup defense and the principles of resistance can be disseminated, and preparations for it may be initiated by the civil institutions of the society, independently of governmental involvement.

在許多情況下，反政變防衛的基本觀念與抵抗的原則是可以普遍傳播的，而這樣的準備也可以由社會的公民機構所發起，並且獨立於政府的參與之外。

These preparations would not mean, of course, that everyone thinks that the current government is the best possible or that it has no serious limitations or problems. The view would simply be that the regime that might be

imposed by possible putschists would most likely be significantly worse. Blocking the imposition through a coup of a more autocratic and repressive government would then be a prerequisite to making needed improvements in the political system and society.

當然，這些準備並不意味著每個人都認為目前的政府是最好有可能的，或是沒有嚴重的限制或問題。這裡的觀點所要指出的是，一個政權如果可能被可能的叛變者所壓制，它很有可能是一個很明顯不良的政權。阻擋以政變企圖建立一個更專制而壓迫之政府，就是改進政治體制與社會所必須的先決要件。

Often the targeted current government may suffer from blatant inadequacies, such as widespread corruption, or social disruption, such as a “breakdown of law and order.” Putschists may sincerely or falsely claim that their coup is necessary to correct these situations. That claim may give them significant popular support. Nevertheless, defense is needed against those coups.

通常被設定為政變目標的現有政府可能困於公開的缺陷，諸如普遍氾濫的貪腐或者社會的分裂，像是「法律與秩序的解體」。叛變者可能會真誠地或錯誤地藉此宣稱，他們的政變對改變這些情況是有必要的。這樣的聲明可能會讓他們受到民衆的支持。即使如此，還是必須要對這些政變進行防衛。

The new regime may not end corruption, and the claim to support “law and order” may be used to impose a new authoritarian or dictatorial regime. The use of a coup to correct such problems represents a dangerous precedent as to how a problem regime should be changed. That coup might in fact take a very different turn, and the next coup might be much more sinister. One of several possible alternative remedies includes carefully focused campaigns by conventional forms of action or narrowly directed nonviolent protests or resistance.

新政權可能不會終結貪腐，而且支持「法律與秩序」的聲明可能被利用來建立新的專制或獨裁的政權。用政變的方式來導正問題，會對如何更換一個有問題的政權開啓危險的先例。事實上，這個政變可能有非常不同的大轉彎，而下一個政變可能採取更惡毒的方式。許多可行的補救辦法之一，包括以傳統形式之活動，或是小型之非暴力而仔細聚焦的抗議或者抵抗運動。

As an anti-democratic technique of political change, coups d'état are intrinsically dangerous even when it is claimed they are intended to correct a serious problem. In politics, there are often unintended consequences of one's actions, and not all intentions are always made public.

以反民主的技術做政治上的改變，軍事政變是一種要求政治改變但違反民主的技術，從本質上來說它是危險的，

即使它宣稱是爲了改正一些嚴重的問題。在政治上，時常因爲某一人的行動而產生不是預期的後果，而且並非所有的意圖對大家都是公開的。

Nongovernmental institutions and organizations can disseminate the essential concept of anti-coup defense widely throughout the society through various means of communication. Those civil bodies can then individually and in cooperation with others initiate and implement an anti-coup defense policy. They may do this by educating their own constituents, making preparations, and undertaking planning as to how their sector of the population and society might most effectively act to help to defeat a future coup. For example, individuals, groups, and institutions working in communications, transportation, government offices, the police, religious life, education, and every major aspect of the society would need to plan how effectively to block control by the putschists.

非政府機構與組織可以透過各種溝通工具來廣泛傳播反政變防衛的重要觀念。這些公民團體可以從個別或者與其他團體合作的方式來啓動與執行反政變防衛的政策。他們可以從教育自己的成員做起、從事準備、進行規劃他們所屬社會這個部門的民衆要如何最有效地行動，以協助擊敗未來可能的政變。例如，個人、團體、通訊的機構、運輸、政府部門、警察、宗教、教育及社會主要的各層面，都必須規劃如

何有效地阻擋政變者的控制。

Strong preparations for anti-coup defense can merge into both education and the organization within governmental structures even when a national anti-coup defense policy has not been adopted. In some situations organized preparations by the civil institutions might also involve local and regional governments and cooperation with personnel and groups within the national governmental structure.

即使當國家還未採納反政變防衛的政策時，強力的反政變防衛準備可以融入教育與政府的結構之內。在某些狀況下，由公民機構所組織的準備也會有地方與區域性政府的參與，並且與中央政府結構國家政府結構中之人員與團體合作。

This type of planning would need to focus to a significant degree on those aspects of the society that would be priority areas of legitimization and control for the putschists. Among the high priority areas would be control of the governmental apparatus (civil servants, bureaucrats, and the like) and control of the police and members of the military forces. Also highly important would be newspapers, radio, television, telephones, water, energy, and food supplies. Through such initiatives

in education, organization, planning, and preparations, national plans to block future coups could be prepared that are suited to specific national conditions. Such a defense policy could be made powerful even without governmental initiative.

這種形式的規劃必須以較重大的程度將焦點集中在社會上的某些層面，這些層面應該是叛變者有關合法性與控制的優先層面。高優先的領域應該是政府機器的控制下（像公務人員、技術官員等等）及對警察與軍隊的控制。還有高度重要的就是新聞報紙、無線電台、電視、電話、水、能源和食物供應等。經由這些初步計畫，從教育、組織、規劃及準備，就可以準備一份阻擋未來政變之國家型計畫，以適應特定的國情。這樣的一個防衛政策就可以變得強有力，即使政府沒有採取主動。

If such institutions are strong and represent the diverse components of the society, it is possible for them to prepare and to conduct a sufficiently powerful anti-coup defense that is able to defeat such an attack even when the government itself has not participated in the organization of such defense.

如果這些機構很健全並且可以代表社會多元的組成，那麼由他們去準備並且指揮一個充足而有力的反政變防衛，是有可能的。即使政府本身並沒有參與這個防衛的組織，這個防衛還是有能力擊退這樣的政變。

## Government initiated preparations 政府主動做準備

Where the society has a high degree of democracy, or at least the political leaders wish their society to evolve peacefully without abrupt changes by coups d'état, governments may adopt anti-coup defense policies. Legislatures and other parts of the government can establish measures to prepare for effective defense against future coups. These measures might be aided by constitutional, legal, and organizational changes aimed to bar putschists from seizing control of the government and society.

在一個高度民主的社會，或者至少政治領袖們希望他們社會的發展是和平的、不會因為軍事政變而突然改變的社會，則其政府可能會採用反政變防衛的政策。立法機關與政府的其他部門可以建立起有效對抗未來政變的防衛準備措施，這些措施可能要藉助憲法的、法律的、組織性的改變，其目的就是阻擋叛變者奪取對政府與社會的控制。

For example, in 1997 Thailand adopted a new constitution that takes a major step in this direction. Its Article 65 states:

例如，1997年泰國所採用的新憲法往這個方向邁進了重要的一步，其第65條記載著：

A person shall have the right to resist peacefully any act committed for the acquisition of power to rule the country by a means which is not in accordance with the modes provided in this Constitution.<sup>17</sup>

一個人有權利以和平的方式，抵抗任何非根據此部憲法所提供的模式而企圖獲取統治國家權力的行動。<sup>17</sup>

Obviously, such a constitutional provision is of major significance. However, to be effective it requires the addition of legal provisions for implementing the principle, and also both governmental and nongovernmental preparations to make the noncooperation sufficiently powerful so as to be successful.

顯然地，像這樣的憲法條款是相當重要的。不過，要使之產生效力則必須要有附帶的法律條款加以履行，同時也需要政府與非政府部門將不合作的準備做得足夠有力，這樣才會成功。

Where possible, involvement of the government itself in the dissemination of the concept of defense against coups, and in the preparations for a vigorous defense

17 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. A certified correct English translation has been used and can be found at: [www.krisdika.go.th/law/text/lawpub/e11102540/text.htm](http://www.krisdika.go.th/law/text/lawpub/e11102540/text.htm) 泰國憲法。此處使用經過正確驗證的英文版本，可在[www.krisdika.go.th/law/text/lawpub/e11102540/text.htm](http://www.krisdika.go.th/law/text/lawpub/e11102540/text.htm)網站找到。



can have significant advantages. The most important advantage would of course be the direct preparation of the governmental machinery to resist a takeover. The bureaucracy, civil service, ministries, administrative departments, police, and military forces could be trained to offer strung resistance. Specific obligations and guidelines for anti-coup resistance would be developed for and by civil servants, media staff, communications operators, police, military forces, and employees of local, regional, and provincial governments. If these components of the state machinery can be kept unusable by putschists, the defense will be more extensive and powerful than if this were not the case. Also, the struggle is likely to be shorter with fewer casualties.

可能的話，政府本身要參與傳播對抗政變的防衛觀念，並且要參與有力的防衛準備，這樣做的好處是很大的。當然最重要的好處就是整個政府機器直接準備可以對抗政變者的佔領，官僚體系、公務人員、部會、行政部門、警察與軍隊都可以加以訓練，以提供強大的抵抗運動。反政變抵抗運動的特定義務與指導原則將可由公務人員、媒體從業人員、通訊操作員、警察、軍隊與地方、區域及省的政府雇員等自己來擬定與使用。如果這些運作國家機器的成員不為叛變者所用，則防衛的規模將更全面而且更有力，同時，抗爭的過程也會比較短，傷亡也會比較少。

## Possible legislation and other plans to mobilize defense 動員防衛可行之立法與計畫

Governmental preparations may require new legislation and implementation of its provisions. Among the steps that can be taken are these (For a fuller discussion of governmental preparations, see Appendix One. For a discussion of preparations by civil institutions, see Appendix Two.):

政府的防衛可能需要新的立法與實施條例。這些步驟中可以採用的有(有關政府做的準備之更完整的討論，參考附錄一。有關公民機構做的準備之討論，參考附錄二。):

- A constitutional amendment can be adopted that grants citizens the right and responsibility to resist a coup and denies them the right to recognize a coup as being legitimate.
- 可以採用憲法的增修條款，賦予公民抵抗政變之權利與責任，及拒絕承認政變為合法的權利。
- Legislation can be enacted that obliges all police and military forces to refuse to participate in or assist with a coup.
- 可以頒佈立法條文規定，所有的警察與軍隊有義務拒絕參與或協助政變。

- Legislation can be enacted that obliges all government employees to refuse cooperation with a coup and obedience to usurpers. In the event of a coup, government employees would be obliged to carry on their work according to established constitutional and legal procedures and policies.
- 可以頒佈立法條文規定，所有的政府員工有義務拒絕與政變合作及服從於篡位者。在政變事件中，政府員工要根據既有的憲政體系、法律程序與政策的約束來執行他們的工作。
- Legislation can be enacted that obliges all personnel in the fields of communications, media, and transportation to resist censorship by the putschists and to refuse to cooperate with, or communicate orders from, coup leaders.
- 可以頒佈立法條文規定，所有在通訊、媒體與運輸領域的人員有義務抵抗叛變者的審查，並拒絕與政變領袖合作或為其傳達命令。
- Legislation can be enacted that obliges all public and private financial institutions to refuse financial relations with the putschists.
- 可以頒佈立法條文規定，所有公立及私人的金融機構有義務拒絕與叛變者有財務上的往來。
- The constitutional government can communicate in advance of a crisis with all international bodies,

organizations, and governments with which it has relations that in the event of a coup, the bodies should maintain recognition of the constitutional government and refuse all relations with the putschists.

- 憲政政府可以事先與所有的國際機構、組織及有外交關係之政府做危機處理的溝通。在一旦發生政變時，這些機構應該維持與憲政政府的承認關係，並拒絕所有與叛變者的關係。
- In the event of a coup, individuals and bodies within the constitutional government can appeal to religious and moral leaders to denounce the attack and to impress upon their adherents that they should refuse to cooperate with it.
- 如果發生政變事件，憲政政府內的個人與團體可以訴請宗教與道德領袖譴責政變攻擊，並且感召他們的追隨者要拒絕與政變者合作。
- The constitutional government can make plans for continuation of leadership in case important government buildings are seized or government officials are imprisoned or executed.
- 憲政政府可以安排領導階層繼承的規劃，以備重要政府建築被佔據或政府官員被監禁或處決之需。
- The legislature can prepare plans for how the constitutional government should resume control of

the country once a coup attempt collapses.

- 立法機關可以做好準備，以規劃憲政政府在政變瓦解之後要如何重新掌控國家。
- The legislature can appeal to organizations and educational institutions to develop and implement programs to educate citizens on their right and duty to refuse cooperation with an attempted coup.
- 立法機關可以呼籲各組織與教育機構去發展並實行公民的課程，教育他們有權利與義務去拒絕與政變合作。

In all of this planning, it must be made clear that the nature of the anti-coup resistance is nonviolent and that no one is to commit acts of violence against fellow citizens who illegally support the coup. It should also be made clear what the penalties are for individuals who are found guilty of either initiating or cooperating with a coup.

在所有的這些規劃裡，都要明確地指出反政變抵抗運動的本質是非暴力的，而且不能有人使用暴力的行為去對抗那些非法支持政變的同胞。同時也要明確地指出，那些發動政變或與其合作的人被判有罪時會受到怎樣的刑罰。

## Other types of preparations 其他形式的準備

In addition to preparation and dissemination of

general guidelines for anti-coup resistance, several other types of preparations for defense are possible. For example, training maneuvers could be organized in which imaginary coups would be defied by staged civilian resistance. These maneuvers could take place in residential areas, offices or factories, cities, provinces, and across the whole country.

除了進行反政變抵抗的一般性指導原則的準備與傳播外，還有一些其他形式的防衛準備是可行的。舉例來說，可以藉著組織演習來加以訓練。在其中，假想的政變會受到上場的公民所抵抗。這些演習可以在住宅區、辦公室或工廠及全國各地的城市、省舉行。

Technical preparations would also be necessary for this type of defense against coups. Provisions and equipment would be required for communications after the putschists had occupied key centers and seized facilities of established newspapers and radio and television stations. Publishing supplies and broadcasting equipment for underground newspapers, resistance leaflets, and underground radio could be secured and hidden for use in emergencies. Advance arrangements should be made for locating such broadcasting stations, communications centers, or printing plants, in the territory of a friendly supportive country.

在這類對抗政變的防衛中，技術上的準備也是必要的。在叛變者已經佔領了一些關鍵中心及奪取了既有之新聞報紙、無線電與電視台的設施時，通訊所需的裝備與補給也是必須的。地下報紙、抵抗運動文宣與地下電台等出版補給品與廣播設備應該確保而且隱藏起來以備緊急所需。這些廣播電台、通訊中心或印刷廠的地點應該事先安排在友好而支持的外國領地內。

## Consequences of an anti-coup defense 反政變防衛的後果

The objective of this defense policy against coups d'état is to preserve constitutional government by blocking the imposition of viable government by the putschists, by making the attacked society unruled by the attackers, and by enabling the population to maintain control and self-direction of their society even when tinder attack. The responsibility for this preservation of constitutional government rests with all members of the society. It is they who can maintain and expand their freedoms and continue to improve their society in accordance with the cherished principles of the nation.

這個對抗政變之防衛政策的目標在於保衛憲政的政府，藉著阻擋叛變者所要建立的政府、讓攻擊者無法統治受到政變攻擊之社會、讓民衆即使受到攻擊時仍然有能力維持他們對社會控制與自治。這個憲政政府的保衛是整個社會所

有成員的責任。就是這些人能夠維護並擴展他們的自由，並且根據國家所珍惜的信仰繼續改善他們的社會。

This anti-coup defense policy would have major positive qualities. It is a policy based on people, not bullets and bombs, on hit-man institutions, not military technology it is a policy that can serve freedom instead of threatening civil war or submitting to a new dictatorship. Adopted and practiced widely internationally this policy would make a major contribution to removing the coup d'état as a major political problem. This would limit the rise of new dictatorships, reducing the prevalence of tyranny in the world.

這個反政變防衛政策有重要而正面的特質。它是一個以人為本的政策，而不是依靠子彈與炸彈的政策，是奠基在人類的制度上，而不是在軍事科技上。這是一個為自由服務的政策，而不是以內戰做為威脅或是屈服於新獨裁政權的政策。如果這個政策在國際上受到廣泛地採用與實行，它將對排除主要政治問題的政變做出相當的貢獻。這將會限制住新獨裁政權的崛起，並且降低世界暴政的盛行。

This policy is a creative defense based on the power of people even in grave crises to become, and remain, the masters of their own destinies. The consequences of this could be profound.



這個政策是一個創新性的防衛，它立基於人民的力量。即使嚴重的危機中，人民就會是並持續維持是，他們自己命運的主宰。這個結果的貢獻是非常重大的。

Appendix One:  
Legislation and Other Governmental

附錄一：反政變防衛的立法與其他政府的準備

Important preparations can be made by governments to prevent and defeat coups d'état. These may require new legislation and implementation of its provisions. In all of this legislation and these declarations of responsibilities and duties, it shall be made clear that no one is to commit acts of violence against one's fellow citizens who are acting illegally. The following legal measures and procedures are recommended for this purpose.

政府可以進行重要的準備以預防及擊敗軍事政變。不過，這可能需要制定新的法律與其附加的實施條款。在制定這個法律與這些宣佈責任義務歸屬的聲明中，必須明確指出任何人不可以用暴力的方式來對抗有違法行為的同胞。以下建議一些以法律的手段與程序，以達成這個目標。

1. A constitutional provision should be adopted that no citizen of any status, role, or position in the society whatsoever has the right to accept as the legitimate government any person or group that has conducted a coup d'état.

1. 憲法條款應該要規定，在社會中的公民不論其地位、角色或立場，都沒有權利接受任何由個人或團體所發動的軍事政變為合法政府。

To the contrary, all citizens without exception have the constitutional duty to deny legitimacy to any group of putschists and to refuse all cooperation with them and all obedience to them. Citizens will persistently continue their usual duties and assist in meeting the human needs of their fellow citizens while defying the putschists.

相反地，毫無例外地，所有的公民都有憲政上的義務否定任何叛變集團的合法性，並拒絕與他們的所有合作與所有屈服。在反抗叛變者的期間，公民要堅定地持續他們背負的義務，並協助滿足他們抵抗陣營同胞的生活所需。

2. Specific laws should be enacted to establish the legal obligations of all government employees and civil servants, on national, regional and local levels of government, to refuse to assist coups d'état. Their legal obligation would be to persist in conducting their work according to established (pre-coup) constitutional and legal procedures and policies only. They would also be legally bound to refuse all cooperation with and obedience to any group of usurpers. This refusal would be aimed to deny to putschists all administrative support to carry out their illegal orders and objectives.

2. 可以制定特別法規定所有全國性的、地區性與地方層級的政府員工與公務人員之法律責任，以拒絕協助軍事政變。他們的法律責任應該就是，堅持只可以依照既有(政變

前)的憲法與法律程序及政策執行他們的工作。法律也要約束他們，以拒絕服從及所有與叛變集團的合作。這種拒絕的目的就是要否定叛變者所有管理上的支持，而無法實行他們違法的命令與目標。

3. Specific laws should be enacted to implement the new constitutional provision to make it a legal obligation of all members of police forces and all members of the military forces to swear not only allegiance to the constitutional government, but to pledge—perhaps in the induction oath—to refuse to participate in any conspiracy to organize or conduct a coup d'état. In case a coup is then later attempted, it would be the duty of these persons to refuse to obey, serve, or collaborate with any group that has attempted to seize the state apparatus.

3. 可以制定特別法規定，以實施新的憲法條款，並以法律義務要求所有警察與軍隊之所有成員，必須不只要宣示效忠憲政政府而且要宣讀——或許在就職台上——拒絕參與任何陰謀組織或發動軍事政變的誓詞。而且如果後來發生政變，這些人就有義務對任何有企圖奪取國家機器的團體拒絕服從、服務或者合作。

The police at all levels and members of the judicial system must be mandated to continue to apply the previously established laws, policies, and procedures only.

They must ignore any new policies, edicts, and orders, received or announced, from those who have illegally attempted to seize the state. Specifically, they may warn persons and groups of the likelihood of arrest, and they should refuse to locate and arrest patriotic resisters who are defying the putsch, either by individual actions or by group resistance and demonstration.

在司法體系下各階層的員警必須被授命繼續只遵照應用已經建立了的法律、政策與程序。他們必須不管來自於那些非法竊佔國家者之任何新政策、政令與命令的接收與宣佈。特別是他們要先去警告那些可能會被逮捕的個人與團體。而且也應該拒絕去找出與逮捕那些反對叛亂的愛國抵抗者，無論是以個人的行動或以團體的方式表示抵抗與示威。

At times this police resistance may be quite open and at other times police may pretend to be obeying the putschists but not actually doing so. For example, they may report that it was impossible for them to locate and arrest wanted persons.

有時候這種警察的抵抗可以相當公開的進行，在另一些時候，警察則可以假裝服從叛變者，但私下卻不是如此去做。例如，他們可以向上級報告說，要找到並且逮捕到上級通緝的人是不可能的。

If ordered to disperse street demonstrations, police

actions may range from simply being present at the site but not taking repressive measures to joining the demonstrators as resisters themselves. The police must not be allowed to become a tool of repression for the usurpers.

如果接到命令是要驅散街頭示威，警察可以只單純地排列在指定的場所但不要採取鎮壓的手段，也可以加入抵抗者自己的示威行列中。絕對不允許警察成為篡位者的鎮壓工具。

4. In addition to resisting the putschists, police should, wherever feasible, be obligated to actively assist the resistance. For example, it has happened in past resistance movements that police transported supplies of resistance newspapers and other literature in police cars to other parts of the city or region where they were needed.

4. 除了去抵抗叛變者之外，警察有義務要盡其所能地去主動協助抵抗運動。例如，在過去的抵抗運動曾發生過，員警用警車載運抵抗運動的新聞報紙與文章到城市內有需要的各個角落。

5. Soldiers and other members of military forces must not allow themselves to become a tool of repression in the service of those who have attempted to replace the

constitutional government. Their noncooperation and disobedience may be especially difficult when the coup has been conducted by officers of the military forces, as compared to a political group which seeks the compliance of the military forces in enforcing their illegal domination on the government and society.

5. 士兵與軍隊中的其他成員，也不能允許他們自己變成那些想取代憲政政府之集團的鎮壓工具。當政變是由軍隊中的長官所帶領時，士兵們的不合作與不服從可能會特別困難。這比較不像政治集團，尋求軍事武力的順從來強制實施他們對社會與政府的非法統治。

Similarly to the options for police, soldiers in this difficult situation who oppose the coup may take any one of a range of actions, none of which serves the usurpers. They may, for example, be very gentle in facing street demonstrators, or, when ordered to fire at protesters, may shoot above their heads so as not to injure anyone. They may also seek to encourage their military unit to openly defy the usurpers, or, without using their military weapons, soldiers may engage in especially dangerous acts of protest and defiance against the putschists.

與警察之替代方案類似，士兵在這種為難的情況下，反對政變的士兵可以採取任何行動，但都不可以是為篡位者服務。例如，他們可以非常溫和地面對街頭示威，或在接到

對抗議者開火的命令時，可以射向群眾頭部上方的天空而不會傷害到任何人。他們也可以試圖去鼓勵所屬的部隊公開地反抗篡位者，或者在特別危險的抗議與反抗行動中，不使用軍事武器來參與。

Open resistance by both police and military troops is likely to be extremely dangerous as the penalty for disobedience and mutiny is often execution. Consequently, other less obvious ways of denying usurpers obedience and assistance merit investigation and application.

警察與軍隊的公開抵抗可能是極度危險的事，因為抗命與造反的罪罰通常就是處決。因此，其他反抗叛變者之比較不明顯的方式就值得詳細研究並加以運用。

6. Specific laws should be enacted to make it a legal obligation of all persons and organizations working in communications to persist in their loyalty to the constitutional government only. This would mean that in the event of a coup d'état they would be legally bound to refuse to submit to the putschists' attempts to impose censorship, publish announcements and orders from the putschists, and comply with any other illegal orders from the putschists.

6. 可以制定特別法規定，賦予所有從事通訊的個人與組織有法定的義務堅持他們對憲政政府的忠誠。這意味著在軍



事政變事件中，他們會因法律的約束而拒絕服從叛變者從事審查、發表政變者的聲明與命令，與拒絕遵守任何叛變者非法的命令。

In case the regular communications, printing and broadcasting facilities are made unusable for normal activities and for use on behalf of the legitimate government as a result of repressive actions of the putschists, it should be the responsibility of people in those professions, as well as other citizens, to create new means of communication among the population outside the control of the usurpers.

假使正常的通訊、印刷與廣播設備因叛變者的壓制行動而不能正常運作，也不能為合法政府所使用時，則這些專業領域的人員及其他的公民，就有義務在篡位者控制之外的民衆中去建立新的通訊工具。

7. All persons and groups working for any level of government should, in the event of a coup, for as long as possible, continue to apply established policies and procedures and ignore any new policies, orders, and instructions issued by the usurpers.

7. 在政變事件中，服務於各層級政府中的所有人與團體都應該繼續處理既有的政策與程序，時間上盡可能愈長愈好，而且不要去管篡位者所發布的新政策、命令與制度。

Under likely initial conditions, the government employees can continue this defiance at their usual places of work. If intolerable repression is launched against them there, these persons and groups can go on strike or even disappear. The machinery of government must not be permitted to become a tool of the usurpers for controlling the society as a whole.

在最初可能的狀況下，政府的員工可以在他們原本的工作崗位上做這樣的抵抗。一旦叛變者在那裡採取不能容忍的鎮壓時，這些個人與團體即可罷工或甚至消失不見。政府的機器也不容許成為篡位者控制社會的工具。

8. Specific laws should be enacted to make it a legal obligation of all persons and organizations working in transportation to refuse all orders from the usurpers and to make the transportation system unusable by the putschists and instead to use it to assist the resistance.

8. 可以制定特別法規定，賦予所有從事運輸的個人與組織有法定的義務拒絕篡位者所有的命令，並且讓運輸系統無法為叛變者所用，反而要用來幫助抵抗運動。

9. Specific laws should be enacted to make it a legal obligation of all governmental and private financial bodies, all banks, business institutions, and other financial institutions, and all labor unions and similar associations,

to refuse all financial relations whatsoever with the putschists.

9. 可以制定特別法規定，賦予所有政府與私人的金融機關、所有銀行、商業機構及其他金融機構、工會與類似的機構有法定的義務拒絕與篡位者有任何的財務關係。

10. Well in advance of a coup attempt, the government should communicate to all governments with which it has diplomatic relations, and to all international organizations, including the United Nations, that those bodies are requested to refuse to conduct any normal political or economic relationships with potential usurpers and instead should recognize the constitutional government only.

10. 遠在政變發生之前，政府就該與有外交關係的外國政府及所有的國際組織，包括聯合國，做好溝通。要求這些團體拒絕與潛在的篡位者有政治上或經濟上的關係，反而應該只承認憲政政府。

11. The legislature and governmental ministries and departments should make various types of contingency plans for the continuation of legitimate leadership in case the putschists occupy government buildings, imprison or execute government officials and representatives, or take similar repressive actions.

11. 立法機關、政府部會與局處部門應該要制定各種合法領導延續的緊急應變計畫，以便在叛變者佔據政府建築、監禁或處決政府官員及民意代表，或類似鎮壓行動的時候，合法的領導階層可以延續運作。

12. The legislature should in advance make precise plans as to how constitutional government shall resume full normal operations upon the collapse of the attempted coup. No other group of usurpers shall be permitted undemocratically to impose its own rule during a period of transition. In Case of loss of life by previous officials during the coup and defense against it, provisions should be made as to how other persons may legitimately assume the constitutional positions that have been vacated.

12. 爲了因應政變瓦解後，憲政政府要如何重新正常運作，立法機關應該要事先做好精確的規劃。在轉型過渡期間，篡位者的任何團體不可以被允許以非民主的方式設立自己的規則。要制定條款規定，在政變中與反抗它的防衛中，如果涉及政府官員的死亡，其他的人員要如何合法地繼承憲法上的這些遺缺。

13. The legislature should in advance of an attempted coup urge and support all independent institutions, organizations, associations, and all educational institutions of the country to participate in the education of their

members and the general citizenry as to their appropriate patriotic duties to repudiate the usurpers and to practice noncooperation and defiance against any attempted coup d'état.

13. 立法機關應在政變企圖發動之前就要敦促所有國內的獨立機構、組織、協會及所有的教育機構，參與教育他們的成員及一般的民衆。教育他們拒絕接受篡位者，並且實踐不合作與反威權來對抗任何政變的企圖是他們應當有的愛國責任。

14. The legislature may also enact legislation to deny participants in a coup any lasting financial gain from their illegal activities. They would also be prohibited from holding any future government employment or positions.

14. 立法機關也可以制定法律，來否決政變參與者因其違法活動而保有所獲取之任何的財務利益。同時要禁止他們未來擔任政府的工作或職位。

15. The legislature should also consider what other types of punishment should be provided in the law for initiating and cooperating with a coup. These provisions need to take into consideration the need to encourage early supporters of a coup to reverse their action and to join the defense against it.

15. 立法機關也應該要考慮，在法律上制定其他制裁發

動政變及與政變合作的處罰方式。這些條款必須考慮到，如何鼓勵早期的政變支持者改變他們的行動並加入對抗政變的防衛陣營。

Appendix Two:  
Preparations by the Civil Society for Anti-Coup Defense

附錄二：公民社會的反政變防衛準備

Coups d'état are less likely to be attempted and more likely to be defeated if the institutions of civil society are prepared and able to resist any attempted seizure of the state.

如果社會的公民機構是有所準備並且有能力抵抗任何竊佔國家的企圖時，軍事政變就比較不容易發生，並且比較容易被擊敗。

This defense would be prepared and waged by the nongovernmental organizations and associations, educational institutions, economic organizations, communications and transportation bodies, religious organizations and institutions, and other bodies.

這個防衛應該由非政府組織與協會、教育機構、經濟組織、通訊與運輸機構、宗教組織與機構等團體共同來準備並發起。

This resistance action by civil society may be waged either in support of planned governmental defense measures, or, in their absence, may be waged independently and directly at the initiative of the citizenry.

這個公民社會的抵抗運動可能以支持政府防衛措施的

方式來進行，或是在沒有政府的防衛計畫時，可以由全體公民獨立而直接地發起。

In either case, advance preparations for anti-coup resistance by the society's independent institutions are likely to make any coup plotters think twice before attempting such an attack. If they nevertheless attempt a putsch, these preparations would increase the power of the anti-coup defense.

不論用上述哪一種方式，由社會獨立機構事前所做反抗政變之抵抗運動的準備，都會使得政變的策劃者在發動攻擊之前思考再三。如果他們無論如何還是要發動政變，則這些準備將會增強反政變防衛的力量。

These preparations and resistance can be grouped roughly into five types of activity: (1) public education; (2) media; (3) political organizations; (4) religious institutions; and (5) specific groups and institutions.

這些準備與抵抗可以大略歸類成五種形式的活動：(1) 公共教育、(2) 媒體、(3) 政治組織、(4) 宗教機構，與(5) 特殊團體與機構。

### 1. Public education

#### 公共教育


The tasks of these nongovernmental bodies would



include educating their members and the general citizenry about effective means to reject as illegitimate any usurpers and how to wage widespread noncooperation and defiance of the putschists' efforts to govern. The aim would be to make illegitimate controls and rule impossible.

這些非政府機構的任務包括教育他們的成員與一般公民，什麼是抵制篡位者使他們成為非法政權的有效方式，及如何發起廣泛的不合作及反抗叛變者統治上的努力，目的就是要使他們的控制變成是非法的而且統治是不可能的。

While all institutions of civil society should participate in these efforts to educate their own members, certain institutions would be especially suitable for reaching the general public. These would include the formal educational system and various branches of the media, such as newspapers, magazines, radio, television, the internet, and the cinema. The political content of such public education measures would include both: (1)the importance of denying legitimacy to any putschists and, (2)the importance of noncooperation and defiance to make it impossible for them to establish and maintain their illegitimate rule. In addition to explicit instructions on how to resist, documentaries and film dramas about cases of earlier anti-coup resistance could be used. Information on consequences in other countries of the failure to resist a



coup d'état could also be important.




當公民社會的所有機構應該要參與教育他們自己成員而努力的同時，某些特定的機構應該特別適合與一般社會大眾接觸。這些機構包括了正式的教育體系與各種媒體的分部，諸如新聞報紙、雜誌、廣播、電視、網路與電影。這些公共教育手段的政治內容包括兩點：(1)否定任何叛變者為合法的重要性，(2)不合作與反威權抵抗會讓叛變者無法建立並維持非法統治的重要性。除了要如何抵抗的明確指示之外，也可以使用一些以前之反政變抵抗的紀錄片與戲劇片，其他國家抵抗政變失敗的資訊也很重要。

The public will need to be informed about the characteristics of nonviolent struggle, including its many methods, and the way it operates in conflicts.

公眾必須被告知非暴力抗爭的特性，包括它的許多方法與在衝突中運作的方式。

At times open street demonstrations may be useful to communicate opposition to an illegal seizure of the state. However, at other times such action as street marches toward the guns of the putschists' troops may be most unwise. Such action may lead not only to massive casualties but also strike fear into the public, and therefore submission.

有時候，公開的街頭示威有助於傳達對非法竊佔國家



的反對意見。不過，在另一些時候，這種朝向叛變部隊槍口的街頭遊行活動可能不太明智。這樣的行動不但可能導致大量的傷亡，也可能造成群眾的恐懼並因此而屈服。

Because of these situations, the public must be informed well in advance of the crisis about alternative forms of protest and defiance that are less obviously dangerous but that make popular opposition unmistakably clear. For example, if the mass of the urban population for specified periods simply stays indoors, in their homes, schools, or other buildings, the streets will be largely empty of people, and therefore not be suitable shooting ranges to kill and intimidate resisters. The empty streets will, however, communicate widespread opposition.

因為會有這樣的情形，所以公眾在事前很久便必須要  
被明確告知這樣的危機，並知道有其他明顯比較不危險的抗議與反抗方式，但可以使用讓民衆的反對清晰而不會受到誤會的方式。例如，如果大量的都市人口在特定期間只要單純地全部待在室內，或待在家裡、學校或其他建築物內，街上空無一人，這麼一來軍隊就無法在射程之內及威脅到抵抗者。然而，這個空曠的街道將傳達更廣泛的反對訊息。

## 2. Media 媒體

The members of society's media—journalists,

newspaper and magazine editors, radio and television reporters and directors, printing unions, communication aides, and the like—can organize advance resistance against a coup d'état. This would include plans to resist censorship by the putschists, plans to communicate messages from the constitutional government to the general citizenry and plans to refuse to communicate messages from the putschists to the population.

社會媒體的成員——新聞記者、報紙與雜誌的編輯、無線電與電視播報員及導播、印刷工會、通訊從業助手等等——都可以事先組織對抗軍事政變的防衛，這包括抵抗叛變者審查的計畫、為憲政政府與一般公民做傳達訊息的計畫，及拒絕幫助叛變者向人民傳達訊息的計畫。

In addition, media personnel can make advance preparations for communications in case they lose their operational centers or must go into hiding. If the putschists take control of society's media apparatus, printers unions, radio operators, and others can claim mechanical failures and inability to carry out the putschists' instructions. Plans for underground printing presses and secret radio broadcasting capacity can also be developed. Preparations to broadcast from neighboring countries can be arranged as well.

除此之外，媒體人可以事先為傳播工作做準備，以因

應他們的營運中心發生淪陷或必須要將機器加以掩藏。如果叛變者控制了社會的媒體設備，印刷工會、無線電台的操作員與其他人，可以宣稱機器故障而無法依照叛變者的指示去運作。也要擬定出版地下新聞與秘密電台廣播能力的計畫，也可事先安排從鄰國發出廣播。

All of these actions will significantly limit the legitimacy and control that people could give to coup leaders because those leaders will be unable to exercise full control over the information to which the society has access and the defenders will be able to communicate widely among themselves and with the public.

所有這些行動將會顯著地限制民衆可以給予政變領導者的正當性與控制，因為對擁有管道而且防衛者彼此之間，及與公衆之間可以廣泛地通訊的社會，這些政變領導者將無法行使對資訊的完全控制。

### 3. Political organizations

#### 政治組織

Both political parties and nonpartisan organizations devoted to advancing their social, economic, and political agendas should include in their missions efforts at educating their members and the public as to the importance and methods of anti-coup defense. Their prior organizational contacts and networks can also help

significantly in communicating guidance about needed resistance and conducting the anti-coup defense.

政黨與非黨派組織在他們致力推展社會、經濟與政治使命之中，應該包含教育它們所屬成員與民衆反政變防衛之方法與重要性的任務工作。他們原有組織的聯繫窗口與網絡，對於傳達必要之抵抗與實施反政變防衛的指導原則，也會很有幫助。

#### 4. Religious institutions

##### 宗教機構

Religious and moral leaders and groups should urge their believers and supporters to regard a coup as an attack on constitutional democracy that is both immoral and a violation of the codes of behavior by which their adherents and believers should live. Consequently, if such an attack occurs, those religious and moral leaders and groups should urge their believers and supporters to apply their beliefs by refusing to give any legitimacy to the putschists, refusing all cooperation with and obedience to them, and instead by participating actively in the anti-coup defense.

宗教與道德的領袖與團體要敦促他們的信仰者與支持者將政變視為對憲政民主的攻擊，就他們擁護者與信仰者的生活來說，既是不道德也是違反行為準則的。因此，如果這樣的攻擊發生了，那些宗教與道德的領袖與團體要敦促他們

的信仰者與支持者要應用他們的信仰，拒絕給予叛變者任何合法性，拒絕與其合作與對他們服從，反而要參與反政變防衛的行動。

## 5. Specific groups and institutions

### 特殊團體與機構

The members and officials of individual groups and institutions in the society could also organize around preventing the putschists from controlling the areas of the society that they operate. For example, members of civil society who work in transportation, economic activities, mass media, communications, religious institutions, and all other major functioning components and services of the society need to prepare and apply noncooperation and defiance to retain their independence from putschists.

社會裡個別團體與機構的成員及幹部也可以串連組織以預防叛變者控制他們運作的社會區域。例如，工作於運輸、經濟活動、大眾媒體、通訊、宗教機構，和所有其他重要社會功能與服務部門之公民社會成員，都必須進行不合作與反抗的準備與應用，以維持他們能夠獨立於叛變者之外。

It will be highly important for these bodies and institutions to block attempts by the putschists or their supporters to seize internal control of these bodies and institutions. Attackers may also even attempt to destroy

these independent groups and institutions and replace them with new institutions controlled by the putschists or their collaborators. Those efforts, too, will need to be defeated.

阻擋叛變者及其支持者佔據這些團體與機構之內部控制的企圖，對這些團體與機構來說，是相當重要的。叛變者甚至可能企圖去摧毀這些獨立的團體與機構，並以受控於叛變者或其共謀者的新機構取代之。這些努力也是必須加以擊退。

The citizens and their nongovernmental institutions should launch preparations and in a crisis should initiate actual resistance. This anti-coup resistance could be in accordance with an advance governmental anti-coup defense plan or, as noted earlier, could be launched independently if no such plan has been prepared.

所有公民與他們的非政府機構應該要展開準備，並且在危機來臨時能夠啓動真實的抵抗。這個反政變的抵抗運動可以根據政府事先的反政變防衛計畫來實行，或者像之前所提到的一樣，如果沒有相關計畫的準備時，就各自獨立展開。

Those population groups and institutions that operate or control important social, economic, political, or industrial functions, will usually be more skilled in determining what



specific forms of noncooperation and defiance may be most effective in keeping that area of the society out of the control of usurpers than the theorists of such resistance. A few examples follow:

這些民衆團體與機構運作或是控制重要的社會、經濟、政治和產業的功能，比起那些抵抗運動的理論家，他們通常能更熟練地決定用哪一種不合作與抗拒的特殊形式，是能夠最有效地保持社會的這些領域不受篡位者的控制。以下是一些例子：

- Transportation workers, such as truck drivers, railroad employees, or airline operators are likely to be far more skilled in determining how best to slow or paralyze the transportation system and to keep it out of the hands of the putschists, than staff in a government office. They are also likely to be most skilled in knowing how, despite partial paralysis by resisters or blockages of transportation by putschists, to move food and other important supplies to places where they are most needed.
- 運輸工作者，諸如卡車司機、鐵路員工或者航空人員等，比起政府辦公室的員工，可以非常熟練地決定最佳的方式以延緩或癱瘓運輸系統，並且將運輸系統保持於叛變者的控制之外。儘管在抵抗者造成部分癱瘓或叛變者的全面封鎖之下，他們更有可能知道如何運

送食物及其他重要的補給品到有需要的地方。

- In the communications field, as long as cell phones and e-mail systems are still operating, they can be used creatively to help communicate resistance plans, to initiate resistance activities, and to report the status of putschists' controls and resistance struggle.
- 在通訊領域，只要手機與電子郵件系統仍然維持運作，它們就可以創造性地被用來協助傳達抵抗計畫、發動抵抗行動，並且報導叛變者的控制與抵抗之抗爭的狀況。


Reserve broadcast equipment that has been hidden away for an emergency can be used for defense purposes even when government offices or previous broadcasting stations have been occupied.

當政府辦公場所或原來的廣播站被佔領時，爲了因應緊急狀況而儲藏的廣播設備也可以被用來做爲防衛之用。

- Civil servants in government offices can continue to function independently, even if their directors have joined the putschists. In addition to open defiance, civil servants can also quietly resist the coup through bureaucratic slowness, misfiling important papers and similar nonprovocative but effective

activities that limit the putschists' control.

- 如果長官加入了叛變者陣營，政府部門內的公務人員仍可以繼續獨立地工作。除了公開反抗之外，公務人員也可靜靜地抵抗政變，透過使行政延宕、錯誤歸檔重要公文等，類似沒有刺激性但卻可以有效限制叛變者之控制的行動。
- Labor unions can defiantly refuse to follow putschists' efforts to direct economic activities and can continue those activities that have been prohibited, whatever the putschist leaders, collaborating administrators, or corporation officials may say.
- 工會可以反抗式地拒絕叛變者對經濟活動的指示，而且可以繼續進行那些被禁止的活動，完全不管那些叛變領導人、共謀的管理者或企業幹部怎麼說。
- Special days that honor persons, events, or principles of significance to the nation and to the democratic resisters may be observed even when the putschists ban them and new such days may be instituted to honor events or casualties of the anti-coup resistance.
- 即使叛變者禁止，紀念偉人、事件或對國家與民主抵抗者具有重要性之信仰的特殊日子可以舉辦儀式，並且制定新的日子來紀念反政變防衛之傷亡者或事件。



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
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# Self-Liberation 自我解放戰略規劃指南

A Guide to Strategic Planning for Action to  
End a Dictatorship or Other Oppression  
終結獨裁政權或其他壓迫之行動

Extended Reading 1 延伸閱讀①

- I. The Politics Of Nonviolent Action 壹、非暴力行動的政治
- II. There Are Realistic Alternatives 貳、確實有實際可行的替代方案
- III. The Anti-Coup 參、反政變

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Associate Editor / Jamila Raqib 傑米拉·拉奎伯協助編撰

Original Publisher / Albert Einstein Institution 原出版單位愛因斯坦研究所

Translator / T. K. Aquia Tsay 蔡丁貴翻譯

Reviewer / Albert Lin 林哲夫審訂

Editor / Hong-Tiong Lyim 林芳仲主編

Proofreader / T. K. Aquia Tsay 校稿 / 蔡丁貴

Editorial Team 編輯群 / Albert Lin 林哲夫、T. K. Aquia Tsay 蔡丁貴、Michael Tsai  
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Executive Editor / Hong-Chu Lee 執行編輯李鳳珠

Cover Designer / Suzu Lee 封面設計李夙儒

Publisher / The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 台灣基督長老教會出版發行

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Website 網址 / <http://www.pct.org.tw>

Printed by / Avanguard Press 前衛出版社承製

Add. 地址 / 台北市中山區農安街153號4樓之3

Tel. 電話 / 02-25865708

Fax 傳真 / 02-25863758

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Published Date / July, 2012 出版日期 2012年7月

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